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ABSTRACT 
The prosecution’s duty of disclosure is at the heart of an accused’s right to a fair trial. 
Information and knowledge is power. Owing to the nature of criminal investigation, the 
prosecution almost always has more time and resources at its disposal in order to 
prepare its case than the defence. More importantly, the prosecution has access to 
certain information that the defence would not have and it has the means to access them. 
As a consequence, in order to ensure the fundamental rights of the accused are respected, 
it is crucial for the prosecution to disclose any relevant material to the defence in a 
timely manner so that the latter has a chance to prepare its case adequately.  
Despite the undeniable importance of this duty, prosecutors routinely violate their 
obligations of disclosing material to the defence that is of vital importance for case 
preparations. This thesis, accordingly, asks the question: why are disclosure problems 
so hard to resolve? Is the disclosure framework really workable in the international 
criminal tribunals?  
Public institutions, like the International Criminal Court, are supposed to be the epitome 
of justice; however, because of its unique characteristics, and perhaps ironically, 
international criminal law proved to be an ever harsher environment for the defendant 
when it comes to disclosure of evidence: the accused faces more obstacles when 
preparing its case and the Courts’ motivation to sanction prosecutors who fail to honour 
disclosure duties seems to be significantly lower when compared with national 
jurisdictions. 
In particular, due to certain difficulties and challenges faced by the international 
criminal tribunals and international prosecution, it is often argued that the standard of 
fairness can be different from the ones guaranteed to the accused in domestic courts. 
This thesis argues that these departures are not justified. Three main areas will be 
examined and analysed: the context in which the international criminal tribunals operate 
in, the nature of the prosecutor’s role, and the attitudes of the judges.  
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CHAPTER I 	
INTRODUCTION 
 
 ‘For in criminal cases the State has in the police, an agency for the discovery of 
evidence, superior to anything which even the wealthiest defendant could employ.’   
– Lord Delvin, Report to the Secretary of State for the Home Department Commenting 
on Evidence of Identification in Criminal Cases, 1976.1   
Information is Power. 
I. Introduction 
The prosecution’s duty of disclosure is at the heart of an accused’s right to a fair trial. 
Information and knowledge is power. This is particularly true in litigations, as the party 
that holds more information is likely to win, and the other party would not be able to 
prepare its case due to a lack of information. Owing to the nature of criminal 
investigation, prior to trial, it is the prosecution that has more time and resources at its 
disposal in order to prepare its case than the defence. More importantly, the prosecution 
has access to certain information that the defence would not have and it has the means 
to access them. As a consequence, in order to ensure a fair trial, it is crucial for the 
prosecution to disclose any relevant material to the defence so that the latter has a 
chance to prepare its case.  
																																																								
1	 Honourable	Lord	Patrick	Devlin,	‘Report	to	the	Secretary	of	State	for	the	Home	Department	
Commenting	on	Evidence	of	Identification	in	Criminal	Cases’	[1976]	London:	Her	Majesty’s	Stationary	
Office,	para.1.17.	 	
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Despite the undeniable importance of this duty, prosecutors routinely violate their 
obligation of disclosing material to the defence that is of vital importance for case 
preparation. This thesis, accordingly, asks the question: why is this disclosure problem 
so hard to resolve? Public institutions, like the International Criminal Court, are 
supposed to be the epitome of justice; however, due to its unique characteristics, 
ironically, international criminal law proved to be an ever harsher environment for the 
defendant when it comes to disclosure of evidence: the accused faces more obstacles 
when preparing the defence and the Courts’ motivation to sanction prosecutors who fail 
to honour disclosure duties seems to be significantly lower when compared with 
national jurisdictions. 
Although the contextual difficulties and challenges faced by international criminal 
tribunals and international prosecutions are well documented,2 the impact of this 
context on the rights of the accused is much less acknowledged.3 More problematically, 																																																								
2	 See	e.g.	Richard	May	and	Marieke	Wierda,	International	Criminal	Evidence	(Transnational	Publishers	
Ardsley	2002)	Chapter	III.	They	focused	on	the	hardship	of	evidence	collection	in	the	international	
context.	They	stated	that	‘it	is	different	from	national	trials,	because	the	prosecution	does	not	have	at	
hand	a	state	machinery	to	assist	in	and	investigations	and	evidence	collection.	It	must	rely	on	the	
cooperation	of	states.	Thus	complications	arise	from	the	fact	that	States	act	according	to	their	own	
interests.’	Similar	views	are	echoed	by	others,	for	example	M	Cherif	Bassiouni,	in	line	with	May	and	
Wierda’s	position	in	his	various	publications,	e.g.	M	Cherif	Bassiouni,	Introduction	to	International	
Criminal	Law	(Martinus	Nijhoff	Publishers	2012).	He	stated	that	these	‘peculiarities	of	[international	
criminal	proceedings]	have	a	direct	impact	on	evidence.	Accordingly,	he	argued	‘as	a	consequence	the	
rules	of	evidence	at	these	proceedings	before	International	Criminal	Tribunals	tend	to	be	flexible	and	
leave	much	discretion	to	the	judges.	 	
See	also	Antonio	Cassese,	International	Criminal	Law	(Oxford	University	Press	2003);	Hiroto	Fujiwara	and	
Stephan	Parmentier,	‘Investigations’	in	Luc	Reydams,	Jan	Wouters	and	Cedric	Ryngaert	(eds),	
International	Prosecutors	(Oxford	University	Press	2012)	573–5;	Mirjan	Damaška,	‘Reflections	on	
Fairness	in	International	Criminal	Justice’	(2012)	10	Journal	of	International	Criminal	Justice	611.	 	
3	 Recent	years,	Defence	counsels	have	provided	more	defence	perspective:	see,	e.g.	Wayne	Jordash	and	
Matthew	R	Crowe,	‘Evidentiary	Challenges	for	the	Defence’	in	Elies	van	Sliedregt	and	Sergey	Vasiliev	
(eds),	Pluralism	in	International	Criminal	Law	(Oxford	University	Press	2014);	Alexander	Zahar,	‘Pluralism	
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arguments presented by the Courts and the scholarship usually side with the prosecution 
in order to cope with the special circumstances of international prosecution arising from 
the international context. This thesis will examine and analyse those common claims for 
the departure of the traditional standards of fairness.4 First and foremost, as will be 
examined in Chapter II, the ad hoc Tribunals restrict the application of the equality of 
arms principle without giving satisfying explanations. The designs of the international 
criminal tribunals reveal further hardship for the internationally accused, and a lower 
standard of fairness is even advocated so that the international criminal tribunals can 
fulfil additional objectives of mainly a political nature, which will be discussed further 
in Chapter III and IV. The next two Chapters (V and VI) provide a comparative view by 
addressing the disclosure issues in two common law jurisdictions (England and United 
States), before dealing with the specific disclosure problems of international criminal 
tribunals in Chapter VII and VIII.  
 
 																																																																																																																																																																		
and	the	Rights	of	the	Accused	in	International	Criminal	Proceedings’	in	Elies	van	Sliedregt	and	Sergey	
Vasiliev	(eds),	Pluralism	in	International	Criminal	Law	(Oxford	University	Press	2014);	Karim	AA	Khan	and	
Anand	A	Shah,	‘Defensive	Practices:	Representing	Clients	before	the	International	Criminal	Court’	(2013)	
76	Law	and	Contemporary	Problems	191;	Karim	AA	Khan	and	Caroline	Buisman,	‘Sitting	on	Evidence:	
Systematic	Failings	in	the	ICC	Disclosure	Regime	-	Time	for	Reform’	in	Carsten	Stahn	(ed),	The	Law	and	
Practice	of	the	International	Criminal	Court	(OUP	Oxford	2015).	
4	 In	particular,	Damaška	argues	that	there	should	be	a	different	assessment.	SeeDamaška,	‘Reflections	
on	Fairness	in	International	Criminal	Justice’	(n	2);	Mirjan	Damaška,	‘Should	National	and	International	
Justice	Be	Subjected	to	the	Same	Evaluative	Framework?’	in	Göran	Sluiter	and	others	(eds),	International	
Criminal	Procedure:	Principles	and	Rules	(OUP	Oxford	2013)	1419.	He	argues	that	‘given	their	innate	
weakness,	the	complexity	of	crimes	they	process,	and	the	multiplicity	of	their	goals,	some	departures	
from	domestic	conception	of	fairness	should	be	expected	and	accepted.’	
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II. The Purpose of this Research 
A. The Research Question 
Is the current Disclosure Regime in the International Criminal Tribunals 
unworkable? If yes, how so?  
The issues related to disclosure can be discussed in many aspects, this thesis, however, 
focuses on the duty of the prosecutor. Despite the well-established importance of this 
duty to the rights of the defence, prosecutors often fail to meet their disclosure 
obligations and are rarely sanctioned by the judges. It seems that a gap exists between 
the law of disclosure and its actual application in practice. Accordingly, the thesis 
endeavours to answer the question: Is the current disclosure framework in the 
international criminal tribunals unworkable? If the answer is in the affirmative, how so? 
Why are the disclosure problems so hard to resolve? 
This thesis notes that international criminal procedure is commonly viewed as a sui 
generis system. While the sui generis claim as such is not wrong, without proper 
analysis, its application could lead to a departure from the traditional standard of 
fairness or a contextualised assessment of fairness. However, it would be argued that 
such departure of fairness is not justified, notwithstanding the special context of 
international criminal proceedings. Although the unique circumstances and peculiar 
difficulties faced by the international criminal tribunals and international prosecutions 
do bring certain difficulties and challenges in their operations, it should be highlighted 
		
 		
	
5 	
that the so-called ‘special context’ of international criminal law makes the international 
defendants suffer no less, if not more, than the prosecution, and puts the defence in a 
more onerous situation than in its domestic counterparts. This is particularly so 
regarding the collection of evidence, since the prosecution enjoy significantly more 
resources and sometimes exclusive access to documents and witnesses. The 
prosecution’s duty of disclosure, accordingly, is extremely crucial for the defence to 
prepare its case and, perhaps, the only possibility to rebalance the inequality of arms in 
international criminal trials.  
Why this Research matters 
Is it better to allow ten guilty persons to escape conviction, than to risk one innocent to 
suffer? Indeed, it is almost impossible to guarantee that all guilty persons would be 
convicted and all innocents would walk free. What most criminal justice systems can 
guarantee is the criminal process to be just and fair. However, if prosecutors do not 
hand over important, relevant material to the defence, it is very likely that innocents will 
suffer and the person who is really responsible will escape.  
Nonetheless, this well-founded perception of criminal law seems to be abandoned when 
international crimes are involved. Here, it should be noted that international criminal 
law is a pluralist body of law. It is, in essence, a mixture of public international law and 
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domestic criminal law5 and its development has been influenced by other branches of 
law, in particular, international human rights law and international humanitarian law.6 
These different types of law often cause tensions,7 as their interests and approaches are 
in a competing state: public international law generally concerns the harmonisation 
between States, and adopts a horizontal approach; by contrast, criminal law employs a 
vertical approach, as it addresses the individuals’ wrongs and punishment by a State.8 
Their assumptions and methods of reasoning can also be contradictory: criminal law 
focuses on a particular individual’s guilt and responsibility, so it follows principles such 
as legality, its application is more restrictive and has a clear boundary; human rights law 
and humanitarian law pay more attention to the broader system; hence, they seek to 
apply to as many people as possible.9 
Disclosure issues highlight such contradictions and tensions inherent in international 
criminal law. For instances, the problems of the disclosure of confidential documents 
shows the conflicting interests between States’ national security and the accused’s right 																																																								
5	 Antonio	Cassese,	Cassese’s	International	Criminal	Law	(3rd	edn,	Oxford	University	Press,	2013)	4,5;	
Robert	Cryer	and	others,	An	Introduction	to	International	Criminal	Law	and	Procedure	(Cambridge	
University	Press	2014)	3;	Ilias	Bantekas,	International	Criminal	Law	(4th	edn,	Hart	Publishing	2010)	3.	
6	 E.g.	Prosecutor	v	Kunarac	et	al,	No.	IT-96-23&23/1-T,	Judgement	(22	February	2001)	at	para.	470.	The	
Trial	Chamber	illustrated	the	different	legal	context	between	international	humanitarian	law	and	
international	human	rights	law.	
7	 Cryer	and	others	(n	5)	3.	
8	 ibid,	citing	Glanville	Williams,	‘The	Definition	of	Crime’	(1955)	8	Current	Legal	Problems	107.	See	also	
Fujiwara	and	Parmentier	(n	2)	584.	Noting	that	Public	International	Law	is	more	often	consensual	and	
non-coercive,	c.f.	domestic	criminal	law:	mandatory	and	coercive.	
9	 Darryl	Robinson,	‘The	Identity	Crisis	of	International	Criminal	Law’	(2008)	21	Leiden	Journal	of	
International	Law	925;	Gabrielle	McIntyre,	‘Defining	Human	Rights	in	the	Arena	of	International	
Humanitarian	Law:	Human	Rights	in	the	Jurisprudence	of	the	ICTY’	in	Gideon	Boas	(ed),	International	
Criminal	Law:	Developments	in	the	Case	Law	of	the	ICTY	(Martinus	Nijhoff	Publishers	2003);	Patricia	
Pinto	Soares,	‘Tangling	Human	Rights	and	International	Criminal	Law:	The	Practice	of	International	
Tribunals	and	the	Call	for	Rationalized	Legal	Pluralism’	(2012)	23	Criminal	Law	Forum	161.	 	
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to access vital information. Also, the exercise of the victims’ rights and the concerns of 
safety of witnesses reveal the tension between the rights of victims and witnesses and 
the fair trial rights of the defence. In addition, political and policy concerns, especially 
in the form of the wider goals of international criminal justice – e.g. establishing a 
historical record and restoring peace and security – can severely affect the accused’s 
rights. 
Moreover, from a comparative criminal procedure viewpoint, the approach of disclosure 
is inseparably linked to philosophical values of procedural models. Disclosure reflects 
the core difference between the adversarial and the inquisitorial system in their 
approach of seeking out the truth. Common law countries adopt a complex set of 
disclosure rules, whilst civil law jurisdictions generally use a dossier. How to reconcile 
the different approaches in the international context has become a long debated issue in 
international criminal tribunals and the scholarship. 
Since disclosure duty bears particular importance to the fairness for the accused, 
non-disclosure should only be granted in exceptional circumstances, with authorisation 
from the courts. However, as the practice of the international criminal tribunals has 
shown, prosecutors routinely violate their duty to disclose and, unfortunately, are rarely 
sanctioned for it.  
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There are various reasons why the disclosure regime raised many disputes in the 
international criminal courts. Partly because the need to ‘secure convictions’ is stronger 
in the context of international crimes given the often-disturbing nature, and the 
presumption of guilt is greater when the crime is more severe, as studies have 
exhibited.10 As illustrated in the Lubanga11and Kenyatta12 cases, the duty of disclosure 
is at the very heart of fundamental clashes between competing interests and, without the 
guarantee of due process to the accused, the Courts could potentially gamble away 
legitimacy to the point of the complete collapse of the prosecution, e.g. Kenyatta.13 
Hence, the prosecutor’s disclosure duty not only has a considerable effect on the 
accused, but also has a large impact on the legitimacy of the Tribunals themselves. In 
other words, while disclosure plays a pivotal role in any fair trial, are the courts, 
watched by the world public, under such immense pressure to re-establish justice and 
other police-based objectives (e.g. establishing historic precedent, restoring peace)? 																																																								
10	 Jennifer	K	Robbennolt,	‘Outcome	Severity	and	Judgments	of	“Responsibility”:	A	Meta-Analytic	
Review1’	(2000)	30	Journal	of	applied	social	psychology	2575;	Jeffrey	W	Lucas,	Corina	Graif	and	Michael	
J	Lovaglia,	‘Misconduct	in	the	Prosecution	of	Severe	Crimes:	Theory	and	Experimental	Test’	(2006)	69	
Social	psychology	quarterly	97.	Studies	have	pointed	out	‘the	more	severe	the	crime,	the	greater	the	
perceived	pressure	to	convict	and	the	greater	the	likelihood	of	perceiving	an	accused	person	as	
responsible	for	the	crime.’	
11	 First	stay	of	proceedings:	Prosecutor	v	Thomas	Lubanga	Dyilo,	No.	ICC-01/04-01/06	(‘Lubanga’	case),	
Trial	Chamber:	Decision	on	the	consequences	of	non-disclosure	of	exculpatory	materials	covered	by	
Article	54(3)(e)	agreements	and	the	application	to	stay	the	prosecution	of	the	accused,	together	with	
certain	other	issues	raised	at	the	Status	Conference	on	10	June	2008	(13	June	2008);	Second	stay	of	
proceedings:	Lubanga	case,	Trial	Chamber:	Redacted	Decision	on	the	Prosecution's	Urgent	Request	for	
Variation	of	the	Time-Limit	to	Disclose	the	Identity	of	Intermediary	143	or	Alternatively	to	Stay	
Proceedings	Pending	Further	Consultations	with	the	VWU	(8	July	2010);	the	Appeals	Chamber	lifted	the	
stay	later:	Lubanga	case,	Appeals	Chamber:	Judgment	on	the	Appeal	of	the	Prosecutor	against	the	
Decision	of	Trial	Chamber	I	of	8	July	2010	Entitled	“Decision	on	the	Prosecution's	Urgent	Request	for	
Variation	of	the	Time-Limit	to	Disclose	the	Identity	of	Intermediary	143	or	Alternatively	to	Stay	
Proceedings	Pending	Further	Consultations	with	the	VWU”	(8	October	2010).	
12	 Prosecutor	v	Uhuru	Muigai	Kenyatta,	No.	ICC-01/09-02/11,	(‘Kenyatta’	case),	Trial	Chamber:	Decision	
on	the	withdrawal	of	charges	against	Mr	Kenyatta	(13	March	2015).	
13	 ibid.	
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Does this pressure lead them to sacrifice the rule of law, which is conditio sine qua non 
in order to dispense justice? Are the Courts so focused on making it right again that they 
tend to accept standards which they know would be insufficient according to 
fundamental principles of law? 
B. Principal Findings  
The particular contexts in which the international criminal tribunals operate in have 
made the prosecution’s duty of disclosure harder to fulfil. This is due to various reasons, 
notably the nature and complexity of international crimes, the pressure from the 
international community to ‘end impunity’ and to achieve other political motivated 
objectives, and the need of state cooperation and assistance. These factors of the 
international context have led to the possible application of a contextualised approach of 
fairness ‒ a departure from the traditional standard of fairness.  
This thesis argues that while a fair disclosure regime is still possible to be achieved in 
international criminal tribunals, the special context of international criminal proceedings 
tends to create certain difficulties, which need to be addressed more directly than at 
present. This thesis finds that the reason behind the unworkability of the disclosure 
regime is more of the result of political reality: the international criminal courts and 
prosecutors are under a tremendous political pressure to deal with related issues. 
		
 		
	
10 
However, it is submitted that the contextual arguments are hardly justifiable after close 
scrutiny, and not warranted from a legal standpoint.  
III. Structure of the Thesis 
A. Scope and Limitation 
At the outset, this research focuses on the disclosure duties of the prosecution. It is 
acknowledged that the defence also has disclosure obligations before international 
criminal tribunals and national jurisdictions. But the issues related to defence disclosure 
are separate matters. For one, unlike prosecution disclosure, the issue of defence 
disclosure is highly contentious in principle, as it might violate the right against 
self-incrimination,14 although it might have the positive effect of assisting the 
prosecution in understanding the defence case at an early stage and aiding the 
prosecution to perform its duty more effectively. Both the U.S. and England have rules 
regulating defence disclosure, and the problems of expanding the side of the defence 
has recently become the centre of debate.15  
However, in the international criminal tribunals there are relatively less requirements 
regarding defence disclosure. The ad hoc Tribunals initially did not provide any general 
obligations for the defence to disclose,16 the ICTY and ICTR RPEs now require the 
																																																								
14	 Article	67(1)	(g)	ICC	Statute.	
15	 Criminal	Justice	Act	2003.	
16	 Rule	67	ICTY/ICTR	RPEs.	
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defence to disclose certain information.17 But in the International Criminal Court, 
defence disclosure requirements are still at a minimum, unless the accused raises a 
defence of alibi18 or insanity.19 The concern is that although defence disclosure might 
facilitate the effectiveness and expeditiousness of the trial, it would be done possibly at 
the expense of the rights of the accused.20 Accordingly, since the nature and purpose of 
defence disclosure is very different from prosecution disclosure, to include it in this 
study would have raised more than one central research question. Therefore, this thesis 
will only discuss the disclosure duties of the prosecutors. References to defence 
disclosure will still be made when required. 
Also, it does not seek to exhaust all relevant rules of the exceptions of disclosure. This 
thesis recognises the exceptions of disclosure provided in the Statutes, e.g. work 
product, internal documents of the prosecution,21 however, it will not go into detail to 
examine them, as they are not problematic as such. The reason for this is that the 
purpose of this thesis is to examine the gap between the law and practice of prosecution 
disclosure and to answer the question: why could the prosecution not perform its duty 
properly? Therefore, if there were a legitimate reason for the prosecution not to disclose, 
which could only be assessed on a case-by-case basis, it would not be a problem as far 																																																								
17	 E.g.	list	of	witnesses:	Rule	65ter	(G)	ICTY	RPE,	Rule	73ter	(B)ICTR	RPEs;	copies	of	defence	witness	
statements:	Rule	67(A)	ICTY	RPEs.	
18	 Rule	79(1)	(a)	ICC	RPEs.	
19	 Rule	79(1)	(b)	ICC	RPEs.	
20	 Kate	Gibson	and	Cainnech	Lussiaá-Berdou,	‘Disclosure	of	Evidence’	in	Karim	AA	Khan,	Caroline	
Buisman	and	Christopher	Gosnell	(eds),	Principles	of	Evidence	in	international	criminal	justice	(Oxford	
University	Press	2010)	342,	344.	
21	 Rule	81(1)	ICC	RPEs.	
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as this research is concerned. In other words, the focus of this thesis is to determine 
when the prosecutors should disclose relevant information to the defence but fail to do 
so. The concerns related to the safety and protection of victims and witnesses are also 
acknowledged, but it would be a separate research question to explore the issues of the 
conflict between victims and defence rights. Hence, victims’ rights will be mentioned 
but not in depth. 
One limitation of this thesis is that it only includes common law jurisdictions as a 
comparative basis. This is due to practical reasons: civil law countries have no 
comparable disclosure rules. Therefore, it would not be able to serve the point of 
comparing the duty of the prosecution to disclose relevant evidence to the defence. 
Nonetheless, the chapter of international criminal procedure has provided a critical 
analysis regarding the differences between the common law and civil law approach, and 
discussed the use of dossier as generally employed in civil law countries 
comprehensively.  
B. Methodology  
Doctrinal Legal Research  
This research is largely based on primary resources, including the Statutes, Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence and jurisprudence, of the modern international criminal courts: 
the ICTY, ICTR and ICC. It reviews and analyses a large amount of decisions regarding 
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prosecution disclosure. In addition, library based theoretical work has been conducted.  
It further examines the gaps between the law and practice of the disclosure regime in 
international criminal tribunals. This thesis focuses on why the prosecution fails to 
perform its duty properly. By examining how this disclosure duty has been interpreted 
and applied by the legal actors in practice, it provides an analysis as to why it is often 
unworkable. Recent cases in both U.S. Courts and the ICC have indicated that the 
disclosure regimes are not operating as intended.  
Comparative Analysis Approach  
The two chapters of common law jurisdictions provide a comparative view of the duty 
of disclosure. The reason for a closer examination of the U.S. Federal and the English 
system is their detailed disclosure system. Academic debate in these countries has 
already lasted for decades, thereby establishing a profound and detailed study of 
disclosure rules and implementation. Accordingly, this approach has the potential to 
closely identify, compare and discuss the inherent problems concerning the law and 
practice of disclosure. 
In addition, the ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence is largely based on the U.S. 
model, particularly its disclosure provisions.22 The ICTR bears similar rules with the 
ICTY. It should be reminded that, with regard to the ICC, the drafters of the Rome 
																																																								
22	 For	the	reasons	of	adopting	a	U.S.	model,	see	Chapter	IV.	
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Statute considered to adopt a dossier model, yet eventually decided against it.23 At the 
Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, lengthy and detailed 
discussions took place regarding disclosure.24 In the end, the Australian proposal was 
largely adopted. The Australian draft was based on the ICTY’s rules of procedure and 
various decisions by the judges. Therefore, it can be concluded that the ICTY had an 
important impact on this part of the ICC rules. Consequently, the jurisprudence at the ad 
hoc Tribunals will be addressed in detailed in this thesis. 
It is observed that the dossier approach might contradict to the existing adversarial 
setting before the ICC. In particular, the Trial Chamber is not allowed to have any 
knowledge of the materials prior to the introduction into evidence at trial. Otherwise the 
Trial Chamber could be prejudiced by this prior knowledge and lose its function as an 
impartial arbiter of the proceedings. This position of the (Pre)Trial Chamber clearly 
reflects adversarial influences. By contrast, civil law systems’ common practice is that 
the judges have full knowledge of the whole dossier prior to the commencement of the 
trial. As a consequence, this thesis will not address any particular civil law countries, as 
they have no comparable rules concerning disclosure. However, the possibility and 
(dis)advantages of using a dossier before the ICC will be discussed in Chapter IV. 
																																																								
23	 Gibson	and	Lussiaá-Berdou	(n	20)	311–2.	
24	 Proceedings	of	the	Preparatory	Commission	at	its	second	session	(26	July–13	August	1999)	
PCNICC/1999/L.4/Rev.1,	New	York,	18	August	1999.	
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The comparative approach in this thesis is crucial, as it highlights certain differences ‒ 
not only in the technical sense, but also the wider context: the impact, the nature of the 
crimes and the international context can have on the accused’s rights to a fair trial. 
In the domestic criminal law context, as pointed out by Robinson, the general focus is 
on ‘the restraining the use of the state’s coercive power against individuals’, however, 
in the context of international criminal justice, ‘prosecution and conviction are often 
conceptualized as the fulfilment of the victims’ human right to a remedy.’25 
Accordingly, there is a great disparity in the scholarship concerning due process and the 
rights of the defendants. While ‘wrongful convictions’ and ‘miscarriages of justice’ are 
a common assessment in the national courts,26 the international jurisdictions seem to be 
more concerned with how to put ‘war criminals’ (note that it should be ‘alleged’ war 
criminals!) to justice and how to ‘end impunity’. This shows that the nature of 
international crimes, especially due to its exceptional magnitude and gravity, can lead to 
a presumption of guilt and therefore make the work of the defence counsels much more 
difficult. 
This potential presumption of guilt, then, could induce a strikingly extravagant 
departure of traditional standard of fairness. This is not to conclude that international 																																																								
25	 Robinson,	‘The	Identity	Crisis	of	International	Criminal	Law’	(n	9).	See	also	Basic	Principles	and	
Guidelines	on	the	Right	to	a	Remedy	and	Reparations	for	Victims	of	Gross	Violations	of	International	
Human	Rights	Law	and	Serious	Violations	of	International	Humanitarian	Law,	UNGA	Res.	60/147	of	16	
December	2005;	Jon	M	Van	Dyke,	‘The	Fundamental	Human	Rights	to	Prosecution	and	Compensation’	
(2000)	29	Denver	Journal	of	International	Law	and	Policy	77.	
26	 See	Chapters	V	and	VI.	
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criminal tribunals should adopt the same standard as domestic criminal courts. However, 
departures would warrant proper justifications. The arguments, so far, as examined in 
this thesis, are not convincing. Others, for example Fry, have examined whether the 
nature of international crime itself justifies a departure.27  
The need to secure convictions is greater in the international context. This is evidently 
shown by the international criminal courts themselves. For example, the expansion of 
certain rights, which were originally designed solely for the accused, to be applicable to 
the prosecution and, at times, applying a lower evidentiary standard. Remarkably, this 
phenomenon also occurs in the scholarship, when scholars often focus on the 
importance of other competing interests and wider objectives of the Courts.28 These 
arguments are much less common in the domestic context, although there is a trend to 
advocate an expansion of victims’ rights. The reasons for this difference is that, in part, 
the early development of international criminal law was dominated by public 
international law and international human rights lawyers, but in the recent years more 
criminal lawyers have attributed to the field.29 
The comparative studies conducted in this thesis are crucial. It clearly illustrates and 
distinguishes the types of problems which are intrinsic in criminal justice and which are 																																																								
27	 Elinor	Fry,	‘The	Nature	of	International	Crimes	and	Evidentiary	Challenges:	Preserving	Quality	While	
Managing	Quantity’	in	Sergey	Vasiliev	and	Elies	van	Sliedregt	(eds),	Pluralism	in	International	Criminal	
Law	(Oxford	University	Press	2014).	
28	 See	e.g.	Bassiouni,	Introduction	to	International	Criminal	Law	(n	2)	(noting	the	importance	of	
historical	record);	Mark	Klamberg,	‘What	Are	the	Objectives	of	International	Criminal	Procedure?	
Reflections	on	the	Fragmentation	of	a	Legal	Regime’	(2010)	79	Nordic	Journal	of	International	Law	279.	
29	 Bantekas	(n	5)	Preface.	
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inherent in the international context. The identification of separate sets of issues is, 
therefore, vital for this research and is designed to provide a much clearer overview of 
the different problems of disclosure. Unfortunately, as far as disclosure in the 
international context is concerned, the scholarship has a tendency to mix non-related 
issues for a ‘balancing test’. Although similar claims have been made in the domestic 
context, for example, to balance public interests and the rights of the accused, 
commentators30 generally criticise such an approach and uphold the importance to 
avoid wrongful convictions. 
It should be noted that some competing interests, for example, the victims and witnesses’ 
safety and the defence’s right to confront witnesses could be subjected to a balance test. 
However, even this should only be done in exceptional circumstances when the 
																																																								
30	 E.g.	Andrew	Ashworth,	Human	Rights,	Serious	Crime	and	Criminal	Procedure	(Sweet	&	Maxwell	2002);	
Mike	Redmayne,	‘Criminal	Justice	Act	2003:(1)	Disclosure	and	Its	Discontents’	(2004)	2004	Criminal	Law	
Review	441	(‘alongside	bureaucratic	managerialism	and	efficiency	is	the	rhetoric	of	“balance”:	we	are	
constantly	told	that	the	criminal	justice	system	needs	rebalancing	in	favour	of	victims	or	the	law	abiding	
majority’);	Andrew	Ashworth	and	Mike	Redmayne,	The	Criminal	Process	(4th	edn,	Oxford	University	
Press	2010)	(arguing	that	if	a	balancing	test	is	to	be	used,	then	it	is	important	to	take	a	wide	view	of	the	
issues	–	could	the	situation	have	been	avoided?	Why	not	abandon	the	prosecution?	–	rather	than	one	
which	simply	weighs	the	importance	of	sensitivity	against	the	Defences	rights);	Andrew	Choo,	Evidence	
(Oxford	University	Press	2015)	147	(regarding	the	privilege	against	self-incrimination,	a	more	principled	
objection	to	the	approach:	the	very	essence	of	a	right	would	seem	to	be	‘balanced	away’	on	an	
apparently	ad	hoc	basis).	See	also	Denise	Meyerson,	‘Why	Courts	Should	Not	Balance	Rights	against	the	
Public	Interest’	(2007)	31	Melb.	UL	Rev.	873;	Ashworth	58.	
Ashworth	(2002)	also	noted	that	in	the	ECHR	context,	‘although	the	balancing	test	is	often	employed,	it	
should	be	noted	that	the	concern	of	‘public	interest’	should	not	be	weighed	against	the	right	to	a	fair	
trial.	Such	arguments	have	a	place	in	relation	to	the	qualified	rights,	but	not	where	Art.	6,	the	right	is	a	
strong	and	unqualified	one.’	At	115.	 	
With	regard	to	disclosure,	he	also	remarked	that	‘it	is	not	simply	that	the	right	to	disclosure	can	be	
‘balanced	away’	whenever	there	is	a	countervailing	public	interest.	The	right	must	be	maintained	so	far	
as	possible;	exceptions	can	only	be	permitted	in	limited	circumstances;	and	when	an	exception	is	
recognized,	its	scope	must	be	kept	to	the	minimum	and	the	Defence	must	be	compensated	for	it	in	some	
way.’	
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witnesses’ safety is genuinely at stake and the accused’s rights must be respected.31 By 
contrast, it is more dubious to suggest a balancing approach between the accused’s fair 
trial rights with other goals of internaitonal criminal justice. For example, Turner has 
advocated for such a balancing approach.32 She considers the Trial Chamber’s 
balancing approach in Kenyatta to be better than the ‘legal absolutist’ approach adopted 
by the Lubanga Trial Chamber.33 She stated that ‘[F]ollowing this approach...while 
important for indicating fair trial rights, can impair the Court’s ability to achieve other 
goals, such as punishing international crimes and compiling an accurate historical 
record.’34 As it will be established in Chapter III, the expectation of establishing a 
historical record is a highly defective one in the context of international criminal justice. 
It might be acceptable to recognise this historical record goal as a by-product,35 but an 
accused’s fundamental right should not be balanced away by it, as the historical record 
goal is only secondary to the primary objective of adjudicating a person’s guilt.  
																																																								
31	 See	e.g.	Salvatore	Zappalà,	‘The	Rights	of	Victims	v.	the	Rights	of	the	Accused’	(2010)	8	Journal	of	
International	Criminal	Justice	137;	Monroe	Leigh,	‘Witness	Anonymity	Is	Inconsistent	with	Due	Process’	
[1997]	American	Journal	of	International	Law	80	(argued	the	Chamber’s	decision	of	withholding	
identities	of	victims	and	witnesses	from	the	Defence	will	deny	the	accused’s	of	a	fair	trial	and	lead	to	the	
conviction	on	the	basis	of	tainted	evidence).	
Cf.	Christine	M	Chinkin,	‘Due	Process	and	Witness	Anonymity’	[1997]	American	Journal	of	International	
Law	75	(argued	that	Leigh	failed	into	take	into	account	the	full	judgement,	the	right	of	accused	is	not	
absolute	and	have	to	be	balanced	against	other	important	interest,	considering	the	context	of	the	ICTY).	
32	 Jenia	Iontcheva	Turner,	‘Accountability	of	International	Prosecutors’	in	Carsten	Stahn	(ed),	Law	and	
Practice	of	the	International	Criminal	Court	(Oxford	University	Press	2014).	
33	 See	Lubanga	case,	Trial	Chamber,	Redacted	Decision	on	the	Prosecution's	Urgent	Request	for	
Variation	of	the	Time-Limit	to	Disclose	the	Identity	of	Intermediary	143	or	Alternatively	to	Stay	
Proceedings	Pending	Further	Consultations	with	the	VWU	(8	July	2010).	The	Trial	Chamber	held	that	fair	
trial	of	the	accused	was	no	longer	possible,	if	Prosecution	refused	to	disclose	the	identities	of	his	
intermediaries.	 	
34	 Turner	(n	31)	393.	
35	 Fry	(n	26)	260.	
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Although prosecutorial misconduct is a serious problem, the international context and 
the so-called wider goals of international criminal tribunals have made this issue a blind 
spot. It should be highlighted that some rights are not meant to be balanced, in 
particular the defence’s rights to access inculpatory and exculpatory material. As 
demonstrated by the collapse of Kenyatta trial, allowing the prosecution to hide such 
crucial information, eventually would lead to the integrity of the proceedings being 
challenged. 
C. Structure of the Chapters 
This thesis will mainly assess the prosecution’s disclosure duty from a defence 
perspective. Admittedly, by framing the question with a focus on the defence would 
seem to imply that Packer’s due process model is favoured in this thesis.36 It will not be 
asking status quo questions, that is, instead of simply providing a detailed description of 
the law of disclosure and the courts jurisprudence, it will critically examine the claims 
made by the courts and in the scholarship.  
This thesis has three main parts: 1) the challenges of the international context; 2) 
disclosure regime in domestic jurisdictions; 3) the law and practice of prosecution’s 
duty of disclosure in the international criminal tribunals. The first part approaches the 
research question by critically analysing the international context, whilst the second part 
																																																								
36	 Herbert	L	Packer,	‘Two	Models	of	the	Criminal	Process’	[1964]	University	of	Pennsylvania	Law	Review	
1.	
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reviews the problem from the context of criminal law. By dividing the question into 
different contexts, it becomes clear where the problems lie and provides a 
comprehensible view of the disclosure regime in the international criminal tribunals. 
1. The Context which the International Criminal Tribunals Operates in 
is challenging for the Defence:  
a) Lack of resources;  
b) Tension between the goals;  
c) Hybrid nature of international criminal procedures. 
This thesis starts from addressing how the duty of disclosure is developed and applied 
in the context of international criminal tribunals (Chapter II). Because this disclosure 
duty is not explicitly stated in the Statutes of, except for the ICC, its statutory status was 
developed within the concept of the equality of arms principle under the right of the 
accused. However, the principle of equality of arms itself is not well-defined and has 
many deficiencies both in principle and in practice.37 The result is that the application 
of this principle is highly limited in international criminal tribunals, which still places 
the defence in a severe disadvantage vis-à-vis the prosecution, in particular the 
significant disparity of resources. 																																																								
37	 See	e.g.	Charles	Chernor	Jalloh	and	Amy	Elizabeth	DiBella,	‘Equality	of	Arms	in	International	Criminal	
Law:	Continuing	Challenges’	in	William	Schabas,	Yvonne	McDermott	and	Niamh	Hayes	(eds),	Ashgate	
Research	Companion	to	International	Criminal	Law:	Critical	Perspectives	(Aldershot:	Ashgate	2013);	
Jordash	and	Crowe	(n	3);	Maria	Igorevna	Fedorova,	The	Principle	of	Equality	of	Arms	in	International	
Criminal	Proceedings	(Intersentia	2012).	
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It proceeds to examine the designs of the international criminal tribunals in Chapter III. 
It will be argued that there is an inherent defect exists in the international settings, 
which places the defence in a further unfavourable position. First and foremost this 
Chapter underscores the primary aim of international criminal proceedings ‒ the 
adjudication of a person’s guilt. It then analyses the so-called wider goals, which, as it 
will be argued, should only have secondary status. They should not interfere with the 
primary goal, for both principle and practical reasons.38 Furthermore, the tensions 
among these wider goals39 will be analysed. To ask the criminal court to kill several 
birds with one stone, will ultimately lead to confusion and failure. In the later section, 
other factors, including structural, financial and political factors, will be explored. It 
will be shown that the international environment is harsh for the accused. 
Chapter IV deals with international criminal procedure. The dispute concerning the 
proper procedural model between civil and common law jurists has been ongoing for 
many years.40 This thesis will underline the inherent problems of the hybrid nature of 
international criminal procedure, and will examine the sui generis claim: do the 
difficulties deriving from the international context justify a departure from the 																																																								
38	 Caroline	Buisman,	‘Ascertainment	of	the	Truth	in	International	Criminal	Justice’	(Brunel	University	
2012).	 	
39	 For	a	detailed	assessment,	see	Mirjan	Damaška,	‘What	Is	the	Point	of	International	Criminal	Justice’	
(2008)	83	Chicago-Kent	Law	Review	329.	
40	 See	discussions	in	e.g.	Gideon	Boas,	‘A	Code	of	Evidence	and	Procedure	for	International	Criminal	Law?	
The	Rules	of	the	ICTY’	in	William	Schabas	and	Gideon	Boas	(eds),	International	Criminal	Law:	
Developments	in	the	Case	Law	of	the	ICTY	(Martinus	Nijhoff	Publishers	2003);	Cryer	and	others	(n	5)	
424–5;	Mark	Klamberg,	Evidence	in	International	Criminal	Procedure:	Confronting	Legal	Gaps	and	the	
Reconstruction	of	Disputed	Events	(Brill	2013)	501–6;	Frédéric	Mégret,	‘Beyond	Fairness:	Understanding	
the	Determinants	of	International	Criminal	Procedure’	(2009)	14	UCLA	Journal	of	International	Law	and	
Foreign	Affairs	37,	46–8.	
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traditional standard of fairness? Furthermore, it will analyse the fundamental differences 
between the two legal systems dominant in the international criminal courts and the 
consequences of blending them. Also, it will be discussed whether the dossier approach 
is a suitable alternative in the international context. 
2. The Law and Practice in Domestic Jurisdictions  
As mentioned, a comparative approach is vital for this research. The purpose is to 
examine disclosure regimes in common law jurisdictions, since the Tribunals disclosure 
rules are similar to the U.S. and England. Accordingly, these two jurisdictions will be 
explored in detail with regard to disclosure rules and procedures. It will be shown that 
similar problems exist in national jurisdictions. For instances, the dual role of the 
prosecutors, and the reliance on the prosecution’s good faith to carry out its disclosure 
duty. However, as it will be shown, their approach regarding the treatment of the rights 
of the defence is much more cautious. In fact, a defence in both systems would not face 
the kind of hardship their counterparts in international criminal courts have to deal with. 
3. The Law and Practice in Modern International Criminal Tribunals  
Chapter VII examines the disclosure regime and how it is applied in modern 
international criminal courts: ICTY, ICTR and the ICC. The Statute and RPEs at the 
hybrid tribunals e.g. SCSL, STL, ECCC are not particularly discussed because, apart 
from the ECCC, they are essentially similar to the ad hoc Tribunals, references are 
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made when necessary. It will explore the issues of prosecution disclosure in these 
tribunals, in particular the problems caused for the defence.  
Chapter VIII further addresses and examines particular disclosure issues at the ICC 
resulting from the structural differences and the international context, particularly the 
ongoing conflicts. In addition, the duty of prosecution disclosure could be potentially 
conflicting with its other duty under the Rome Statute, such as the need to protect 
witnesses and duties under confidentially agreement. Although these matters might also 
exist in the ICTY and ICTR, it is intensified in the ICC due to the special context, and 
has caused the two stays of the proceedings in the Lubanga trial.  
It would seem that the unworkability of the duty of disclosure, in part, arises from the 
difficulty of seeking evidence in the international context, which implies that the 
defence rights can be somewhat compromised. It will be shown that many issues of 
disclosure could be avoided if the prosecutors did not fail to uphold their disclosure 
duties. However, the circumstances of the international context seem to passively 
encourage the prosecution’s misconduct with regard to disclosure, since sanctions are 
extremely rare, and if applied, they lack sufficient severity. 
IV. Concluding Remarks 
This thesis will argue that it is exactly because the internationally accused is charged 
with serious crimes, there is much more at stake not only for the defendant but also for 
		
 		
	
24 
the international criminal courts and the international community. The internationally 
accused deserves no less protection from wrongful conviction and fair treatment. 
Traditional standards of fairness should be maintained and, only by doing so, justice 
could be achieved. It should be emphasised that neither the interests of victims, nor the 
international community as a whole, are served by reducing the rights of defendants in 
the hope of making it easier to convict them.
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CHAPTER II 	
THE PROSECUTION’S DUTY OF DISCLOSURE AND 
THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY OF ARMS 
 
I. Introduction: the Development 
The prosecution’s duty of disclosure in the context of international criminal law is 
developed through the concern of protecting basic human rights of the accused. In the 
literature and jurisprudence of international criminal law, the accepted legal basis for 
disclosure obligations is the right to a fair trial, in particular, the principle of equality of 
arms and the minimum guarantees which should be afforded to the accused, such as the 
right to adequate time and facilities.1  
By contrast, disclosure is developed mostly through common law in national 
jurisdictions.2 In England and Wales, and the United States, the importance of proper 
disclosure was only recognized after several occasions of prosecution malpractice. In 
fact, until recently, in the domestic context, disclosure was merely viewed as 
professional ethics, rather than recognized as a ‘duty’ or even a right of the defendant.3 
Nevertheless, in both national and international criminal law, the concept of the 
																																																								
1	 See	Klamberg,	Evidence	in	International	Criminal	Procedure	(n	39)	274;	Vladimir	Tochilovsky,	
Jurisprudence	of	the	International	Criminal	Courts	and	the	European	Court	of	Human	Rights:	Procedure	
and	Evidence	(Martinus	Nijhoff	Publishers	2008)	274–84.	See	also	Article	6	ECHR	and	relevant	
jurisprudence.	 	 	
2	 See	Chapters	V	and	VI	‘Common	Law	Jurisdictions’.	
3	 For	a	more	development,	see	Chapters	V	and	VI	‘Common	Law	Jurisdictions’.	
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prosecution having a duty to disclose evidence to the accused so that the defence can 
prepare his defence properly is widely recognised as an essential requirement to 
guarantee a fair trial.  
In the context of the historical tribunals i.e. the International Military Tribunal and the 
International Military Tribunal for the Far East, disclosure rules did not appear in the 
Charter of the International Military Tribunal,4 although Article 9 of the Charter of the 
International Military Tribunal for the Far East and Rule 4 of the Rules of Procedure 
for the International Military Tribunal permitted the accused to request documents or 
witness testimony.5 Also, the historical tribunals did not provide adequate resources for 
the preparation of the defence case, which the defence counsels of both Nuremberg and 
Tokyo Tribunals made mention of more than once.6 The defence investigators were 
																																																								
4	 Charter	of	the	International	Military	Tribunal	at	Nuremberg,	annexed	to	the	Agreement	for	the	
Prosecution	and	Punishment	of	the	Major	War	Criminals	of	the	European	
Axis,	82	UNTS	279,	8	August	1945	(‘IMT	Charter’).	
5	 Charter	of	the	International	Military	Tribunal	for	the	Far	East,	TIAS	No.	1589	at	3,	4	Bevans	20,	19	
January	1946,	amended	26	April	1946	(‘IMTFE	Charter’).	
	
IMTFE	Charter	Article	9	(e)	–	‘Production	of	Evidence	for	the	Defense’	 	
(e)	 	 An	accused	may	apply	in	writing	to	the	Tribunal	for	the	production	of	witnesses	or	of	documents	
[…].	 	
	
IMT	RPE	Rule	4	‘Production	of	Evidence	for	the	Defense’	
(a) The	Defense	may	apply	to	the	Tribunal	for	the	production	of	witnesses	or	of	documents	by	written	
application	to	the	General	Secretary	of	the	Tribunal.	The	application	shall	state	where	the	witness	
or	document	is	thought	to	be	located,	together	with	a	statement	of	their	last	known	location.	It	
shall	also	state	the	facts	proposed	to	be	proved	by	the	witness	or	the	document	and	the	reasons	
why	such	facts	are	relevant	to	the	Defense.	 	
	
6	 Yvonne	McDermott,	‘General	Duty	to	Ensure	the	Right	to	a	Fair	and	Expeditious	Trial’	in	Göran	Sluiter	
and	others	(eds),	International	Criminal	Procedure:	Principles	and	Rules	(Oxford	University	Press	2013)	
776;	Neil	Boister	and	Robert	Cryer,	The	Tokyo	International	Military	Tribunal	(Oxford	University	Press	
2007)	89–90.	McDermott	noted	that,	in	particular,	a	lack	of	adequate	of	time	for	the	preparation	of	the	
defence	case	was	at	issue	in	the	Tokyo	tribunal.	 	
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even denied access to the archives of Nazi Germany.7 As the defence was at a 
significant disadvantage, the principle of equality of arms was not upheld at the 
historical tribunals, and can be seen as one of the fundamental deficiencies in both the 
Nuremberg and Tokyo trials.8 
As for modern international criminal trials, disclosure rules are still not mentioned in 
the Statute of the ad hoc Tribunals, but regulated by their Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence (‘RPEs’). Accordingly, concerning the statutory basis of the disclosure duty, 
the international criminal law jurisprudence has derived the disclosure duty from Article 
21 of ICTY and Article 20 of the ICTR, entitled ‘Rights of the Accused’. The 
International Criminal Court, arguably, is more advanced in this matter: Article 67 (1) 
has similar wording regarding the rights of the accused, and paragraph (2) has expressed 
the prosecution’s duty to disclose favourable evidence to the Accused.9 Also, Article 
																																																								
7	 Otto	Kranzbuhler,	‘Nuremberg	Eighteen	Years	Afterwards’	in	Guénaël	Mettraux	(ed),	Perspectives	on	
the	Nuremberg	Trial	(Oxford	University	Press	2008)	436.	
8	 McDermott,	‘General	Duty	to	Ensure	the	Right	to	a	Fair	and	Expeditious	Trial’	(n	45)	777.	
9	 Rome	Statute	of	the	International	Criminal	Court,	UN	Doc.	A/CONF.	183/9	of	17	July	1998,	entered	
into	force	1	July	2002.	(‘ICC	Statute’)	
	
Article	67—	‘Rights	of	the	accused’	
1.	In	the	determination	of	any	charge,	the	accused	shall	be	entitled	to	a	public	hearing,	having	regard	to	
the	provisions	of	this	Statute,	to	a	fair	hearing	conducted	impartially,	and	to	the	following	minimum	
guarantees,	in	full	equality:	
(a)	To	be	informed	promptly	and	in	detail	of	the	nature,	cause	and	content	of	the	charge,	in	a	language	
which	the	accused	fully	understands	and	speaks;	
(b)	To	have	adequate	time	and	facilities	for	the	preparation	of	the	defence	and	to	communicate	freely	
with	counsel	of	the	accused's	choosing	in	confidence;	
(c)	To	be	tried	without	undue	delay;	
(d)	Subject	to	article	63,	paragraph	2,	to	be	present	at	the	trial,	to	conduct	the	defence	in	person	or	
through	legal	assistance	of	the	accused's	choosing,	to	be	informed,	if	the	accused	does	not	have	legal	
assistance,	of	this	right	and	to	have	legal	assistance	assigned	by	the	Court	in	any	case	where	the	
interests	of	justice	so	require,	and	without	payment	if	the	accused	lacks	sufficient	means	to	pay	for	it;	
(e)	To	examine,	or	have	examined,	the	witnesses	against	him	or	her	and	to	obtain	the	attendance	and	
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54(1) (a) imposes a further duty on the ICC prosecutors – the duty to proactively search 
for both incriminating and exonerating evidence.10 In this Chapter, the principle of 
equality of arms and the courts’ approach will be examined.  
II. Equality of Arms and Right to a Fair Trial 
The principle of equality of arms is developed within the concept of the right to a fair 
trial in the international context,11 in both international human rights law and 
																																																																																																																																																																		
examination	of	witnesses	on	his	or	her	behalf	under	the	same	conditions	as	witnesses	against	him	or	her.	
The	accused	shall	also	be	entitled	to	raise	defences	and	to	present	other	evidence	admissible	under	this	
Statute;	
(f)	To	have,	free	of	any	cost,	the	assistance	of	a	competent	interpreter	and	such	translations	as	are	
necessary	to	meet	the	requirements	of	fairness,	if	any	of	the	proceedings	of	or	documents	presented	to	
the	Court	are	not	in	a	language	which	the	accused	fully	understands	and	speaks;	
(g)	Not	to	be	compelled	to	testify	or	to	confess	guilt	and	to	remain	silent,	without	such	silence	being	a	
consideration	in	the	determination	of	guilt	or	innocence;	
(h)	To	make	an	unsworn	oral	or	written	statement	in	his	or	her	defence;	and	 	
(i)	Not	to	have	imposed	on	him	or	her	any	reversal	of	the	burden	of	proof	or	any	onus	of	rebuttal.	
	
2.	In	addition	to	any	other	disclosure	provided	for	in	this	Statute,	the	Prosecutor	shall,	as	soon	as	
practicable,	disclose	to	the	defence	evidence	in	the	Prosecutor's	possession	or	control	which	he	or	she	
believes	shows	or	tends	to	show	the	innocence	of	the	accused,	or	to	mitigate	the	guilt	of	the	accused,	or	
which	may	affect	the	credibility	of	prosecution	evidence.	In	case	of	doubt	as	to	the	application	of	this	
paragraph,	the	Court	shall	decide.	
	
See	also	Rule	83	ICC	RPEs	‘Ruling	on	exculpatory	evidence	under	article	67,	paragraph	2’	
10	 Article	54	ICC	Statute—	‘Duties	and	powers	of	the	Prosecutor	with	respect	to	investigations’	
1.	The	Prosecutor	shall:	
(a)	In	order	to	establish	the	truth,	extend	the	investigation	to	cover	all	facts	and	evidence	relevant	to	an	
assessment	of	whether	there	is	criminal	responsibility	under	this	Statute,	and,	in	doing	so,	investigate	
incriminating	and	exonerating	circumstances	equally.	
	
But	see:	
Article	54	(3)	(e)	ICC	Statute—	
(e)	Agree	not	to	disclose,	at	any	stage	of	the	proceedings,	documents	or	information	that	the	Prosecutor	
obtains	on	the	condition	of	confidentiality	and	solely	for	the	purpose	of	generating	new	evidence,	unless	
the	provider	of	the	information	consents.	 	
	
See	also	Rule	82—	‘Restrictions	on	disclosure	of	material	and	information	protected	under	article	54,	
paragraph	3	(e)’	
11	 William	Schabas,	An	Introduction	to	the	International	Criminal	Court	(Cambridge	University	Press	
2011)	221.	 	
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international criminal law.12 It is recognised that the principle of equality of arms 
between the prosecution and the defence in a criminal trial goes to the heart of the fair 
trial guarantee.13 Originating from European human rights law,14 the ICTY has adopted 
the position that the notion of fair trial under European Convention on Human Rights 
(‘ECHR’) is equivalent to Article 20(1) of the ICTY Statute,15 and has been referring to 
the European jurisprudence extensively when interpretation of the principle is needed.  
According to the jurisprudence of European Court of Human Rights, the principle of 
equality of arms means that each party must be afforded a reasonable opportunity of 
presenting its case to the court under conditions which do not place him or her at a 
substantial disadvantage vis-à-vis his or her opponent.16 Although this principle itself 
does not explicitly appear in the Statute or RPEs of the ICTY and ICTR and of the ICC, 																																																								
12	 For	international	human	rights	law,	see	e.g.	Neumeister	v	Austria	[1968]	ECHR	1,	27	Jun	1968;	Morael	
v	France,	Merits,	Communication	No.	207/1986,	UN	Doc	CCPR/C/36/D/207/1986,	IHRL	2458	(UNHRC	
1989),	28th	July	1989,	p/416.	For	International	Criminal	Court	cases,	see	e.g.	Prosecutor	v	Jean-Pierre	
Bemba	Gombo,	No.	ICC-01/05-01/08	(‘Bemba’	case),	Appeals	Chamber,	Judgment	on	the	Appeal	of	
Jean-Pierre	Bemba	Gombo	Against	the	Decision	of	Pre-Trial	Chamber	III	entitled	Decision	on	Application	
for	Interim	Release	(16	December	2008)	at	paras.	32;	Prosecutor	v	Germain	Katanga	and	Mathieu	
Ngudjolo	Chui,	No.	ICC-01/04-01/07	(‘Katanga’	case)	Decision	on	the	Set	of	Procedural	Rights	Attached	
to	the	Procedural	Status	of	Victim	at	the	Pre-Trial	Stage	of	the	Case,	Prosecutor	v.	Katanga	and	Ngudjolo	
Chui	(13	May	2008)	at	para.	63;	Prosecutor	v	Thomas	Lubanga	Dyilo,	No.	ICC-01/04-01/06	(‘Lubanga’	
case),	Trial	Chamber:	Decision	on	the	Consequences	of	Non-Disclosure	of	Exculpatory	Materials	covered	
by	Article	54(3)	(e)	Agreements	and	the	Application	to	stay	the	Prosecution	of	the	Accused,	together	with	
certain	other	issues	raised	at	the	Status	Conference	on	10	June	2008	(13	June	2008)	at	para.	79.	
13	 Prosecutor	v	Milomir	Stakić,	No.	IT-97-24-A,	Judgement	(22	March	2006)	at	para.	149;	Prosecutor	v	
Orić,	No.	03-68-AR73.2,	Interlocutory	Decision	on	Length	of	Defence	Case	(20	July	2005)	at	para.7;	
Prosecutor	v	Duško	Tadić,	No.	IT-94-1-A,	Judgement	(15	July	1999)	at	para.	44	(hereinafter	Tadić	Appeal	
Judgement).	
14	 Ekbatani	v	Sweden	(1988)	A	134,	13	EHRR	504,	at	para.	30;	Barbera	v	Spain	(1988)	11	EHRR	360	at	
para.18;	Brandsetter	v	Austria	(1991)	15	EHRR	213	at	para.67,	citing	in	Prosecutor	v	Aleksovski,	No.	IT-	
95-14/1-AR73,	Decision	on	Prosecutor’s	Appeal	on	Admission	of	Evidence	(16	February	1999)	at	para.24.	
15	 Prosecutor	v	Kordić	and	Čerkez,	No.	IT-95-14/2-A,	Judgement	(17	December	2004)	(hereinafter	Kordić	
and	Čerkez	Appeal	Judgement)	at	para.	175;	Tadić	Appeal	Judgement	(n	52)	at	para.44.	 	
16	 Dombo	Beheer	BV	v	NL	(1994)	18	EHRR	213,	at	para.	33;	Ruiz-Mateos	v	Spain	[1993]	16	EHRR	505,	at	
para.63	(noting	equality	of	arms	require	a	real	opportunity	for	the	parties	to	comment	on	the	evidence	
against	it).	
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it is implicit to the wording of Article 21(4) ICTY and Article 20(4) ICTR Statute, 
which ensures certain minimum guarantees ‘in full equality’. The Rome Statute also 
included this right in Article 67. The doctrine has been increasingly favoured in the 
international criminal law jurisprudence, and has been addressed as elementary to the 
fairness of international criminal proceedings.17 As explained by one ICC Pre-Trial 
Chamber, ‘fairness is closely linked to the concept of equality of arms, or of balance 
between the parties during the proceedings. As commonly understood, it concerns the 
ability of a party to a proceeding to adequately make its case, with a view to influencing 
the outcome of the proceedings in its favour.’18 
Nevertheless, how the principle is and ought to be applied before an international 
criminal trial, and the exact scope of this principle is not without confusion. The ad hoc 
Tribunals’ approach towards the principle will be critically assessed in the next section.  
III. The Scope of Equality of Arms 
A. Procedural Equality 
The ad hoc Tribunals have limited the scope of the principle of equality of arms to 																																																								
17	 Christoph	Safferling,	‘Equality	of	Arms’	in	Antonio	Cassese	(ed),	The	Oxford	companion	to	
international	criminal	justice	(Oxford	University	Press	2009)	311	(described	it	as	a	general	principle	of	
law).	See	also,	Prosecutor	v	Radoslav	Brđanin	&	Momir	Talić,	No.	IT-99-36-T,	Public	version	of	the	
confidential	decision	on	the	alleged	illegality	of	rule	70	of	6	May	2002	(23	May	2002)	at	para.	22	
(describing	the	overall	fairness	test);	Prosecutor	v	Krajišnik	and	Plavšić,	No.	IT-00-39-T,	Decision	on	
Prosecution	Motion	for	Clarification	in	respect	of	Application	of	Rules	65	ter,	66	(B)	and	67	(C)	(1	August	
2001).	
18	 Situation	in	Uganda,	ICC-02/04-01/05-20-US-Exp,	PTC	II,	Decision	on	Prosecutor's	Application	for	
Leave	to	Appeal	in	part	Pre-Trial	Chamber	II's	Decision	on	the	Prosecutor's	Applications	for	Warrants	of	
Arrest	under	Article	58	Unsealed	pursuant	to	Decision	ICC-02/04-01/05-52	dated	13	October	2005	(19	
August	2005)	at	para.	30.	PTC	II	relies	on	Tadić	Appeal	Judgement	(n	52)	at	para.	48.	 	
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procedural equality. In Tadić, the Appeals Chamber considered the proper scope of this 
principle. There are three main points that should be discussed here. Firstly, the 
prosecution maintained that this principle is restricted to procedural equality, whereas 
the defence argued that the principle also extends to substantive equality.19 By referring 
to the jurisprudence of the European authorities, the Appeals Chamber accepted the 
prosecution’s submission that the principle meant procedural equality only.20 Secondly, 
the Chamber held that ‘there is nothing in the ECHR case law that suggests that the 
principle is applicable to conditions, outside the control of a court...’21 Thirdly, due to 
the particular circumstances of the international tribunals, e.g. the need of state 
cooperation, lacking enforcement power, etc., ‘the principle of equality of arms must be 
given a more liberal interpretation than that normally upheld with regard to proceedings 
before domestic courts.’ Although the conclusion reached by the Appeals Chamber is 
understandable as a matter of practical consideration, it is, however, not entirely 
convincing from a principle viewpoint. 
Concerning the first point, the problem is that the Appeals Chamber cited several ECHR 
and HRC authorities to support its reasoning.22 The Courts and some commentators 
hold the view that the principle of equality of arms can be interpreted as identical as its 
ECHR equivalent.23 However, it is doubtful that the Tribunals could and should apply 																																																								
19	 ibid	at	para.	45.	
20	 ibid	at	para.	50.	
21	 ibid	at	para.	49.	
22	 ibid	at	para.	48-50.	
23	 Kordić	and	Čerkez	Appeal	Judgement	(n	54)	at	para.	175;	Tadić	Appeal	Judgement	(n	52)	at	para.	44.	 	
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the ECHR jurisprudence without careful analysis first. Admittedly, it is natural to 
interpret the purview of a principle as its origins, nevertheless, the different context 
between the ECHR and the ICTY, ICTR should have been taken into account when 
applying it.24 As Jones and Powles critically pointed out, in the Appeals Chamber’s 
Judgement, the Chamber has relied on inappropriate ECHR cases, as many of them are 
in fact concerned about civil matters, rather than criminal ones.25 The distinctiveness 
between civil and criminal cases should be observed, in that none of the parties in civil 
cases will suffer the institutional and other inherent disadvantages as the accused does 
in criminal cases. Also, the purpose of civil litigation and criminal proceedings differs, 
as the former deals with dispute and compensation, whereas the latter decides over 
one’s guilt and punishment. Therefore, in civil law cases, it can be accepted that 
guaranteeing procedural equality is enough for the Court while the same does not hold 
true for criminal cases. Furthermore, the emphasis on civil cases can too easily lead to 
the conclusion that the prosecution and defence are equal parties in the proceedings, 
both the intended beneficiaries of the equality of arms principle.26  
As to the second point, the Tribunal held that if the matter is outside the control of the 
Tribunals, equality of arms does not apply. Again, the Appeals Chamber relied on the 
																																																								
24	 Robinson,	‘The	Identity	Crisis	of	International	Criminal	Law’	(n	9)	943,	946–949	(noting	the	different	
contexts	between	international	criminal	law	and	human	rights	law).	 	
25	 John	RWD	Jones	and	Steven	Powles,	International	Criminal	Practice:	The	International	Criminal	
Tribunal	for	the	Former	Yugoslavia,	the	International	Criminal	Tribunal	for	Rwanda,	the	International	
Criminal	Court,	the	Special	Court	for	Sierra	Leone,	the	East	Timor	Special	Panel	for	Serious	Crimes,	War	
Crimes	Prosecutions	in	Kosovo	(Oxford	University	Press	2003)	592.	
26	 ibid.	
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European human rights cases to support its position. However, the situation between the 
two institutions can be very different, since the European Court of Human Rights 
mainly deals with cases from relatively stable, western democracies where police forces 
are able to provide law and order and, thus, are able to ensure the appearance of 
witnesses before domestic courts. This was evidently not the situation in Prijedor, 
where the police chief, Simo Drljaca, was himself indicted for genocide by the ICTY 
(and shot by SFOR troops trying to arrest him on 10 July 1997, 2 months after the Tadić 
Trial judgment was rendered), and where the attendance of witnesses could not and 
would not be secured by the local police.27 The distinct context is even more so when 
comparing the European situation to that of the ICTR and the ICC, although both 
Courts have followed the approach of the ICTY. 
Turning to the third point, the Tribunal calls this approach ‘more liberal’ is in fact 
confusing. It has been believed to imply a more lenient approach favouring the 
defence,28 but this was not the case in Tadić. In this case, the defence contended that the 
lack of cooperation and obstruction by certain external entities29 prevented the proper 
presentation of its case at trial. However, what the Chamber meant in that context was 
that the Tribunal would assist the defence to obtain access to evidence only when it 
would be within its control. The defence was not in protest of the Trial Chamber’s 																																																								
27	 ibid	591–2.	
28	 Cf.	Geert-Jan	GJ	Knoops,	Theory	and	Practice	of	International	and	Internationalized	Criminal	
Proceedings	(Kluwer	Law	International	2005)	39–40;	Stefania	Negri,	‘The	Principle	of	Equality	of	Arms	
and	the	Evolving	Law	of	International	Criminal	Procedure’’	(2005)	5	International	Criminal	Law	Review	
513,	545.	 	
29	 Referring	to	the	Government	of	Republika	Srpska	and	the	civic	authorities	in	Prijedor.	
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failure in responding to a request for assistance, but the result of the relevant authorities’ 
non-cooperation. The Chamber held that the defence is given a reasonable opportunity 
to present its case and, accordingly, no breach of the equality of arms principle can be 
observed.30 
Commentators are of divided opinion if this liberal approach is warranted. Buisman, for 
example, has cautioned that this approach could be precarious, as it may justify 
undesirable restrictions on the principle.31 However, others seem to view this approach 
‘realistic’, as the Chamber acknowledges that ‘there are no mechanistic solutions to the 
“inequality” problem’.32  
B. The Applicability of the Principle of Equality of Arms 
It is submitted that the only ‘right’ holder of the principle of equality of arms is the 
accused. Other parties, e.g. the prosecution, victims, international community, at most 
could only be addressed as ‘interest holders’ of the right to a fair trial, they do not hold 
such enforceable rights as deriving from their status at trial.33  
Concerning the applicability of the principle of equality of arms, the Tribunal’s current 
																																																								
30	 Tadić	Appeal	Judgement	(n	52)	at	para.53.	
31	 Caroline	Buisman,	‘Defence	and	Fair	Trial’	in	Roelof	Haveman,	Olga	Kavran	and	Julian	Nicholls	(eds),	
Supranational	Criminal	Law:	A	System	of	Sui	Generis	(2003)	221.	
32	 Sergey	Vasiliev,	‘Trial’	in	Luc	Reydams,	Jan	Wouters	and	Cedric	Ryngaert	(eds),	International	
Prosecutors	(OUP	Oxford	2012)	735.	
33	 Yvonne	McDermott,	‘Rights	in	Reverse:	A	Critical	Analysis	of	Fair	Trial	Rights	Under	International	
Criminal	Law’	in	William	Schabas,	Yvonne	McDermott	and	Niamh	Hayes	(eds),	The	Ashgate	Research	
Companion	to	International	Criminal	Law:	Critical	Perspectives	(Ashgate	Publishing	2012)	166.	 	
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position is that it applies to both the defence and the prosecution.34 Despite the 
principle was traditionally understood as a remedy of disadvantages suffered by the 
weaker party, i.e. the accused,35 the Chambers did not dismiss the possibility of 
applying equality of arms on the prosecution.36 Tracing back to the early era of the 
ICTY, both positions existed. In Tadić, Judge Vohrah stated in his Separate Opinion 
that ‘the principle is intended in an ordinary trial to ensure that the defence has means to 
prepare and present its case equal to those available to the prosecution which has all the 
advantages of the State on its side … the application of the equality of arms principle 
especially in criminal proceedings should be inclined in favour of the defence acquiring 
parity with the prosecution in the presentation of the defence case before the Court to 
preclude any injustice against the accused.’37 
This position, however, was rejected by a later case, where the Trial Chamber expressed 
the view that to interpret the principle as guaranteeing equality for one side of 
proceedings would itself be ‘tantamount to a procedural inequality in favour of the 																																																								
34	 Prosecutor	v	Karemera	et	al,	No.	ICTR-98-44-PT,	Decision	on	Severance	of	Andre	Rwamakuba	and	
Amendments	of	the	Indictment	(7	December	2004)	at	para.26;	Prosecutor	v	Aleksovski,	No.	IT-	
95-14/1-AR73,	Decision	on	Prosecutor’s	Appeal	on	Admission	of	Evidence	(16	February	1999)	at	para.	25;	
Prosecutor	v	Prlić	et	al,	No.	IT-04-74-AR73.4,	Decision	on	Prosecution	Appeal	Concerning	the	Trial	
Chamber’s	Ruling	Reducing	Time	for	the	Prosecution	Case	(6	February	2007)	at	para.	14.	
35	 Stefania	Negri,	‘Equality	of	Arms-Guiding	Light	or	Empty	Shell?’	in	Michael	Bohlander	(ed),	
International	Criminal	Justice:	A	critical	Analysis	of	Institutions	and	Procedures	(Cameron	May	2007)	13.	
36	 Prosecutor	v	Kordić	and	Čerkez,	No.	IT-65-14/2-A,	Decision	on	Application	by	Mario	Cerkez	for	
Extension	of	Time	to	File	his	Respondent's	Brief	(11	September	2001)	at	para.	7.	
37	 Prosecutor	v	Tadić,	Separate	Opinion	of	Judge	Vohrah	on	Prosecution	Motion	for	Production	of	
Defence	Witness	Statements,	No.	IT-94-1-A	(27	Nov	1996)	p.7.	In	this	case,	the	Chamber	interpreted	
Article	21(4)	(e)	to	mean	that	there	must	be	procedural	equality	between	the	accused	and	the	
prosecutor	and,	since	the	Prosecutor	must	provide	a	witness	list	pre-trial,	the	Defence	must	provide	a	
witness	list	prior	to	the	commencement	of	its	case,	so	that	the	Defence	Witnesses	can	be	examined	
‘under	the	same	conditions’	as	the	Defence	examined	Prosecution	witnesses.	See,	para.22.	
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defence and against the prosecution, and will result in inequality of arms.’38 It should 
be noted that the Trial Chamber seemingly misinterpreted the statement of Judge 
Vohrah. He stated that the principle should be interpreted to favour the defence and the 
prosecution being equal before the Trial Chamber, not that the principle favours the 
defence.39 Nevertheless, the issue was then settled by the Appeals Chamber in Tadić, 
held that:  
‘[U]nder the Statute of the International Tribunal the principle of equality of arms must 
be given a more liberal interpretation than that normally upheld with regard to 
proceedings before domestic courts. This principle means that the prosecution and the 
defence must be equal before the Trial Chamber. It follows that the Chamber shall 
provide every practicable facility it is capable of granting under the Rules and Statute 
when faced with a request by a party for assistance in presenting its case.’40  
The Appeals Chamber provided the justification for this approach in Aleksovski, and 
explaining that ‘this application of the concept of a fair trial in favour of both parties is 
understandable because the prosecution acts on behalf of and in the interests of the 
community, including the interests of the victims of the offence charged.’41 It even 																																																								
38	 Prosecutor	v	Zejnil	Delalić	et	al.,	No.	IT-96-21-T,	Decision	on	the	Prosecution’s	Motion	for	an	Order	
Requiring	Advance	Disclosure	of	Witnesses	by	the	Defence”,	(4	February	1998)	at	para.	48-9.	
39	 	 John	E	Ackermann	and	Eugène	O’Sullivan,	Practice	and	Procedure	of	the	International	Criminal	
Tribunal	for	the	Former	Yugoslavia:	With	Selected	Materials	from	the	International	Criminal	Tribunal	for	
Rwanda	(Martinus	Nijhoff	Publishers	2000)	135.	
40	 Tadić	Appeal	Judgement	(n	52)	at	para.	52.	This	position	has	been	consistently	applied	by	the	
Chambers	in	the	later	Kordić,	Prlić,	Aleksovski	cases.	
41	 Prosecutor	v	Aleksovski,	No.	IT–95–14/1–AR73,	Decision	on	Prosecutor's	Appeal	on	Admissibility	of	
Evidence	(16	February	1999)	at	para.24.	
		
 		
	
37 
went on to suggest that ‘it is difficult to see how a trial could ever be considered to be 
fair where the accused is favoured at the expense of the prosecution beyond…’42 
However, this explanation apparently is not convincing after scrutiny and is hardly 
consistent with the Statute. Although many authorities have endorsed the Tribunal’s 
rationale for the prosecution’s entitlement to equality of arms,43 they failed to provide 
proper explanation as well. 
Firstly, it is curious that the ICTY has used Article 21 paragraph (1) instead of 
paragraph (4) as the statutory basis for equality of arms.44 Article 21(1) ICTY Statute 
provides that ‘All persons shall be equal before the Tribunal’. The fact that this was 
routinely interpreted as a legal basis for equality of arms in the proceedings of the ad 
hoc Tribunals is confusing.45 The problem is that the provision speaks of the equality of 																																																								
42	 ibid	at	para.	25;	See	also	Tochilovsky,	Jurisprudence	of	the	International	Criminal	Courts	and	the	
European	Court	of	Human	Rights:	Procedure	and	Evidence	(n	40)	276.	
43	 See	May	and	Wierda	(n	2)	262	(citing	the	above	Aleksovski	Decision);	Bassiouni,	Introduction	to	
International	Criminal	Law	(n	2)	839;	Tochilovsky,	Jurisprudence	of	the	International	Criminal	Courts	and	
the	European	Court	of	Human	Rights:	Procedure	and	Evidence	(n	40)	276.	These	authorities	did	not	
closely	examine	the	rationale,	but	simply	stated	that	because	the	prosecution	‘represents	international	
community,	including	the	victims’;	however,	why	would	the	fact	of	being	a	representative	justify	the	
prosecution	to	be	entitled	to	such	right?	Tochilovsky	further	note	that	‘although	use	of	the	word	
fairness	in	the	context	of	a	criminal	trial	might	commonly	refer	to	fairness	for	an	accused,	the	
Prosecution	undoubtedly	is	entitled	to	a	fair	opportunity	to	present	its	case.’	But	why	‘undoubtedly?	He	
did	not	provide	further	explanation.	 	
44	 E.g.	Prosecutor	v	Aleksovski,	No.	IT–95–14/1–AR73,	Decision	on	Prosecutor's	Appeal	on	Admissibility	
of	Evidence	(16	February	1999)	at	para.	23.	 	
Article	21(4)	ICTY	RPEs	provides	that	‘In	the	determination	of	any	charge	against	the	accused	pursuant	
to	the	present	Statute,	the	accused	shall	be	entitled	to	the	following	minimum	guarantees,	in	full	
equality’.	
45	 E.g.	Prosecutor	v	Slobodan	Milošević,	No.	IT-02-54-AR73,	Reasons	for	Refusal	of	Leave	to	Appeal	from	
Decision	to	Impose	Time	Limit	(16	May	2002)	at	para.	313;	Prosecutor	v	Stakić,	No.	IT-97-24-A,	
Judgement	(22	March	2006)	at	para.	149;	Prosecutor	v	Aleksovski,	No.	IT–95–14/1–AR73,	Decision	on	
Prosecutor's	Appeal	on	Admissibility	of	Evidence	(16	February	1999),	at	para.	23;	Prosecutor	v	Duško	
Tadić,	No.	IT-94-1-A,	Judgement,	IT-94-1-A	(15	July	1999),	at	para.	47;	Prosecutor	v	Kordić	and	Čerkez,	
No.	IT-95-14/2-A,	Decision	on	Application	by	Mario	Čerkez	for	Extension	of	Time	to	File	his	Respondent's	
Brief	(11	September	2001),	at	para.5.	
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‘all persons’, and not ‘all parties’. The principle of equality before the court is a 
different issue than the principle of ‘equality of arms’; it is a principle of 
non-discrimination, meaning that the accused should not be discriminated due to 
grounds such as gender, ethnic race, nationality, or religion, etc.46 Although it is 
possible to evoke a parallel with the principle of equality of persons before the court, 
merging them in this manner is hardly justifiable.47 Some scholars seem to follow this 
strange logic of the Tribunals without questioning it further.48 
Moreover, Article 21 of the ICTY Statute and Article 20 ICTR) is titled ‘Rights of the 
Accused’, hence, it could be reasonably inferred that Article 21 (1) was intended to 
grant equality between accused persons, and does not call for an equal status of the 
prosecution and the defence at trial.49 That is, the prosecution should be excluded from 
the application of this Article.  
Nevertheless, the ad hoc Tribunals have interpreted this provision differently. The 
ICTR held that the Statute obliges a Trial Chamber to ensure that a trial is fair and 
expeditious with full respect for the rights of the accused, and does not provide that only 
the accused is entitled to be treated equitably. It was noted that ‘protecting the integrity 																																																								
46	 Vasiliev	(n	71)	729.	
47	 Stefan	Trechsel	and	Sarah	J	Summers,	Human	Rights	in	Criminal	Proceedings	(Oxford	University	Press	
Oxford	2005)	95.	 	
48	 	 E.g.	Tochilovsky,	Jurisprudence	of	the	International	Criminal	Courts	and	the	European	Court	of	
Human	Rights:	Procedure	and	Evidence	(n	40)	277.	Curtis	FJ	Doebbler,	Introduction	to	International	
Criminal	Law	(Lulu.com	2007)	118.	Both	referred	to	Article	21(1)	ICTY	RPE	and	20(1)	ICTR	RPE.	
49	 McDermott,	‘General	Duty	to	Ensure	the	Right	to	a	Fair	and	Expeditious	Trial’	(n	45)	780.	See	also,	
Sergey	Vasiliev,	‘The	Role	and	Legal	Status	of	the	Prosecutor	in	International	Criminal	Trials’	[2010]	
Available	at	SSRN	1715465	40–9	<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1715465>	
accessed	2	October	2015.	
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of the proceedings means ensuring fairness in the conduct of the case as far as both 
parties are concerned.’ While a Chamber must be diligent in ensuring that the accused is 
not deprived of its rights, the prosecution must also not be unduly hampered in the 
presentation of its case.50 
Secondly, the discourse of the prosecution’s entitlement to a fair trial, because the 
prosecution ‘acts on behalf the interests of the international community’, including the 
victims, is also dubious. Is not the accused himself also part of the ‘international 
community’?51 Having said that, it is still questionable to what extent the prosecution 
can be properly regarded as representing victims in the procedural sense, as the interests 
of the prosecution might not always be identical to the victims’. The ICC innovation 
structure of the Victims Representation is an example of this point. The role of the 
prosecution, in addition to being an advocate, can also be defined as ‘minister of justice’, 
which entails that the prosecution has no identifiable clients. Since the prosecution is 
the servant of justice, accordingly, it is perhaps more proper to define its procedural 
status as powers and discretion rather than ‘rights’.52 Consequently, the right to a fair 
trial does not apply to the prosecutor as a matter of legal entitlement, as the situation of 																																																								
50	 Prosecutor	v	Zigiranyirazo,	No.	ICTR-01-73-T,	Decision	on	the	Prosecution	Joint	Motion	for	Reopening	
its	Case	and	for	Reconsideration	of	the	31	January	2006	Decision	on	the	Hearing	of	Witness	Michel	
Bagaragaza	by	Video-Link	(16	November	2006)	at	para.	18.	[emphasis	added];	Prosecutor	v	Aleksovski,	
No.	IT–95–14/1–AR73,	Decision	on	Prosecutor's	Appeal	on	Admissibility	of	Evidence	(16	February	1999)	
at	para.	25.	
51	 Cf.	Vasiliev	(n	49)	737	(noting	the	mainstream	view	thus	acknowledges	that	the	Prosecution	does	not	
hold	the	relevant	‘rights	‘for	the	sake	of	it,	but	only	as	a	corollary	of	representing	one	side	in	an	
adversarial	debate	between	the	accused,	on	the	one	hand,	and	the	victims	and/or	the	community,	on	
the	other	hand)	.	 	
52	 Vasiliev	(n	71)	738.	 	
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the accused. 
Without a doubt, the original formulation of fair trial rights was designed for the 
defendant.53 Presumably, the prosecution, as an organ of the state, was seen to have the 
backing of the state in the pursuit of its prosecutorial prerogatives; thus it is possibly 
more likely that granting the prosecution explicit due process rights was seen as 
unnecessary, rather than being undesirable.54 However, practice has shown that in 
international criminal proceedings, there are occasions where the prosecution has 
alleged that its fair trial rights have been violated.55  
However, despite the dictates of logic, the international criminal tribunals have 
continued to recognise prosecutorial rights emulating various rights of the accused, and 
this practice looks unlikely to change in the near future. Other actors, such as victims 
and the international community, continue to have their fundamental interests 
recognised in this manner, albeit less frequently.56 
C. Burden of proof 
Another argument for justifying the approach of the ‘proportionality’ test, instead of 																																																								
53	 McDermott,	‘General	Duty	to	Ensure	the	Right	to	a	Fair	and	Expeditious	Trial’	(n	45)	780.	 	
54	 ibid.	Cf.	Salvatore	Zappalà,	Human	Rights	in	International	Criminal	Proceedings	(Oxford	University	
Press	2003)	324–5.	
55	 See	e.g.	Prosecutor	v	Haradinaj	et	al,	No.	IT-04-84-A,	Judgement	(19	July	2010)	and	Prosecutor	v	
Haradinaj	et	al,	No.	IT-04-84-A,	Corrigendum	to	Judgement	of	19	July	2010	(23	July	2010).	For	an	analysis,	
see	Yvonne	McDermott,	‘Double	Speak	and	Double	Standards:	Does	the	Jurisprudence	on	Retrial	
Following	Acquittal	under	International	Criminal	Law	Spell	the	End	of	the	Double	Jeopardy	Rule?’	in	
David	Keane	and	Yvonne	McDermott	(eds),	The	Challenge	of	Human	Rights:	Past,	Present	and	Future	
(Edward	Elgar	Publishing	2012).	
56	 McDermott,	‘General	Duty	to	Ensure	the	Right	to	a	Fair	and	Expeditious	Trial’	(n	45).	
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substantive equality, is that the prosecution has the burden of proof. In Orić, the 
Appeals Chamber noted that, in light of the burden of proof, a prosecution’s task is 
more onerous than that of the defence.57 Analysing the different treatment concerning 
the restrictions on witnesses and time between the prosecution and defence, the ICTY 
concluded that proportionality, and not mathematical equality, was, therefore the 
required approach.58 The Appeals Chamber held that: 
    ‘This is not to say, however, that an Accused is necessarily entitled to precisely the 
same amount of time or the same number of witnesses as the prosecution. The 
prosecution has the burden of telling an entire story, of putting together a coherent 
narrative and proving every necessary element of the crimes charged beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Defen[s]e strategy, by contrast, often focuses on poking specifically 
targeted holes in the prosecution’s case, an endeavour which may require less time and 
fewer witnesses.’59  
This logic is endorsed by the SCSL in Sesay60 and Norman.61 In response to the 
defence’s request for better resources, the Court hold that the prosecution ‘bears the 
																																																								
57	 Prosecutor	v	Orić,	No.	IT-03-68-AR73.2,	Interlocutory	Decision	on	Length	of	Defence	Case	(20	July	
2005)	at	para.	7.	
58	 Jordash	and	Crowe	(n	3)	179–80;	Vasiliev	(n	71)	734.	 	
59	 Prosecutor	v	Orić,	IT-03-68-AR73.2,	Interlocutory	Decision	on	Length	of	Defence	Case	(20	July	2005)	
at	para.7.	
60	 Prosecutor	v	Sesay,	Kallon,	and	Gbao,	Case	No.	SCSL-04-15-T,	Decision	on	the	Sesay	Defence	Team’s	
Application	for	Judicial	Review	of	the	Registrar’s	Refusal	to	Provide	Additional	Funds	for	an	Additional	
Counsel	as	Part	of	the	Implementation	of	the	Arbitration	Agreement	of	the	16th	April	2007	(12	February	
2008)	at	para.39.	
61	 Prosecutor	v	Norman,	Fofana,	and	Kondewa,	Case	No.SCSL-04-14-T,	Order	to	the	First	Accused	to	
re-file	summaries	of	witness	testimonies	(2	March	2006)	at	p.3.	
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burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, every count and essential element of those 
counts, while the defence only needs to raise a reasonable doubt in order to secure the 
acquittal of the Accused. This reality, we consider, might justify the attribution of more 
resources and more time to enable the prosecution to accomplish this very heavy and 
delicate task.’62 
The contention that because the prosecution has a heavy burden of proof, a substantive 
inequality is justified between the parties is slightly flawed. Admittedly, in reality there 
can be no true equality of arms, the link between burden of proof and equality of arms 
is, however, oversimplified by the Tribunals, especially in the context of international 
criminal proceedings. It is submitted the fact that the prosecution has the burden of 
proof, as such, does not justify the different treatment between the prosecution and 
defence.   
The burden of proof, onus probandi, means that the burden is on the party who asserts 
it. As a general principle of law, it is a fundamental requirement that the party who 
alleges must prove it, not the party who denies it.63 This principle applies in both civil 
																																																								
62	 Prosecutor	v	Sesay,	Kallon,	and	Gbao,	Case	No.	SCSL-04-15-T,	Decision	on	the	Sesay	Defence	Team’s	
Application	for	Judicial	Review	of	the	Registrar’s	Refusal	to	Provide	Additional	Funds	for	an	Additional	
Counsel	as	Part	of	the	Implementation	of	the	Arbitration	Agreement	of	the	16th	April	2007	(12	February	
2008)	at	para.39.	
See	also	Jalloh	and	DiBella	(n	36)	275	(noting	the	use	of	qualified	instead	of	definitive	language,	‘it	seems	
apparent	that	the	Court	recognised	that	it	was	treading	on	dangerous	territory’	and	‘the	logic	here	
oversimplifies	the	reality	of	International	criminal	charges’).	 	
63	 Prosecutor	v	Delalić	et	al,	No.	IT-96-21-T,	Judgement	(16	November	1998)	at	para.	599;	Juliane	Kokott,	
The	Burden	of	Proof	in	Comparative	and	International	Human	Rights	Law:	Civil	and	Common	Law	
Approaches	with	Special	Reference	to	the	American	and	German	Legal	Systems	(Martinus	Nijhoff	
Publishers	1998)	149–150	(citing	cases	of	other	international	courts).	 	
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and criminal cases. Because criminal cases are always initiated by the prosecution, it is 
the prosecution who will bear the burden of proving the defendant’s guilt. Here, it 
should be reminded that burden of proof is closely linked to the principle of 
presumption of innocence.64 In respect of the imposition of the burden of proof, there is 
no fundamental difference between adversarial and inquisitorial systems.65 Let us 
assume a situation where the defendant is extraordinary wealthy and has all sorts of 
resources,66 will this fact switch the burden of proof onto the defence? Or, in other 
words, will the defendant lose its right to be presumed innocent? The answer is that it is 
still the prosecution who will bear the burden of proof, because he is the party that 
alleges it.  
The different standard of burden of proof, that is, to prove ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ 
in criminal cases, however, suggests that criminal law recognises the institutional 
advantage enjoyed by the prosecution. In addition, the stake, e.g. liberty or life, in 
criminal cases is normally higher than civil matters. Logically, as mentioned, because of 
the prosecutor’s role and the nature of criminal proceedings, he enjoys several 
advantages during criminal investigation which justifies the heavy burden of proof. 
However, as applied by the Tribunals, the argument goes the other way round: because 
																																																								
64	 The	principle	of	presumption	of	innocence:	Article	21(3)	ICTY	Statute;	Article	20	(3)	ICTR	Statute;	
Article	66	(1)	ICC	Statute.	
65	 Zappalà,	Human	Rights	in	International	Criminal	Proceedings	(n	93)	91.	
66	 Although	this	question	is	moot.	As	noted	at	the	outset	of	this	thesis,	even	the	wealthiest	defence	is	
hardly	able	to	outrank	the	prosecution.	See	Honourable	Lord	Patrick	Devlin,	‘Report	to	the	Secretary	of	
State	for	the	Home	Department	Commenting	on	Evidence	of	Identification	in	Criminal	Cases’	[1976]	
London:	Her	Majesty’s	Stationary	Office	para.	1.17.	
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the prosecution has a high burden of proof, he is entitled to enjoy much more resources 
and, thus, the principle of equality of arms will not be violated. More inherently, if the 
prosecution receives support proportionate to his burden, then the claims of equivalence 
between the parties become meaningless.67 
In practical terms, because of the complex nature of international crimes, the 
international defence has to do a lot more than ‘poking holes’ in the prosecution’s case 
in international criminal proceedings. But even if poking holes would be the focus of a 
defence case, the size of the prosecution case may require the defence to tailor its case 
to it, as a matter of strategy.68 The more evidence the prosecution presents, the more 
there is for the defence to rebut.69 The reasoning provided in Orić suggests that the 
defendant might only undertake to investigate one element of the defence, is 
overlooking the reality of international criminal charges. 
This argument in fact shows the pro-prosecution atmosphere among the judges, which 
is similarly illustrated in the U.S. policy arguments.70 The presumption of innocence is 
difficult to be upheld, as many judges themselves view the defence as enjoying too 
many advantages, and feel the necessity to argue for the prosecution. Therefore, it does 
																																																								
67	 Jalloh	and	DiBella	(n	36)	266.	
68	 Jordash	and	Crowe	(n	3)	279.	
69	 JPW	Temminck	Tuinstra,	Defence	Counsel	in	International	Criminal	Law	(TMC	Asser	Press	2009)	164.	 	
70	 See	Chapter	V.	
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not come as a surprise that the only retrial in the ICTY – based on the violation of the 
right to a fair trial – is not ordered in favour of the defence, but the prosecution!71 
IV. Equality of Arms and Resources 
A. Resources – Key to Prepare One’s Defence 
In order for a criminal justice system to work fairly, the defence must be able to present 
its case properly. This is particularly true for the adversarial settings adopted by the 
international criminal tribunals. The defence’s ability to prepare an effective defence is 
indispensable for the right to a fair trial and the principle of equality of arms. The 
Statutes of the modern criminal Tribunals has recognised the importance of this right, 
and explicitly guarantee the accused’s right ‘to have adequate time and facilities for the 
preparation of his or her defence’.72  
However, at least from the viewpoint of the defence, this right is far from being realised. 
At the ad hoc Tribunals, the defence counsels have frequently complained about the 
lack of sufficient resources which impaired their ability to conduct proper investigations. 
In contrast, the prosecution has enjoyed wide-ranging resources, including time, 
personnel and other investigative powers. The international context, in particular at the 
investigation phase, has imposed further evidentiary challenges for the defence.73 As 
pointed out by Jordash and Crowe, the allocation of resources ‘is often the key to 																																																								
71	 Prosecutor	v	Haradinaj	et	al,	No.	IT-04-84-A,	Judgement	(19	July	2010).	
72	 Article	21	ICTY	Statute	and	Article	20	ICTR	Statute.	
73	 Jordash	and	Crowe	(n	3)	263.	 	
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unlocking a good defence’.74  
Inequality of resources has further widened the existing imbalance between the two 
parties, where the defence has already suffered numerous institutional disadvantages. 
Instead of addressing this issue, however, the Tribunals have avoided providing any 
meaningful explanation of what this right means in the context of international trials.75 
B. Not Equality of Resources 
The Chambers have constantly stated that an accused is entitled to ‘a reasonable and 
adequate opportunity to present his case’.76 One ICC Chamber elaborated that this 
means the right of a ‘party to proceeding to adequately make its case, with a view to 
influencing the outcome of the proceedings in its favour’.77 Nonetheless, practice has 
shown that the Courts have promise much, but delivered little that is enforceable in 
practice.78 
In light of the jurisprudence of the ad hoc Tribunals, it seems that the Courts are more 
concerned about the difficulties and obstacles encountered by the Tribunals and the 
prosecution than the rights of the defence. Instead of attempting to improve the 																																																								
74	 ibid	276.	
75	 ibid	278.	 	
76	 Prosecutor	v	Milošević,	No.	IT-02-54-T,	Decision	in	relation	to	Severance,	Extension	of	Time	and	Rest	
(12	December	2005)	at	para.	25;	Prosecutor	v	Stakić,	No.	IT-97-24-A,	Judgement	(22	March	2006)	at	
para.149.	Nahimana	et	al	v	Prosecutor,	No.	ICTR-99-52-A,	Judgement	(28	November	2007)	at	para.	181.	
Katanga	case,	Trial	Chamber,	Judgment	(7	March	2014)	at	para.	1572.	
77	 Situation	in	Uganda,	ICC-02/04-01/05-20-US-Exp,	PTC	II,	Decision	on	Prosecutor’s	Application	for	
Leave	to	Appeal	in	part	Pre-Trial	Chamber	II’s	Decision	on	Prosecutor’s	Applications	for	Warrants	of	
Arrest	under	Article	58	(19	August	2005)	para.	30.	
78	 Jordash	and	Crowe	(n	3)	278.	
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disequilibrium between the two parties, the Courts appear to prepare a full set of 
arguments which can combat nearly any defence claim of reconstructed the concept of 
equality of arms inequality.79 Being unable to meet the demand of the defence, the 
Chambers seek to be creative with its response, rather than solving the underlying 
problem itself. 
Firstly, the Tribunals considered that equality of arms does not mean equality of 
‘resources’. According to the ICTY, the principle of equality of arms means that a 
judicial body is obligated to ensure that neither party is put at a disadvantage when 
presenting its case.80 It is interesting to note that the Chambers have always defined 
this right as a negative one, 81 rather than positive, which seem to imply that there is a 
minimal guarantee of adequate and sufficient time and resources to present one’s 
defence. In line with the ECHR jurisprudence, it is interpreted as merely requiring 
‘procedural’ equality, not substantive equality.82 As the jurisprudence continuously 
reiterates, this is not to be confused with ‘equality of means and resources’,83 or with 
mathematical equality.84 So, in Milutinović, the defence cannot rely on a lack of 																																																								
79	 	 Jalloh	and	DiBella	(n	36)	272.	
80	 Prosecutor	v	Kordić	and	Čerkez,	No.	IT-65-14/2-A,	Judgement	(17	December	2004)	at	paras	175-76;	
Prosecutor	v	Milutinović	et	al,	No.	IT-99-37-AR73.2,	Decision	on	Interlocutory	Appeal	on	Motion	for	
Additional	Funds	(13	November	2003)	at	para.	23;	Tadić	Appeal	Judgement	(n	52)	at	paras	48	and	50	
(discussing	human	rights	principles	from	the	jurisprudence	of	the	ECtHR	and	by	the	Human	Rights	
Committee).	
81	 Jordash	and	Crowe	(n	3)	278.	 	
82	 See	e.g.	Tadić	Appeal	Judgement	(n	52)	at	paras.	51-2.	
83	 Prosecutor	v	Perišić,	No.	IT-04-81-PT,	Decision	on	Motion	to	Appoint	Amicus	Curiae	to	Investigate	
Equality	of	Arms	(18	June	2007)	at	para.	9	 	
84	 Prosecutor	v	Kayishema	and	Ruzindana,	No.ICTR-95-1-T,	Judgement	(21	May	1999)	at	para.	60;	
Prosecutor	v	Kayishema	and	Ruzindana,	No.ICTR-95-1-T,	Order	on	the	Motion	by	the	Defence	Counsel	for	
Application	of	Article	20(2)	and	(4)(b)	of	the	Statute	of	the	International	Criminal	Tribunal	for	Rwanda	(5	
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resources during the pre-trial stage to establish that he is disadvantaged in presenting his 
case at trial.85 In Orić, it is considered unnecessary to give the accused the same amount 
of time as the prosecution to present his case. A principle of basic proportionality, rather 
than strict mathematical equality, generally governs the relationship between the time 
allotted to both sides.86 Similarly, the proportionality test applies to the numbers of 
documents and translation services.87 For example, in Prlić, the Appeals Chamber held 
that it was not relevant to compare the number of documents translated for the 
prosecution to determine if the number of documents to be translated for the defence 
was reasonable.88 
By employing this approach, any differences between the defence and the prosecution 
regarding personnel, financial and other resources will not necessarily affect the 
principle of equality of arms.89 The Appeal Chambers reviews the sufficiency of 
defence recourses without regard to parity or equality with the prosecution. In doing so, 
the apparent secrecy of the prosecutorial practice is protected and, for the Tribunals it is 																																																																																																																																																																		
May	1997)	at	para.	3.	See	also	Prosecutor	v	Orić,	No.	03-68-AR73.2,	Interlocutory	Decision	on	Length	of	
Defence	Case	(20	July	2005).	
85	 Prosecutor	v	Milutinović	et	al,	No.	IT-99-37-AR73.2,	Decision	on	Interlocutory	Appeal	on	Motion	for	
Additional	Funds	(13	November	2003)	at	para.	24.	
86	 Prosecutor	v	Orić,	No.	03-68-AR73.2,	Interlocutory	Decision	on	Length	of	Defence	Case	(20	July	2005)	
at	para.	9.	 	
87	 Although	these	are	problems	more	related	with	the	Registrar	as	opposed	to	the	judges.	See	
Prosecutor	v	Zejnil	Delalić,	No.	IT-96-21-T,	Order	on	Defence	Applications	for	Amendment	of	the	Directive	
on	Assignment	of	Defence	Counsel,	Forwarding	the	Documents	in	the	Language	of	the	Accused	and	
Confirmation	of	the	Status	of	the	Witnesses	for	the	Defence	(31	May	1996);	Prosecutor	v	Boškoski	and	
Tarčulovski,	No.	IT-04-82,	Decision	on	the	motions	on	fair	trial	and	extensions	of	time	(19	May	2006)	at	
para.	13.	
88	 Prosecutor	v	Prlić	et	al,	No.	IT-04-74-AR73.9,	Decision	on	Slobodan	Prajlak’s	Appeal	Against	the	Trial	
Chamber’s	Decision	of	16	May	2008	on	Translation	of	Documents	(4	September	2008)	at	para.	29.	
89	 Prosecutor	v	Kayishema	&	Ruzindana,	No.	ICTR-95-1-A,	Judgement	(1	June	2001)	at	paras.	63-71.	
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better to move away from the arguments that are bound to lead to the conclusion that 
there is in fact actual disparity.90 
As pointed out by Safferling, this approach has been rightly criticized as ‘being 
premature and damaging the visibility of procedural fairness’91 due to the huge 
disparity between the parties in their respective ability to prepare their case. 
Furthermore, some have spoken out in favour of a more normative approach and a 
renunciation of the formal interpretation of this principle for the ICTY. 92 This would 
result in an allocation of responsibility to the judges with regard to the abilities of the 
defence. This would also shift the role of the judges from an observant to a more active 
state.  
C. Different Roles of the Parties 
Under the international criminal law jurisprudence, equality of arms does not mean that 
the prosecution and defence should be treated in an absolute equal fashion. Indeed, 
pursuing ‘full’ equality of arms in criminal proceedings will not be possible in reality 
and perhaps not necessary.93 In criminal proceedings, both the prosecution and defence 
																																																								
90	 Jalloh	and	DiBella	(n	36)	273.	 	
91	 Christoph	Safferling,	International	Criminal	Procedure	(Oxford	University	Press	2012)	414.	
92	 Gabrielle	McIntyre,	‘Equality	of	Arms–Defining	Human	Rights	in	the	Jurisprudence	of	the	International	
Criminal	Tribunal	for	the	Former	Yugoslavia’	(2003)	16	Leiden	Journal	of	International	Law	269,	272.	
93	 Wąsek-Wiaderek,	The	Principle	of	‘Equality	of	Arms’	in	Criminal	Procedure	Under	Article	6	of	the	
European	Convention	on	Human	Rights	and	Its	Functions	in	Criminal	Justice	of	Selected	European	
Countries:	A	Comparative	View	(Leuven	University	Press	2000)	50;	Pieter	Van	Dijk,	Godefridus	JH	Hoof	
and	Godefridus	JH	Van	Hoof,	Theory	and	Practice	of	the	European	Convention	on	Human	Rights	
(Martinus	Nijhoff	Publishers	1998)	430.	
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have different roles and, accordingly, have different rights and obligations.94 The very 
nature of the criminal process, regardless the model employed, is not equal between the 
prosecution and defence; at least during the investigation stage, equality is not the aim. 
In order to conduct a criminal investigation, the prosecution is equipped with all kinds 
of resources, e.g. support of police and other authorities, privileges and immunities,95 
and has more time to prepare its case. In contrast, the defence is more of a responsive 
role. It is clear that the prosecution is in a stronger position than the defence even before 
the trial has started.  
At the trial stage, for the civil law systems, the imbalance between the parties is not 
problematic as such, as there is a lesser need to compensate this inequality – it is 
believed that the judges will find out the truth and protect the accused’s basic rights, at 
least in theory. In the common law jurisdictions, however, because the underlying 
premise of the adversarial settings is two parties are equal, the defence are given certain 
rights and privileges, such as the right to be presumed innocent and right to remain 
silence, in order to compensate the greater powers which the prosecution enjoys.96 
However, the question that should be asked here is, whether the fact that the two parties 
have different roles to play can justify the substantial imbalance between them. The 																																																								
94	 See	Trechsel	and	Summers	(n	86)	96.	Noting	that	‘From	the	very	beginning	of	the	criminal	process,	
the	prosecution	and	the	defence	are	in	very	different	positions…	Equality	can	only	be	conceived	of,	in	
this	context,	as	a	certain	equivalence.’	
95	 	 Klamberg,	Evidence	in	International	Criminal	Procedure	(n	39)	264–5	(noting	the	prosecution	‘has	
special	powers	to	collect	evidence,	the	support	of	States,	larger	resources,	privileges	and	immunities	
which	create	an	imbalance	to	the	detriment	of	the	defence’).	
96	 Buisman	(n	70)	218.	
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underlying presumption is that the prosecution is entitled to enjoyed significant 
advantages, as a natural consequence of their different functions.97 Following this 
premise and logic, the defence will hardly be ever able to successfully argue equality of 
arms. In other words, due to the ‘inherent different roles’, even huge disparity in 
resources between the parties would not render the trial unfair. 
In addition, the analysis of the Chamber did not go as far as clarifying how this 
proportionality test can be applied in practice, especially with regard to actual resources. 
In order to deal with the evidentiary challenges, the defence team must have resources 
that are proportionate to the size and complexity of the case. 98 This involves the 
amount of evidence against the accused, the layout of a defence strategy and the 
question of how to react to the prosecution’s theory of events, and evidence to be 
investigated. Every defence team has to deal with these issues, since they are necessary 
to develop a sound defence strategy and assess its potential.99 
 
V. Concluding Remarks 
As critically pointed out by Jordash and Crowe, after two decades ‘the meaning of 
equality of arms remains poorly defined.’100 It is submitted that the principle of equality 																																																								
97	 Jordash	and	Crowe	(n	3)	278.	 	
98	 ibid.	
99	 ibid.	
100	 ibid	274.	
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of arms as applied by the ad hoc Tribunals, is far too restricted. This principle, which is 
designed to guarantee the defendant’s right to a fair trial, has become almost impotent in 
the ad hoc Tribunals. By adopting a formal interpretation approach, the Tribunals 
generally reject the defence’s claims based on this principle, in particular when more 
resources are requested by the defence. Ironically, at the same time, the Tribunals are 
concerned about the prosecution being disadvantaged when a similar claim is advanced 
by the prosecution, as illustrated in the Haradinaj case. In this regard, it is not a surprise 
when some commentators doubt if the principle of ‘equality of arms is or even could be 
a key element of trial fairness.’101  
After examining the arguments used by the courts to limit the scope of the principle of 
equality of arms, it can be submitted that only the accused should be the right-holder of 
this principle and, even if accepting the argument that equality of arms is applicable to 
the prosecution, it should not be as a matter of right, but only as an ‘indirect 
consequence.’ The Court’s approach of procedural equality is not clear enough; instead, 
this Chapter argues that the courts should make an effort to ensure substantive equality, 
which should be the proper approach in the context of international criminal law.102  
Notwithstanding the Tribunals’ own difficulties and hurdles, the fact remains that the 
defence is at a significant disadvantage position vis-à-vis the prosecution. Accordingly, 
in order to truly reach the equality of arms principle and the right to a fair trial, the 																																																								
101	 Safferling,	International	Criminal	Procedure	(n	130)	416	(suggesting	quite	the	contrary	is	true).	 	
102	 For	similar	arguments,	see	Buisman	(n	70).	
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Courts should do more than only guaranteeing the minimum requirements to the 
accused, but assist the defence to deal with evidentiary problems commonly faced in 
international crimes cases. 
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CHAPTER III 	
THE DESIGNS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
TRIBUNALS — A HARSH DEAL FOR THE DEFENCE 	
I. Introduction 
The purpose of this Chapter is to show the disadvantaged position of the defence under 
the current design of the international criminal tribunals. Notwithstanding the peculiar 
circumstances faced by the tribunals, it is without a doubt that, in most cases, the 
prosecution holds a much stronger position than the defence before trial.1 While the 
international environment is indeed hard for an international prosecutor to conduct an 
investigation,2 it should be highlighted that the situation is even more difficult for the 
defence to prepare its case. In other words, the defence is suffering no less from those 
‘unique challenges’ arising from the international characters of an international criminal 
trial than the prosecution, and is more likely to be affected due to its institutional, 
financial and political disadvantages. Accordingly, the task of preparing an adequate 
defence in international criminal tribunals is far more strenuous than in the domestic 
ones. However, jurisprudence and scholarship generally focus on the difficulties and 
challenges faced by the Tribunals or the prosecution. As for a defence perspective, it 																																																								
1	 Although	see	Alex	Whiting,	‘Disclosure	Challenges	at	the	ICC’	in	Carsten	Stahn	(ed),	The	Law	and	
Practice	of	the	International	Criminal	Court	(Oxford	University	Press,	USA	2014)	(arguing	that	in	certain	
Croatian	leadership	cases,	the	Defence	has	more	access	than	the	Prosecution).	Cf.	Khan	and	Buisman	(n	
3).	
2	 See	e.g.	Damaška,	‘Reflections	on	Fairness	in	International	Criminal	Justice’	(n	2)	614	(’given	their	
innate	weakness’);	Bassiouni,	Introduction	to	International	Criminal	Law	(n	2)	868;	Whiting	(n	142)	1008.	 	
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was rarely mentioned until recently.3  
This Chapter is divided into two parts. The first part will address the issues of the goals 
of international criminal justice while the second part would explore other difficulties 
and challenges arising from the international context for the defence. By examining the 
wider goals of international criminal justice, it will be shown that the discourse of 
international criminal justice reflects a certain degree of presumption of guilt towards 
the accused. This is problematic for the defence, because these goals affect the design of 
a court. If a criminal court seeks to achieve objectives such as ‘ending impunity’ and 
‘justice for victims’, inevitably, certain rights of the defence would be sacrificed and, 
we risk to come dangerously close to the goal of ‘securing convictions’. Even the term 
‘fairness’ is having a different meaning in international criminal justice,4 as described 
in the previous Chapter. In light of the discrepancies between domestic and international 
criminal courts, some have suggested that fairness of the defendants should be balanced 
with fairness of the victims and even prosecutors.5 The aim of establishing historical 
record and truth seeking is also troublesome, as it is doubtful if this should be the 
function of a criminal court.6 The conflicting nature and ‘overabundance’7 of these 
																																																								
3	 See	e.g.	Zahar	(n	3);	Jordash	and	Crowe	(n	3);	Jalloh	and	DiBella	(n	36);	Khan	and	Buisman	(n	3);	Khan	
and	Shah	(n	3).	 	
4	 Prosecutor	v	Tadić,	No.	IT-94-1-T,	Decision	on	the	Prosecutor’s	Motion	Requesting	Protective	Measures	
for	Victims	and	Witnesses	(10	August	1995)	at	paras.	27	and	55.	
5	 Damaška,	‘Reflections	on	Fairness	in	International	Criminal	Justice’	(n	2)	615.	
6	 For	a	thorough	examination	and	analysis	regarding	the	function	of	seek-seeking,	see	Buisman	(n	37)	
51–3.	
7	 Damaška,	‘What	Is	the	Point	of	International	Criminal	Justice’	(n	38)	331.	 	
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goals would also be observed.8 
Despite of the special circumstances of international criminal justice, it will be argued, 
the adjudication of guilt should be the main aim of an international criminal trial, and 
other objectives could only be regarded as secondary. This is also out of realistic and 
practical concerns of what a criminal court could do. As Buisman puts it, it is hard to 
‘determine in any situation whether the secondary objectives, e.g. reconciliation, peace 
and security, and contribution to a historical record have been achieved.’9 
The second part of this Chapter will then address other challenges in the international 
context for the defence. Three particular aspects would be examined: structural, 
financial and political. These conditions place the international defence in less 
favourable circumstances than its national counterparts. 
II. Goals of International Criminal Law 
A. Introduction 
It is often contended that by virtue of the grave, shocking nature of international crimes, 																																																								
I. 8	 See	also	Mirjan	Damaška,	‘Problematic	Features	of	International	Criminal	Procedure’	in	Antonio	
Cassese	(ed),	The	Oxford	Companion	to	International	Criminal	Justice	(Oxford	University	Press	
2009)	177;	Buisman	(n	37)	24–31;	Fry	(n	26)	256.	
9	 Buisman	(n	37)	366.	
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international criminal tribunals should not only pursue the ordinary goals as of domestic 
criminal courts, but also endeavour to achieve a set of wider goals.10 However, in 
particular from the defence point of view, the so-called wider goals run the risk of 
accounting for a bias against the internationally accused before the trial has even started. 
It is submitted that while the international courts are attempting to pursue these wider 
goals, they should not lose sight of the principal objective of the criminal trial, that is, to 
determine the guilt of the accused, based on the evidence properly presented before the 
court. 
One should not neglect that the political agendas have been an attendant phenomenon of 
the ad hoc Tribunals since their first formation.11 As illustrated by the mandate of the 
ICTY, it is ‘established for the prosecution of persons responsible for genocide and 
other serious violations of international humanitarian law.’12 A similar concept was 
expressed in the Preamble of the Rome Statute, which states that ‘the most serious 
crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must not go unpunished’.13 
As for their main goals the trials are ‘to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of 
																																																								
10	 For	discussions	of	goals,	see	e.g.	Cryer	and	others	(n	5)	29–42;	Jens	David	Ohlin,	‘Goals	of	
International	Criminal	Justice	and	International	Criminal	Procedure’	in	Göran	Sluiter	and	others	(eds),	
International	Criminal	Procedure:	Principles	and	Rules	(Oxford	University	Press	2013);	Damaška,	‘What	Is	
the	Point	of	International	Criminal	Justice’	(n	38);	Klamberg,	‘What	Are	the	Objectives	of	International	
Criminal	Procedure?	Reflections	on	the	Fragmentation	of	a	Legal	Regime’	(n	27).	
11	 For	a	comment,	see	Howard	Morrison,	International	Criminal	Tribunals,	Counsel,	June	2001,	at	14	
(expressing	concerns	about	these	objectives	and	not	mentioning	due	process	rights	of	the	accused).	
12	 Preamble,	ICTY	Statute;	Preamble,	ICTR	Statute.	See	also,	Colloquium,	‘Developments	in	the	Law,	
International	Criminal	Law:	The	Promises	of	International	Prosecution’	(2001)	114	Harvard	Law	Review	
1957.	 	
13	 1998	Rome	Statute	of	the	International	Criminal	Court,	2187	UNTS	3.	 	
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these crimes and thus to contribute to the prevention of such crimes.’14 It is, 
accordingly, not surprising that the rights and interests of the defence are not mentioned, 
letting alone regarded as a priority by the international community. On the contrary, the 
protection of defence rights is often seen as an obstacle to achieving justice,15 and a 
misconception held by many is that ‘a strong defence will weaken a court ... by winning 
cases and gaining acquittals.’16 However, it should be borne in mind that justice can 
only be achieved when a trial is fair, and a proper defence team, accordingly, will only 
strengthen the legitimacy of a trial and of the Court itself. 
B. The Primary Goal of Criminal Trials: Determination of Guilt or 
Innocence 
There is little objection that the principal objective in international criminal proceedings 
is to determine whether the defendant is guilty or innocent.17 In addition, conventional 
goals of domestic criminal law usually include retribution for wrongdoing, general and 
individual deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.18 In this regard, the objectives 
of national and international criminal law are indeed similar. For example, the ICTY has 
																																																								
14	 Preamble,	Rome	Statute.	
15	 Prosecutor	v	Issa	Hassan	Sesay,	No.	SCSL-2003-05-PT,	Defence	Reply	to	Prosecution	Response	to:	
Application	for	Reconsideration	of	and/or	Leave	to	Appeal	Regarding	the	Order	of	Judge	Bankole	
Thompson	(Protective	Measures	for	Witnesses	and	Victims)	Rendered	on	the	23rd	May	2003	(June	13	
2003)	p.	26.	
16	 ibid,	p.	27.	
17	 Damaška,	‘What	Is	the	Point	of	International	Criminal	Justice’	(n	38)	331;	Bert	Swart,	‘Damaška	and	
the	Faces	of	International	Criminal	Justice’	(2008)	6	Journal	of	International	Criminal	Justice	87,	100;	
Stephan	Landsman,	Crimes	of	the	Holocaust:	The	Law	Confronts	Hard	Cases	(University	of	Pennsylvania	
Press	2013);	May	and	Wierda	(n	2)	para.1.30.	 	
18	 Cryer	and	others	(n	5)	29.	 	
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stated that its two main objectives are retribution and deterrence.19 Certain procedural 
objectives, such as the protection of fundamental rights of the accused are also observed 
in order to serve the above mentioned goals.20 As stated by May and Wierda, ‘a trial 
falling short of international standards of fairness can be said to the contrary to the very 
purpose of holding international trials.’21 Nevertheless, some have asserted that 
punishment may differ, or at least be differently interpreted, between international and 
domestic criminal law.22 
C. Wider Goals  
In the context of international criminal justice, it is often suggested that these 
international criminal tribunals should have additional purposes, which surpass the 
traditional confines of normal domestic criminal trials.23 As international criminal trials 																																																								
19	 See	e.g.	Prosecutor	v	Zlatko	Aleksovski,	No.	IT-95-14/1-A,	Judgement	(24	March	2000)	at	para.	185.	
See	also	U.N.	SCOR	48th	Sess.,	3217th	mtg,	U.N.	Doc.	S/Res	827	(1993);	ICTY	Statute.	
20	 Jens	David	Ohlin,	‘A	Meta-Theory	of	International	Criminal	Procedure:	Vindicating	the	Rule	of	Law’	
(2009)	14	UCLA	Journal	of	International	Law	and	Foreign	Affairs	77,	84–100	(noting	that	the	goals	for	
international	criminal	procedure	and	international	criminal	justice	in	general	might	be	different	albeit	
related);	Damaška,	‘What	Is	the	Point	of	International	Criminal	Justice’	(n	38).	 	
21	 May	and	Wierda	(n	2)	260.	Although	they	also	noted	that	‘the	object	and	purpose	of	the	modem	
tribunals	is	to	contribute	to	the	restoration	and	maintenance	of	peace	and	security	in	the	former	
Yugoslavia	and	Rwanda.’	See	also	John	Jackson,	‘Finding	the	Best	Epistemic	Fit	for	International	Criminal	
Tribunals	Beyond	the	Adversarial–Inquisitorial	Dichotomy’	(2009)	7	Journal	of	International	Criminal	
Justice	17.	With	regard	to	the	goal	of	‘restoration	and	maintenance	of	peace	and	security’,	Fry	noted	
that	this	goal	is	only	applicable	for	the	ad	hoc	Tribunals,	‘in	the	sense	of	the	UN	Charter	is	a	goal	of	
international	criminal	justice	at	the	macro	(institutional)	level,	because	the	UNSC	as	the	guardian	of	
international	peace	and	security	is	also	the	sponsor	of	the	tribunals’	mandates	and	the	trigger	of	their	
jurisdiction.	However,	whether	restoring	peace	and	security	in	general	is	typical	for	international	crimes	
to	the	extent	that	it	can	be	viewed	as	a	differentiating	factor	at	the	micro	level	(of	individual	trials	and	
related	evidentiary	issues)	is	far	from	obvious.’	Fry	(n	26)	256–7.	
22	 See	Mark	A	Drumbl,	‘Collective	Violence	and	Individual	Punishment:	The	Criminality	of	Mass	Atrocity’	
[2005]	99	Northwestern	University	Law	Review	539;	Frederik	Harhoff,	‘Sense	and	Sensibility	in	
Sentencing:	Taking	Stock	of	International	Criminal	Punishment’	in	Ola	Engdahl	and	Wrange,	Pal	(eds),	
Law	at	war:	The	Law	as	it	Was	and	the	Law	as	it	Should	Be	(Martinus	Nijhoff	Publishers	2008)	121.	
23	 May	and	Wierda	(n	2)	12;	Cryer	and	others	(n	5)	30;	Damaška,	‘What	Is	the	Point	of	International	
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deal with gruesome, heinous crimes such as war crimes, crimes against humanity, and 
genocide, they should serve greater purposes.24 Accordingly, wider goals, including 
ending impunity, creating a historical record, and provide justice for victims,  have 
been imposed on international criminal tribunals.25 The main contention for the pursuit 
of these wider goals is that given the special context of international crimes, and the 
specific mandates of international criminal tribunals, the objectives of international 
criminal proceedings can be different from the ones of domestic criminal law. 26  
However, it is submitted that although these goals are admirable, they should only be 
considered as secondary, as they can obscure the primary objective of criminal trials 
and encroach the defendant’s’ basic rights. As observed by Damaška, there is an 
‘overabundance’ of aims, not all of which stand in perfect harmony with each other.27 
These goals can be competing and even conflicting and, therefore, cannot be resolved 
easily.28 Also, potentially, they contradict fundamental principles of criminal law, such 
as the principle of legality29 and the presumption of innocence.30 This negatively 																																																																																																																																																																		
Criminal	Justice’	(n	38)	331.	
24	 Cryer	and	others	(n	5)	30.	
25	 ibid	30–5;	John	Jackson,	‘Faces	of	Transitional	Justice:	Two	Attempts	to	Build	Common	Standards	
beyond	National	Boundaries’	in	John	Jackson,	Maximo	Langer	and	Peter	Tillers	(eds),	Crime,	Procedure	
and	Evidence	in	a	Comparative	and	International	Context:	Essays	in	Honour	of	Professor	Mirjan	Damaška	
(Oxford:	Hart	Publishing	2008)	226.	See	also	Report	of	the	UN	Secretary-General,	‘The	Rule	of	Law	and	
Transitional	Justice	in	Conflict	and	Postconflict	Societies’,	UN	Doc	S/2004/616,	23	August	2004,	para.	38.	
26	 See	Ohlin	(n	151).	 	
27	 Damaška,	‘What	Is	the	Point	of	International	Criminal	Justice’	(n	38)	331.	 	
28	 ibid.	 	
29	 A	lower	standard	of	proof	is	often	advocated	and	employed	in	international	criminal	tribunals.	For	
instances,	the	concept	of	Joint	Criminal	Enterprise	and	Command	Responsibility	are	created	to	deal	with	
the	hardship	in	charging	international	defendants.	See	e.g.	Robinson,	‘The	Identity	Crisis	of	International	
Criminal	Law’	(n	9)	938–43	(joint	criminal	enterprise),	649–955	(command	responsibility);	Carsten	Stahn	
and	Larissa	Van	den	Herik,	‘“Fragmentation”,	Diversification	and	“3D”Legal	Pluralism:	International	
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affects the rights of the accused. Practically, it is also debatable whether the 
international criminal tribunals are the best forums to accomplish these wider goals.31 
As a consequence of pursuing a variety of goals, cases before international criminal 
courts could be unnecessary lengthy and costly.32 
Therefore, perhaps it would be more realistic and helpful to accept the limits of criminal 
law. These wider objectives could and should be better pursued by other means.33 
Having unrealistic hopes or expectations of what criminal law is capable of could be 
potentially dangerous.34 As pointed out by other commentators, ‘by setting impossible 
tasks to international criminal law ‘disenchantment and depression will set in when 
these goals are not being met.’35 Some consider that this is already the case.36  
The following broader goals will be examined: ending impunity, establishment of a 
historical record, and justice for victims. 
																																																																																																																																																																		
Criminal	Law	as	the	Jack-in-The-Box?’	in	Larissa	Van	den	Herik	and	Carsten	Stahn	(eds),	The	
Diversification	and	Fragmentation	of	International	Criminal	Law	(Martinus	Nijhoff	2012)	57.	 	
30	 Damaška,	‘What	Is	the	Point	of	International	Criminal	Justice’	(n	38)	355–6.	
31	 For	further	detail	discussion,	see	e.g.	Buisman	(n	37).	
32	 M	Cherif	Bassiouni,	‘Reflections	on	Contemporary	Developments	in	International	Criminal	Justice’	in	
Bartram	S	Brown	(ed),	Research	handbook	on	international	criminal	law	(Edward	Elgar	Publishing	2011)	
410.	
33	 Buisman	(n	37).	
34	 Cryer	and	others	(n	10)	29.	 	
35	 Iain	Cameron,	‘Individual	Responsibility	under	National	and	International	Law	for	the	Conduct	of	
Armed	Conflict’	in	Ola	Engdahl	and	Pal	Wrange	(eds),	Law	at	War:	The	Law	as	it	Was	and	the	Law	as	it	
Should	Be	(2008)	58;	Damaška,	‘What	Is	the	Point	of	International	Criminal	Justice’	(n	38)	331.	
36	 Florian	Jessberger	and	Julia	Geneuss,	‘Down	the	Drain	or	Down	to	Earth?	International	Criminal	
Justice	under	Pressure’	(2013)	11	Journal	of	International	Criminal	Justice	501;	Payam	Akhavan,	‘The	Rise,	
and	Fall,	and	Rise,	of	International	Criminal	Justice’	(2013)	11	Journal	of	international	criminal	justice	
527.	 	 	
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1. ‘Ending Impunity’ 
The United Nations ad hoc tribunals and the International Criminal Court were 
established with the public policy aim of ‘ending impunity’ for the leaders allegedly 
responsible for genocide and war crimes.37  It should be noted that, however, the 
discourses – ‘impunity’ and ‘war criminals’— to a certain extent, demonstrate a definite 
prosecutorial bias in the very objectives and designs of these tribunals.38 It seems to 
imply that because of the serious, immoral nature of the crimes, certain safeguards 
created by traditional criminal law can be suspended. In addition, due to the previous 
hardship of prosecuting these defendants, inter alia, immunity, the development of 
public international law and human rights law has been focusing on removing these 
prosecutorial barriers.39  
																																																								
37	 See	The	Preamble	of	the	Rome	Statute:	‘Determined	to	put	an	end	to	impunity	for	the	perpetrators	
of	these	crimes	and	thus	to	contribute	to	the	prevention	of	such	crime’.	
ICTY	as	the	first	international	criminal	tribunal	since	Nuremberg	and	Tokyo,	and	the	first	one	established	
by	the	UN,	the	ICTY	reversed	the	tradition	of	impunity	for	war	crimes	and	sent	a	message	that	
international	criminal	justice	could	be	delivered.	This	justice	has	touched	countless	individuals	in	the	
former	Yugoslavia	and	helped	them	to	restore	both	their	dignity	and	the	rule	of	law	in	the	region	as	a	
whole,”	said	ICTY	Registrar	John	Hocking,	in	Press	Relase,	The	Hague,	24	October	2011.	
Preamble,	ICTR	Statute:	‘the	prosecution	of	persons	responsible	for	serious	violations	of	international	
humanitarian	law	would	enable	(the	aim	of	ending	impunity)	to	be	achieved	and	would	contribute	to	the	
process	of	national	reconciliation	and	to	the	restoration	and	maintenance	of	peace’	
Brian	H	Bornstein	and	Richard	L	Wiener	(eds),	Justice,	Conflict	and	Wellbeing:	Multidisciplinary	
Perspectives	(Springer	2014)	198;	Mark	Klamberg,	Power	and	Law	in	International	Society:	International	
Relations	as	the	Sociology	of	International	Law	(Routledge	2015)	107	(claiming	the	purpose	is	to	end	
impunity).	
38	 See	the	later	section	of	this	Chapter.	
39	 E.g.	Bassiouni,	‘Reflections	on	Contemporary	Developments	in	International	Criminal	Justice’	(n	173)	
409	(stating	that	impunity	is	no	longer	the	norm);	Amrita	Mukherjee,	‘Rethinking	Justice:	Individual	
Criminal	Responsibility,	Immunity	and	Torture’	in	Charles	Sampford,	Spencer	Zifcak	and	Derya	Aydin	
Okur	(eds),	Rethinking	International	Law	and	Justice	(Ashgate	Publishing,	Ltd	2015)	102;	Sarah	Williams,	
Hybrid	and	Internationalised	Criminal	Tribunals:	Selected	Jurisdictional	Issues	(Bloomsbury	Publishing	
2012)	326.	 	
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However, it is submitted that, applying such a policy-oriented approach to criminal law 
could be precarious, in particular for the rights of the accused. The context of 
international criminal justice creates a temptation, in the name of ‘fighting impunity’, to 
provide a lower standard of fairness in international criminal proceedings. As pointed 
out by Aranburu, the ‘investigation of international crimes is often affected by a certain 
tendency to downgrade the presumption of innocence of the accused due to the extreme 
of the crime and the high expectations created by the proceedings’.40 Fry also noted that 
the goal of fighting impunity could harbour the possibilities of influencing certain 
evidentiary issues, such as employing a lower standard of proof.41 Nevertheless, from a 
normative viewpoint, to apply lower evidentiary standards for such objective is clearly 
unacceptable, as such standards are paramount to achieving an accurate and reliable 
fact-finding and the basic protection of the defence’s rights.42 
In addition, this approach has the potential of destroying the foundation of the 
international criminal tribunals. Luban, for instance, has rightfully observed that the 
legitimacy of these tribunals does not come ‘from the shaky political authority that 
creates them, but from the manifested fairness of their procedures and punishments. 
Tribunals bootstrap themselves into legitimacy by the quality of justice they deliver; 
																																																								
40	 Xabier	Agirre	Aranburu,	‘Methodology	for	the	Criminal	Investigation	of	International	Crimes’	in	Alette	
Smeulers	(ed),	Collective	violence	and	international	criminal	justice:	An	Interdisciplinary	Approach	
(Antwerpen:	Intersentia	2010)	358.	
41	 Fry	(n	26)	255.	
42	 ibid	256.	
		
 		
	
64 
their rightness depends on their fairness.’43 It is precisely because the international 
accused are charged with genocide and other serious crimes, the Tribunals should 
adhere to the fundamental principles of criminal law and bearing the accused’s rights in 
mind. What is the point of having international trials at all if the outcome is without 
being fair and just?  
2. Establishing a Historical Record 
Another ambitious aim set by the United Nations is the attempt to use the Tribunals as 
history recording devices.44 Recognising such aim has the didactic purpose of learning 
from the past,45 or ‘educating people of “historical truth” through law.’46 Note that, the 
aim of establishing a historical record is sometimes being equalised with the goal of 
truth finding.47 However, it should be highlighted that there is a subtle difference 
between ‘truth’ and ‘history’. History is, in fact, a subjective matter, as there can exist 
various versions of history. By contrast, the ‘truth’, is an objective one. As it would be 																																																								
43	 David	J	Luban,	‘Fairness	to	Rightness:	Jurisdiction,	Legality,	and	the	Legitimacy	of	International	
Criminal	Law’	[2008]	Georgetown	Public	Law	Research	Paper.	
44	 Cryer	and	others	(n	5)	30–5;	Jackson,	‘Faces	of	Transitional	Justice’	(n	166)	226.See	also	Report	of	the	
UN	Secretary-General,	‘The	Rule	of	Law	and	Transitional	Justice	in	Conflict	and	Postconflict	Societies’,	
UN	Doc	S/2004/616	(23	August	2004)	at	para.	38.	
45	 Fry	(n	26)	257;	Damaška,	‘What	Is	the	Point	of	International	Criminal	Justice’	(n	38).	
46	 Martti	Koskenniemi,	‘Between	Impunity	and	Show	Trials’	(2002)	6	Max	Planck	Yearbook	of	United	
Nations	Law	Online	1,	34.	
47	 See	e.g.	Klamberg,	‘What	Are	the	Objectives	of	International	Criminal	Procedure?	Reflections	on	the	
Fragmentation	of	a	Legal	Regime’	(n	27);	Bassiouni,	‘Reflections	on	Contemporary	Developments	in	
International	Criminal	Justice’	(n	173)	410	(giving	the	example	of	Eichmann	Trial	as	an	example	of	setting	
a	historical	record	of	the	Holocaust ;	and	stating	that	in	Al-Dujail	trial	of	Saddam	Hussein	such	purpose	is	
absent).	 	 But,	see	also	In	his	opening	statement	at	the	beginning	of	the	Eichmann	trial	in	Jerusalem	in	
1961,	Attorney-General	Gideon	Hausner	seemed	less	confident	about	the	trial’s	role	in	this	larger	
scheme:	‘I	doubt	whether	in	this	trial	we…will	succeed	in	laying	bare	the	roots	of	the	evil.	This	task	must	
remain	the	concern	of	historians,	sociologists,	authors	and	psychologists,	who	will	try	to	explain	to	the	
world	what	happened	to	it.’	 	
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examined in the next Chapter,48 the extent of truth that could achieved, at best, in a 
criminal trial is limited to the ‘trial truth’, which is determined based on the evidence 
presented to the fact-finders. In other words, since history will be depending on who is 
telling it, to ask an international criminal tribunal to achieve this goal could be 
problematic, as the fact-finders could be easily influenced by the narrative created by 
the prosecution or the victims.  
However, the ICTY in its early days appeared to be committed to this truth-seeking 
mission. For instance, trial in absentia is permitted by the Rule 61 proceedings, which 
supposedly has the purpose of giving victims a forum for their voice, and pursing the 
truth.49 In Karadžić and Mladić, the Trial Chamber stated that:  
  ‘Rule 61 proceedings… International criminal justice, which cannot accommodate 
the failures of individual or states, must pursue its mission of revealing the truth about 
the acts perpetrated and suffering endured, as well as identifying and arresting those 
accused of responsibility.’50  
This decision shows that the ICTY equates the importance of seeking historical truth 
with adjudicating a person’s criminal responsibility. However, such an assessment 
perhaps is overstated, since the history presented in international criminal proceedings 
																																																								
48	 See	Chapter	IV.	
49	 Rule	61	ICTY	RPEs.	
50	 Prosecutor	v	Karadžić	and	Mladić,	No.	IT-95-5-R61,	IT-95-18-R61,	Review	of	the	Indictments	pursuant	
to	Rule	61	(11	July	1996).	
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is usually one-sided.51 Later, as the Tribunals have grown relatively mature, the 
Chamber appeared to be re-thinking their own role and limitations. For example, in 
Stakić, they have recognised that although they have ‘endeavoured to come as close as 
possible to the truth . . . the Chamber is aware that no absolute truth exists.’52 
The history telling function is generally regarded as the most peculiar goal of 
prosecuting international crimes.53 While it is harmless to have such an objective as 
merely a by-product of the criminal proceedings,54 as it would not necessarily 
undermine the rights of the accused or affect the purview of the trial,55 it might have a 
differentiating effect if it is set as a primary objective at the trial level.56 This is because, 
when the judges decide to put the task of ‘recording historical events’ in front of 
adjudicating a person’s guilt, they would have to admit plenty of evidence, and a huge 
amount of it would be inadmissible otherwise. The current practice of the ad hoc 
tribunals seem to be admitting as much as they can, and reviewing it at a later date to 
decide the probative value. The Rules 92ter, 92bis, 92quater have these effects, as they 
would not have been admitted in most common law jurisdictions.57 It is submitted that 																																																								
51	 Vladimir	Tochilovsky,	‘Defence	Access	to	the	Prosecution	Material’	in	Göran	Sluiter	and	others	(eds),	
International	Criminal	Procedure:	Principles	and	Rules	(Oxford	University	Press	2013).	
52	 Prosecutor	v	Stakić,	No.	IT-97-24-T,	Judgement	(31	July	2003)	at	para.	21.	
53	 Swart	(n	158)	107.	
54	 Richard	Ashby	Wilson,	Writing	History	in	International	Criminal	Trials	(Cambridge	University	Press	
2011)	16.	
His	research	shows	practitioners	often	insist	that	the	goal	of	history	telling	is	not	a	burden	that	should	
be	placed	on	the	shoulders	of	judicial	institutions;	providing	historical	truth,	or	historical	narratives,	is	
merely	a	by-product	of	international	crime	proceedings.	See	also	William	Schabas,	Unimaginable	
Atrocities:	Justice,	Politics,	and	Rights	at	the	War	Crimes	Tribunals	(OUP	Oxford	2012)	161.	
55	 Mirjan	Damaška,	‘Truth	in	Adjudication’	(1997)	49	Hastings	Law	Journal	289,	293.	
56	 Fry	(n	26)	260.	
57	 E.g.	Prosecutor	v	Kordic	&	Cerkez,	No.	IT-65-14/2-AR73.5,	Decision	on	Appeal	Regarding	Statements	
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this type of approach is dubious and the judges are at the risk of being tainted by 
unreliable evidence. This could put the accused in a severely disadvantageous position, 
as more evidence are being admitted without providing a proper chance to challenge 
them, and many are admitted without careful scrutiny. It also might make the trial 
proceedings unnecessary lengthy. Accordingly, it should be emphasised that there is an 
inherent limitation of criminal proceedings: truth-finding should be based on the 
evidence presented and not go beyond than that.58 The criminal trial itself should focus 
on the adjudication of the guilt of the accused.59 The better forum for the goal of 
‘historical truth’ perhaps would be the Truth and Reconciliation commission,60 and the 
task of recording history should be left to the historians alone.  
3. Justice for Victims 
Victims’ versus Defence Rights 
The issues related to victims perhaps are the most difficult ones in any criminal justice 
systems.61 Traditionally, in criminal trials, the focus of ‘rights’ is on the defendants 
only and victims do not have the right to intervene during a criminal trial. In most 
																																																																																																																																																																		
of	a	Deceased	Witness	(21	July	2000)	at	para.	18.	The	Appeals	Chamber	observed	that	it	was	faced	with	
the	question	of	whether	the	‘unsworn,	uncross-examined,	out-of-court	statement	of	a	deceased	witness	
should	have	been	admitted	into	evidence	as	the	only	proof	of	the	accused's	presence	in	a	particular	
place	at	a	particular	time.’	See	further,	Megan	A	Fairlie,	‘Due	Process	Erosion:	The	Diminution	of	Love	
Testimony	at	the	ICTY’	(2003)	34	Cal.	W.	Int’l	LJ	47.	 	
58	 Ohlin	(n	151).	 	
59	 E.g.	Landsman	(n	158).	
60	 E.g.	The	South	African	Truth	and	Reconciliation	Commission	
61	 The	issue	of	protection	of	victims	is	a	separate	matter,	which	will	be	addressed	at	Chapter	VII	
regarding	redactions	and	delays.	
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common law jurisdictions, victims have no particular status, other than being heard as 
witnesses when they are called to the stand. But the recent movement seems to be 
advocating a shift from defendants to victims’ rights and participation.62 However, it 
should be noted that, this issue is not for international criminal courts alone, as the calls 
for a more ‘victim-centred’ or ‘victim-oriented’ approach are also trendy in the 
domestic context, in particular in common law countries.63 The rationale is to 
‘rebalance justice’; at least it is so argued.64 Interestingly, in the domestic context, 
many have expressed concerns about the potential threat to the defendants’ rights,65 
whilst the scholarship in the field of international criminal law seems to be much less 
alarmed. 
The international criminal tribunals have placed significant focus on victims, notably 
																																																								
62	 For	detailed	analysis	regarding	victims’	participation,	see	e.g.	Tochilovsky,	‘Defence	Access	to	the	
Prosecution	Material’	(n	192)	1300;	Håkan	Friman,	‘The	International	Criminal	Court	and	Participation	of	
Victims:	A	Third	Party	to	the	Proceedings?’	(2009)	22	Leiden	Journal	of	International	Law	485.	 	
Jo-Anne	Wemmers,	‘Where	Do	They	Belong?	Giving	Victims	a	Place	in	the	Criminal	Justice	Process’	(2009)	
20	Criminal	Law	Forum	395.	
Mariana	Pena	and	Gaelle	Carayon,	‘Is	the	ICC	Making	the	Most	of	Victim	Participation?’	(2013)	7	
International	Journal	of	Transitional	Justice	518.	 	
Cf.	Sara	Kendall	and	Sarah	Nouwen,	‘Representational	Practices	at	the	International	Criminal	Court:	The	
Gap	between	Juridified	and	Abstract	Victimhood’	(2013)	76	Law	and	Contemporary	Problems	235.	
(noting	that	victim	participation	can	contribute	to	truth-finding	in	trials	and	give	examples	in	which	
victims’	representatives	added	facts	and	legal	arguments	that	had	been	left	out	by	the	prosecution	and	
defense,	either	due	to	error	or	their	focus	on	the	guilt	or	innocence	of	the	accused.	But	the	authors	see	
obstacles	to	meaningful	participation,	including	the	application	process	and	the	fact	that	victims	have	
little	input	into	OTP’s	selection	of	crimes	to	be	prosecuted.	They	are	particularly	concerned	that	
common	legal	representatives	do	not	have	sufficient	opportunity	to	consult	with	victims	and	make	
arguments	on	their	behalf.)	Cf.	ibid.	(contrasting	participation	and	representation,	they	see	
representation	as	participation	provided	it	is	done	well).	
63	 E.g.	England.	
64	 See	e.g.	Government	White	Paper	2002	for	the	Criminal	justice	Act	(England).	
65	 For	England,	see	e.g.	Ashworth	and	Redmayne	(n	29);	Ben	Emmerson,	Andrew	Ashworth	and	Alison	
Macdonald,	Human	Rights	and	Criminal	Justice	(Sweet	&	Maxwell	2012).	
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the ICC.66 Due to the nature of international crimes in many cases there will be high 
numbers of victims and this, among other things, draws great attention from the 
international community. However, this substantial focus on victims could have a 
negative impact on the accused’s right to a fair trial.67 In particular, this 
‘victim-oriented’ approach can lead to the erosion of the presumption of innocence. 
Branding it as victims’ justice against the accused, as if the defendant is deemed to be 
found guilty. Therefore, it is no wonder why the Courts tolerate the prosecution’s 
overused of redactions and delays in disclosing material to the accused.68 To a certain 
extent, putting more attention on the victims means that the rights of the defence would 
be compromised in order to accompany the need of victims.69 
The scholarship has mixed views regarding victims. Many have hailed the 
victims-related provisions as a substantial advance when compared with the law and 
practice of the ICC’s predecessors.70 But the regime of victim participation also has its 
critics and some warn that it is a potentially harmful experiment to what is still a highly 
fragile system.71 Others, without being so critical, identify problems such as the unclear 
																																																								
66	 E.g.	Claude	Jorda	and	Jérôme	de	Hemptinne,	‘The	Status	and	Role	of	the	Victims’	in	Antonio	Cassese	
and	others	(eds),	The	Rome	Statute	of	the	International	Criminal	Court:	A	Commentary	(2002)	1389.	
67	 Zappalà,	‘The	Rights	of	Victims	v.	the	Rights	of	the	Accused’	(n	30)	(expressing	concerns	that	a	
significant	focus	on	victims	would	detract	from	the	attention	traditionally	bestowed	on	the	accused,	and	
perhaps	on	the	right	to	the	accused’s	fair	trial).	 	
68	 See	Chapter	VII.	
69	 See	e.g.	Packer’s	crime	control	and	due	process	models.	Packer	(n	35).	
70	 E.g.	Theo	Van	Boven,	‘The	Position	of	the	Victim	in	the	Statute	of	the	International	Criminal	Court’	in	
Herman	Von	Hebel,	Johan	G	Lammers	and	Jolien	Schukking	(eds),	Reflections	on	the	International	
Criminal	Court:	Essays	in	Honour	of	Adriaan	Bos,	vol	77	(1999)	87.	
71	 Alexander	Zahar	and	Göran	Sluiter,	International	Criminal	Law:	A	Critical	Introduction	(Oxford	
University	Press	2008)	75–6.	
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purposes behind the right of participation, and tensions with respect to the rights of the 
accused, the role of the prosecution, and the victim’s potential parallel role as a 
witness.72 
The expansion of victims’ rights is also related to the ever-greater influence of NGOs in 
the international context. The NGOs, mostly, have been paying particular attention to 
the protection of victims, giving victims voices, and how to achieve justice for them. 
While these NGOs advocate human rights and justice, they are less concerned when it 
comes to the rights of the defence. Some commentators have expressed their concerns 
regarding the NGOs, pointing out that some of the most vocal ‘NGOs have been 
unusually silent with regard to the rights of the defendants before international courts’.73 
When mentioning ‘human rights’, they often mix the human right of defendants and 
victims, which could have a misleading effect on analysing particular rights. Moreover, 
their approach is to expand the power of the prosecution; often, ‘securing convictions’ 
is more important than due process.74 Jalloh and DiBell remarked that ‘they are on the 
ground liaising with the victims and witnesses, in the media calling for an end to 
impunity, and often prematurely pronouncing the guilt of the accused’.75 In addition, 
																																																								
72	 See	e.g.	Jorda	and	de	Hemptinne	(n	207)	1338–9;	Emily	Haslam,	‘Victim	Participation	in	the	
International	Criminal	Court:	A	Triumph	of	Hope	over	Experience?’	in	Dominic	McGoldrick,	Peter	Rowe	
and	Eric	Donnelly	(eds),	The	Permanent	International	Criminal	Court:	Legal	and	Policy	Issues	(Bloomsbury	
Publishing	2004)	334;	Mikaela	Heikkilä,	International	Criminal	Tribunals	and	Victims	of	Crime	(Turku :	
Institute	for	Human	Rights,	Åbo	Akademi	University	2004)	152–4.	
73	 Jacob	Cogan,	‘International	Criminal	Courts	and	Fair	Trials:	Difficulties	and	Prospects’	(2002)	27	Yale	
Journal	of	International	Law	111,	112.	 	
74	 Jordash	and	Crowe	(n	3)	274.	 	
75	 Jalloh	and	DiBella	(n	36)	251–2.	
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NGOs often act as an additional investigative field resource for the prosecution. 76 This 
is particularly true in the context of the ICC. The problem is that this type of source – 
NGOs are interest groups – is hardly objective and often choose to overlook the 
defence’s rights. Jordash and Crowe observed that ‘convinced of the fundamental need, 
yet fragility, of the international criminal justice project, human rights activist groups 
have rarely advanced justified criticism of the international tribunals.’77  
III. Challenges in the International Context  
A. Inherent difficulties – Defence greater than Prosecution  
As Richard J. Wilson correctly observes, ‘[i]f the general problems with war crimes 
tribunals are great, the specific problems for defence counsel are especially difficult.’78 
The defence have ‘precious few resources and little or no institutional support’, while at 
the same time the law is a ‘rapidly developing blend of international and domestic 
concepts and procedures, requiring unique skills, experience, knowledge, strategic sense 
and training on the part of defen[s]e counsel.’79 The ICTY has considered these 
difficulties since the early case of Tadić, in which the Trial Chamber has stated that ‘the 
Trial Chambers are mindful of the difficulties encountered by the parties in tracing and 
																																																								
76	 ibid	252.	 	 	
77	 Jordash	and	Crowe	(n	3)	274.	 	
78	 Richard	J	Wilson,	‘Special	Issues	Pertaining	to	International	and	War	Crimes	Tribunals’,	International	
Legal	Aid	&	Defender	System	Development	Manual	(National	Legal	Aid	&	Defender	Association	2010)	
184–5,	available	at	
<http://www.nlada.org/Defender/Defender_Publications/International_Manual_2010>.	
79	 ibid	185.	
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gaining access to evidence in the territory of the former Yugoslavia where some States 
have not been forthcoming in complying with their legal obligation to cooperate with 
the Tribunal.’80 However, the Chamber considered that these difficulties are beyond the 
control of the Tribunals and, therefore, refused to assist the defence any further. 
Although the position of the Chamber is understandable, it is submitted that this 
approach is not desirable and can lead to detrimental consequences for the defence, 
which, in turn, could weaken the legitimacy of the Tribunal. Furthermore, if the Court 
wishes to give the right to a fair trial a true meaning and to comply with the principle of 
equality of arms, the Chambers must engage beyond this passive approach. As 
suggested by Jalloh and DiBella, ‘the Courts should at least make an effort to assure 
that the defence was not placed on unequal footing during investigations and the 
procedures leading up to those decisions and judgements.’81 This section would 
examine the three main disadvantage aspects of the defence in the international settings. 
B. The Designs of International Criminal Courts 
1. Institutional Factor 
Structure – an Imbalance Tripartite 
An inherent structural imbalance exists in the institutional designs of the international 
																																																								
80	 Prosecutor	v	Duško	Tadić,	No.	IT-94-1-A,	Judgement	(15	July	1999)	at	para.	52.	(hereinafter	Tadić	
Appeal	Judgement).	
81	 Jalloh	and	DiBella	(n	36)	273.	
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criminal tribunals.82 Ideally, a healthy and effective adversarial criminal justice system 
requires three main pillars: ‘an independent judiciary, a prosecuting authority which 
guards public interests, and independent and effective defence counsel.’83 However, the 
current international criminal justice system is far from this wholesome tripartite. As 
Groulx pointed out, the reality is that the international criminal tribunals are mainly 
built around ‘two pillars’, the judges and prosecutors.84 More problematically, the two 
ad hoc tribunals and the ICC are all built with the same ‘architectural defect’: while the 
judicial and prosecutorial pillars are well defined and independent, the defence has no 
independent organisation.85 
To a certain extent, the international criminal tribunals also operate as a tripartite, the 
difference between domestic criminal courts is that the third pillar is not the defence; it 
is the Registrar. This is an additional obstacle the international defence counsels have to 
deal with. Structurally, the Defence is subordinated to the Registry, and its function is 
depending on the Registry’s budget.86 In order words, unlike in the national system, the 
structural position of the defence is not on the same level as the prosecution, and many 
aspects of preparing a case is made subject to approval of the Registry. 
																																																								
82	 Elise	Groulx,	‘Equality	of	Arms:	Challenges	Confronting	the	Legal	Profession	in	the	Emerging	
International	Criminal	Justice	System’	[2010]	Revue	québécoise	de	droit	international	21.	
83	 ibid.	See	also	Stephen	Thaman,	'General	Report.	The	Planning	of	the	Conference',	(1992)	63	Revue	
Internationale	de	Droit	Penal,	505	and	516.	
84	 ibid.	
85	 ibid.	
86	 The	Special	Tribunal	for	Lebanon	is	the	only	exception,	which	has	an	independent	Defence	Office.	
However,	their	budget	is	still	subordinated	to	the	Registry.	
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It is clear that placing so much power on the Registry can potentially be unfair to the 
defence.87 Firstly, the main responsibility of the Registry are non-judicial matters, e.g. 
witness protection, detention facilities and routine court administration.88 In order 
words, the function of the Registrar is not to assist the defence; it is to provide support 
to the judges and the prosecution in performing their duties. This in effect means that 
the defence would only receive limited resources and support from the Registry, as the 
issues related to the defence are not their priority. Secondly, such an institutional 
designs can easily foster a sympathetic relationship between the Registry and the 
prosecution since the two organs work closely together.89 
Accordingly, it is not a surprise that many defence counsels consider the concentration 
of power in the hands of the Registrar to be excessive.90 As highlighted by the defence 
counsels Sesay, ‘access to an office, the right to send a fax, the payment of a bill, 
permission to hire an investigator or to conduct legal research, approval of travel plans, 
the drafting of the code of professional conduct and the conduct of a professional 
disciplinary actions ... all these decisions are in the hands of the Registrar.’91 The fact 																																																								
87	 Groulx	(n	223).	
88	 Article	43	ICC	Statute.	
89	 Toma	Fila,	‘The	ICTY	from	the	Perspective	of	Defence	Counsel	from	the	Former	Yugoslavia:	My	Point	
of	View’	in	Richard	May,	David	Tolbert	and	John	Hocking	(eds),	Essays	on	ICTY	Procedure	and	Evidence	in	
Honour	of	Gabrielle	Kirk	McDonald:	In	Honour	of	Gabrielle	Kirk	McDonald	(Martinus	Nijhoff	Publishers	
2001)	187	(noting	that	‘the	Prosecution	office	and	Trial	Chambers	function	in	conjunction	with	a	
common	administration,	and	that	they	are	even	in	spatial	proximity	since	they	are	located	in	the	same	
building	could	be	indicative	in	certain	respects	of	the	privilege	position	of	the	Prosecution’s	office	in	
relation	to	the	Defence).	
90	 E.g.	Prosecutor	v	Issa	Hassan	Sesay,	No.	SCSL-2003-05-PT,	Defence	Reply	to	Prosecution	Response	(n	
15).	
91	 Prosecutor	v	Issa	Hassan	Sesay,	No.	SCSL-2003-05-PT,	Defence	Reply	to	Prosecution	Response	(n	15),	
p.	23.	
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that the Registry controls the work and budget of the defence, in combination with the 
potential possibility of a prosecutorial bias, can have a tremendously negative impact on 
the work of the defence.  
2. Financial Factor 
Money plays an indispensable role in the international criminal justice system. Cryer 
has critically named money as the ‘dirty little secret’ of international criminal law.92 
Indeed, money is often associated with power, as it can have an impact on the decisions 
to initiate prosecutions, and even who to prosecute.93 Money is also essential for 
determining the time and resources needed to pursue these prosecutions, and to the very 
establishment of the Tribunals themselves.94 It should be highlighted that, for the 
defence, to have adequate funding is equally pivotal for preparing an effective defence. 
Nevertheless, the international community and the scholarship tend to neglect such 
importance to it.  
It is noted that immensely disparate budgets is a norm at the international courts.95 The 
establishment of the International Criminal Court did not change the financial structure 
																																																								
92	 Robert	Cryer,	‘International	Criminal	Justice	in	Historical	Context:	The	Post-Second	World	War	Trials	
and	Modern	International	Criminal	Justice’,	in	Michael	P	Scharf,	William	Schabas	and	Gideon	Boas	(eds),	
International	criminal	justice:	Legitimacy	and	coherence	(2012)	170.	 	
93	 ibid.	Cryer	pointed	out	that	money	‘can	influence	the	decisions	to	initiate	prosecutions,	the	time	
taken	to	continue	such	prosecutions,	and,	perhaps	more	cynically,	who	to	prosecute.’	
94	 ibid.	
95	 Simon	De	Smet,	‘A	Structural	Analysis	of	the	Role	of	the	Pre-Trial	Chamber	in	the	Fact-Finding	Process	
of	the	ICC’,	in	Carsten	Stahn	and	Göran	Sluiter	(eds),	The	Emerging	Practice	of	the	International	Criminal	
Court	(Martinus	Nijhoff	Publishers	2009)	425.	 	
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as of the ad hoc Tribunals. That is to say, the Registrar has the discretion to decide the 
defence’s budget. Similarly, a huge imbalance between the prosecution and the defence 
can be observed. As noted by Higgins, ‘in the present system, the efficacy of defence 
investigations cannot be guaranteed as they are commonly and consistently hampered 
by inadequate funding, a lack of cooperation from state institutions and logistical 
difficulties in accessing crime sites, potential witnesses and known sources of 
information’.96 Other defence counsels also have collaborated that, during their practice 
at the ICTY, ‘little had changed in the intervening years with regard to funding.’97  
Although the problem of financing is more of a practical matter, it is also linked to 
politics and diplomacy.98 The funding of the ad hoc Tribunals, although formally a 
matter of UN budget, depends on certain powerful State’s inclination to finance it, in 
particular the United States of America.99 Some pointed out the fact that the NATO 
States were not thoroughly investigated over their military actions with respect to the 
Kosovo may be linked to the support given to the Tribunal by some of those 
Countries.100 The issue of funding was also evident for the establishment of the IMTs, 
as they were largely counting on the willingness of the United States.101 The funding of 
																																																								
96	 Gillian	Higgins,	‘Fair	and	Expeditious	Pre-Trial	Proceedings:	The	Future	of	International	Criminal	Trials’	
(2007)	5	Journal	of	International	Criminal	Justice	394,	395.	 	
97	 Jordash	and	Crowe	(n	3)	281.	
98	 Cryer	(n	233)	170.	 	
99	 David	Scheffer,	‘A	Review	of	the	Experiences	of	the	Pre-Trial	and	Appeals	Chambers	of	the	
International	Criminal	Court	Regarding	the	Disclosure	of	Evidence’	(2008)	21	Leiden	Journal	of	
International	Law	151.	
100	 Danilo	Zolo,	Invoking	Humanity:	War,	Law	and	Global	Order	(Bloomsbury	Publishing	2002)	149.	
101	 Cryer	(n	233)	172.	 	
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the ICC is contributed by its member States.102 
The question here is: why would the States fund the operation of these international 
criminal courts? As the States are the ultimate sponsors or ‘donors’103 of these 
international courts, their motivations are predominately based on self-interests. 
Accordingly, it is not a surprise that they are rarely concerned with the financial 
resources of the defence. The financial structure of the international courts proves this 
point. As mentioned, in the context of the ad hoc Tribunals, the Registry controls the 
budget of the defence, and the Tribunals’ budget is decided by the United Nations.104 
As to the ICC, the structural situation is similar to the ad hoc Tribunals and the budget 
is contributed by the State Parties.105 When it comes to resources and funding, it is 
often argued that resources are too limited to support the defence.106 As a consequence, 
in terms of funding, it is foreseeable that the defence will not be in a favourable 
situation.   
3. Political Factor  
Another challenge for both the prosecution and the defence in the context of 
																																																								
102	 Japan,	Germany,	France	and	the	UK	are	the	largest	contributors.	This	also	reflects	why	civil	law	has	a	
more	powerful	influence	in	the	ICC.	
103	 See	Cryer	(n	233)	172.	See	generally,	Sara	Kendall,	‘Donors’	Justice:	Recasting	International	Criminal	
Accountability’	(2011)	24	Leiden	Journal	of	International	Law	585.	 	
104	 Benjamin	F	Nelson,	United	Nations:	Financial	Issues	and	U.S.	Arrears	(DIANE	Publishing	1998)	2.	
105	 For	a	comparison	of	budgets	between	the	ICC	and	ICTY,	see	Stuart	K	Ford,	‘How	Much	Money	Does	
the	ICC	Need?’	in	Carsten	Stahn	(ed),	The	Law	and	Practice	of	the	International	Criminal	Court	(Oxford	
University	Press,	USA	2014)	84.	 	
106	 Groulx	(n	223).	
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international criminal law is that they need the cooperation and supports of states for 
their investigation. For example, without the consent of the territorial State, the parties 
would not be able to enter the State to collect material or interview witnesses. This 
political factor creates evidentiary difficulties that domestic prosecution or defence 
normally would not have to deal with.107 However, it should be noted that this factor 
has a harsher impact on the accused, compared with the prosecutor, as it might restrict 
the ability of the defence to prepare an adequate and effect defence.108 The States are 
generally more cooperative with the prosecution. For instance, in Tadić, while the 
prosecutor encountered little problems in interviewing witnesses,109 the defence team 
was met with obstruction by the certain external entities, as most defence witnesses still 
live in Republic Srpska in Bosnia.110 The Bosnian authorities did not cooperate with the 
defence and accordingly, the defence counsels, contended that ‘there was no “equality 
of arms” between the prosecution and the defence at trial, and that the effect of this lack 
of cooperation was serious enough to frustrate the Appellant’s right to a fair trial’.111 
 
However, in practical terms, there was little the Tribunals can actually assist in these 
matters, as the operation of international criminal tribunals are also depending on States 
																																																								
107	 See	Jordash	and	Crowe	(n	3)	280–1.	 	
108	 Stuart	Beresford,	‘Redressings	the	Wrongs	of	The	International	Criminal	Justice	System’	in	Ustinia	
Dolgopol	and	Judith	Gail	Gardam	(eds),	The	challenge	of	conflict:	international	law	responds	(Martinus	
Nijhoff	Publishers	2006)	378.	
109	 Tadić	Appeal	Judgement	(n	80),	the	prosecution	witnesses	are	mostly	Muslim,	lives	in	Western	
Europe	and	North	America,	where	governments	are	cooperating	fully	with	the	ICTY.	
110	 Tadić	Appeal	Judgement	(n	80).	
111	 Tadić	Appeal	Judgement	(n	52)	at	para.	29.	
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cooperation. As noted by Cassese, without such cooperation, the ad hoc Tribunals 
would ‘turn out to be utterly impotent’.112 They are often criticised for this heavy 
reliance, which also leads to its ineffectiveness and political decisions, including 
selectivity.113 The ICC, for instance, is accused of being biased against Africans.114 
Admittedly, these criticisms have its merits; nevertheless, it is important to note that, as 
a branch of Public international law, state consent plays an indispensable role in 
international criminal law and, accordingly, the effectiveness could not be assessed in 
the same way as domestic criminal law. In addition, the nature of public international 
law implies that the decision-making process is horizontal, rather than vertical as in the 
domestic context. The States’ willingness determines if an international court can run 
smoothly. As a consequence, the Tribunals’ hands are tied even if they wish to assist the 
defence. The issue of disclosure further touches the core of state interests and the 
sensitive question of national security. For example, in Blaškić,115 the Appeals Chamber 
had to reverse the Trial Chamber’s decision116 regarding the Subpoena issued against 
																																																								
112	 Antonio	Cassese,	‘Reflections	on	International	Criminal	Justice’	(1998)	61	The	Modern	Law	Review	1,	
10.	
113	 For	a	detailed	discussion	on	the	issue	of	selectivity,	see	Robert	Cryer,	Prosecuting	International	
Crimes:	Selectivity	and	the	International	Criminal	Law	Regime	(Cambridge	University	Press	2005).	
114	 Cryer	(n	233)	168–9.	
115	 Prosecutor	v	Blaškić,	No.	IT-95-14-AR108bis,	Judgement	on	the	Request	of	the	Republic	of	Croatia	for	
Review	of	the	Decision	of	Trial	Chamber	II	of	18	July	1997	(29	Oct.	1997)	at	para.	25.	The	Appeals	
Chamber	held	that	only	binding	‘orders’	or	‘requests’	can	be	addressed	to	States.	The	Appeals	Chamber	
also	dismissed	the	possibility	of	addressing	subpoenas	to	state	officials,	at	para.	38.	
116	 Prosecutor	v	Blaškić,	No.	IT-95-14-PT,	Decision	on	the	Objection	of	the	Republic	of	Croatia	to	the	
Issuance	of	Subpoena	duces	Tecum	(18	July	1997).	Note,	this	subpoena	was	requested	by	the	
Prosecution.	The	Trial	Chamber	emphasized	on	its	primary	obligation,	which	is	‘to	provide	a	fair	and	
expeditious	trial	and	to	guarantee	the	rights	of	the	accused’,	at	para.	154.	The	Trial	Chamber	ordered	
Croatia	and	the	Croatian	Defence	Minister	Mr.	Gojko	Susak	to	comply	with	the	Subpoena	Duces	Tecum	
within	thirty	days	of	the	date	of	this	Decision.	
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States and state officials.117 As observed by Cogan, ‘evidence necessary to prove 
innocent or assert a legal defence may be beyond the reach of the court, either because 
of the court’s inability to successfully coerce the evidence-holder or because the 
evidence holder deliberately seeks to influence the outcome of the trial by manipulating 
the release of probative information.’118 The fact is that the operation of international 
criminal tribunals is and will continue to be depending on the States’ cooperation, 
which creates a certain inferiority of the defence, as they are more likely to be denied 
state assistance. 
IV.  Concluding Remarks 
This Chapter demonstrated that the international accused have to handle challenges that 
are unknown in the domestic context. If the international context is hard for the 
prosecutors, it is certainly harsher for the defence. As shown from the wider objectives 
of the international criminal tribunals, it is evident that the defence faces more pressure 
than their domestic counterparts. Many have advocated that in order to fulfil politically 
motivated goals, lower evidentiary requirements are sufficient. Also, the nature and 
																																																								
117	 For	discussions	about	this	case,	see	e.g.	Mieke	Dixon	and	Grant	Dawson,	‘The	Protection	of	States’	
National	Security	Interests	in	Cases	before	the	ICTY:	A	Descriptive	and	Perspective	Analysis	of	Rule	54	Bis	
of	the	Rules	of	Procedure	and	Evidence’	in	Hirad	Abtahi	and	Gideon	Boas	(eds),	The	Dynamics	of	
International	Criminal	Justice:	Essays	in	Honour	of	Sir	Richard	May	(Martinus	Nijhoff	2006)	112–8;	Ruth	
Wedgwood,	‘Case	Analysis:	International	Criminal	Tribunals	and	State	Sources	of	Proof:	The	Case	of	
Tihomir	Blaškic’	(1998)	11	Leiden	Journal	of	International	Law	635,	635	et	seq;	Roland	Bank,	
‘Cooperation	with	the	International	Criminal	Tribunal	for	the	Former	Yugoslavia	in	the	Production	of	
Evidence’	(2000)	4	Max	Planck	Yearbook	of	United	Nations	Law	233.	See	also	Klamberg,	Evidence	in	
International	Criminal	Procedure	(n	39)	240–1	(noting	the	inherent	constraint	for	the	accused,	and	the	
prosecution,	to	present	his	case,	including	evidence).	 	
118	 Cogan	(n	214)	124.	
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gravity of the crimes make the principle of presumption of innocence harder to be 
upheld in the international courts, as some argued that contextual assessment could be 
made. However, this approach might have detrimental effects on the rights of the 
accused and result in undesirable consequences as it might cause doubt to the legitimacy 
of the Tribunals themselves. In addition, expecting the Tribunals to work as a history 
recording device can make the trials unnecessary lengthy and, more importantly, 
untested and unreliable ‘evidentiary debris’ might be admitted into evidence and, 
possibly, taint the judges’ minds. Although the goal ‘justice for victims’ is of great 
importance, the expansion of the victims’ rights and their participation in the 
proceedings warrants a more cautious approach. 
The institutional designs of the international criminal tribunals further illustrated certain 
factors that normally would not exist in their domestic counterparts. What could not be 
ignored is that political factors more or less would have an influence on the Courts’ 
decisions, which could partially explain why the Chambers are reluctant to sanction the 
prosecution when they violate their disclosure obligations. 
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CHAPTER IV 	
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE – THE 
BATTLE BETWEEN COMMON LAW AND CIVIL LAW 
SYSTEMS 
 
I. Introduction 
The disclosure regime adopted in the international criminal tribunals is one of the most 
controversial aspects of international criminal procedure. One main reason for this 
controversy is that the disclosure system is at the crux of the fundamental difference 
between the common law and civil law traditions. Civil lawyers would probably find 
the complex disclosure rules ‘foreign’ and ‘alien’,1 since in civil law legal systems it is 
the ‘dossier which fulfil[l]s the function of the common law disclosure rules.’2 The 
principle rationale of the different approaches of disclosure is similar though; it is 
believed that disclosure will result in the ‘just and efficient disposal of litigation.’3  
																																																								
1	 Vladimir	Tochilovsky,	‘International	Criminal	Justice:	“Strangers	in	the	Foreign	System”’	(2004)	15	
Criminal	Law	Forum	319,	342	(noting	disclosure	is	‘another	unknown	phenomenon	to	a	civil	law	
attorney’.	See	also	Lars	Büngener,	‘Disclosure	of	Evidence’	in	Christoph	Safferling	(ed),	International	
Criminal	Procedure	(Oxford	University	Press	2012)	344	(noting	‘in	Roman-Germanic	criminal	procedure	
the	term	is	unknown’).	 	
2	 Robert	Heinsch,	‘How	to	Achieve	Fair	and	Expeditious	Trial	Proceedings	before	the	ICC:	Is	It	Time	for	a	
More	Judge-Dominated	Approach’	in	Carsten	Stahn	and	Göran	Sluiter	(eds),	The	Emerging	Practice	of	the	
International	Criminal	Court	(Brill	2009)	488;	Kai	Ambos,	‘International	Criminal	Procedure:	“Adversarial”,	
“Inquisitorial”	or	Mixed?’	(2003)	3	International	Criminal	Law	Review	1,	15.	With	reference	to	Alphons	
Orie,	‘Accusatorial	v.	Inquisitorial	Approach	in	International	Criminal	Proceedings	prior	to	the	
Establishment	of	the	ICC	and	in	the	Proceedings	before	the	ICC’	in	Antonio	Cassese	and	others	(eds),	The	
Rome	Statute	of	the	International	Criminal	Court:	A	Commentary,	vol	1	(Oxford	University	Press	Oxford	
2002)	1484.	
3	 Kate	Gibson	and	Cainnech	Lussiaá-Berdou,	‘Disclosure	of	Evidence’	in	Karim	AA	Khan,	Caroline	
Buisman	and	Christopher	Gosnell	(eds),	Principles	of	Evidence	in	international	criminal	justice	(Oxford	
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Some commentators believe that switching to the dossier approach would have solved 
the problems of the current disclosure system in international criminal tribunals,4 in that 
the dossier is more complete with regard to available evidence, and provides a ‘broader’ 
disclosure framework than the one employed in the current adversarial setting.5 
However, it is submitted this is not necessarily the case, as the rooted problem of 
disclosure is the same, regardless of approach, the system is relying on the prosecutor’s 
good faith and competence to collect evidence and disclose it to the defence. 
In addition, the dossier approach could have created a more prejudicial situation for the 
Accused, since in civil law jurisdictions the dossier is prepared for the judges,6 whereas 
the defence is only entitled to a copy after the prosecution’s investigation is completed.7 
By adopting this approach in the present adversarial settings, it could risk the judges 
being biased by seeing the evidence in advance. Accordingly, in order to fully 
																																																																																																																																																																		
University	Press	2010)	306.	Citing	Paul	Matthews	and	Hodge	M	Malek,	Disclosure	(Sweet	&	Maxwell	
2012)	4.	 	
4	 E.g.	Tochilovsky,	Jurisprudence	of	the	International	Criminal	Courts	and	the	European	Court	of	Human	
Rights:	Procedure	and	Evidence	(n	40)	95.	 	
5	 Nancy	A	Combs,	‘Evidence’	in	William	A	Schabas	and	Nadia	Bernaz	(eds),	Routledge	handbook	of	
international	criminal	law	(Routledge	2010)	324.	 	
6	 Mirjan	Damaška,	‘Evidentiary	Barriers	to	Conviction	and	Two	Models	of	Criminal	Procedure:	A	
Comparative	Study’	[1973]	University	of	Pennsylvania	Law	Review	506,	533–4;	Richard	S	Frase,	
‘Comparative	Criminal	Justice	as	a	Guide	to	American	Law	Reform:	How	Do	the	French	Do	It,	How	Can	
We	Find	Out,	and	Why	Should	We	Care?’	[1990]	California	law	review	539,	672.	
7	 Mary	C	Daly,	‘Some	Thoughts	on	the	Differences	in	Criminal	Trials	in	the	Civil	and	Common	Law	Legal	
Systems’	(1999)	2	Journal	of	the	Institute	for	the	Study	of	Legal	Ethics	65,	67–8;	Nico	Jörg,	‘Are	
Inquisitorial	and	Adversarial	Systems	Converging?’	in	Phil	Fennell	(ed),	Criminal	justice	in	Europe:	a	
comparative	study	(Oxford	University	Press	1995)	47;	Christine	Van	den	Wyngaert,	‘Belgium’	in	Christine	
Van	den	Wyngaert	and	others	(eds),	Criminal	procedure	systems	in	the	European	Community	
(Butterworths	1999)	30.	
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understand the problems of disclosure, an analysis and examination of international 
criminal procedure is requisite.  
This section starts by arguing that the nature of international criminal procedure, which 
is a hybrid of different procedural models, creates a harsh environment for the 
international accused. One might assume that the blend would provide the defence extra 
layers of procedural guarantees, however, the opposite are usually true. This Chapter 
will seek to establish that the result of the mixture is the diminishing of the original 
procedural guarantees, which would have been afforded to the defendants in national 
legal systems. However, instead of addressing these issues, scholars have been 
attempting to justify such departures from domestic jurisdictions by claiming the system 
as ‘sui generis’. They argue, in order to deal with the ‘unique challenges’ arising from 
the international context, judges and prosecutors are entitled to have more freedom 
when exercising their power. This claim will be examined and, it is submitted that this 
approach could risk the judicial and prosecutorial position being unchecked and the 
rights of the defence being sacrificed. Then, this Chapter will examine the two main 
procedural models that dominate the modern criminal tribunals, and whether the call for 
a more inquisitorial style of proceeding is warranted.8 
 																																																								
8	 For	discussions	of	the	influence	of	the	accusatorial	and	inquisitorial	systems	on	the	Tribunals,	see	May	
and	Wierda	(n	2)	2.01-2.12;	George	P	Fletcher,	‘The	Influence	of	the	Common	Law	and	Civil	Law	
Traditions	on	International	Criminal	Law’	in	Antonio	Cassese	and	others	(eds),	The	Oxford	Companion	to	
International	Criminal	Justice	(Oxford	University	Press	2009)	104.	 	
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II. The Nature of International Criminal Procedure 
A. ‘Hybrid’ or ‘Compromised’ 
The general understanding of the procedure applied in international criminal tribunals is 
that it is a ‘blend,’ ‘mixture,’ or ‘hybrid’ of the common law and civil law systems. The 
dichotomy between the so-called ‘common and civil law,’ ‘adversarial (accusatorial) 
and inquisitorial,’ or ‘Anglo-American and Romano-Germanic (Continental Europe)’ 
systems has been a monotonous and almost tiresome debate. Note that, whatever terms 
are chosen, they are only considered to be the ideal-types,9 because no ‘pure’ criminal 
procedure model exists in any current jurisdictions, and even within the same legal 
system there are substantial differences.10 For example, although juge d’instruction has 
been commonly referred to as the typical feature of an inquisitorial system during the 
investigation phase, this is only true for a few civil law countries, e.g. Belgium and 
																																																								
9	 These	terms	are	not	entirely	precise	and	can	be	misleading.	However,	for	illustration	purposes,	these	
terms	will	be	used	throughout.	For	a	discussion	of	the	two	systems,	see	Mirjan	Damaška,	‘The	Uncertain	
Fate	of	Evidentiary	Transplants:	Anglo-American	and	Continental	Experiments’	[1997]	The	American	
Journal	of	Comparative	Law	839;	Mirjan	Damaška,	‘Atomistic	and	Holistic	Evaluation	of	Evidence:	A	
Comparative	View’	in	David	Scott	Clark	(ed),	Comparative	and	private	international	law:	essays	in	honor	
of	John	Henry	Merryman	on	his	seventieth	birthday	(Duncker	&	Humblot	1990);	William	T	Pizzi,	‘The	
American	Adversary	System’	(1997)	100	West	Virginia	Law	Review	847;	Françoise	Tulkens,	‘Main	
Comparable	Features	of	the	Different	European	Criminal	Justice	Systems’	in	Mireille	Delmas-Marty	(ed),	
The	criminal	process	and	human	rights:	toward	a	European	consciousness	(Martinus	Nijhoff	Publishers	
1995).	
10	 See	Choo	(n	29)	57.	See	also	Gordon	Van	Kessel,	‘European	Perspectives	on	the	Accused	as	a	Source	
of	Testimonial	Evidence’	(1997)	100	West	Virginia	Law	Review	799,	800	(commenting	on	American	
distrust	of	‘anything	inquisitory’);	Renee	Lettow	Lerner,	‘Intersection	of	Two	Systems:	An	American	on	
Trial	for	an	American	Murder	in	the	French	Cour	D’Assises,	The’	[2001]	University	of	Illinois	Law	Review	
791,	819	(observing	that	it	was	difficult	for	a	French	judge	and	prosecutor	to	appreciate	the	degree	to	
which	American	prosecutions	are	adversarial).	 	
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France.11 In contrast, in other countries such as Italy and Germany, it is the prosecutor 
who is responsible for the pre-trial investigation.12 
It is indeed becoming increasingly difficult to put the present legal traditions into the 
corner of the common law or civil law. In the domestic context, commentators generally 
agree that the current trend is a convergence of the adversarial and inquisitorial 
models.13 As Damaška rightly noted, ‘the venerable frontier between Anglo-American 
and Continental Europe has become increasingly ill-marked, open and transgressed.’14 
Generally, it is accepted that the Anglo-American and Continental Europe systems are 
the dominant ones in the international criminal tribunals.15 Although, some 
commentators have considered that the rules cannot be truly international if other ‘legal 
families’ (e.g. Islamic, Chinese) are ignored. For example, Delmas-Marty and Ambos 
both argued that the Islamic system could or should have been included.16 However, 
whether a system is truly ‘international’ should not depend on how many legal 																																																								
11	 Lerner	(n	10)	801	(describing	the	role	of	the	juge	d’instruction	in	serious	cases	in	France).	
12	 In	Germany,	there	is	no	longer	an	investigating	judge;	the	prosecutor	directs	the	pre-trial	
investigation.	See	Francis	Pakes,	Comparative	Criminal	Justice	(Routledge	2014)	100.	
13	 Mark	J	Findlay,	International	and	Comparative	Criminal	Justice:	A	Critical	Introduction	(Routledge	
2013)	48;	Craig	M	Bradley,	Criminal	Procedure :	A	Worldwide	Study	(Carolina	Academic	Press	1999)	xxi;	G	
Van	Kessel,	‘European	Trends	towards	Adversary	Styles	in	Procedure	and	Evidence’	in	Malcolm	Feeley	
and	Setsuo	Miyazawa	(eds),	The	Japanese	Adversary	System	in	Context:	Controversies	and	Comparisons	
(MacMillan,	Basingstoke	2002);	Basil	S	Markesinis,	The	Gradual	Convergence	(Clarendon	Press,	Oxford	
1994)	30.	
14	 Mirjan	Damaška,	‘Negotiated	Justice	in	International	Criminal	Courts’	(2004)	2	Journal	of	International	
Criminal	Justice	1018,	1019.	
15	 Cryer	and	others	(n	5)	424–5;	Göran	Sluiter	and	others,	International	Criminal	Procedure:	Principles	
and	Rules	(OUP	Oxford	2013)	28	(noting	international	criminal	justice	traditionally	serves	as	an	arena	for	
a	clash	between	these	two	visions);	Christoph	Safferling,	Towards	an	International	Criminal	Procedure	
(Oxford	University	Press	2001)	5.	
16	 Kai	Ambos,	‘International	Criminal	Procedure:	“Adversarial”,	“Inquisitorial”	or	Mixed?’	(2003)	3	
International	Criminal	Law	Review	1,	37	(suggesting	should	add	Islamic	Law	or	Chinese	Law);	Mireille	
Delmas-Marty,	‘The	Contribution	of	Comparative	Law	to	a	Pluralist	Conception	of	International	Criminal	
Law’	(2003)	1	Journal	of	International	Criminal	Justice	13,	19.	 	
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traditions have been added to the mixture. Even if elements of the other legal systems 
were added, the system would only create a more perplexing ‘mix and match’ and the 
not-so international arguments would still stand.17 In other words, this type of 
‘internationalism’ would not necessarily contribute to a better international criminal 
justice. 
Accordingly, the analysis of these differences is not purely one of historical or 
superficial values.18 Not only are the convergence and conflicts resulting from the blend 
of the adversarial and inquisitorial systems necessary and relevant for the application of 
the rules of international criminal procedure, but also affects the fairness of international 
criminal trials. The differences matter, and are not for academic exercise only.19  
																																																								
17	 Richard	Vogler,	‘Making	International	Criminal	Procedure	Work:	From	Theory	to	Practice’	in	Mark	
Findlay	and	Ralph	J	Henham	(eds),	Exploring	the	Boundaries	of	International	Criminal	Justice	(2011)	115.	
18	 See	also	George	C	Christie,	‘Some	Key	Jurisprudential	Issues	of	the	Twenty-First	Century’	(2000)	8	
Tulane	Journal	of	International	and	Comparative	Law	217,	222	(’[T]here	are	more	than	historical	
explanations	for	these	differences	in	approach	[between	the	two	legal	systems’.)	
19	 See	Colin	B	Picker,	‘International	Law’s	Mixed	Heritage:	A	Common/civil	Law	Jurisdiction’	(2008)	41	
Vanderbilt	Journal	of	Transnational	Law;	Robert	Christensen,	‘Getting	to	Peace	by	Reconciling	Notions	of	
Justice:	The	Importance	of	Considering	Discrepancies	Between	Civil	and	Common	Legal	Systems	in	the	
Formation	of	the	International	Criminal	Court’	(2001)	6	Journal	of	International	Law	and	Foreign	Affairs	
391.	
Christensen	examines	whether	such	amalgamation	in	the	context	of	the	International	Criminal	Court	
matters,	and	suggested	that	‘the	gap	between	the	two	models	suggests	that	in	a	criminal	court	setting,	
legal	tradition	does	matter’	at	403.	 	 	
Cf.	Safferling,	International	Criminal	Procedure	(n	130)	126	(noting	the	comparative	approach	is	
important	but	not	decisive);	Gideon	Boas,	James	L	Bischoff	and	Natalie	L	Reid,	International	Criminal	Law	
Practitioner	Library:	International	Criminal	Procedure	(Cambridge	University	Press	2011)	15–16	(arguing	
that	international	criminal	procedure	is	a	legitimate	body	of	public	international	law,	then	it	seems	clear	
that	international	criminal	law	should	embrace	its	status	as	a	jurisdiction	in	its	own	right.	Only	then	will	
those	who	draft	and	interpret	the	law	be	free	from	pre-occupation	with	the	common	and	civil	
approaches	to	problem-solving	in	international	criminal	procedure).	 	 But	they	also	note	that	the	
procedure	rules	are	based	on	the	rules	of	major	domestic	jurisdictions,	Gideon	Boas,	James	L	Bischoff	
and	Natalie	L	Reid,	Elements	of	Crimes	under	International	Law:	International	Criminal	Law	Practitioner	
Library	Series,	vol	II	(Cambridge	University	Press	2009)	8.	
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B. Sui generis? 
Scholarship has started to view international criminal procedure as a sui generis 
system.20 While this thesis does not seek to challenge this view in depth,21 it is noted 
that the fundamental differences and inherent conflicts, which exist between the 
different legal traditions, should not be ignored when applying such an approach. In 
essence, the international criminal justice system represents a procedural hybrid, which 
contains elements from different legal systems.22 Accordingly, this procedural mixture 
means that the international criminal tribunals will face numerous challenges and 
endure tensions caused by a mixture of these conflicting common law and civil law 
characteristics. 
As mentioned, the problem of this hybrid system is that many procedural safeguards, 
which exist in either common law or civil law systems to prevent prosecutorial abuse, 																																																								
20	 E.g.	Ohlin	(n	161)	81	(’moving	beyond	the	common	and	civil	law	dichotomy	and	searching	for	its	sui	
generis	theory’);	Cryer	and	others	(n	5)	427;	Ambos	(n	261)	34–35;	Patrick	L	Robinson,	‘Ensuring	Fair	and	
Expeditious	Trials	at	the	International	Criminal	Tribunal	for	the	Former	Yugoslavia’	(2000)	11	European	
Journal	of	International	Law	569,	574;	Boas,	Bischoff	and	Reid,	International	Criminal	Law	Practitioner	
Library	(n	278)	1–17.	See	also	John	D	Jackson	and	Sarah	J	Summers,	The	Internationalisation	of	Criminal	
Evidence:	Beyond	the	Common	Law	and	Civil	Law	Traditions	(Cambridge	University	Press	2012)	133	
(noting	the	debate	is	less	important	than	‘the	question	as	to	how	well	the	system	conforms	to	each	of	
these	participatory	standards’);	Jackson,	‘Finding	the	Best	Epistemic	Fit	for	International	Criminal	
Tribunals	Beyond	the	Adversarial–Inquisitorial	Dichotomy’	(n	162).	 	
21	 See	Maxìmo	Langer,	‘The	Rise	of	Managerial	Judging	in	International	Criminal	Law’	53	American	
Journal	of	Comparative	Law	835	(claiming	that	the	ICTY’s	procedure	are	neither	unique	nor	represent	an	
undefined	hybrid	system);	Tochilovsky,	‘International	Criminal	Justice:	“Strangers	in	the	Foreign	System”’	
(n	260)	(feeling	uneasy	about	the	hybrid	system	as	it	departs	from	the	mature	and	carefully	structured	
balance	of	domestic	system).	
22	 See	Mark	Findlay,	‘Synthesis	in	Trial	Procedures?	The	Experience	of	International	Criminal	Tribunals’	
(2001)	50	International	and	Comparative	Law	Quarterly	26,	29;	K	Ambos,	‘The	Structure	of	International	
Procedure:	“Adversarial”,	“Inquisitorial”	or	Mixed?’	in	Michael	Bohlander	(ed),	International	criminal	
justice:	a	critical	analysis	of	institutions	and	procedures	(2007)	431.	 	 For	an	account	of	the	adversarial	
and	inquisitorial	systems	in	a	domestic	setting,	see	Damaška,	‘Evidentiary	Barriers	to	Conviction	and	Two	
Models	of	Criminal	Procedure’	(n	265)	506.	
		
 		
	
89 
disappeared during the mixture.23 Arguing the international criminal system as sui 
generis, or accepting the unique circumstances argument, seems to provide a 
justification for the diminishing restrictions that usually would be offered in domestic 
jurisdictions. However, it is submitted that this approach can lead to potentially perilous 
effects on evidentiary matters and procedural fairness and, accordingly, the Court’s 
ability to reach a fair and just decision. 
The common contention for justifying the sui generis approach are the distinctive 
circumstances of the international context which gives rise to a set of evidentiary 
challenges.24 The assertion goes: the investigation of international crimes for the 
international prosecutors is far more complicated than in domestic crimes,25 due to the 
																																																								
23	 Scott	T	Johnson,	‘On	the	Road	to	Disaster:	The	Rights	of	the	Accused	and	the	International	Criminal	
Tribunal	for	the	Former	Yugoslavia’	(1998)	10	International	Legal	Perspectives	111,	176;	Christensen	(n	
19)	407–8.	 	
In	domestic	systems,	prosecutors	are	held	accountable	through	a	variety	of	external	mechanisms,	
including	the	democratic	process,	professional	discipline	boards,	civil	service	disciplinary	frameworks,	
and	judicial	supervision.	For	a	debate	of	the	different	approaches	in	common	and	civil	law	with	regard	
to	prosecutors	accountability,	see	e.g.	Michael	Tonry,	Punishment	and	Politics	(Routledge	2012);	Ronald	
F	Wright	and	Marc	L	Miller,	‘The	Worldwide	Accountability	Deficit	for	Prosecutor’	(2010)	67	Washington	
and	Lee	Law	Review	1587,	1600–9.	Several	of	these	mechanisms	are	either	unavailable	or	only	
minimally	available	at	the	international	level.	As	a	result,	international	courts	have	to	rely	more	on	
judicial	supervision,	but	this	then	gave	rise	to	the	question	of	the	independence	of	the	Prosecutors.	See	
Turner	(n	31)	385–6.	 	
24	 See	e.g.	Nancy	A	Combs,	Fact-Finding	without	Facts:	The	Uncertain	Evidentiary	Foundations	of	
International	Criminal	Convictions	(Cambridge	University	Press	2010)	Chapter	9;	May	and	Wierda	(n	8)	
1.03.	
See	also	John	D	Jackson	and	Yassin	M	Brunger,	‘Fragmentation	and	Harmonization	in	the	Development	
of	Evidentiary	Practices	in	International	Criminal	Tribunals’	in	Elies	van	Sliedregt	and	Sergey	Vasiliev	(eds),	
Pluralism	in	International	Criminal	Law	(Oxford	University	Press	2014).	
25	 	 See	Fujiwara	and	Parmentier	(n	2)	573–4	(noting	the	distinctivness	of	international	investigations);	
Morten	Bergsmo	and	William	H	Wiley,	‘Human	Rights	Professionals	and	the	Criminal	Investigation	and	
Prosecution	of	Core	International	Crimes’,	Manual	on	human	rights	monitoring:	An	introduction	for	
human	rights	field	officers	(Norwegian	Centre	for	Human	Rights,	University	of	Oslo	2008);	Fry	(n	26)	
253–4.	Fry	noted	that	the	distinction	between	ordinary	and	international	crimes	is	not	a	black-and-white	
division.	
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nature of the crime, in that involves massive numbers of victims and perpetrators,26 and 
the high threshold of the contextual requirement of the crime, e.g. ‘wide and systematic 
attack’ for the establishment of crime against humanity, ‘armed conflict’ for war 
crimes.27 Furthermore, the complexity with regard to gathering evidence is in excess of 
domestic cases.28 For example, the prosecution has to travel to the crime scene, which 
usually is remote from the Tribunals, and often requires assistance of the territorial 
states. In the context of the ICC, the collection of evidence is even more difficult, as it 
might have to take place in war zones where the conflict is still ongoing.29 Unlike the 
domestic prosecutors, which are supported by a police force, the international 
prosecutors often have to rely on the cooperation of States, and sometimes have to ask 
national authorities to obtain information for them.30 The assistance of international 
organisations and NGOs is often needed. For example, in order to get materials from the 
																																																								
26	 May	and	Wierda	(n	2)	1.26;	M	Cherif	Bassiouni,	International	Criminal	Law:	International	Enforcement	
(3rd	edn,	Martinus	Nijhoff	2008)	581;	Fujiwara	and	Parmentier	(n	2)	574;	Bergsmo	and	Wiley	(n	284);	
Samuel	Totten	and	Eric	Markusen	(eds),	Genocide	in	Darfur:	Investigating	the	Atrocities	in	the	Sudan	
(Routledge	2006).	 	
27	 Aranburu	(n	181)	367	(International	crimes	are	crimes	of	context	because	their	definitions	contain	
‘elements	that	operate	as	qualifiers	of	gravity	and	restrictors	of	international	jurisdiction	to	
extraordinarily	offensive	crimes’).	 	
28	 See	Amal	Alamuddin,	‘Collection	of	Evidence’	in	Karim	AA	Khan,	Caroline	Buisman	and	Christopher	
Gosnell	(eds),	Principles	of	Evidence	in	international	criminal	justice	(Oxford	University	Press	2010)	242.	 	
29	 William	Schabas,	The	International	Criminal	Court :	A	Commentary	on	the	Rome	Statute	(Oxford	
University	Press	2010)	677.	See	e.g.	Situation	in	Uganda,	ICC-02/04,	PTC	II,	Decision	to	Convene	a	Status	
Conference	on	the	Investigation	in	the	Situation	in	Uganda	in	Relation	to	the	Application	of	Article	53	(2	
December	2005)	at	para.3-4;	Darfur,	OTP	‘Report	on	the	activities	performed	during	the	first	3	years	
(June	2003	-	June	2006)	at	para.14.	The	Prosecution	stated	that	‘on-going	conflict	has	prevented	the	
Office	from	investigating	on	the	ground	in	Darfur,	as	the	necessary	security	conditions	are	not	present	
for	victims,	witnesses	and	staff	members.’	
30	 Fujiwara	and	Parmentier	(n	2)	575–6;	Schabas,	The	International	Criminal	Court :	A	Commentary	on	
the	Rome	Statute	(n	288)	676.	 	 In	the	context	of	the	ICC,	in	principle,	the	State	authorities	should	
conduct	the	investigations	first;	see	Article	54(2)	ICC	Statute.	In	exceptional	situations,	the	Statute	
allows	the	Prosecutor	to	conduct	investigations.	 	 Although	on	a	practical	level,	the	Prosecutors	do	so	
regularly.	
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United Nations, the ICC prosecutor must sign confidentiality agreements that the 
information would not be disclosed to the accused. This, as claimed by Mégret, is a hard 
reality the accused must accept, because ‘the stakes of international criminal justice 
justify minimal concessions’.31 
The Tribunals themselves also suffer from all kinds of ‘institutional handicaps,’32 as an 
organ established under public international law, state consents and sovereignty issues 
often come into play.33 This creates further obstacles in obtaining evidence. For 
example, in the Blaškić case,34 the ICTY basically failed to subpoena certain evidence 
from Croatia because Croatia failed to cooperate due to national security concerns.35 
Although the case was solved, it is apparent that the function of an international 
criminal court is restricted by comparison with domestic courts. Other practical 
complications are also observed, such as cultural differences between witnesses and 
practitioners, and between criminal law professionals themselves, in addition to 
																																																								
31	 F.	Mégret,	‘Beyond	“Fairness”:	Understanding	the	Determinants	of	International	Criminal	Procedure’	
(2009)	14	UCLA	Journal	of	International	Law	and	Foreign	Affairs	37,	67.	 	
32	 Fry	(n	26)	251.	
33	 Bassiouni,	International	Criminal	Law	(n	285)	584.	 	
34	 Prosecutor	v	Blaškić,	No.	IT-95-14-AR108bis,	Judgement	on	the	Request	of	the	Republic	of	Croatia	for	
Review	of	the	Decision	of	Trial	Chamber	II	of	18	July	1997	(29	October	1997).	
35	 Thomas	Henquet,	‘Accountability	for	Arrests:	The	Relationship	between	the	ICTY	and	NATO’s	NAC	and	
SFOR’	in	Gideon	Boas	and	William	Schabas	(eds),	Boas,	&	Schabas,	International	Criminal	Law	
Developments	in	the	Case	Law	of	the	ICTY	(2003)	136.	See	generally	Ruth	Wedgwood,	‘Case	Analysis:	
International	Criminal	Tribunals	and	State	Sources	of	Proof:	The	Case	of	Tihomir	Blaškic’	(1998)	11	
Leiden	Journal	of	International	Law	635.	
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languages and translations problems,36 which normally would not be an issue in 
domestic courts. 
The question, accordingly, arises: does this ‘unique circumstances’ and ‘institutional 
handicaps’ in combination with the attempt to fulfil the broader goals of international 
criminal justice,37 justify a sui generis approach of international criminal procedure, 
which could lead to a lower standard of fairness to be applied to the accused?  
One substantial issue is that massive amounts of poor quality prosecutorial material, 
which Murphy has described as ‘evidential debris’, might be admitted to evidence.38 
Due to the hardship in the collection of evidence, certain innovative procedures were 
adopted to cope with the special context. For example, the ad hoc Tribunals now adopt 
written statements in lieu of oral testimony.39 Rule 92bis of the ICTY and ICTR RPEs 
allows such statements if they constitute ‘proof of a matter other than the acts and 
conduct of the accused as charged in the indictment’.40 Similarly, ICC may also permit 																																																								
36	 Combs	(n	264)	74.	
37	 As	described	in	Chapter	III.	
38	 Peter	Murphy,	‘No	Free	Lunch,	No	Free	Proof:	The	Indiscriminate	Admission	of	Evidence	Is	a	Serious	
Flaw	in	International	Criminal	Trials’	(2010)	8	Journal	of	International	Criminal	Justice	539,	543;	HH	Judge	
Peter	Murphy	and	Lina	Baddour,	‘Evidence	and	Selection	of	Judges	in	International	Criminal	Tribunals’	in	
Elies	van	Sliedregt	and	Sergey	Vasiliev	(eds),	Pluralism	in	International	Criminal	Law	(Oxford	University	
Press	2014)	369;	Peter	Murphy,	‘Excluding	Justice	or	Facilitating	Justice-International	Criminal	Law	
Would	Benefit	from	Rules	of	Evidence’	(2008)	12	International	Journal	of	Evidence	&	Proof	1,	2,3.	
Murphy,	‘Excluding	Justice	or	Facilitating	Justice-International	Criminal	Law	Would	Benefit	from	Rules	of	
Evidence’.	Murphy	argues	that	what	he	calls	‘evidential	debris’	will,	rather	than	assist	the	fact-finders	in	
establishing	the	truth,	frustrate	the	trial.	
39	 Cryer	and	others	(n	15)	469.	Originally,	oral	and	live	testimony	is	the	principle,	so	the	Defence	would	
be	given	a	chance	to	cross-examine.	Now	ICTY	switched	to	favouring	documentary	evidence,	though	this	
is	not	the	case	in	the	ICTR.	
40	 Rule	92bis	ICTY/R	RPEs	–	‘Admission	of	Written	Statements’	
(A)	A	Trial	Chamber	may	dispense	with	the	attendance	of	a	witness	in	person,	and	instead	admit,	in	
whole	or	in	part,	the	evidence	of	a	witness	in	the	form	of	a	written	statement	or	a	transcript	of	evidence,	
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video-recorded or audio-recorded testimony, documents, and written transcripts.41 
However, this approach risks the possibility of admitting unreliable evidence, because 
this in effect denies the opportunity for the defence to cross-examine the truthfulness of 
the witness statements.42 This is one of the consequences of adopting an adversarial 
procedure model with a mixture of inquisitorial style of evidentiary rules, which is in 
favour of the so-called free proof, or flexible approach of evidence.43 Note that, 
although civil law jurisdictions also contained exclusionary rules, it is not as extensive 
and complex as in common law system.44 The result is that a substantial part of the 
material admitted in international criminal trials would never have been considered in 
																																																																																																																																																																		
which	was	given	by	a	witness	in	proceedings	before	the	Tribunal,	in	lieu	of	oral	testimony	which	goes	to	
proof	of	a	matter	other	than	the	acts	and	conduct	of	the	accused	as	charged	in	the	indictment.	 	
(i)	Factors	in	favour	of	admitting	evidence	in	the	form	of	a	written	statement	or	transcript	include	but	
are	not	limited	to	circumstances	in	which	the	evidence	in	question:	
(a)	is	of	a	cumulative	nature,	in	that	other	witnesses	will	give	or	have	given	oral	testimony	of	similar	
facts;	 	
(b)	relates	to	relevant	historical,	political	or	military	background;	
(c)	consists	of	a	general	or	statistical	analysis	of	the	ethnic	composition	of	the	population	in	the	places	to	
which	the	indictment	relates;	 	
(d)	concerns	the	impact	of	crimes	upon	victims;	
(e)	relates	to	issues	of	the	character	of	the	accused;	or	
(f)	relates	to	factors	to	be	taken	into	account	in	determining	sentence.	
	
41	 Article	69(2)	ICC	Statute;	Rules	47,	67,	68	ICC	RPEs.	See	e.g.	Lubanga	case,	Trial	Chamber,	Decision	on	
the	Consequences	of	Non-Disclosure	of	Exculpatory	Materials...	(13	June	2008)	at	para.	1399	(written	
evidence);	Lubanga	case,	Trial	Chamber,	Decision	on	the	Prosecutions	Application	for	the	Admission	of	
the	Prior	Recorded	Statements	of	Two	Witnesses	(15	January	2009)	(prior	recorded	statements);	
Prosecutor	v	Katanga	and	Ngudjolo	Chui,	ICC-01/04-01/07	(‘Katanga	and	Chui’	case),	Trial	Chamber,	
Decision	on	Prosecutor’s	request	to	allow	the	introduction	into	evidence	of	the	prior	recorded	testimony	
of	P-166	and	P-219	(3	September	2010)	(prior	recorded	testimony).	
42	 Paul	De	Hert,	‘Legal	Procedures	at	the	International	Criminal	Court’,	in	Roelof	Haveman,	Olga	Kavran	
and	Julian	Nicholls	(eds),	Supranational	Criminal	Law:	A	System	Sui	Generis	(Intersentia	2003)	107.	
43	 See	e.g.	Murphy,	‘No	Free	Lunch,	No	Free	Proof:	The	Indiscriminate	Admission	of	Evidence	Is	a	Serious	
Flaw	in	International	Criminal	Trials’	(n	297).	 	
44	 Caroline	Buisman,	Myriam	Bouazdi	and	Matteo	Costi,	‘Principles	of	Civil	Law’	in	Karim	AA	Khan,	
Caroline	Buisman	and	Christopher	Gosnell	(eds),	Principles	of	Evidence	in	International	Criminal	Justice	
(Oxford	University	Press	2010)	30.	 	
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domestic criminal cases.45 This gives the prosecution an enormous advantage in 
establishing its case. As described by Zahar, an excess amount of poor quality of 
evidence has become ‘a feature of leadership trials at the international tribunals’.46  
Because of the contextual nature of the crime, a sheer quantity of material is needed to 
establish international crimes.47 The tendency in the international criminal tribunals, 
therefore, is to admit as much evidence as possible. However, this practice is 
problematic and could be detrimental to the accused. Since the defence is given little 
chance to challenge the prosecution’s evidence in cross-examination, much prosecution 
evidence is admitted without appropriate scrutiny. It would be very difficult for the 
accused to rebut the evidence after it has been admitted.48 In addition, as noted by Fry, 
although quantity might lead to quality, quantity could also ‘clog up the system and 
creates unmanageable trials, the quality of the proceedings as a whole may be affected 
negatively.’49 The practice of the international criminal tribunals to admit as much as 
																																																								
45	 In	civil	law	jurisdictions	exclusionary	rules	are	often	viewed	as	unnecessary,	because	professional	
judges	will	be	handling	them,	unlike	jury	in	common	law	trials.	See	ibid	29.	However,	it	is	doubtful	if	it	is	
that	different,	notwithstanding	their	professional	training.	For	example,	in	Germany,	see	Richard	S	Frase	
and	Thomas	Weigand,	How	the	Germans	Do	It,	Comparisons	with	American	Criminal	Justice	(University	
of	Minnesota,	Law	School	1992)	344;	George	P	Fletcher	and	Steve	Sheppard,	American	Law	in	a	Global	
Context:	The	Basics	(Oxford	University	Press	2005)	547;	Mirjan	Damaška,	‘Free	Proof	and	Its	Detractors’	
[1995]	The	American	Journal	of	Comparative	Law	343,	351.	
46	 Alexander	Zahar,	‘Pluralism	and	the	Rights	of	the	Accused	in	International	Criminal	Proceedings’	in	
Elies	van	Sliedregt	and	Sergey	Vasiliev	(eds),	Pluralism	in	International	Criminal	Law	(Oxford	University	
Press	2014)	232.	
47	 Murphy,	‘No	Free	Lunch,	No	Free	Proof:	The	Indiscriminate	Admission	of	Evidence	Is	a	Serious	Flaw	in	
International	Criminal	Trials’	(n	297)	552.	
48	 Zahar	(n	46)	232.	
49	 Fry	(n	26)	267.	
		
 		
	
95 
they can ‘ultimately makes it more difficult for judges to assess the weight of the 
evidence and arrive at the truth.’50  
Another innovation of the international criminal tribunals, in light of the special context 
of international criminal trials, is the use of judicial notice51 and adjudicated facts,52 
which is unknown in national jurisdictions.53 These rules are adopted in order to shorten 
the trials, the reason of judicial economy, and to uniform decisions.54 Many scholars 
have cautioned that the rights of the accused are likely to be infringed by the taking of 
judicial notice,55 including the right to raise defences and to present evidence,56 and 
possibly the right not to have a reversal burden of proof on the accused.57 Although the 
defence may rebut judicially noted facts, this is considered a violation of the principle of 
the presumption of innocence, as it should be the prosecution’s job to prove the guilt of 
the accused and not the accused to prove his innocence by rebutting judicial notice and 
adjudicated facts.58 However, the Trial Chambers of both the ad hoc Tribunals have 
																																																								
50	 Murphy,	‘No	Free	Lunch,	No	Free	Proof:	The	Indiscriminate	Admission	of	Evidence	Is	a	Serious	Flaw	in	
International	Criminal	Trials’	(n	297)	552.	
51	 Rule	93	ICTY/R	RPEs.	
52	 Rule	94	ICTY/R	RPEs	
53	 O	Gon	Kwon,	‘The	Challenge	of	an	International	Criminal	Trial	as	Seen	from	the	Bench’	(2007)	5	
Journal	of	International	Criminal	Justice	360,	369.	
54	 Fergal	Gaynor,	‘Judicial	Notice	and	Agreed	Facts’	in	Göran	Sluiter	and	others	(eds),	International	
Criminal	Procedure:	Principles	and	Rules	(Oxford	University	Press	2013)	1109–1124;	Klamberg,	Evidence	
in	International	Criminal	Procedure	(n	39)	471;	Karin	Calvo-Goller,	The	Trial	Proceedings	of	the	
International	Criminal	Court:	ICTY	and	ICTR	Precedents	(Brill	2005)	264–5.	
55	 James	G	Stewart,	‘Judicial	Notice	in	International	Criminal	Law:	A	Reconciliation	of	Potential,	Peril	and	
Precedent’	(2003)	3	International	Criminal	Law	Review	245,	269.	
56	 Article	67(1)	(e)	ICC	Statute.	
57	 Article	67(1)	(i)	ICC	Statute.	
58	 Göran	Sluiter	and	Koen	Vriend,	‘Defending	the	“Undefendable”?	Taking	Judicial	Notice	of	Genocide’	in	
Harmen	Wilt	and	others	(eds),	The	Genocide	Convention:	The	Legacy	of	60	Years	(Brill	2012)	84.	 	
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used this provision extensively.59 With regard to the ICC this issue is still not clear,60 
although some have argued the ICC would be able to establish a proper balance 
between the rights of the accused and judicial notice.61 
These rules and practices arising from special impediments of the international context 
clearly have some troublesome impact on the fairness towards the accused. Some 
commentators, however, have argued that to apply such contextualised fairness in 
international criminal proceedings is acceptable. Damaška, for example, contends that 
in light of the distinctive circumstances of the international criminal tribunals and the 
impediments they suffer, ‘some departures from domestic conceptions of fairness 
should be expected and accepted’.62 In the application of the aforementioned 
exclusionary rules, he considers that it ‘must be weighed against the complexity of 
cases and the difficulties of obtaining evidence.’63 Similarly, Mégret has claimed that, 
‘to understand the arbitrages that international criminal procedure requires, one must be 
able to contextualize them in an understanding of the broader goals of international 
																																																								
59	 See	cases	cited	in	Gaynor	(n	313)	1109–1121.	
60	 ibid	1121;	Klamberg,	Evidence	in	International	Criminal	Procedure	(n	39)	476;	Donald	Piragoff,	‘Article	
69	-	Evidence’	in	Otto	Triffterer	(ed),	Commentary	on	the	Rome	Statute	of	the	International	Criminal	
Court:	Observers’	Notes	(2nd	edn,	CH	Beck	2008)	1317–8,	1331.	
61	 Calvo-Goller	(n	313)	266.	
62	 Mirjan	Damaška,	‘Reflections	on	Fairness	in	International	Criminal	Justice’	(2012)	10	Journal	of	
International	Criminal	Justice	611,	614.	He	argued	that	‘while	international	criminal	procedure	should	be	
governed	by	standards	of	fairness,	this	does	not	necessarily	imply	that	fairness	demands	are	to	be	
identical	to	the	ones	applicable	in	domestic	proceedings.	The	context	within	which	international	
criminal	courts	and	tribunals	operate	should	be	taken	into	account.’	
63	 ibid	619.	 	
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criminal justice.’ He argued that due to ‘daunting difficulties’ faced by the international 
tribunals, it is justifiable to impose heavy burden on the international accused.64 
It is submitted that these arguments put forward by both Damaška and Mégret are 
questionable. Allowing context to determine rights of the defence certainly is a 
dangerous assertion. As assessed by Zahar, ‘if context is a determining factor, is it not a 
recipe for relativism? What is to prevent the lower limit from being context-dependent, 
too? Where does context-dependency stop? If we allow the tribunals the benefit of 
context, why not also allow it to the accused?’65   
C. Mixed Model: Adversarial as Main with Inquisitorial Features 
International criminal procedures are arising as a new branch of law66 as they are being 
maturely discussed and widely contested in the recent years.67 Still, it has been often 
described as ‘fragmented’ and there are numerous calls for the harmonization of the 
rules.68 The purpose of this Chapter, therefore, is not to debate which procedure model 
is more suitable for international criminal proceedings, or which is better for achieving 																																																								
64	 Mégret	(n	39)	65.	
65	 Zahar	(n	46)	229	(describing	Damaška’s	argument	is	‘on	thin	ice’).	 	
66	 See	e.g.	Alex	Whiting,	‘The	ICTY	as	a	Laboratory	of	International	Criminal	Procedure’	in	Bert	Swart,	
Alexander	Zahar	and	Göran	Sluiter	(eds),	The	legacy	of	the	International	Criminal	Tribunal	for	the	former	
Yugoslavia	(Oxford	University	Press	2011);	Bartram	S	Brown,	‘International	Criminal	Law:	Nature,	Origins	
and	a	Few	Key	Issues’	in	Bartram	S	Brown	(ed),	Research	Handbook	on	International	Criminal	Law	
(Edward	Elgar	Publishing	2011)	13.	 	
67	 Cryer	and	others	(n	15)	423.	
68	 See	e.g.	Jackson	and	Brunger	(n	283).	They	argue	that	the	process	of	harmonization	has	developed	in	
a	pragmatic	manner	on	the	basis	of	those	procedures	that	seemed	most	accessible	to	hand	and	has	
resulted	in	a	procedural	convergence	of	largely	‘adversarial’	structures.	Yet	such	a	convergence,	it	will	
be	argued	secondly,	was	achieved	without	a	shared	consensus	as	to	how	these	structures	were	to	be	
utilized	for	the	purposes	of	doing	international	justice.	See	Stahn	and	Van	den	Herik	(n	170).	
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the goals of international criminal trials.69 Rather, it is to discuss how the hybrid system 
affects the rights of the accused. 
The general view is that the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICTY and the 
ICTR essentially adopt the adversarial system with some features of the inquisitorial 
one.70 With regard to evidence collection and presentation, the party-driven structure of 
a trial is obvious in the ad hoc Tribunals.71 However, unlike in the adversarial system, 
the evidentiary rules implemented by the Tribunal are ‘immensely minimal’.72 
According to Judge McDonald, ‘we merged elements of common and civil law into 129 
rules,’73 whilst the U.S. model proved to be ‘particularly influential’.74 Civil law 
																																																								
69	 For	discussions,	see	Linda	Carter	and	Fausto	Pocar	(eds),	International	Criminal	Procedure:	The	
Interface	of	Civil	Law	and	Common	Law	Legal	Systems	(Edward	Elgar	Publishing	2013)	19–23;	Gideon	
Boas,	The	Milošević	Trial:	Lessons	for	the	Conduct	of	Complex	International	Criminal	Proceedings	
(Cambridge	University	Press	2007)	(discussing	how	to	manage	complex	international	criminal	cases).	 	
70	 Christoph	Safferling,	Towards	an	International	Criminal	Procedure	(Oxford	University	Press	2001)	223	
(noting	that	the	structure	of	the	Tribunal’s	procedure	is	along	the	lines	of	the	Anglo-American	System);	
Antonio	Cassese,	International	Criminal	Law	(Oxford	University	Press	2003)	384	(remarking	that	the	
Tribunal	adopted	a	system	close	to	a	U.S.	prepared	memorandum	and	that,	accordingly,	‘the	court	was	
conceived	of	as	a	sort	of	referee’.	 	 But	civil	law	elements	have	influenced	the	conduct	of	the	
proceedings,	see,	in	general,	e.g.	Robinson,	‘Ensuring	Fair	and	Expeditious	Trials	at	the	International	
Criminal	Tribunal	for	the	Former	Yugoslavia’	(n	279);	Daryl	A	Mundis,	‘From	“common	Law”	towards	
“civil	Law”:	The	Evolution	of	the	ICTY	Rules	of	Procedure	and	Evidence’	(2001)	14	Leiden	Journal	of	
International	Law	367;	Damaška,	‘The	Uncertain	Fate	of	Evidentiary	Transplants’	(n	268);	Boas,	‘A	Code	
of	Evidence	and	Procedure	for	International	Criminal	Law?	The	Rules	of	the	ICTY’	(n	39).	
71	 Richard	May	and	Marieke	Wierda,	‘Trends	in	International	Criminal	Evidence:	Nuremberg,	Tokyo,	The	
Hague,	and	Arusha’	(1998)	37	Colum.J.Transnat’l	L.	725,	737;	Langer	(n	280)	857–8;	Megan	Fairlie,	‘The	
Marriage	of	Common	and	Continental	Law	at	the	ICTY	and	Its	Progeny,	Due	Process	Deficit’	(2004)	4	
International	Criminal	Law	Review	243.	
72	 Dirk	Ryneveld,	Q.C.	and	Daryl	A	Mundis,	‘The	Contribution	of	the	ICTY	to	the	ICC:	Procedural	And.	
Evidentiary	Aspects	from	a	Practitioner’s	Perspective’,	The	Changing	Face	of	International	Criminal	Law:	
Selected	Papers	(International	Centre	for	Criminal	Law	Reform	and	Criminal	Justice	Policy	2002)	54	
(noting	that	of	the	125	rules	initially	adopted,	only	ten	were	rules	of	evidence).	 	
73	 Gabrielle	Kirk	McDonald,	‘Reflections	on	the	Contributions	of	the	International	Criminal	Tribunal	for	
the	Former	Yugoslavia’	(2001)	24	Hastings	International	and	Comparative	Law	Review	155,	158.	 	
74	 Virginia	Morris	and	Michael	P	Scharf,	An	Insider’s	Guide	to	the	International	Criminal	Tribunal	for	the	
Former	Yugoslavia:	A	Documentary	History	and	Analysis	(Transnational	Publishers	Irvington-on-Hudson,	
New	York	1995)	177.	 	 	
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influence is apparent in two particular aspects: the active role of professional judges and 
flexible approach regarding the admissibility of evidence.75 The International Criminal 
Court, similar to the ad hoc tribunals, follows such a model but has added more 
elements of the civil law traditions, such as the establishment of a Pre-Trial Chamber.76 
The primary rationale for this gradual shift to civil law was the need to speed up 
proceedings.77 Although, it should be noted that the intents for such shift are not pure,78 
as some are driven by political considerations79 and the desire to better represent the 
procedures of civil law countries.80 
The approach taken for the adoption of the rules of procedure and evidence, however, is 
different between the ad hoc tribunals and the permanent International Criminal Court.81 																																																								
75	 Ilias	Bantekas,	International	Criminal	Law	(4th	edn,	Hart	Publishing	2010)	475;	Donald	Piragoff,	
‘Evidence’	in	Roy	S	Lee	(ed),	The	International	Criminal	Court:	elements	of	crimes	and	rules	of	procedure	
and	evidence	(Transnational	Publishers	2001)	351,	354	(describing	the	ICC	framework	as	a	compromised	
one).	Piragoff	stated	that	‘Common	law	systems	tend	to	exclude	or	weed	out	irrelevant	evidence,	and	
inherently	unreliable	types	of	evidence,	as	a	question	of	admissibility,	while	in	civil	law	countries	all	
evidence	is	generally	admitted	and	its	relevancy	and	probative	value	are	considered	freely	together	with	
the	weight	of	the	evidence.	The	compromise	in	the	Rome	Statute	was	to	eschew	generally	the	technical	
formalities	of	the	common	law	system	of	admissibility	of	evidence	in	favour	of	the	flexibility	of	the	civil	
law	system,	provided	that	the	Court	has	discretion	to	“rule	on	the	relevance	or	admissibility	of	any	
evidence.”’	
76	 Boas,	Bischoff	and	Reid,	International	Criminal	Law	Practitioner	Library	(n	278)	15	(‘in	the	context	of	
the	ICC,	a	larger	number	of	civil	law-oriented	procedures	are	taking	root	than	have	been	seen	in	the	ad	
hoc	tribunals’).	For	a	discussion,	see	Boas,	The	Milošević	Trial:	Lessons	for	the	Conduct	of	Complex	
International	Criminal	Proceedings	(n	328)	39–41.	 	
77	 Klamberg,	Evidence	in	International	Criminal	Procedure	(n	39)	371;	Mundis,	‘From	“common	
Law”towards	“civil	Law”’	(n	329)	368.	 	
78	 Combs	(n	264)	294;	Gilbert	Bitti,	‘Two	Bones	of	Contention	Between	Civil	and	Common	Law:	The	
Record	of	the	Proceedings	and	the	Treatment	of	a	Concursus	Delictorum’	in	Dr	Horst	Fischer,	Claus	Kress	
and	Sascha	Rolf	Lüder	(eds),	International	and	National	Prosecution	of	Crimes	Under	International	Law:	
Current	Developments	(Arno	Spitz	2001)	276.	 	
79	 Ambos	(n	261)	7–9	(noting	the	Pre-Trial	Chamber	derives	more	from	a	political	compromise).	 	
80	 Silvia	A	Fernández	Gurmendi,	‘The	Process	of	Negotiations’	in	Roy	SK	Lee	(ed),	The	International	
Criminal	Court:	the	making	of	the	Rome	Statute :	issues,	negotiations	and	results	(Martinus	Nijhoff	
Publishers	1999)	220.	 	
81	 Fausto	Pocar	and	Linda	Carter,	‘The	Challenge	of	Shaping	Procedures	in	International	Criminal	Courts’	
in	Linda	Carter	and	Fausto	Pocar	(eds),	International	Criminal	Procedure	(Edward	Elgar	Publishing	2013)	
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The ICTY and ICTR judges are entrusted to amend and interpret the Rules as 
‘quasi-legislative’.82 They possess the power to choose the rules freely as they deem 
appropriate. In contrast, the judges of the ICC do not have such power; it is the 
Assembly of State Parties, a political body, which has the authority to adopt the rules.83 
As a consequence, the ICC is less flexible regarding this matter. 
Commentators have made arguments for favouring one tradition over another in the 
context of international criminal justice,84 despite the fact that there is no real consensus 
on this question. As observed by Cassese, the choice for an adversarial structure for the 
Nuremberg Trials was more of pragmatic concerns.85 Looking back to the 
establishment of the International Military Tribunal, it was more efficient and 
applicable to have each of the four allied powers contributing their own prosecutors 
than to appoint an investigating judge, which might create more difficulty than it could 
have solved.86  
																																																																																																																																																																		
13.	
82	 Daryl	A	Mundis,	‘The	Legal	Character	and	Status	of	the	Rules	of	Procedure	and	Evidence	of	the	Ad	Hoc	
International	Criminal	Tribunals’	(2001)	1	International	Criminal	Law	Review	191	(noting	that	judges	go	
beyond	simply	interpreting	the	statute.	Judges	fill	lacunae	with	respect	to	substantive	crimes	and	
evidentiary	rules).	Mundis	is	of	the	opinion	that	this	quasi-legislative	function	resembles	the	
quasi-legislative	function	exercised	by	the	judges	when	making	the	rules.	
83	 Pocar	and	Carter	(n	340)	13	(noting	that	the	ICC	rules	are	negotiated	within	a	political	body	instead	of	
a	restricted	group	of	judges,	they	tend	to	be	more	elaborated	and	articulated,	but	lack	flexibility).	See	
also	Daryl	A	Mundis,	‘The	Assembly	of	States	Parties	and	the	Institutional	Framework	of	the	
International	Criminal	Court’	[2003]	American	journal	of	international	law	132,	132–47.	
84	 See	e.g.	William	Pizzi,	‘Overcoming	Logistical	and	Structural	Barriers	to	Fair	Trials	at	International	
Tribunals’	(2007)	4	International	Commentary	on	Evidence.	 	
85	 Cassese,	International	Criminal	Law	(n	70)	377–8.	See	also	The	President	of	the	International	Tribunal,	
First	Annual	Report	of	the	International	Tribunal	for	the	Prosecution	of	Persons	Responsible	for	Serious	
Violations	of	International	Humanitarian	Law	Committed	in	the	Territory	of	the	Former	Yugoslavia	Since	
1991,	15,	UN	Doc	S/1994/1007,	A/49/342	(Aug	29,	1994)	at	para.	71.	 	
86	 Jackson	and	Brunger	(n	283)	163.	
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The ICTY was created under a different environment than Nuremberg. The United 
Nations Security Council had to take actions in relation to the Balkan conflicts, 
however, the challenges were of another nature compared with the International 
Military Tribunal — the conflict was still on going, there were no police force at its 
disposal, and local authorities were reluctant to cooperate.87 Once more, the situation 
called for a powerful and independent prosecutor with the strong flexibility, in order to 
adapt to extraordinary circumstances unfettered by any judicial supervision.88 
Unsurprisingly, when it came to drafting the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, the 
judges, under pressure of time, were drawn to the models of procedure that were the 
most readily available.89 The precedent of Nuremberg created a starting point, but by 
far the best crafted and most complete draft at the disposal of the judges was that 
provided by the Americans. That draft drew upon the procedure of the US military 
commissions.90 The ICTR basically followed the ICTY model, the Security Council 
aimed to establish an international tribunal to punish those responsible for international 
crimes in Rwanda. The Statute of the ICTR explicitly stated that its judges ‘shall 
adopt... the Rules of Procedure and Evidence ... of the ICTY with such changes as they 
deem necessary.’91 The only significant concession to civil law practice was the 
																																																								
87	 ibid.	
88	 Christopher	Gosnell,	‘The	Changing	Context	of	Evidential	Rules’	in	Karim	AA	Khan,	Caroline	Buisman	
and	Christopher	Gosnell	(eds),	Principles	of	Evidence	in	International	Criminal	Justice	(Oxford	University	
Press	2010)	215–6.	
89	 Jackson	and	Brunger	(n	283)	162.	
90	 Morris	and	Scharf	(n	333)	177;	Antonio	Cassese,	‘The	ICTY:	A	Living	and	Vital	Reality’	(2004)	2	Journal	
of	International	Criminal	Justice	585,	594.	
91	 Article	14	ICTR	Statute.	
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principle of ‘flexibility’,92 which permitted the court under Rule 89 to ‘admit any 
relevant evidence which it deems to have probative value’.93 Such rules have allowed 
the Tribunals to make any type of evidence admissible.94 
As to the establishment of the ICC, however, is different. Unlike the Historical 
Tribunals and the ad hoc Tribunals, as a permanent international criminal court, there 
have been extensive and lengthy debates on the procedural rules for the ICC. As 
observed by some, ‘for the first time in history there was an opportunity for the 
international community to meet and construct a system of international criminal 
justice.’95 Admittedly, civil law influences came to play a more dominant role, but here 
too the preference for a powerful prosecutor won out; that is, ‘the adversary-accusatorial 
process prevailed in substance’.96 This is probably because States themselves feel easier 
to control a powerful prosecutor in secrecy than over a judge who must account for 
decisions in a more public manner.97  
Applying such a mixed model means that complications will inevitably present 
themselves. Regardless of the criticism about the hybrid approach, it is often argued that 
																																																								
92	 Gideon	Boas,	‘Creating	Laws	of	Evidence	for	International	Criminal	Law:	The	ICTY	and	the	Principle	of	
Flexibility’,	Criminal	Law	Forum	(Springer	2001);	Murphy,	‘No	Free	Lunch,	No	Free	Proof:	The	
Indiscriminate	Admission	of	Evidence	Is	a	Serious	Flaw	in	International	Criminal	Trials’	(n	297).	
93	 Rule	89	(C)	ICTY/R	PREs.	For	a	commentary,	see	Christopher	Gosnell,	‘Admissibility	of	Evidence’	in	
Karim	AA	Khan,	Caroline	Buisman	and	Christopher	Gosnell	(eds),	Principles	of	Evidence	in	International	
Criminal	Justice	(Oxford	University	Press	2010).	
94	 Vogler	(n	276)	106.	 	
95	 Jackson	and	Brunger	(n	283)	163.	 	
96	 M	Cherif	Bassiouni,	‘Negotiating	the	Treaty	of	Rome	on	the	Establishment	of	an	International	Criminal	
Court’	(1999)	32	Cornell	International	Law	Journal	443,	464.	
97	 	 Jackson	and	Brunger	(n	283)	163.	 	
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in the context of international criminal law, certain compromises are bound to happen.98 
Other than political reasons, from a legal point of view, it was hoped that in combining 
the advantages of both systems, the international trials would be able to guarantee the 
rights of the accused whilst at the same time ensuring the guilty would not escape 
punishment.99 The common belief is that the common law principles are better at 
achieving the fair trial rights of the defendants,100 and the civil law’s feature of pre-trial 
management would be able to improve the trials’ effectiveness and efficiency.101 
However, it is submitted that the above belief is not necessarily true. In the domestic 
context, each system has its strength and weakness.102 For example, it is not entirely 
accurate to suggest that the common law system affords more protection to the rights of 
the accused,103 although it is true that there are more rights exercisable for the defence 
during trial.104 Such as, with regard to the presumption of innocence, while being 
regarded as the ‘golden thread’ principle of criminal law,105 common law countries 
often allow statutory exceptions to reverse the burden of proof, imposing a heavy 
																																																								
98	 May	and	Wierda	(n	2)	1.28;	Bassiouni,	International	Criminal	Law	(n	285)	581;	Damaška,	‘Reflections	
on	Fairness	in	International	Criminal	Justice’	(n	2).	
99	 May	and	Wierda	(n	8)	4.03	(UNWCC	LAW	REPORTs,	‘The	Procedure	of	the	Courts’,	Vol.	XV,	190,	197).	
100	 Fletcher	and	Sheppard	(n	304)	547;	Cryer	and	others	(n	5)	425.	
101	 See	e.g.	Heinsch	(n	261)	488–92.	But	see	e.g.	Patrick	L	Robinson,	‘Rough	Edges	in	the	Alignment	of	
Legal	Systems	in	the	Proceedings	at	the	ICTY’	(2005)	3	Journal	of	International	Criminal	Justice	1037,	
1040	(noting	that	‘if	not	properly	resolved,	tension	between	the	legal	systems	may	lead	to	unfairness’).	 	 	
102	 Both	systems	have	strengths	and	weaknesses	in	the	protection	afforded	the	rights	of	accused	
persons	as	well	as	in	the	process	by	which	the	truth	is	sought.	See	e.g.	Cryer	and	others	(n	15)	425	
(noting	that	the	inquisitorial	system	might	be	better	in	achieving	the	aim	of	creating	an	‘accurate	
historical	record’).	 	
103	 ibid.	
104	 Fletcher	and	Sheppard	(n	304)	531–47.	
105	 Woolmington	v	DPP	[1935]	UKHL	1.	
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burden on the defence.106 This type of exceptions is unlikely to happen in most civil law 
countries. Another example is the status of victims. Although many have observed that 
victims have a theoretically stronger position in some civil law-based systems, as they 
enjoy the status of partie civile, it is doubtful if the victims are really treated better in 
those jurisdictions.107 With regard to the length of trial, empirical evidence shows that 
England is in fact faster than many Continental European countries.108 
Accordingly, the adoption of a mixed model is only partially the result of the desire to 
create a better system, as the reasons are probably more of political arrangements and to 
achieve broad acceptance among States.109 Safferling pointed out that ‘chauvinism’ also 
plays a considerable part.110 Continental European lawyers have expressed their dismay 																																																								
106	 For	example,	in	England:	
Section	28	Misuse	of	Drugs	Act	1971	-	Burden	on	the	accused	to	prove	that	he	neither	believed	nor	
suspected	nor	had	reason	to	suspect	that	the	item	in	his	possession	was	a	controlled	drug.	See	R	v	
Lambert	[2002]	2	AC	545;	Section	139(4)	Criminal	Justice	Act	1988	-	Burden	on	the	defendant	to	prove	
that	he	had	good	reason	or	lawful	authority	for	having	a	bladed	article	in	a	public	place.	See	L	v	DPP	
[2003]	QB	137	(Divisional	Court).The	Court	held	that	the	legal	burden	imposed	was	compatible	with	
Article	6	ECHR	because	Strong	public	interest	in	bladed	articles	not	being	carried	without	good	reason).	
107	 See	John	R	Spencer,	‘Introduction’	in	Mireille	Delmas-Marty	and	John	R	Spencer	(eds),	European	
Criminal	Procedures	(Cambridge	University	Press	2002)	36	(’Although	the	position	of	the	victim	is	
theoretically	stronger	on	the	Continent	than	in	England,	it	is	a	debatable	question	how	much	[if	at	all]	
the	victim	is	really	better	off’).	 	
Another	example	is	the	compensation	orders.	Spencer	noted	that	‘in	England	the	victim	has	no	right	to	
ask	the	court	for	one,	and	-	unlike	in	continental	Europe	-	the	sums	so	awarded	are	usually	small	
because	they	are	always	geared	to	the	defendant’s	ability	to	pay.	 	 On	the	other	hand,	where	a	French	
or	Belgian	court	awards	a	partie	civile	damages	against	the	defendant,	it	is	the	partie	civile	who	then	has	
the	thankless	task	of	trying	to	make	the	convicted	defendant	pay;	whereas	in	England,	compensation	
orders	are	enforced	automatically	by	the	same	court	machinery	as	is	used	to	make	the	defendant	pay	
his	fines.’	At	36.	
For	discussions	regarding	Victims’	rights	in	the	ICC,	see,	e.g.	T	Markus	Funk,	Victims’	Rights	and	
Advocacy	at	the	International	Criminal	Court	(Oxford	University	Press	2010);	Juan	Carlos	Ochoa,	The	
Rights	of	Victims	in	Criminal	Justice	Proceedings	for	Serious	Human	Rights	Violations	(Martinus	Nijhoff	
Publishers	2013)	137–141.	
108	 See	Spencer	(n	366)	33	(noting,	particularly,	the	serious	and	complicated	cases	are	notably	faster	in	
England).	 	
109	 Cryer	and	others	(n	15)	425.	 	
110	 Safferling,	International	Criminal	Procedure	(n	130)	57	(Chauvinism‘	is	certainly	the	wrong	approach	
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regarding the domination of common law rules in the ad hoc tribunals, pointing out that 
the adversarial rules may not be the best for international criminal trials.111 Since the 
characters of different legal systems are not always compatible with one another, these 
compromises can lead to adverse effects, affecting the accused’s fair trial rights and 
causing inefficiency of the proceedings.112 The impact of political compromises over the 
Rules is even stronger in the ICC than the ad hoc Tribunals,113 which might explain the 
dominance of inquisitorial elements in the ICC RPEs.  
III. The Roles of Judges and Parties 
The fundamental difference between the adversarial and inquisitional legal systems is 
the role of the parties and judges. There are various discussions regarding the roles of 
the actors in the scholarship.114 This section would briefly examine the relevant part of 
the roles of the actors in criminal trials. 
																																																																																																																																																																		
in	this	regard	and	mistrust,	which	is	still	to	be	observed’).	See	also	Gregory	S	Gordon,	‘Toward	an	
International	Criminal	Procedure:	Due	Process	Aspirations	and	Limitations’	(2006)	45	Columbia	Journal	
of	Transnational	Law	635.	
111	 See	e.g.	Albin	Eser,	‘Procedural	Structure	and	Features	of	International	Criminal	Justice:	Lessons	from	
the	ICTY’	in	Bert	Swart,	Alexander	Zahar	and	Göran	Sluiter	(eds),	The	Legacy	of	the	International	Criminal	
Tribunal	for	the	Former	Yugoslavia	(Oxford	University	Press	2011)	123–6	(the	relationship	between	the	
role	of	actors	and	the	search	for	truth);	Cryer	and	others	(n	5)	429–34;	Karel	de	Meester	and	others,	
‘Investigation,	Coercive	Measures,	Arrest,	and	Surrender’	in	Göran	Sluiter	and	others	(eds),	International	
Criminal	Procedure:	Principles	and	Rules	(Oxford	University	Press	2013)	205–10	(with	regard	to	the	
pre-trial	phase).	 	 	
112	 Cryer	and	others	(n	15)	425.	 	
113	 ibid	424–5	(noting	that	the	ICC	with	a	broad	geographical	jurisdiction	may	have	a	greater	need	for	
mixed	influences).	
114	 See	e.g.	Mirjan	Damaška,	The	Faces	of	Justice	and	State	Authority:	A	Comparative	Approach	to	the	
Legal	Process	(Yale	University	Press	1991);	Roelof	Haveman,	Olga	Kavran	and	Julian	Nicholls,	
Supranational	Criminal	Law:	A	System	Sui	Generis	(Intersentia	Uitgevers	NV	2003);	Cassese,	Cassese’s	
International	Criminal	Law	(n	5)	335–6;	Langer	(n	280).	For	detailed	discussions	regarding	the	roles	of	
the	actors	in	the	European	context,	see	Mario	Chiavario,	‘Private	Parties:	The	Rights	of	the	
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In general, criminal proceedings in the adversarial system are often described as a 
contest between two active parties before a passive fact-finder, either professional 
judges or a jury. Therefore, the role of defence counsels is expected to be more 
vigorous. As noted by Gallant, ‘[d]efense investigation plays a more important role in 
criminal justice in the common law world [than in the civil law world].’115 By contrast, 
in the inquisitorial system, criminal procedure is seen as an official investigation, 
conducted by officials of the state. Note that, some civil law lawyers dislike the term 
‘inquisitorial’ as it seems to refer to the inquisitions held by the Catholic Church in the 
European Late Middle Ages.116 It is the judge, or sometimes a panel of judges, who is 
the main actor of criminal trials. This type of criminal procedure sometimes is also 
referred as ‘judge-led’ or ‘judge-centric’.117  
As noted by Boas, the greatest disparity between the two models is illustrated during the 
pre-trial phase.118 In civil law jurisdictions, the pre-trial investigation will be conduct by 																																																																																																																																																																		
Defendantand	the	Victim’	in	Mireille	Delmas-Marty	and	JR	Spencer	(eds),	European	Criminal	Procedures	
(Cambridge	University	Press	2002);	Antoinette	Perrodet,	‘The	Public	Prosecutor’	in	Mireille	
Delmas-Marty	and	JR	Spencer	(eds),	European	Criminal	Procedures	(Cambridge	University	Press	2002);	
Denis	Salas,	‘The	Role	of	the	Judge’	in	Mireille	Delmas-Marty	and	JR	Spencer	(eds),	European	Criminal	
Procedures	(Cambridge	University	Press	2002).	
115	 Kenneth	S	Gallant,	‘The	Role	and	Powers	of	Defense	Counsel	in	the	Rome	Statute	of	the	International	
Criminal	Court’	[2000]	The	International	Lawyer	21,	37.	
116	 See,	Michael	Bohlander,	‘Basic	Concepts	of	German	Criminal	Procedure:	An	Introduction’	(2011)	1	
Durham	Law	Review	1,	1.	Note	that	the	term	‘inquisitorial’	is	perhaps	historically	compromised.	It	refers	
to	a	historic	proceeding	by	the	church	that	is	known	to	be	unlawful	in	itself	and	had	only	political	
ideological	aims.	See	e.g.	GEP	Brouwer,	‘Inquisitorial	and	Adversary	Procedures	-	A	Comparative	Analysis’	
(1981)	55	Australian	Law	Journal,	207,	208	referring	to	the	Spanish	inquisition);	David	Luban,	Lawyers	
and	Justice:	An	Ethical	Study	(Princeton	University	Press	1988)	93–94	(remarking	that	‘the	label	
“inquisitorial”	evokes	images	of	the	auto-da-fe	and	the	Iron	Maiden,	the	Pit	and	the	Pendulum’).	
117	 Craig	R	Callen	and	others,	‘Cognitive	Strategies	and	Models	of	Fact-Finding’	[2008]	Crime,	Procedure	
and	Evidence	in	a	Comparative	and	International	Context	165,	165;	Damaška,	The	Faces	of	Justice	and	
State	Authority	(n	373)	109,	154.	
118	 Boas,	‘A	Code	of	Evidence	and	Procedure	for	International	Criminal	Law?	The	Rules	of	the	ICTY’	(n	39)	
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an ‘impartial’ official, either an investigation judge, or a prosecutor. Unlike the 
prosecution which represents the executive branch in the common law countries, the 
prosecutors in civil law jurisdictions usually enjoy ‘quasi-judiciary’ status. In addition, 
even the educational training is very different between the two systems.119 The roles of 
the judicial are considered to be neutral, and their missions are to find out the truth. The 
presumption is that the investigating judge or prosecutor will collect both inculpatory 
and exculpatory materials,120 although empirical studies suggest that this perhaps only 
exists at the normative level.121 The idea behind the inquisitorial system is ‘continuity’, 
as ‘policy-implementing’. After the investigating judge or prosecutor finished the 
investigation, all the information collected will be placed in a written case file, the 
‘dossier’.122 This dossier will then be passed on to the presiding judge. At trial, the roles 
for the trial prosecutor and defence counsel are limited, as they are only secondary to 
the judges. There is only ‘one-case’ and the judge will conduct the proceedings by 
asking the court witnesses questions and looking into the evidence. The prosecutor and 
																																																																																																																																																																		
19.	 	
119	 Fletcher,	‘The	Influence	of	the	Common	Law	and	Civil	Law	Traditions	on	International	Criminal	Law’	
(n	267)	104.	
120	 Keith	A	Findley,	‘Adversarial	Inquisitions:	Rethinking	the	Search	for	the	Truth’	(2011)	56	New	York	
Law	School	Law	Review	12	(describing	a	German	prosecutor	as	a	‘second	judge’	who	functions	in	a	
‘neutral,	detached,	and	objective’	role).	Cf.	In	France,	the	Prosecutor	(Procurer),	is	considered	to	be	part	
of	the	judiciary	(magistrat).	See	e.g.	Jacqueline	S	Hodgson,	‘The	French	Prosecutor	in	Question’	(2010)	67	
Washington	and	Lee	Law	Review	1361;	Lerner	(n	269)	802;	Jacqueline	Hodgson,	French	Criminal	Justice:	
A	Comparative	Account	of	the	Investigation	and	Prosecution	of	Crime	in	France	(Bloomsbury	Publishing	
2005).	 	
121	 E.g.	German	Criminal	Procedure	Code	(Strafprozessordnung):	Section	160	(2):	The	public	prosecution	
office	shall	ascertain	not	only	incriminating	but	also	exonerating	circumstances,	and	shall	ensure	that	
such	evidence	is	taken	the	loss	of	which	is	to	be	feared.	See	further	Christine	Van	den	Wyngaert,	
Criminal	Procedures	in	the	European	System	(Butterworths	1993)	141;	de	Meester	and	others	(n	370)	
208–10	(role	of	the	prosecutor	at	the	pre-trial	stage).	 	
122	 Pakes	(n	271)	88,	94–5;	Lerner	(n	269)	805.	
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defence counsel can suggest additional witnesses or lines of questioning to the judges,123 
but active performances are discouraged. 
By contrast, the adversarial model is considered as ‘party-driven’ or ‘party-centric’ 
because the main actors in criminal proceedings are the parties—the prosecutor and 
defence. It is also referred as the ‘two-case’ approach. The stark contrast is evident 
during the investigation phase, the police or prosecutor (executive branch) are 
responsible for conducting the investigation.124 The roles of the judiciary are limited, 
unless involving matters which require judicial approval such as warrant or detention. 
The parties will decide how to proceed the case, for example, plea bargains are a typical 
feature of common law systems. During the trial phase, the parties also have the liberty 
to present the evidence and to call witnesses.125 Both the prosecutor and the defence 
counsel are ‘zealous advocates’, representing the State and the accused respectively. 
Meanwhile the judges usually take the approach of a ‘referee’ or ‘passive umpire’, 
whose roles are to control the proceedings such as regulating the time and ruling on the 
																																																								
123	 	 Valérie	Dervieux,	‘The	French	System’	in	Mireille	Delmas-Marty	and	JR	Spencer	(eds),	European	
Criminal	Procedures	(Cambridge	University	Press	2002)	253,258;	Leonardo	J	Raznovich,	‘A	Comparative	
Review	of	the	Socio-Legal	Implication	of	Burden	of	Proof	and	Presumptions	to	Deal	with	Factual	
Uncertainty’	(2008)	32	American	Journal	of	Trial	Advocacy	57,	58.	 	
124	 In	England,	it	is	the	police	who	are	responsible	for	the	investigation,	then	pass	to	the	Crown	
Prosecution	Service	decide	whether	to	prosecute	or	not.	In	the	US,	it	is	the	executive	branch—police,	
prosecutors,	investigating	agents—	there	is	no	concept	of	an	investigating	judge,	as	is	found	in	a	civil	
system.	
125	 John	R	Spencer,	‘Evidence’	in	Mireille	Delmas-Marty	and	John	R	Spencer,	John	R.	(eds),	European	
Criminal	Procedures	(Cambridge	University	Press	2002)	627.	
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admissibility of the evidence. If the case is tried by lay judges, or a jury, there will be a 
professional judge or legal clerk to give the jury instructions.126  
Although the prosecutor in the adversarial system is also seen as an administrator of 
justice and an officer of the court, his or her role is not expected to be neutral. Unlike in 
the civil law system, the prosecution case should only consist of evidence that will be 
used against the accused, notwithstanding its duty to disclose exculpatory material to 
the accused.127 The theory is that, two parties present their view of the events in 
question by substantiating their claims with evidence and, subsequently, the fact finder 
is enabled to make a determination on the basis of the presented evidence.128  
In the context of the international Tribunals, as observed by Christensen, the role of the 
prosecutor in the ad hoc Tribunals is a deviation from the original adversarial 
tradition.129 The international prosecutor is far more powerful than the domestic one 
and possibly ‘not only has the authority, but he or she has the responsibility to 
decapitate an army, a negotiating team, or a civil authority even before the offense is 
proved.’130 Johnson noted that the experience of the ICTY shows that ‘the prosecutor’s 
work goes largely unchecked by the judges.’131 ICC sceptics are often concerned about 
																																																								
126	 Salas	(n	373)	500	(describing	England).	
127	 See	Chapters	V	and	VI.	 	
128	 David	A	Harris,	‘The	Constitution	and	Truth	Seeking:	A	New	Theory	on	Expert	Services	for	Indigent	
Defendants’	[1992]	Journal	of	Criminal	Law	and	Criminology	469,	499–500.	 	
129	 Christensen	(n	278)	407.	 	
130	 Alfred	P	Rubin,	‘An	International	Criminal	Tribunal	For	Former	Yugoslavia’	(1994)	6	Pace	International	
Law	Review	7,	9.	
131	 Johnson	(n	282)	176.	 	
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this fact, and pointed out that lessons are not always learned from the past 
experiences.132 
Common law lawyers are more concerned about the role of the prosecutor in the ICC. 
The imbalance between the prosecutor and defence in the ICC perhaps is even more 
remarkable, and some see this as ‘an injustice carried over from the ICTY.’133 
Disfavouring the defence, Gallant remarked that ‘the ICC Statute omits provisions 
guaranteeing sufficient funding for fair defence investigation of the facts of a case. 
Additionally, the ICC Statute omits a clear determination of privileges and immunities 
of defence counsel and staff to investigate the facts of cases in the states in which 
evidence is or may be located or in which the alleged crimes occurred.’134  
As to the role of the defence, its perilous position is a direct product of the clash 
between civil and common law. ‘Investigative funding is tied to the continuing 
discussion regarding the relationship between civil and common-law criminal procedure 
in the ICC.’135 Because the ‘relationship’ has not been defined, the defence’s role in 
assuring justice is left in jeopardy.136  
IV. The Search for Truth?  
																																																								
132	 E.g.	Rubin	(n	389)	9	(‘The	only	effect	that	this	arrangement	seems	likely	to	have	would	involve	
captives	or	the	leaders	of	a	defeated	enemy.	This	should	not	be	surprising,	given	that	the	Nuremberg	
model	was	in	fact	a	victors’	tribunal’).	 	
133	 E.g.	Christensen	(n	278)	417.	
134	 Gallant	(n	374)	21.	 	
135	 ibid	37.	 	
136	 Groulx	(n	223).	 	
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Both common and civil law system seek for the truth, albeit different ways. 
Commentators have observed that both systems aim at finding the truth, the only 
variation is the method chosen.137 However, the weight and extent of this truth-seeking 
task can have a stark contrast between these two systems, especially when it might be 
conflicting with fairness. For common law lawyers, ‘fair play’ is equally, or perhaps 
even more, important than seeking the so-called truth, while for civil lawyers searching 
for the truth is the absolute priority.138 It is also noted that the truth they seek in each 
system sometimes is not necessarily the same thing.139 This is reflected, for example, in 
the two system’s approach with regard to the admission of evidence, where criminal 
procedure rules in civil law jurisdictions usually contain very little technical rules of 
evidence.140 
Damaška, for example, has suggested that the common law system focuses more on the 
need for dispute resolution than truth seeking.141 According to Damaška, there are two 
models: conflict solving and policy implementing. The common law system represents 
the former, which is also often referred to as the ‘contest’ model, while the civil law 
																																																								
137	 E.g.	Cryer	and	others	(n	5)	424;	Ohlin	(n	151)	61,	fn	86	(‘However,	this	does	not	entail	the	conclusion	
that	a	wholly	party-driven	evidentiary	system	is	not	designed	with	truth-seeking	as	its	procedural	goal;	
rather,	the	operative	distinction	is	the	chosen	procedural	method	for	achieving	the	truth’).	See	also	
Thomas	Weigend,	‘Should	We	Search	for	the	Truth,	and	Who	Should	Do	It’	(2010)	36	North	Carolina	
Journal	of	International	Law	and	Commercial	Regulation	389,	389	(criminal	procedure	systems	all	have	
the	same	goal	of	truth	finding).	
138	 See	e.g.	Weigend	(n	396).	 	
139	 Zappalà,	Human	Rights	in	International	Criminal	Proceedings	(n	93)	16;	Pocar	and	Carter	(n	340)	20.	
They	noted	the	difference	between	the	‘objective	truth’	and	‘procedural	truth’,	the	latter	emphasises	on	
the	just	settlement	of	disputes.	
140	 Buisman,	Bouazdi	and	Costi	(n	303)	28–34.	
141	 Damaška,	The	Faces	of	Justice	and	State	Authority	(n	373)	3.	 	
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system is equivalent to the latter.142 He has observed that the two systems are not 
even-handedly committed to the pursuit of truth.143 Although the description of a truth 
focus in civil law systems compared with a dispute resolution focus in common law 
systems do not do justice to the complexity of the systems today, the two themes are 
descriptive and explanatory of some underlying principles of the procedures. 
Regarding the extent of truth-seeking, while it is generally accepted by both sides that 
procedural truth is the best that we could achieve, the common observation is that the 
adversarial model puts more emphasis on ensuring fairness for the accused in contrast 
with the non-adversarial attitude of ‘be as close as possible to the absolute truth’.144 For 
example, common law systems have more complicated rules for admission of evidence, 
illegally obtained evidence will be excluded, even if it would assist the 
truth-determining process.145 In the civil law system, despite recognising the fact that it 
is hardly possible to reach the absolute truth, they must aim at ‘striving for the best 
possible truth’.146 Civil law lawyers would argue that truth is intertwined with justice; 																																																								
142	 Damaška,	The	Faces	of	Justice	and	State	Authority	(n	373);	Damaška,	‘Evidentiary	Barriers	to	
Conviction	and	Two	Models	of	Criminal	Procedure’	(n	265)	581.	 	 	 	
143	 Damaška,	‘Evidentiary	Barriers	to	Conviction	and	Two	Models	of	Criminal	Procedure’	(n	265)	513.	
144	 Eser	(n	370)	122.	See	also	Damaška,	‘Evidentiary	Barriers	to	Conviction	and	Two	Models	of	Criminal	
Procedure’	(n	265)	(describing	civil	law	system	as	‘more	committed	to	the	search	for	truth’	than	an	
adversary	system);	Mirjan	Damaška,	‘The	Competing	Visions	of	Fairness:	The	Basic	Choice	for	
International	Criminal	Tribunals’	(2011)	36	North	Carolina	Journal	of	International	Law	and	Commercial	
Regulation	365,	379–80	(noting	a	more	recent	decrease	in	emphasis	on	truth	with	an	increase	in	
procedural	fairness);	Thomas	Weigend,	‘Is	the	Criminal	Process	About	Truth?	A	German	Perspective’	
(2003)	26	Harvard	Journal	of	Law	&	Public	Policy	157,	161–2	(describing	the	tradition	emphasis	on	truth	
and	noting	changes	dues	to	procedural	rights	of	the	accused).	
145	 Richard	E	Myers,	‘Adversarial	Counsel	in	an	Inquisitorial	System’	(2011)	37	NCJ	Int’l	L.	&	Com.	Reg.	
411,	413–6	(truth-deflecting’	practices	in	adv	proceedings);	Jacqueline	S	Hodgson,	‘Safeguarding	
Suspects’	Rights	in	Europe:	A	Comparative	Perspective’	(2011)	14	New	Criminal	Law	Review	611,	620.	
146	 Eser	(n	370)	122.	 	
		
 		
	
113 
there cannot be just judgement without making an honest effort to seek the truth.147 
Many civil law scholars often dislike the adversarial system tendency to focus on the 
‘just settlement of dispute’, in particular, the willingness to ‘sacrifice’ the truth to other 
competing interests. 
By contrast, the common law way of thinking regards justice almost as interchangeable 
with fairness.148 The notion of fair play is deeply rooted in the common law’s society 
and philosophy.149 Not only must the outcome be just, but the process must also be 
open and fair. This is also the reason why, in the Anglo-American literature, criminal 
trials are often referred as a ‘sporting contest’.150 The courts in both the UK and the 
U.S. often emphasise that justice must also be seen to be done.151 It has been described 
that the common law system is more fairness oriented and the dominant goal is to 
																																																								
147	 E.g.	ibid	(‘Despite	all	the	skepticism,	truth	and	justice	are	“intimately	intertwined”	to	such	a	degree	
that	a	judgment	can	be	accepted	as	“just”	only	if	it	is	at	least	based	on	an	honest	effort	to	find	the	truth’);	
Weigend	(n	403)	161–2	(arguing	that	the	truth	is	the	absolute	priority	in	criminal	trials).	 	 Similarly	see	
Heike	Jung,	‘Nothing	but	the	Truth?	Some	Facts,	Impressions	and	Confessions	about	Truth	in	Criminal	
Procedure’	in	Robin	Antony	Duff	and	others	(eds),	The	Trial	on	Trial:	Volume	One—The	Truth	and	Due	
Process	(Hart	Publishing	2004);	Damaška,	‘Evidentiary	Barriers	to	Conviction	and	Two	Models	of	Criminal	
Procedure’	(n	265)	580	(describing	civil	law	system	as	“more	committed	to	the	search	for	truth	than	an	
adversary	system);	Damaška,	‘The	Competing	Visions	of	Fairness:	The	Basic	Choice	for	International	
Criminal	Tribunals’	(n	403)	369–70	(noting	a	more	recent	decrease	in	emphasis	on	truth	with	an	increase	
in	procedural	fairness).	 	
148	 John	Rawls,	Justice	as	Fairness:	A	Restatement	(Harvard	University	Press	2001).	
149	 For	the	concept	of	fairness	in	common	law	countries,	see	George	P	Fletcher,	The	Grammar	of	
Criminal	Law:	American,	Comparative,	and	International	(Oxford	University	Press	2007)	134–7	(noting	
that	it	is	difficult	to	translate	‘fair’	to	other	languages	since	the	notion	does	not	really	exist	in	civil	law	
jurisdictions).	 	
150	 See	e.g.	William	J	Brennan	Jr,	‘The	Criminal	Prosecution:	Sporting	Event	or	Quest	for	Truth–A	
Progress	Report’	(1990)	68	Washington	University	Law	Quarterly	1.	
151	 	 The	original	quote	can	be	traced	back	to	1924:	‘justice	should	not	only	be	done,	but	should	
manifestly	and	undoubtedly	be	seen	to	be	done.’	-	Lord	Hewart,	R	v	Sussex	ex	parte	McCarthy	[1924]	1	
KB	256;	[1923]	All	ER	Rep	233.	
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resolve the conflict between the two parties: the prosecution and the defence. 152 In 
general, common law systems are seen as giving more prominence to the rights of the 
accused, which, often in the eyes of civil lawyers, may compromise the search for 
absolute truth.153 
Consequently, the civil law systems generally reflects the emphasis on truth finding 
with fewer restrictive evidence rules than one could observe in the common law system, 
which involves more elaborate rules for the admission of evidence.154 The theory is that 
if determining the absolute truth is a priority, it is preferable to have a system in which 
as much evidence as possible is admissible so that all relevant factors are known. 
However, if resolving the dispute is the dominant goal, then establishing ‘the rules of 
the game’ that regulate what evidence is admissible helps to control the proceeding on 
the dispute. Possibly, common law commentators might not agree with this. Common 
law practitioners also criticise the inquisitorial approach towards finding the truth. For 
example, Findley contends that ‘the inquisition’s review process thus conflicts with the 
way we search for truth in a scientific context.’155 Judge Murphy and Baddour argue 
that the ‘free proof’ approach, which came from civil law jurisdictions, is not only ‘far 																																																								
152	 Anglo-American	writers,	by	contrast,	tend	to	emphasize	the	conflict-resolving	potential	of	the	
criminal	process.	See	e.g.	 	 John	D	Jackson,	‘Managing	Uncertainty	and	Finality:	The	Function	of	the	
Criminal	Trial	in	Legal	Inquiry’	in	RA	Duff	and	others	(eds),	The	Trial	on	Trial:	Volume	1:	Truth	and	Due	
Process	(Bloomsbury	Publishing	2004)	124–5;	Fairlie	(n	330)	248.	
153	 Eser	(n	370)	120,	132	at	fn	10.	Eser	criticised	Fairlie	(at	295)	‘seems	only	worried	about	the	rights	of	
the	accused.’	Fairlie	(n	330).	
154	 Although	some	have	argued,	this	is	better	for	finding	the	truth:	see	e.g.	Whiting	(n	325)	86.	 	
155	 Findley	(n	379)	933.	See	also	Chrisje	Brants,	RC	Huff	and	M	Killias,	‘The	Vulnerability	of	Dutch	
Criminal	Procedure	to	Wrongful	Conviction’	[2008]	Wrongful	conviction:	International	perspectives	on	
miscarriages	of	justice	157,	172,	174.	
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from aiding in the search for the truth’, but also ‘wastes time, obscures the real issues 
and distracts the focus of the judges from the evidence that really matters.’156 
In sum, the subtle difference between the goals pursued by different legal traditions is 
one of the causes for the procedural problems arising in international criminal tribunals. 
As pointed out by Pocar and Carter, for international criminal tribunals, in particular the 
ICC, it is not clear which goals – the truth or dispute settlement – should have the 
priority.157 
V. The ‘Inquisitorial Drift’158 
A. More Efficient and Effective?  
A related issue is the efficiency and the effectiveness of international criminal trials. 
After a few years of the ad hoc tribunals operation, criticism arises. It mostly concerns 
three points: expense, ineffectiveness, and inefficiency.159 Critiques often point to the 
party centric aspect of adversarial systems as a defect for expeditious trial and 
impediment for the search for the truth, and have advocated that the inquisitorial system 
would be better in achieving this aim.160 This is because civil law system is generally 
																																																								
156	 Judge	Peter	Murphy	and	Baddour	(n	297)	379.	
157	 Pocar	and	Carter	(n	340)	22–3.	
158	 Vogler	(n	276)	106.	
159	 See	e.g.	Ralph	Zacklin,	‘The	Failings	of	Ad	Hoc	International	Tribunals’	(2004)	2	J.	Int’l	Crim.	Just.	541;	
Higgins	(n	237).	
160	 E.g.	Eser	(n	370)	(suggesting	that	adopting	civil	law	model	could	enhance	the	efficiency	of	
international	trials).	Similarly,	Combs	(n	283)	312;	Tochilovsky,	‘International	Criminal	Justice:	“Strangers	
in	the	Foreign	System”’	(n	260)	342.	
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perceived as placing more importance on the truth-seeking and the efficiency of the 
trial.161 In addition, commentators also argued that a less two-party-centred process also 
allows the crime victims a more pronounced role. Additionally, increased judicial 
control may enhance the efficiency of the proceedings and the acceptance of wide 
prosecutorial powers.162 Accordingly, many have called for moving towards a more 
inquisitorial approach.163  
Some have claimed that the adversarial settings, particularly the aspect of letting the 
parties determine the presentation of evidence, makes the proceedings lengthy and 
inefficient.164 Nevertheless, this is not necessarily true, and it should be noted that there 
are many factors that would affect the length and speed of the trial proceedings, in 
particular the complexity and nature of the crimes. In fact, comparative studies of 
European procedures have suggested otherwise: in general, criminal proceedings are far 
more expeditious in England, a classic example of an adversarial system, than in 
Continental Europe.165 The jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights 
shows that most civil law-based Continental European countries, in particular France, 
																																																								
161	 Frase	(n	265)	627.	
162	 Cryer	and	others	(n	15)	425.	 	
163	 Others,	while	noting	the	confusion	and	delay	of	trials	such	as	that	of	Milošević,	call	for	an	even	more	
radical	strengthening	of	inquisitorial	features.	E.g.	Vladimir	Tochilovsky,	‘Proceedings	in	the	
International	Criminal	Court:	Some	Lessons	to	Learn	from	ICTY	Experience’	(2002)	10	European	Journal	
of	Crime	Criminal	Law	and	Criminal	Justice	268;	Gregory	A	McClelland,	‘A	Non-Adversary	Approach	to	
International	Criminal	Tribunals’’	(2002)	26	Suffolk	Transnational	Law	Review	1;	Jackson,	‘Finding	the	
Best	Epistemic	Fit	for	International	Criminal	Tribunals	Beyond	the	Adversarial–Inquisitorial	Dichotomy’	
(n	162);	Geoffrey	Nice	and	Phillipe	Vallieres-Roland,	‘Procedural	Innovations	in	War	Crimes	Trials’’	(2005)	
3	Journal	of	International	Criminal	Justice	354.	
164	 Pocar	and	Carter	(n	340)	22.	
165	 Spencer	(n	366)	33.
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Germany, Italy, have been brought against the European Court of Human Rights for 
violating Article 6(1) ‘a reasonable time’, but not the common-law based England.166 
Admittedly, there are plenty of other factors which might affect the efficiency of the 
proceedings, for example, many countries of the Continents’ criminal justice system are 
overloaded, and people’s expectations may differ.167 But at least empirical evidence 
suggests that notably serious and complex cases run faster in England, and at the 
Appeals stage there are much shorter delays.168 
Regardless, scholars have continued claiming that by empowering the judges to manage 
the trial, in particular, their predominant control over the admission of evidence would 
enhance the efficiency of trials.169 In this regard, both the ad hoc Tribunals have been 
criticised for their inefficacy due to their dominant adversarial structure. In particular, 
the experience of the Milošević trial has provided a perfect example of how detrimental 
it could be if parties are left to lead the proceedings themselves.170 Therefore, 
particularly subsequent to the Milošević case, the suitability of the party-driven model 
for the international criminal tribunals has often been questioned.171 In an attempt to 
																																																								
166	 ibid.	Spencer	pointed	out	that	although	‘various	deficiencies	in	English	criminal	procedure	have	led	
to	embarrassing	condemnations	from	the	European	Court	of	Human	Rights,	until	recently	none	of	them	
have	been	for	failing	to	do	criminal	justice	within	‘a	reasonable	time’	as	required	by	Article	6(1)	of	the	
Convention.’	By	contrast,	‘the	experience	of	many	continental	systems,	including	France,	Germany	and	
Italy,	all	of	which	have	been	condemned	at	least	once	for	this	 	 -	and	in	the	case	of	Italy,	repeatedly.	The	
delays	involved	in	some	of	these	cases	seem,	to	common	lawyers,	almost	fantastic.’	 	
167	 ibid	34.	
168	 ibid	33.	
169	 E.g.	Pocar	and	Carter	(n	340)	22.	 	
170	 Boas,	The	Milošević	Trial:	Lessons	for	the	Conduct	of	Complex	International	Criminal	Proceedings	(n	
328).	
171	 	 E.g.	Klamberg	(n	54);	Mundis,	‘From	“common	Law”towards	“civil	Law”’	(n	70)	368.	 	
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shorten trials and expedite proceedings, according to a recent report made by Langer 
and Doherty, the ICTY implemented the so-called managerial reforms, adopting 
measures such as, allowing judges to actively manage the pre-trial and trial phases, 
permitting more written witness statements in lieu of live testimony, granting trial 
chambers the authority to permit or reject applications for interlocutory appeals, and 
limiting, at the trial stage, the number of sites and incidents under review.172 However, 
the outcome was not what the ICTY has hoped for: the ICTY actually lengthened the 
average duration of proceedings.173 In addition, the analysis shows that the achieved 
reductions in the duration of trials were not due to procedural reforms, but rather 
resulted from increases in court capacity and plea-bargaining.174 Hence, the report 
showed that ‘the procedural reforms that aimed to shorten procedure had the opposite 
effect: lengthening both pre-trial and trial.’175 
The procedure rules of the ICC reflect a heavier civil law influence than the ad hoc 
tribunals.176 One of the reasons is to avoid the lengthy experience of the ad hoc 
Tribunals. A notable structural change is the introduction of the Pre-Trial Chamber, 
whose purpose is to ensure better case management.177 Nevertheless, as the practice of 																																																								
172	 Maximo	Langer	and	Joseph	W	Doherty,	‘Managerial	Judging	Goes	International	but	Its	Promise	
Remains	Unfulfilled:	An	Empirical	Assessment	of	the	ICTY	Reforms’	(2011)	36	Yale	Journal	of	
International	Law	241,	251,	253;	Heidi	L	Hansberry,	‘Too	Much	of	a	Good	Thing	in	Lubanga	and	Haradinaj:	
The	Danger	of	Expediency	in	International	Criminal	Trials’	(2010)	9	Nw.	UJ	Int’l	Hum.	Rts.	357.	
173	 Langer	and	Doherty	(n	431)	252.	
174	 ibid	259.	
175	 ibid	243.	
176	 Boas,	Bischoff	and	Reid,	International	Criminal	Law	Practitioner	Library	(n	278)	15.	
177	 See	Calvo-Goller	(n	313)	3;	Håkan	Friman,	‘Trial	Procedures’	in	Carsten	Stahn	(ed),	The	Law	and	
Practice	of	the	International	Criminal	Court	(Oxford	University	Press	2015)	923;	Cryer	and	others	(n	5)	
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the ICC has shown, the Pre-Trial Chamber is less efficient than it was hoped for, and 
disclosure issues have caused the Lubanga Trial to almost collapse.178 
B. Dossier: The Cure? 
As mentioned, commentators have propounded that the civil law approach of dossier 
will work better for the international criminal tribunals.179 However, it should be noted 
that the dossier approach is not a magic wand: the inherent problems of the international 
disclosure practice will not magically disappear by creating a dossier, and it is still 
uncertain that the prosecutors would put all the essential information inside the file. If 
the prosecutors would tend to exclude important material in order to secure convictions 
and ‘end impunity’, it would not matter whether the dossier approach is being adopted. 
In addition, from a practical aspect, switching to the dossier approach would have 
required a very complicated Statute amending process, which is considered to be highly 
unlikely.180 
There are two crucial points which are often omitted when claiming the dossier is a 
better approach. Firstly, it should be highlighted that the timing of disclosure is 
different. Rarely mentioned by scholars is the fact that, although the defence will 
receive an entire dossier, it will be at a much later stage, that is, when the investigation 																																																																																																																																																																		
(noting	the	functions	of	the	Pre-Trial	Chamber,	which	is	inspired	by	civil	law	systems,	can	ensure	the	
efficiency	of	the	proceedings	while	protect	the	rights	of	the	accused).	
178	 Will	be	examined	later	in	Chapter	VII.	
179	 Tochilovsky,	‘International	Criminal	Justice:	“Strangers	in	the	Foreign	System”’	(n	1)	342;	Heinsch	(n	2)	
489	(considering	that	dossier	approach	is	easier	to	achieve	than	disclosure).	 	
180	 Scheffer	(n	240)	156	(stating	the	difficulties	in	amending	Rome	Statute).	
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phase is already closed.181 By contrast, the common law disclosure rules have a certain 
time frame, and are mostly completed before the trial starts, accompanied by a continual 
obligation to disclose.  
Secondly, the dossier works better for the inquisitorial judges, not the defence. As the 
judges take primary control in the proceedings and are expected to be well-informed of 
the case in civil law legal systems, a dossier is essential for judges to fulfil their role.182 
This is also associated with their function to find the truth. For such judicial questioning 
to be effective, judges must have substantial knowledge about the case. For this purpose, 
a collection of all relevant documents in the form of a dossier is prepared by all 
authorities involved in the pre-trial investigation. The completed dossier is then 
submitted to the presiding judge, among others.183 By contrast, the disclosure rules 
employed in the common law system is to assist the defence to prepare its defence and 
the judges are supposed to have no knowledge about the case prior to trial. 
In this regard, despite the dossier approach seemingly being more convenient and 
workable for the accused, it would not necessarily place the defence in a better position 
than in the common law disclosure system. The reason is obvious to the common law 
lawyers: it could easily create a bias for the judges, who are receiving the material 																																																								
181	 Damaška,	The	Faces	of	Justice	and	State	Authority	(n	373)	132.	He	noted	that	a	fair	comparison	
should	be	observed	in	a	larger	context:	‘the	Continental	defendants	acquires	an	unlimited	right	to	
‘discovery’	from	the	prosecution	only	after	pretrial	investigators	have	had	ample	opportunity	to	obtain	
information	from	him	and	to	convert	this	info	into	technical	evidence;	since	the	cat	is	already	out	of	the	
bag,	the	prosecutor	can	well	afford	to	give	the	defence	a	look.’	At	fn	64.	
182	 Combs	(n	264)	324.	
183	 ibid.	
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solely prepared by the prosecution.184 This is even more so in the international criminal 
tribunals, as the international settings are already heavily biased against the accused. 
After reviewing the dossier, the Judges are more likely to be inclined to side with the 
prosecutors. Accordingly, it is submitted that the proposed dossier approach is not 
necessary even on a principle level as it would not facilitate the process of finding the 
truth, and might undercut the due process rights of the defence. 
VI. Concluding Remarks 
The Chapter established that the procedural and evidential rules in the international 
criminal tribunals, in essence, are an ‘amalgamation of the civil and common law 
systems.’185 The illustrations of the procedural models exhibit that the fundamental 
differences between them are hard to solve, and explain the hardness in finding 
consensus on many core issues of procedure.186 This battle between the different 
procedural models, inevitably, will cause some damage, and the defence, as shown, is 
hit the most. 
The difference between each tribunal is the degree of mixture, with the ICC being 
infused with more civil law features, as it seeks to represent a wider consensus of states. 
Scholars have recognised this combination to be a ‘precarious straddling’ of common 																																																								
184	 Fletcher	and	Sheppard	(n	304)	547.	
185	 Sara	Stapleton,	‘Ensuring	a	Fair	Trial	in	the	International	Criminal	Court:	Statutory	Interpretation	and	
the	Impermissibility	of	Derogation’	(1998)	31	NYUJ	Int’l	L.	&	Pol.	535,	575.	
186	 Håkan	Friman,	‘Inspiration	from	the	International	Criminal	Tribunals	When	Developing	Law	on	
Evidence	for	the	International	Criminal	Court’	(2003)	2	The	Law	&	Practice	of	International	Courts	and	
Tribunals	373,	373–7.	
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and civil legal systems.187 This blending approach, in combination with the contextual 
argument, has put the defence in an awkward position, as specific procedural 
protections, which normally would be warranted in domestic criminal trials, were 
dropped during the mix. However, instead of addressing the issues of the departures of 
domestic criminal law, a sui generis system view was developed for dealing with the 
special international context, and relatively weak arguments are put forward in order to 
justify a lower standard of fairness. 
With regard to the disclosure system, the most contentious issue is whether the ICC 
should switch to the dossier approach, as employed by most civil law countries. 
However, it is submitted that the dossier would not solve the current problems, and 
perhaps even further diminish the situation for the defence. Since the prosecution’s 
disclosure obligation is based on good faith and proficiency, it would not make much 
difference if the prosecution wishes to hide relevant evidence or would simply be 
incapable of performing its duty properly. 
 
																																																								
187	 E.g.	Vincent	M	Creta,	‘The	Search	for	Justice	in	the	Former	Yugoslavia	and	Beyond:	Analyzing	the	
Rights	of	the	Accused	under	the	Statute	and	the	Rules	of	Procedure	and	Evidence	of	the	International	
Criminal	Tribunal	for	the	Former	Yugoslavia’	(1997)	20	Hous.	J.	Int’l	L.	381,	415.	
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CHAPTER V 	
THE PROSECUTION’S DUTY OF DISCLOSURE IN 
COMMON LAW JURISDICTIONS I — UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA 
 
I. Introduction 
The purpose of these two chapters is to provide a comparative view of the law and 
practice of the prosecution’s duty of disclosure in domestic jurisdictions. Only two 
common law jurisdictions, the United States of America (‘United States’ or ‘U.S.’) and 
England and Wales (‘England’) are selected. The reason for this approach is that civil 
law jurisdictions do not have disclosure rules; in most civil law countries, the 
prosecutors will prepare a dossier to the judges and the defence is entitled to receive a 
copy. However, it is submitted that the dossier approach is not necessarily a better 
approach for the international criminal tribunals, even though some might have claimed 
so.1 More realistically, the international criminal justice system is unlikely to amend 
their rules to a dossier practice.2 Accordingly, dossier approach would not be the focus 
of this thesis, although references will be made when necessary.  
The choice of the United States and the English model is evident for a comparative 
																																																								
1	 E.g.	Tochilovsky,	‘International	Criminal	Justice:	“Strangers	in	the	Foreign	System”’	(n	260);	Heinsch	(n	
261).	
2	 Robert	Cryer	and	others,	An	Introduction	to	International	Criminal	Law	and	Procedure	(Cambridge	
University	Press	2014).	 	
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approach of the disclosure rules in the international criminal tribunals: the procedural 
rules since Nuremberg are based on an U.S. model,3 and in the RPEs of the ad hoc 
tribunals, at least with regard to disclosure, the relevant disclosure Rules are almost 
identical to the United States Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 16.4 The 
judges of the ICTY and the ICTR, at least during the early days of the Tribunals, have 
made extensive references to the U.S. Federal Criminal Procedure Rules.5 Accordingly, 
the U.S. federal disclosure system serves as a legitimate and necessary choice for this 
comparative purpose. As to England, it is the origin of common law and many concepts 
of the United States law originated from the English common law, albeit later 
developments lead to distinctive differences in the two systems. Similarly, some ICTY 
judges have made reference to the English jurisprudence when guidance is needed for 
interpreting disclosure rules.6 
Through a comparative approach, it will be shown which sets of problems are identical 
in each adversarial jurisdictions, or if they are fundamental to criminal justice systems. 
By doing so, this Chapter will be able to identify and distinguish the issues from those 																																																								
3	 	 William	Schabas	and	Gideon	Boas,	International	Criminal	Law:	Developments	in	the	Case	Law	of	the	
ICTY,	vol	6	(Martinus	Nijhoff	Publishers	2003)	3–4;	Morris	and	Scharf	(n	333)	177;	M	Cherif	Bassiouni	and	
Peter	Manikas,	The	Law	of	the	International	Criminal	Tribunal	for	the	Former	Yugoslavia	(Transnational	
Publishers	1996)	863;	Jackson	and	Summers	(n	279)	122;	Bert	Swart,	Alexander	Zahar	and	Göran	Sluiter	
(eds),	The	Legacy	of	the	International	Criminal	Tribunal	for	the	Former	Yugoslavia	(Oxford	University	
Press	2011)	89.	
4	 Prosecutor	v	Tihomir	Blaškić,	No.	IT-95-14-T,	Decision	on	the	Production	of	Discovery	Materials	(27	Jan	
1997)	at	paras.	35-38.	
5	 See,	e.g.	Prosecutor	v	Delalić	et	al,	No.	IT-96-21-T,	Decision	on	the	Motion	by	the	Accused	Zejnil	Delalić	
for	the	Disclosure	of	Evidence	(26	September	1996)	at	para.	7	(citing	the	U.S.	Supreme	Court's	
jurisprudence,	such	as	United	States	v	Jackson,	850	F.	Supp.	1481,	1503).	
6	 See,	e.g.	Prosecutor	v	Delalić	et	al,	No.	IT-96-21-T,	Decision	on	the	Motion	by	the	Accused	Zejnil	Delalić	
for	the	Disclosure	of	Evidence	(26	September	1996)	at	para.	7	(citing	R	v	Keane).	
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of the international context or related to the inherent problems of public international 
law, such as state cooperation. After an analysis of the two common law systems, it will 
help to clarify whether the approach taken by the international criminal tribunals are 
necessary, or if there are alternatives as provided in the domestic practice. 
II. Aims and Purposes of Criminal Discovery7 
A. Assist the Adjudication of Guilt  
The primary goal in all criminal process is the same: to convict the guilty and acquit the 
innocent.8 Sometimes this aim is referred to as the pursuit of truth,9 although the 
so-called ‘truth’ cannot be equated with the truth in the general sense.10 Note that, in the 
concept of American criminal procedure, ‘truth-finding’ is referred to the adjudication 
of the defendant’s guilt, or to ascertain facts.11 The context of truth varies between the 
Anglo-American tradition, which focuses more on the ‘procedural truth’ that arises 
																																																								
7	 In	both	the	U.S.	and	the	UK,	the	terms	‘discovery’	and	‘disclosure’	are	commonly	used	to	describe	the	
process	of	pre-trial	evidence	collection	and	production.	
8	 See	e.g.,	United	States	v.	Nobles,	422	U.S.	225,	238-239,	95	S.	Ct.	2160,	45	L.Ed.2d	141	(1975)	at	page	
422.	‘The	dual	aim	of	our	criminal	justice	system	is	‘that	guilt	shall	not	escape	or	innocence	suffer’,	
Berger	v.	United	States,	295	U.	S.	78,	295	U.	S.	88	(1935).	To	this	end,	we	have	placed	our	confidence	in	
the	adversary	system,	entrusting	to	it	the	primary	responsibility	for	developing	relevant	facts	on	which	a	
determination	of	guilt	or	innocence	can	be	made.	See	United	States	v.	Nixon,	418	U.	S.	683,	418	U.	S.	709	
(1974);	Williams	v.	Florida,	399	U.	S.	78,	399	U.	S.	82	(1970);	Elkins	v.	United	States,	364	U.	S.	206,	364	U.	
S.	234	(1960)	(Frankfurter,	J.,	dissenting).	See	also,	Hannah	Arendt,	Eichmann	in	Jerusalem	(Penguin	
1963),	5.	Steven	Kay	and	Bert	Swart,	‘The	Role	of	the	Defence’	in	Antonio	Cassese	and	others	(eds),	The	
Rome	statute	of	the	International	Criminal	Court:	a	commentary	(Oxford	University	Press	Oxford	2002)	
1421–2.	
9	 William	J	Brennan	Jr,	‘The	Criminal	Prosecution:	Sporting	Event	or	Quest	for	Truth’	[1963]	Washington	
University	Law	Quarterly	279.	For	an	update,	see	Brennan	Jr	(n	409).	
10	 See	the	discussions	in	Chapter	IV.	
11	 ‘Pre-Trial	Disclosure	in	Criminal	Cases	Comment’	(1951)	60	Yale	Law	Journal	626.	See	also	Joshua	
Dressler	and	Alan	C	Michaels,	Understanding	Criminal	Procedure:	Adjudication,	vol	2	(LexisNexis	2006)	
Chapter	2.	
		
 		
	
126 
from the tournament between the parties, and Continental Europe, which is more 
devoted to the search for ‘substantial truth’.12  
In American literature, despite the common use of metaphors such as ‘contest’, 
‘winning’, ‘gamesmanship’ to describe criminal trials, it is generally accepted that 
criminal prosecution should be a ‘quest for truth’ rather than a ‘sporting event’ between 
the prosecution and the defence.13 This truth-seeking function will, arguably, be 
enhanced by a proper criminal discovery system. 14 Advance disclosure, which is 
allowing a criminal defendant to find out information relevant to the prosecution at an 
early stage,15 would minimise the risk of convicting an innocent person. 
B. Avoid trial at Surprise 
Furthermore, the truth is more likely to be revealed at trial if the defence has been given 
an early opportunity to investigate the evidence and prepare the case.16 Surprise 
evidence may produce fine drama, but it leads to poor justice. The old tactic ‘trial by 
																																																								
12	 Weigend	(n	403)	168;	Elisabetta	Grande,	‘Dances	of	Criminal	Justice:	Thoughts	on	Systemic	
Differences	and	the	Search	for	the	Truth’	in	John	Jackson,	Máximo	Langer	and	Peter	Tillers	(eds),	Crime,	
Procedure	and	Evidence	in	a	Comparative	and	International	Context:	Essays	in	Honour	of	Professor	
Mirjan	Damaska	(Bloomsbury	Publishing	2008)	145.	
13	 See	Brennan	Jr	(n	455);	Bennett	L	Gershman,	‘Litigating	Brady	v.	Maryland:	Games	Prosecutors	Play’	
(2007)	57	Case	Western	Reserve	Law	Review	531,	538.	
14	 See	Brennan	Jr,	‘Criminal	Prosecution’	(n	8),	arguing	that	the	rules	of	discovery	would	serve	the	basic	
function	of	the	trial-	determination	of	truth.	Although	Brennan’s	argument	is	supported	widely,	some	
have	argued	against	Justice	Brennan’s	proposition,	and	contended	that	broad	discovery	will	diminish	
fairness	in	criminal	trials.	For	example,	see	Edward	SG	Dennis	Jr,	‘The	Discovery	Process	in	Criminal	
Prosecutions:	Toward	Fair	Trials	and	Just	Verdicts’	(1990)	68	Wash.	ULQ	63.	
15	 Note	that	whether	this	obligation	should	be	extended	to	pre-plea	is	still	controversial.	Although,	the	
Supreme	Court	has	ruled	that	the	Constitution	did	not	require	discovery	to	apply	before	a	guilty	plea.	
See	e.g.	United	States	v.	Ruiz,	536	U.S.	622,	633	(2002).	
16	 Brennan	Jr	(n	409)	2.	
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ambush’ is not accepted in the modern criminal trials.17 As noted by Justice Douglas, 
‘modern instruments of discovery serves a useful purpose…. They together with 
pre-trial procedures make a trial less a game of blind man’s bluff and more a fair contest 
with the basic issues and facts disclosed to the fullest practicable extent.’18 
Although at first glance, the requirement to disclose the parties’ own case seems to be 
contrary to the original intention of adversarial traditions, when ‘ambush’ used to be a 
legitimate strategy at trial. However, attacking the other party by surprise might not be 
the best way to achieve the objectives of criminal trials, and the victory of an individual 
advocate victory is not one of them.19 In this regard, the discovery process will be able 
to assist the determination of truth. 
C. Ensure Fairness – Due Process 
A related task of criminal discovery is to ensure the integrity and fairness of the trial 
and reach a more reliable outcome in criminal cases. The constitutional right to 
discovery, now commonly known as the ‘Brady Rule’,20 emerges from the concept of 
due process, which requires that the procedures by which laws are applied must be even 
																																																								
17	 Roger	J	Traynor,	‘Ground	Lost	and	Found	in	Criminal	Discovery’	(1964)	39	NyUL	Rev.	228,	249.	(‘The	
truth	is	most	likely	to	emerge	when	each	side	seeks	to	take	the	other	by	reason	rather	than	by	
surprise.’)	 	
18	 US	v.	Procter	&	Gamble	Co.,	356	U.S.	677,	682	(1958).	 	
19	 See,	e.g.	United	States	v.	Gallo,	654	F.	Supp.	463	(E.D.N.Y.	1987),	477.	Linda	S	Eads,	‘Adjudication	by	
Ambush:	Federal	Prosecutors’	Use	of	Nonscientific	Experts	in	a	System	of	Limited	Criminal	Discovery’	
(1988)	67	NCL	Rev.	577.	 	
20	 Brady	v	Maryland,	373	U.S.	83,	83	S.	Ct.	1194,	10	L.Ed.2d	215	(1963).	The	Court	held	that	‘due	process’	
requires	that	the	prosecution	disclose	evidence	favourable	to	the	accused.	 	
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handed, so that individuals are not subjected to the arbitrary exercise of governmental 
power. This right will be examined at a later section. 
Also required by due process, is the principle of presumption of innocence. The main 
effect of this principle in the criminal process is that the prosecution bears the burden of 
proof and must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.21 Since the defence lawyers 
only have very imperfect opportunities to challenge the prosecution’s cases,22 liberal 
discovery rules are the essential tools for the defence to challenge the prosecution’s case 
and prepare its defence. Thus, the principle of presumption of innocence could be 
seriously eroded by not giving the defence a sufficient opportunity to cast doubt on the 
prosecution’s case. Damaška has commented accurately, that ‘restraints placed on 
disclosure make it harder for the American defence to rebut the prosecution’s evidence, 
thus indirectly decreasing prosecutorial evidentiary burdens.’23 In other words, too 
limited discovery rights of the defendant could have a detrimental effect on the 
presumption of innocence. 
D. Procedural Safeguard and Judicial Efficiency 
Discovery rules also have the effect of reducing other common causes for wrongful 
																																																								
21	 See	e.g.	Estelle	v.	Williams,	425	U.S.	501,	503	(1976);	Henderson	v.	Kibbe,	431	U.S.	145,	153	(1977)	;	
Ulster	County	Court	v.	Allen,	442	U.S.	140,	156	(1979)	;	Sandstorm	v.	Montana,	442	U.S.	510,	520–24	
(1979).	On	the	interrelated	concepts	of	the	burden	of	the	prosecution	to	prove	guilt	beyond	a	
reasonable	doubt	and	defendant’s	entitlement	to	a	presumption	of	innocence,	see	Taylor	v.	Kentucky,	
436	U.S.	478,	483–86	(1978)	,	and	Kentucky	v.	Whorton,	441	U.S.	786	(1979).	
22	 Brennan	Jr	(n	455)	3.	
23	 Damaška,	‘Evidentiary	Barriers	to	Conviction	and	Two	Models	of	Criminal	Procedure’	(n	265)	534.	
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convictions, such as eyewitness misidentification, perjury and false confessions.24 
Accordingly, it could promote the accuracy and confidence of criminal trials, and 
enhances judicial efficiency. The experience of those jurisdictions, which adopted more 
liberal discovery rules, also shows a more efficient process, with less reversals and 
retrials, and more cases resolved earlier in the process.25 
In sum, as summarised in State v. Tune, the purpose of broad discovery is ‘to promote 
the fullest possible presentation of the facts, minimise opportunities for falsification of 
evidence, and eliminate the vestiges of trial by combat.’26 It would seem that, without 
broad discovery in criminal adjudication, a serious limitation is imposed upon the 
achievement of the criminal proceeding’s aim. By obligating the timely exchange of all 
material collected by the prosecution in criminal cases, broad discovery laws can 
provide for a more fair and accurate criminal justice system.27 
III.  The Pre-Trial Discovery System – Inculpatory Evidence 
The American criminal discovery system is divided into two categories: inculpatory and 
exculpatory materials. Regarding these types of information the governing laws and 
procedures are different. The inculpatory evidence will form the prosecution case. The 
types of materials which are subjected to disclosure, and exceptions of disclosure are 
																																																								
24	 The	Justice	Project,	‘Expanded	Discovery	in	Criminal	Cases:	A	Policy	Review’	(2007).	
25	 E.g.	California.	
26	 State	v.	Tune,	13	NJ	203,	210,	98	A2d	881,	884	(1953).	 	
27	 The	Justice	Project,	‘Expanded	Discovery	in	Criminal	Cases:	A	Policy	Review’	(2007).	
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mainly regulated by Stature and Court Rules. These rules vary in each jurisdiction, and 
they usually should be disclosed prior to trial so that the accused can prepare their 
defence. The exculpatory evidence, on the other hand, is governed by constitutional law, 
as interpreted by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has developed this obligation 
through Brady v. Maryland and its progeny case.28 These categories will be discussed 
separately.  
A. The Law of Criminal Discovery and its Development 
At the outset, it is important to note that the U.S. Supreme Court stated that a criminal 
defendant has no federal constitutional right to general discovery.29 In the United States, 
the law of discovery in criminal cases is dominated by statute and court rules.30 The 
types of discovery permitted vary in each jurisdiction, some states allow broad 
discovery31 whilst some have very restrictive rules, and with the Federal Rules being 
the narrowest.32 
Under most rules, the right of criminal defendants to obtain discovery of information 
material for the preparation of the defence involves a statutory right to discovery of 
evidence that is considerably broader than the constitutional right. 
																																																								
28	 Also	known	as	‘Brady	material’:	material	evidence	favourable	to	the	accused	not	handed	over	at	the	
time	of	trial.	
29	 Weatherford	v.	Bursey,	429	U.S.	545	(1977).	
30	 Wayne	R	Lafave	and	others,	Criminal	Procedure	(5th	edn,	West	Publishing	Company	2009).	
31	 Similar	to	the	ABA	Standards	Relating	to	Discovery	and	Procedure	Before	Trial.	ibid.	
32	 ibid.	
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Although the content is substantially different, the structure of discovery rules is 
roughly similar. The rules commonly will first establish a procedure by which the 
defence and prosecution can put into effect the other side’s obligation to make pre-trial 
disclosure. Then it will state what information shall or may, upon court order, be 
disclosed by the prosecution to the defence, and vice versa. After that, the exceptions of 
disclosure are based on content (e.g. work product) or nature (e.g. witness statements). 
Under special circumstances, the Court is authorised to issue a protective order which 
will bar or limit disclosure. It imposes a continuing duty to disclose discoverable items 
so that the process automatically encompasses items acquired after the initial disclosure. 
Lastly, it provides a procedure for judicial administration and enforcement of the 
discovery provisions, including the imposition of sanctions.33 
B. The Common Law: Pre-Trial Disclosure as an Exceptional Practice 
Originally pre-trial disclosure was rarely permitted.34 The common law rule, from its 
English precedent, was that the judiciary lacked any inherent authority to order pre-trial 
discovery in criminal cases.35 Without legislative authorisation a trial court could not 
order one party to make a disclosure of its evidence to the other. There was a feeling 
																																																								
33	 ibid.	 	
34	 John	Henry	Wigmore,	Evidence	(3rd	edn,	1940)	§	1859g,	1863;	Francis	Wharton,	Criminal	Evidence	
(12th	edn,	1955)	§	671;	‘Pre-Trial	Disclosure	in	Criminal	Cases	Comment’	(n	457)	626;	Robert	L	Fletcher,	
‘Pretrial	Discovery	in	State	Criminal	Cases’	[1960]	Stanford	Law	Review	293,	294	(stating	there	was	no	
right	to	criminal	discovery	under	the	common	law	as	starting	point).	 	
35	 People	ex	rel.	Lemon	v.	Supreme	Court	N.Y.	24,	156	N.E.	84	(1927)	at	28.	
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that pre-trial disclosure would ‘subvert criminal justice.’36 Therefore, similar to the 
early development in England, the only pre-trial discovery available to the parties was 
the one that was obtained informally through mutual exchange of information or 
incidentally in the course of such pre-trial proceedings. Later in the 1930s, however, 
states started to regulate formal pre-trial discovery and, by the mid-century, a 
substantial number of states allowed or required pre-trial discovery However, such 
discovery was treated primarily as an exceptional practice for a limited number of 
situations rather than as a standard element of pre-trial procedure.37  
Where a discovery provision neither authorises nor prohibits discovery of a particular 
item, the jurisdiction now recognises an inherent discretionary authority of the trial 
court to grant discovery of that item.38 However, they varied greatly with regard to the 
leeway that they would grant to the trial court in the exercise of the authority to compel 
discovery. 
C.  Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
In order to get a better understanding of the discovery rules, the current Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure will be briefly examined here.  
The discovery obligations of federal prosecutors are generally established by Federal 
																																																								
36	 ‘Pre-Trial	Disclosure	in	Criminal	Cases	Comment’	(n	457)	627.	
37	 Lafave	and	others	(n	476).	 	
38	 ibid.	
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Rules of Criminal Procedure 16 (‘Rule 16’) and the Jencks Act,39 Brady v. Maryland,40 
and Giglio v. United States.41 The federal criminal discovery system recognises a trial 
court’s inherent authority to fill in the ‘gaps’ in the coverage of defence discovery 
provisions, that same discretionary authority is not extended to prosecution discovery 
provisions. 
1. Types of Materials which should be disclosed 
Rule 16 requires the Prosecution to disclose, upon the Defence’s request: 
a. Defendant's Written or Recorded Statement. 
b. Defendant's Oral Statement.  
c. Organizational Defendant. 
d. Defendant's Prior Record.  
e. Documents and Objects. if the item is within the government's possession, 
custody, or control and: 
i. the item is material to preparing the defense; 
ii. the government intends to use the item in its case-in-chief at trial; 
or 
iii. the item was obtained from or belongs to the defendant. 
f. Reports of Examinations and Tests. 
g. Expert Witnesses. 
The government is obligated to let the defence inspect and copy42 certain materials, but 
only upon defence’s request. The types of materials which should be disclosed are 
																																																								
39	 The	Jencks	Act,	26.2,	18	U.S.C.	§	3500.	
40	 Brady	v.	Maryland.	
41	 Giglio	v.	US,	405	U.S.	150	(1972).	
42	 United	States	v.	Jeffers,	570	F.3d	557,	572	(4th	cir.	2009).	
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limited compared to other U.S. jurisdictions.  
The prosecution must disclose a defendant’s ‘relevant’ oral statement made in response 
to interrogation by a person the defendant knew was a government agent if the 
government intends to use the statement at trial. Rule 16(a) (1) (B) contains the written 
or recorded statement disclosure rules. Rule 16(a)(1)(C) contains the ‘organizational’ 
defendant statements which state that, upon request, the government must disclose a 
defendant’s written or oral statements which meet the requirements of (a)(1)(A) as well 
as (a)(1)(B) and which were made by a person who could legally bind the defendant. 
Rule 16 (a) (1) (D) contains the rules regarding disclosure of a defendant’s prior record. 
Rule 16(a)(1)(B)(i) requires the government to furnish to the defence: all relevant 
written or recorded statements made by the defendant which are in the custody or 
control of the government and which are known to the government or by the exercise of 
due diligence may become known to the government.43 
There are two main points here. First, unlike England, reciprocal discovery exists in the 
U.S. federal discovery system. Under Rule 16(a) (1) disclosure only takes place when 
the defence requests the prosecution to do so. This requirement is potentially 
problematic to the defendant.44 Because under Rule 16 (b) Defendant’s Disclosure 																																																								
43	 Carol	A.	Brook,	2012	Federal	Criminal	Discovery	Outline	(2012),	available	at	
https://www.fd.org/docs/select-topics/discovery/federal-criminal-discovery-outline.pdf?sfvrsn=8	
44	 Opponents	might	argue	that	the	defendant	‘invites’	this	choice.	However,	this	‘invitation’	is	a	false	
one.	Few	defendants,	if	any,	will	choose	to	forgo	discovery,	because	they	will	not	be	able	to	adequately	
prepare	their	defenses	without	it.	See	e.g.,	United	States	v.	Tucker,	249	F.R.D.	58,	60	(S.D.N.Y.	2008)	
(‘[A]n	innocent	defendant	has	no	a	priori	knowledge	of	the	accusations	against	which	she	must	defend	
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section, a defendant’s request of disclosure under 16(a) (1) (E), (F) or (G) will trigger 
the government’s entitlement to inspect the defence’s documents.45 The defence, 
therefore, is put in a strategic dilemma: whether to seek discovery at the high price of 
revealing its own case, or not to ask for any information from the prosecution at all. 
Furthermore, if a certain piece of material is not disclosed to the government, the 
defence bears the risk of exclusion from trial.46 Commentators also worried that this 
reciprocity aspect would have undermined the defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination.47 The argument relates to the fact that the burden of proof 
lies with the government, and the defence is not obligated to assist the state in this 
matter. 
Secondly, in comparison with English law, it is perhaps surprising that Rule 16 not only 
does not mention the prosecution witnesses, but also prohibits the disclosure of witness 
statement prior to testimony under the Jencks Act.48 In this regard, it is quite 																																																																																																																																																																		
herself,	and	thus	must	rely	on	the	government’s	disclosures	to	calculate	how	best	to	present	a	
defense.’)	
45	 Note	that,	reciprocal	discovery	obligations	do	not	arise	until	after	government	has	complied	with	its	
own	discovery	obligations,	see	e.g.	United	States	vKraselnick,	702	F.	Supp.	480	(D.N.J.	1988).	Also,	
reciprocal	discovery	obligations	are	not	triggered	by	Brady	requests	alone,	see	e.g.,	United	States	v.	
Marenghi,	893	F.	Supp.	85	(D.	Maine	1995).	
46	 Taylor	v.	Illinois,	484	U.S.	400	(1988)	(holding	that	preclusion	of	testimony	was	appropriate	sanction	
for	defense	counsel's	failure	to	disclose	the	names	of	alibi	witnesses	until	second	day	of	trial	when	
counsel	knew	about	the	witnesses	one	week	earlier	and	had	been	permitted	to	amend	the	witness	list	
on	the	first	day	of	trial.)	See	also	United	States	v.	Rodriguez	Cortes,	949	F.2d	532	(1st	Cir.	1991)	(court	
did	not	abuse	discretion	in	precluding	admission	of	defense	documents	as	sanction	for	reciprocal	
discovery	violation).	 	
See,	e.g.	Therese	M	Myers,	‘Reciprocal	Discovery	Violations:	Visiting	the	Sins	of	the	Defense	Lawyer	on	
the	Innocent	Client’	(1995)	33	Am.	Crim.	L.	Rev.	1277.	
47	 E.g.	Robert	P	Mosteller,	‘Discovery	Against	the	Defense:	Tilting	the	Adversarial	Balance’	[1986]	
California	Law	Review	1567,	1571–3,	1625.	
48	 The	Jencks	Act,	26.2,	18	U.S.C.	§	3500	requires	the	prosecution	to	produce	a	prosecution	witness	
statement	only	after	the	witness	has	testified.	
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unfortunate that none of the reform proposals to expand the scope of Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure has succeeded.49  
2. Types of Materials which are not subjected to Disclosure 
Rule 16(a) (2) provided the exceptions to disclosure.50 The government does not need 
to disclose their work-product51 and witness statements which are only discoverable 
pursuant to the Jencks Act. In addition, if the government has other ‘good cause’, such 
as national security, the court may agree to inspect documents ex parte.52 
D. Arguments against broad Discovery  
Inspired by the success of the expansion of civil discovery rules, there were calls for a 																																																																																																																																																																		
§	3500:	‘Demands	for	production	of	statement	and	reports	of	witnesses’		
(a) In	any	criminal	prosecution	brought	by	the	United	States,	no	statement	or	report	in	the	possession	
of	the	United	States	which	was	made	by	a	Government	witness	or	prospective	Government	witness	
(other	than	the	defendant)	shall	be	the	subject	of	subpoena,	discovery,	or	inspection	until	said	
witness	has	testified	on	direct	examination	in	the	trial	of	the	case.	
	
The	purpose	of	this	provision	is	said	to	serve	as	a	precautionary	measure	to	prevent	witness	intimidation	
and	harassment	by	defendants.	However,	as	a	practical	matter,	federal	prosecutors	often	provide	Jencks	
Act	material	slightly	in	advance	of	a	witness’	testimony.	For	a	more	detailed	analysis	on	the	Jencks	Act,	
see	Charles	A	Pulaski	Jr,	‘Extending	the	Disclosure	Requirements	of	the	Jencks	Act	to	Defendants:	
Constitutional	and	Nonconstitutional	Considerations’	(1978)	64	Iowa	L.	Rev.	1;	Paul	K	Rooney	and	Elliot	L	
Evans,	‘Let’s	Rethink	the	Jencks	Act	and	Federal	Criminal	Discovery’	(1976)	62	ABAJ	1313;	David	B	Wexler,	
‘The	Constitutional	Disclosure	Duty	and	the	Jencks	Act’	(1965)	40	.	John’s	L.	Rev.	206.	
	
49	 Most	recently,	‘Fairness	in	Disclosure	of	Evidence	Act	of	2012’,	March	15	2012	(introduced	but	not	
enacted).	
50	 Rule	16(a)	(2)	Federal	Rules	of	Criminal	Procedure	‘	Information	Not	Subject	to	Disclosure’:	
Except	as	permitted	by	Rule	16(a)(1)(A)-(D),	(F),	and	(G),	this	rule	does	not	authorize	the	discovery	or	
inspection	of	reports,	memoranda,	or	other	internal	government	documents	made	by	an	attorney	for	
the	government	or	other	government	agent	in	connection	with	investigating	or	prosecuting	the	case.	
Nor	does	this	rule	authorize	the	discovery	or	inspection	of	statements	made	by	prospective	government	
witnesses	except	as	provided	in	18	U.S.C.	§3500.	
51	 Government	may	waive	and	may	be	superseded	by	Brady.	See	United	States	v.	Musick,	291	Fed.	Appx.	
706,	727	(6th	Cir.	2008);	United	States	v.	Starusko,	729	F.2d	256	(3d	Cir.	1984).	
52	 United	States	v.	Moussaoui,	591	F.3d	263,	281	(4th	Cir.	2010).	
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broader criminal discovery. Although the importance of liberal discovery in criminal 
cases is recognised, the law and practice varies, and the reluctance of the federal 
government to expand the rules further demonstrates the fears of expanding criminal 
discovery laws. 
In comparison with England, there was little discovery required in criminal cases in the 
US. As mentioned, in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, even the prosecution’s 
witness list is prohibited from being disclosed pre-trial. As expressed by the infamous 
wording of Chief Justice Vanderbilt in State v. Tune,53  
‘In criminal proceedings long experience has taught the courts that often discovery 
will lead not to honest fact-finding, but on the contrary to perjury and the 
suppression of evidence… To permit unqualified disclosure of all statements and 
information in the hands of the State would go far beyond what is required in civil 
cases; it would defeat the very ends of justice.’  
It seems that the courts have been reluctant to impose any more duty on the prosecution 
to show its cards prior to trial, and a hostile attitude towards the defendants. One may 
wonder if the fears behind the rejection of liberal discovery are legitimate. For many 
criminal practitioners, the discovery process is more of a matter of litigation techniques, 																																																								
53	 State	v.	Tune	(n	26),	884	(1953).	Judge	Vanderbilt:	‘In	criminal	proceedings	long	experience	has	
taught	the	courts	that	often	discovery	will	lead	not	to	honest	fact-finding,	but	on	the	contrary	to	perjury	
and	the	suppression	of	evidence…	To	permit	unqualified	disclosure	of	all	statements	and	information	in	
the	hands	of	the	State	would	go	far	beyond	what	is	required	in	civil	cases;	it	would	defeat	the	very	ends	
of	justice.’	
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and the prosecutors often regards it as a way for the defence counsels to stir up the mud 
and make their jobs more difficult. However, the purpose of criminal discovery laws is 
certainly not about giving the prosecution a hard time, it is ‘a rule of fairness’,54 a 
means to guarantee the right to a fair trial on the part of the accused. As the Court in 
Brady v. Maryland held, ‘[s]ociety wins not only when the guilty are convicted but 
when criminal trials are fair; our system of the administration of justice suffers when 
any accused is treated unfairly.’55 
Notwithstanding the fact that criminal trials in the US are generally recognised as fair, 
there are still many incidents of innocent defendants being convicted.56 One of the main 
reasons for wrongful conviction is the government’s failure to disclose evidence.57 The 
Ted Stevens case is a good example here. Stevens was a Senator in Alaska, he was 
accused of corruption and found guilty in 2008.58 However, it was later revealed that 
the prosecutors had hidden evidence that could have proved his innocence. A federal 
																																																								
54	 United	States	v.	Beasley	576	F.2d	628,	630	(5th	Cir.	1978).	
55	 Brady	v.	Maryland,	at	87.	The	Court	affirmed	that	a	prosecutor	should	not	be	the	‘architect	of	a	
proceeding	that	does	not	comport	with	standards	of	justice.’	
56	 Alafair	S	Burke,	‘Talking	About	Prosecutors’	(2010)	31	Cardozo	Law	Review	2119.	
57	 See	Paul	Gianelli	and	Myrna	Raeder,	Achieving	Justice:	Freeing	the	Innocent,	Convicting	the	Guilty.	
Report	of	the	ABA	Criminal	Justice	Section’s	Ad	Hoc	Committee	to	Ensure	the	Integrity	of	the	Criminal	
Process	(Washington,	DC:	American	Bar	Association	2006).	See	also,	David	Keenan	and	others,	‘The	Myth	
of	Prosecutorial	Accountability	after	Connick	v.	Thompson:	Why	Existing	Professional	Responsibility	
Measures	Cannot	Protect	against	Prosecutorial	Misconduct’	(2011)	121	Yale	LJ	Online	203;	Brandon	L	
Garrett,	‘Judging	Innocence’	[2008]	Columbia	Law	Review	55;	Peter	A	Joy,	‘The	Relationship	between	
Prosecutorial	Misconduct	and	Wrongful	Convictions:	Shaping	Remedies	for	a	Broken	System’	(2006)	
2006	Wisconsin	Law	Review	399;	Ronald	L	Carlson,	‘False	or	Suppressed	Evidence:	Why	a	Need	for	the	
Prosecutorial	Tie?’	[1969]	Duke	Law	Journal	1171.	 	
58	 For	Prosecutorial	misconduct,	see	e.g.	Beth	Brennan	and	Andrew	King-Ries,	‘A	Fall	from	Grace:	United	
States	v.	WR	Grace	and	the	Need	for	Criminal	Discovery	Reform’	(2010)	20	Cornell	JL	&	Pub.	Pol’y	313.	
Ted	Stevens	was	a	long-time	Republican	senator	from	Alaska.	Some	Prosecutors	concealed	documents	
that	would	have	helped	Stevens	defend	him	against	false-statements	charges	in	2008.	 	
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court vacated his conviction in 2009.59 The court also recognised the gravity of the 
prosecutorial misconduct and two prosecutors were suspended,60 although the decision 
was reversed in 2013.61 
What happened to the late Senator Stevens is very alarming, and brought us to the 
disturbing awareness of how powerful the prosecutors can be and, sometimes, without 
accountability. It has been half a century since Brady was delivered, and the prosecutors 
are still ignoring the disclosure rules. It also brings the public to the realisation that if 
someone with such high public visibility and media scrutiny can be played in the hands 
of the prosecutors, the danger for less privileged defendants could be even higher.  
Many scholars have urged that it is time to call for a reform.62 Attempts have been 
made, but none has succeeded on the federal level. The most recent proposal – Fairness 
																																																								
59	 United	States	of	America	v.	Theodore	F.	Stevens,	No.	1:08-cr-00231-EGS	Document	324	filed	
04/01/2009.	The	district	judge	granted	the	prosecution’s	request	to	dismiss	a	few	days	later.	United	
States	v.	Stevens,	No.	08-cr-231,	2009	U.S.	Dist.	LEXIS	39046	(D.D.C.	Apr.	7,	2009).	
60	 Office	of	Professional	Responsibility	Report,	Department	of	Justice	(August	5,	2011).	It	ordered	Mr.	
Bottini	suspended	for	40	days	and	Mr.	Goeke	for	15	days.	
61	 Decision	of	the	U.S.	Merit	Systems	Protection	Board	Western	Regional	Office	(April	5,	2013).	The	
Decision	is	available	at	http://legaltimes.typepad.com/files/mspb-stevens.pdf	
62	 E.g.	Bruce	A	Green,	‘Federal	Criminal	Discovery	Reform:	A	Legislative	Approach’	(2013)	64	Mercer	Law	
Review	639;	Janet	Moore,	‘Democracy	and	Criminal	Discovery	Reform	after	Connick	and	Garcetti’	(2012)	
77	Brooklyn	Law	Review;	Lissa	Griffin,	‘Pretrial	Procedures	for	Innocent	People:	Reforming	Brady’	(2011)	
56	New	York	Law	School	Law	Review;	D	Michael	Risinger	and	Lesley	C	Risinger,	‘Innocence	Is	Different:	
Taking	Innocence	into	Account	in	Reforming	Criminal	Procedure’	(2011)	56	NYL	Sch.	L.	Rev.	869.	See	also,	
proposals	to	improve	incentives	of	prosecution	to	comply	with	Brady,	e.g.	Steven	K	Berenson,	‘Public	
Lawyers,	Private	Values:	Can,	Should,	and	Will	Government	Lawyers	Serve	the	Public	Interest?’	(2000)	41	
Boston	College	Law	Review	789	(a	'do	justice'	standard	instead	of	conviction	rate).	Tracey	L	Meares,	
‘Rewards	for	Good	Behavior:	Influencing	Prosecutorial	Discretion	and	Conduct	with	Financial	Incentives’	
(1995)	64	Fordham	L.	Rev.	851	(suggesting	financial	awards).	Daniel	S	Medwed,	‘The	Zeal	Deal:	
Prosecutorial	Resistance	to	Post-Conviction	Claims	of	Innocence’	(2004)	84	Boston	University	Law	
Review	125	(advocating	education	prosecutors	about	its	ethical	obligations).	
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in Disclosure of Evidence Act of 201263 – which was made in light of the Ted Stevens 
case, has been another endeavour to amend the federal criminal rules, ultimately failed.  
The three main arguments against the expansion of criminal discovery are: the criminal 
discovery rules are being unfair to the prosecution, the fear of perjury and the 
intimidation of witnesses. These arguments play a pivotal role in the position of the 
State, especially the federal government nowadays. 
1. ‘We are Treating Criminal Defendants Too Well’ 
The primary argument against broad discovery is the risks involved in the defence’s 
access to prosecutorial information.64 It is concerning that the balance would be upset 
by being too favourable to the accused, since the defendants already enjoys certain 
privileges and protections under constitutional law, and the heavy burden which the 
prosecutors already bears to prove. These elements do not exist in the civil discovery 
laws.65 
The constitutional protection, which is most commonly asserted, is the right against 
self-incrimination. Because the accused is protected under the Fifth Amendment, he 
may have tactical advantages and be able to surprise the prosecution, it is therefore 																																																								
63	 Fairness	in	Disclosure	of	Evidence	Act	of	2012,	available	at	
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/s2197#summary	
64	 Stephen	A	Saltzburg	and	Daniel	J	Capra,	American	Criminal	Procedure:	Cases	and	Commentary	(10	
edition,	West	Academic	Publishing	2014).	 	
65	 Opponents	of	broad	discovery	argued	that	adversary	system	relied	on	equal	discovery	for	both	sides,	
if	both	sides	could	not	benefit,	then	neither	side	should	benefit.	See	e.g.	Thomas	A	Flannery,	‘The	
Prosecutor’s	Case	against	Liberal	Discovery’	[1963]	F.R.D.	74,	78-79.	
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unfair to force the prosecution to disclose its case to the accused. The classic statement 
of this view was illustrated by Judge Learned Hand, in United States v. Garsson:66 
‘Under our criminal procedure the accused has every advantage. While the 
prosecution is held rigidly to the charge, he need not disclose the barest outline 
of his defense. He is immune from question or comment on his silence; he 
cannot be convicted when there is the least fair doubt in the minds of any one of 
the twelve. Why in addition he should in advance have the whole evidence 
against him to pick over at his leisure, and make his defense, fairly or foully, I 
have never been able to see.’67 
Chief Justice Vanderbilt even went a step beyond Judge Hand and argued that giving 
the defendant non-reciprocal discovery rights would make the prosecution’s task 
‘almost insurmountable.’68  
The difference between the civil and criminal discovery system although might have a 
valid point, and it is true that the constitutional protection, as interpreted by the 
Supreme Court, made the prosecutor’s job more difficult to gather evidence from 
defence. Nevertheless, this argument is faulted in two key points and displays the 
hidden concern behind the proposed expansion. 
																																																								
66	 United	States	v.	Garsson,	291	F.	646	(S.D.Ny.Y	1923).	 	
67	 ibid,	649.	Although	this	position	was	later	strongly	challenged	by	Goldstein.	See	Abraham	S	Goldstein,	
‘The	State	and	the	Accused:	Balance	of	Advantage	in	Criminal	Procedure’	[1960]	Yale	Law	Journal	1149.	
68	 State	v.	Tune	(n	26).	
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Firstly, this argument seems to imply that a defendant is allowed to be treated poorly if 
he is treated well in other respects. But is this really a legitimate way of arguing when a 
person’s liberty, or even life in some jurisdictions, is at stake?  It also ignores the 
rationale of providing the right against self-incrimination at the very first place.69 The 
government must prove its case without the assistance of the defendant. It is important 
to recall the reasons for the prosecution’s high burden of proof – to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt – are different than the ones to disclose documents to the accused.70  
Justice Brennan is one of the strongest supporters of liberal discovery.71 He rejected the 
contention that, because the defendant has other ‘advantages in the criminal justice 
process’, discovery can be appropriately denied. In Tune, he wrote a sharp dissenting 
opinion:  
‘If the privilege created a discovery imbalance [in favor of the defendant], that 
imbalance would be consistent with the intent of the framers; the defendant should 
not be denied a procedure essential to the establishment of the truth in an attempt 
to offset a protection granted by the Constitution.’72 
Another problematic implication of this position is that it portrays the criminal process 																																																								
69	 Which	is	a	valuable	restriction	of	tyranny	and	the	cornerstone	of	individual	liberty.	The	right	against	
self-incrimination	is	rooted	in	the	Puritans’	refusal	to	cooperate	with	interrogators	in	17th	century	
England.	They	often	were	coerced	or	tortured	into	confessing	their	religious	affiliation	and	were	
considered	guilty	if	they	remained	silent.	English	law	granted	its	citizens	the	right	against	
self-incrimination	in	the	mid-1600s,	when	a	revolution	established	greater	parliamentary	power.	
70	 Saltzburg	and	Capra	(n	510).	
71	 Brennan	Jr	(n	455);	Brennan	Jr	(n	409).	
72	 Justice	Brennan	Dissenting	Opinion,	State	v.	Tune	(n	26),	894	(N.J.	1953).	
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as a sporting contest. This view overlooks the true aim of a criminal trial, which is the 
adjudication of a person’s guilt, and ignores the need to take every precaution to ensure 
that the innocent should not be convicted. Regardless, as pointed out by Goldstein, the 
alleged advantage of the defendant was largely a myth.73 Even at trial, where the 
defence allegedly possesses his greatest advantage, many of his rights, such as the right 
not to testify, are of limited practical significance. Of more relevance was the defence’s 
disadvantage in the preparation of his case. Here, the state will have all of the 
advantages—investigators, greater resources, search, and subpoena etc. that the 
defendants rarely can match.74 Moreover, those investigators often could acquire 
extensive information from the accused through interrogation following his arrest that 
reached ‘up to the point of coercion’.75 
A relevant claim here is the reciprocity argument.76 Discovery in criminal cases is 
frequently seen as a one-way street and therefore, as the opponents of broad discovery 
contend, it is unfair to the prosecution. This limitation, they argued, should not be 
ignored in determining the proper scope. They contended that in an adversary system, it 
would be unfair to give one side discovery rights that could not also be made available 
to the other side. Apart from considerations of equity, discovery simply would not be an 
																																																								
73	 Goldstein	(n	513)	1162.	 	
74	 See	e.g.	Douglas	J.,	Dissent	in	Adams	v.	Illinois,	405	U.S.	278,	291	(1972).	
75	 Goldstein	(n	513)	1187;	Fletcher,	‘Pretrial	Discovery	in	State	Criminal	Cases’	(n	480)	312.	
76	 Similar	question	has	been	discussed	in	England	and	Australia	recently.	This	has	been	the	recent	
movement,	while	some	expressed	their	concern	as	moving	backwards,	some	argued	that	reciprocal	
actually	is	better,	for	the	truth	seeking	process.	See	Cosmas	Moisidis,	Criminal	Discovery:	From	Truth	to	
Proof	and	Back	Again	(Institute	of	Criminology	2008)	61–7.	
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effective tool in developing the truth unless it was a ‘two-way street’, as in civil 
discovery.77 This concern might be an overstatement, however, since the modern 
discovery rules provide that the defence must give the prosecution an advance notice of 
some of the defence strategy, i.e. alibi or insanity, and the federal rules also obligate 
reciprocal discovery. 
The point is, it is deficient to argue that this constitutes an opportunity for the defence to 
challenge the prosecution’s case: it operates at such an investigative disadvantage that 
the adversary system is substantially undermined without the partial equalisation 
provided by liberal defence discovery. The investigative advantage varies with the 
nature of the crime and the resources of the particular defence. This is not, in any event, 
truly relevant. Furthermore, in civil cases, it has rarely, if ever been suggested that the 
better-financed side should therefore be barred from equal discovery. 
2.  ‘Criminal Defendants will Commit Perjury’ 
The common, though unwarranted, fear of disclosing materials to the criminal 
defendants is that they are very likely to commit perjury and obstructing justice. This 
line of reasoning against the broad discovery rules is seen as the ‘old hobgoblin’ based 
on ‘untested folklore’,78 or even the ‘bogey man’ by the advocates of liberal 
																																																								
77	 Flannery	(n	511)	78–9.	
78	 United	States	v.	Projansky,	44	F.R.D.	550,	556	(S.D.N.Y.	1968)	(Frankel	J.	(‘[T]he	point	is	built	
one-sidedly	of	untested	folklore.’	)	
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discovery.79  
The opponents of broad criminal discovery argued that greater discovery would lead to 
an increased use of perjury by the defendants instead of achieving a more accurate 
fact-finding.80 They believed that the accused can tailor his testimony, minimise 
conflict with the government’s evidence and to take advantage of the weakest point in 
the prosecution’s case, and hence makes the fabrication more likely to be successful.81 
While generally accepting the alleged success of civil discovery, they contended that 
criminal discovery should be treated differently because criminal cases offer a far 
greater risk of successful perjury.82 The potential of committing perjury is greater, they 
claimed, because there is more at stake for the criminal defendant.83 Some also 
suggested that more criminal defendants are likely to be basically dishonest than the 
parties in civil cases.84  
But does this contention have any merits? Civil cases, too, often have considerable 
values at risk, and the incentive to commit perjury can be even greater when a large 
amount of money is involved.85 The assertion that criminal defendants are more likely 
																																																								
79	 	 William	H	Speck,	‘The	Use	of	Discovery	in	United	States	District	Courts’	[1951]	Yale	Law	Journal	1132,	
1154.	(‘Facilitation	of	perjury	has	been	a	bogey	man	of	discovery	for	over	a	hundred	year’)	
80	 See	e.g.	State	v.	Tune	(n	26).	Vanderbilt’s	opinion	presented	the	majority	view.	Dennis	Jr	(n	460)	63.	
Dennis	Jr.	considered	Vanderbilt’s	arguments	are	still	compelling.	 	
81	 See	e.g.	Dennis	Jr	(n	460).	
82	 See	Lafave	and	others	(n	476)	955	(addressing	the	opponents’	arguments).	See	also	Chief	Justice	
Vanderbilt	in	State	v.	Tune	(n	26)	884.	
83	 Lafave	and	others	(n	30).	
84	 Lafave	and	others	(n	30)	.	
85	 See	e.g.	David	W	Louisell,	‘Criminal	Discovery:	Dilemma	Real	or	Apparent?’	[1961]	California	Law	
Review	56.	
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to be dishonest is problematic and, therefore, should be rejected: it disregards a 
fundamental rule of criminal law, the presumption of innocence. More ironically, the 
prosecutors are also, if not more, likely to commit perjury.86 Several cases dealt with 
the issues of prosecution perjury and this line of cases led to the requirement of Brady.87  
Another problem of this argument is that it is not substantiated by any conclusive 
evidence, to prove or disprove it.88 It is hard to deny that there is always a possibility 
for the partisan to commit perjury, but the success in the experience of civil discovery 
had proven many of these concerns are unjustified.89 Notwithstanding several 
fundamental differences between the civil and criminal law system, the perjury claim is 
not a valid way to argue why the civil discovery can work but the criminal one cannot. 
For example, although the prosecution is unable to use deposition as a tool, there are 
plenty other devices (e.g. police interrogation) to ‘pin down’ the accused.90  
It is important to bear in mind that the society has no interest in an innocent person’s 
suffering. The proper safeguard against perjury, as noted by Justice Brennan, ‘is not to 
refuse to permit any inquiry at all, or that will eliminate the true as well as the false, but 
																																																								
86	 E.g.	Napue	v.	Illinois,	360	U.S.	264	(1959);	Alcorta	v.	Texas,	355	U.S.	28	(1957);	White	v.	Ragen,	324	
U.S.	760	(1945);	Pyle	v.	Kansas,	317	U.S.	213	(1942).	
87	 See,	e.g.	Mooney	v.	Holohan,	294	U.S.	103;	Giglio	v.	United	States,	405	U.S.	150	(1972).	
88	 Speck	(n	525)	1154.	(‘Facilitation	of	perjury	has	been	a	bogey	man	of	discovery	for	over	a	hundred	
years.	No	evidence	can	be	produced	conclusively	to	prove	or	disprove	it,	and	the	consensus	among	
lawyers	is	to	reject	it.	This	investigation	disclosed	the	variety	of	ways	in	which	lawyers	use	discovery	to	
thwart	perjury.’)	
89	 See	e.g.	Goldstein	(n	513)	1193	(’Every	one	of	the	many	excellent	arguments	which	carried	the	day	for	
pretrial	discovery	in	civil	cases	is	equally	applicable	on	the	criminal	side);	A	Kenneth	Pye,	‘The	
Defendant’s	Case	for	More	Liberal	Discovery’	(1963)	33	F.R.D.	82,	83.	
90	 Lafave	and	others	(n	30)	955.	 	
		
 		
	
147 
the inquiry should be conducted so as to separate and distinguish the one from the 
other.’91  
3. ‘Criminal Defendants will Intimidate Witnesses, Victims and their 
Families’ 
This argument is perhaps the strongest one among all which opposes the expansion of 
criminal discovery. Indeed, even the strongest supporters of liberal discovery cannot 
ignore that the potential danger to the witness once his or her identity and whereabouts 
are revealed to the defendants.92 It is also often argued that the witnesses will be more 
reluctant to testify.93 
However, the question that should be asked here is whether this danger can justify a 
blanket limitation on discovery in a criminal case. Is it valid to postulate that, because of 
possible threats, discovery should be denied to all criminal defendants? Apparently the 
conclusion cannot be that black and white; it can be either granting discovery as a rule 
and withholding discovery in exceptional circumstances, or permitting discovery in 
some if not all cases. Rule16(d) has adopted the latter approach. 																																																								
91	 Brennan	Jr	(n	455)	291.	
92	 Similar	contentions	had	already	been	rejected	in	civil	discovery	law.	Justice	Brennan	stated	‘[this]	
fallacy	has	been	starkly	exposed	through	the	extensive	and	analogous	experience	in	civil	cases	where	
liberal	discovery	has	been	allowed	and	perjury	has	not	been	fostered.	Indeed,	this	experience	has	
suggested	that	liberal	discovery,	far	from	abetting,	actually	deters	perjury	and	fabrication.’	ibid	289,	291.	
See	also,	H	Lee	Sarokin	and	William	E	Zuckerman,	‘Presumed	Innocent-Restrictions	on	Criminal	
Discovery	in	Federal	Court	Belie	This	Presumption’	(1990)	43	Rutgers	L.	Rev.	1089.	([d]enying	all	
defendants	access	to	pre-trial	statements	made	by	government	witnesses	out	of	the	fear	that	some	will	
use	such	information	wrongfully	can	be	likened	to	outlawing	the	institution	of	bail	on	the	theory	that	
some	of	those	arrested	might	commit	further	crimes.)	
93	 Chief	Justice	Vanderbilt	in	State	v.	Tune	(n	26)	884.	
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The approach that only allows limited discovery is not without its problems. As the 
current practice of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure has shown, it resulted in 
enormous hearings when one side or the other tries to overcome the presumption.94 
Defence counsels file lots of discovery motions, prosecutions complain about wasting 
lots of time and resources in litigating these pre-trial motions, which can be resolved by 
expanding the discovery laws. 
The other option, which is the approach adopted in England, might prove to be a better 
solution. Relevant materials should be presumed as appropriate and be disclosed, but 
the prosecution could file a protective order to the Court, or other motions explaining 
why disclosure in a particular case might threaten the fair administration of justice.95 
Insofar as the concern here relates to actual intimidation, the appropriate response was 
to allow discovery generally, but grant the trial court authority to limit discovery when 
the prosecution can establish a realistic threat of physical or economic intimidation.96  
This approach, however, has been met with the response that such a protective order 
procedure would place an impracticable burden on the prosecution by requiring it to 
establish a defendant’s intent to intimidate. Nevertheless, it should not be assumed a 
defendant would act improperly without such a substantial showing. In addition, 
although the concern for the witnesses’ safety should be accommodated, the search for 
																																																								
94	 Lafave	and	others	(n	476).	
95	 See	Chapter	VI.	 	
96	 Lafave	and	others	(n	476)	973.	 	
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truth should not be made more difficult simply because witnesses have unfounded fears 
or do not want to be ‘bothered’ by the investigative efforts of the defence.97 Similar 
contentions had already been rejected in civil discovery law.98 
4.  The End of the Debate: Expanding the Laws 
The trend has been in the direction of consistently expanding the discovery laws. The 
issues raised in the classic debates during the 1950s and 60s have been largely resolved 
in each jurisdiction by court rules or statutes which detail that discovery which must or 
may be given to the defendant. The response uniformly was to provide for defence 
discovery where it did not previously exist or expand. The Supreme Court also 
recognised this expansion, saying ‘the growing realisation that disclosure, rather than 
suppression, of relevant materials ordinarily promotes the proper administration of 
criminal justice’, and ‘the expanding body of materials, judicial and otherwise, 
favouring disclosure in criminal cases analogous to the civil practice.’99  
Despite the expansion movement, the above arguments remain as powerful claims 
opposing broad federal criminal discovery. The perjury and danger to witness 
arguments are still having a strong stand, and the attempts to amend Rule 16, which 
required the prosecution to disclose its witnesses’ identity and addresses, have failed 
																																																								
97	 Lafave	and	others	(n	476).	 	
98	 See	also	Federal	Rules	of	Civil	Procedure	26–37	(outlining	the	federal	court	rules	related	to	discovery	
in	civil	cases).	
99	 Dennis	v.	United	States,	384	U.S.	855	(1966).	
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because of opposition by the Department of Justice. It stated that the prospect of 
prosecution’s witness list was ‘dangerous and frightening in that governmental 
witnesses and their families will even be more exposed than they are now to threats, 
pressures, and physical harm.’100 In the end Congress abandoned the provision, and the 
Justice Department maintained its opposition to witness-list disclosure today.101  
5.  Open-File Policy as a Cure? 
Notwithstanding the arguments against liberal discovery, the road to expansion is 
already being taken.102 The current popular trend in the United States is the so-called 
‘open file’ policy, which is an informal discovery practice, permitting defence lawyers 
to inspect and copy the files of the prosecution. Some states have made this policy 
mandatory, requiring that the prosecutors must make their entire case file, including 
both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence, available to the defence.103 This was seen as 
a great alternative to the liberal approach, which demands the change of federal criminal 
laws. 
The advocates of open-file commonly argue that this policy could serve all legitimate 
needs of the defence while avoiding most of the dangers that may accompany formal 																																																								
100	 Brennan	Jr	(n	409)	6.	
101	 Justice	Department	U.S.	Attorneys’	Manual	§	9-21.	
102	 The	Justice	Project,	‘Expanded	Discovery	in	Criminal	Cases:	A	Policy	Review’	(2007).	
103	 North	Carolina,	for	example,	has	already	introduced	open	file	policies.	See	Robert	P	Mosteller,	
‘Exculpatory	Evidence,	Ethics,	and	the	Road	to	the	Disbarment	of	Mike	Nifong:	The	Critical	Importance	of	
Full	Open-File	Discovery’	(2008)	15	George	Mason	Law	Review.	Another	example	is	Ohio.	See,	Ellen	
Yaroshefsky,	‘New	Orleans	Prosecutorial	Disclosure	in	Practice	After	Connick	v.	Thompson’	(2012)	25	
Georgetown	Journal	of	Legal	Ethics	939.	
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discovery requirements.104 The prosecutor readily can deny discovery where there is 
substantial likelihood that the defendant will use it to fabricate a defence or to 
intimidate witnesses. Where the prosecutor is concerned that discovery will upset the 
balance of the adversary system, he can condition an offer of discovery on the defence’s 
willingness to reciprocate. The end result, it is argued, is a system that is preferable, at 
least when prosecutors are acting in an even handed manner. 
This open file approach might seem promising but, it is submitted that, it is not the cure 
to the problems inherent in the discovery system.105 Firstly, it might mislead the 
defence counsel into believing that the prosecutor indeed has disclosed everything and 
did not request further when he is entitled to do so.106 Crucial information might not be 
included in the files, either because the prosecution is deliberatively hiding them or due 
to negligence. Accordingly, this approach could become a ‘weapon’ for the 
prosecutors,107 and increase the ‘gamesmanship’ attitude towards disclosure.108 
																																																								
104	 Commentators	who	are	advocating	open-file	polices,	see	e.g.	Alafair	S	Burke,	‘Revisiting	
Prosecutorial	Disclosure’	(2009)	84	Indiana	Law	Journal	481;	Jenny	Roberts,	‘Too	Little,	Too	Late:	
Ineffective	Assistance	of	Counsel,	the	Duty	to	Investigate,	and	Pretrial	Discovery	in	Criminal	Cases’	(2004)	
31	Fordham	Urban	Law	Journal	1097;	Mosteller	(n	493).	See	Mosteller	(n	549).	Open-file	discovery	is	
particularly	favoured	after	the	Duke	Lacrosse	Case.	
105	 On	the	other	hand,	other	commentators	critically	pointed	out	that	open-file	policy	might	not	be	the	
cure,	see,	e.g.	Brian	Fox,	‘An	Argument	Against	Open-File	Discovery	in	Criminal	Cases’	(2013)	89	Notre	
Dame	Law	Review	425,	446.	
106	 See	e.g.	Strickler	v.	Greene,	527	U.S.	263,	276	(1999)	(defense	counsel	neglected	to	file	a	pretrial	
motion	for	discovery	of	possible	exculpatory	evidence	because	an	open-file	policy	gave	defendant	
access	to	all	of	the	evidence	in	the	prosecutor’s	files—except	the	Brady	evidence).	R	Michael	Cassidy,	
‘Plea	Bargaining,	Discovery	and	the	Intractable	Problem	of	Impeachment	Disclosures’	(2011)	64	
Vanderbilt	Law	Review	1429,	1439	(noting	that	‘defense	counsel	might	believe	that	he	has	all	
exculpatory	material	and	need	to	conduct	deeper	into	an	investing	or	question	witnesses	
independently’).	 	
107	 Fox	(n	551)	446.	
108	 Gershman	(n	459)	546.	
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Secondly, this policy is also questionable because of its availability. Even the definition 
of the term ‘open-file discovery’ varies considerably.109 Not all prosecution offices 
provide this informal practice, and when they do the exact scope is determined by the 
respective prosecutor’s office.110 It is problematic since it would result in different 
treatment before the law. Should a defendant’s right to access information depend on 
luck, or the mercy of a particular prosecutor? Some advocates suggested guidelines that 
have been issued in order to achieve uniformity.111 However, the guidelines are 
sufficiently flexible with the effect that a defence counsel may be denied access and 
prosecutors may insist upon reciprocity that goes beyond what any Statute or court 
would or could permit. Furthermore the prosecution might threaten to withdraw all 
discovery to force the defence to give disclosure that the state could not compel 
consistent with the defendant’s privilege. Last but not least, the financial cost is high for 
both the prosecution and defence.112  
 
 
																																																								
109	 Ellen	Yaroshefsky,	‘Wrongful	Convictions:	It	Is	Time	to	Take	Prosecution	Discipline	Seriously’	(2004)	8	
UDC/DCSL	L.	Rev.	275.	
110	 Bruce	A	Green	and	Ellen	Yaroshefsky,	‘Prosecutor’s	Ethics	in	Context:	Influences	on	Prosecutorial	
Disclosure’	in	Leslie	C	Levin	and	Lynn	Mather	(eds),	Lawyers	in	Practice:	Ethical	Decision	Making	in	
Context	(University	of	Chicago	Press	2012)	279–280.	
111	 For	example,	one	third	of	States	have	adopted	the	ABA	Standards	of	Criminal	Justice.	ABA	Standards	
for	Criminal	Justice:	Discovery	and	Trial	by	Jury	(3rd	edn,	American	Bar	Association	1996)	
<http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/criminal_justice_standards/discovery_tri
albyjury.authcheckdam.pdf>.	
112	 Fox	(n	551)	434–443.	
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IV. Exculpatory Evidence: Constitutional Obligation 
A. The Prosecution’s Duty to Disclose Favourable Evidence: Development 
by the Supreme Court 
Although there is no general right to discovery for criminal defendants, prosecutors 
have a constitutional duty to disclose favourable evidence to the defence under the 
Brady rule. This duty stems from the constitutional right to due process, and is 
developed through a series of cases by the Supreme Court, which will be addressed as 
follows. 
Mooney v. Holohan (1935)113 
The first form of this obligation, although only dealing with perjury, can be traced back 
to Mooney v. Holohan. It was recognised that the prosecutor’s ‘knowing use’ of 
perjured testimony to convict a criminal defendant violated due process of law.114 The 
Court argued that the ‘due process requirement is not satisfied by mere notice and 
hearing if the state, through prosecuting officers acting on state’s behalf, has contrived 
conviction through pretense of trial which in truth is used as a means of depriving 
defendant of liberty through deliberate deception of court and jury by presentation of 
																																																								
113	 Mooney	v.	Holohan,	294	US	103	(1935).	
114	 The	Due	Process	Clause	of	the	Fifth	Amendment	is	violated	if	government	engages	in	deliberate	
deception	of	court	and	jury	by	the	presentation	of	testimony	known	to	be	perjured.	See	also	Mooney’s	
progeny:	Napue	v.	Illinois,	360	U.S.	264	(1959);	Alcorta	v.	Texas,	355	U.S.	28	(1957);	Pyle	v.	Kansas,	317	
U.S.	213	(1942).	But	note	that	the	test	for	perjury	is	different	from	Brady.	Reversal	was	required	if	false	
testimony	could	have	affected	the	judgment	of	the	jury	(not	about	outcome).	
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testimony known to be perjured.’115 
As stated in Brady, ‘the principle of Mooney v. Holohan is not punishment of society 
for misdeeds of a prosecutor but avoidance of an unfair trial to the accused. Society 
wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair; our system 
of the administration of justice suffers when any accused is treated unfairly.’116 
Brady v. Maryland (1963)  
Almost thirty years later, this principle was observed again and expanded in Brady v. 
Maryland, which became the landmark decision of the prosecution’s duty to disclose 
exculpatory materials to the defence. Brady confessed that he participated in the crime, 
but it was his accomplice who performed the act of killing. However, the prosecution 
withheld the statement of his co-accused, who admitted that he did the actual killing. 
This statement was not shown to Brady’s lawyers until Brady was convicted and 
sentenced. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, saying that  
‘[T]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence favourable to an accused 
upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt 
or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the 
prosecution.’117  
																																																								
115	 Mooney	v.	Holohan,	at	112.	
116	 Brady	v.	Maryland,	at	87.	
117	 ibid.	
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This paragraph, later known as the Brady rule, was further interpreted and developed in 
the subsequent cases. 
Giglio v. United States (1972)118 
Giglio was an important case which has an impact on the prosecution’s duty to disclose 
impeaching materials. In Giglio, the government’s star witness had been given a 
promise, by the grand jury prosecutor, that he will not be indicted if he testified against 
Giglio. This information was not revealed to the defendant because it was unknown to 
the trial prosecutor. During the proceedings, the government first argued that the 
witness did not receive any promises and then later denied perjury since the trial 
prosecutor did not have any knowledge about it.  
The Court, however, held that the trial prosecutor’s actual knowledge of the information 
was irrelevant to his Brady disclosure obligation, and stated that impeachment 
information fell under Brady: ‘When the reliability of a given witness may well be 
determinative of guilt or innocence, nondisclosure of evidence affecting credibility falls 
within [Brady].119 Impeachment evidence is also referred as ‘Giglio materials’. 
 
																																																								
118	 Giglio	v.	United	States,	405	U.S.	150	(1972).	
119	 ibid	at	154.	
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United States v. Agurs (1976)120  
In Agurs, the Court set out three different standards of materiality for Brady violations: 
knowing perjury and false evidence: the highest threshold, it is material unless the 
government can show beyond a reasonable doubt that it was harmless;121 when a 
specific request is made;122 and when a general or no request is made.123 
Even when no or only a general Brady request is made, the prosecutor still has a 
disclosure obligation. But the standard of review is more lenient: whether, after viewing 
everything, there is any reasonable doubt about the conviction.124 Nevertheless, the 
distinction between specific request and no or general request has been rejected in a 
later case, Bagley.125 When the prosecutors are in doubt, they should err on the side of 
disclosure.126 
Agurs thus provided a tidy framework for analysing alleged prosecutorial breaches of 
duty. The type of alleged breach — knowing use of perjury, failure to produce 
potentially exculpatory evidence following a specific request, or failure to produce 
potentially exculpatory evidence absent such a request — first had to be identified. 
Then, the appropriate standard for judging the materiality of the evidence at issue was 																																																								
120	 United	States	v.	Agurs,	427	U.S.	97	(1976).	
121	 ibid	at	110.	
122	 ibid	at	106.	
123	 ibid	at	112-13.	
124	 ibid	at	112-13.	
125	 United	States	v.	Bagley,	473	U.S.	667	(1985).	
126	 United	States	v.	Agurs,	at	108	(‘[T]he	prudent	prosecutor	will	resolve	doubtful	questions	in	favor	of	
disclosure’).	
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selected. Finally, the relevant test was applied to the specific case facts for a decision. 
However, the Agurs analytical framework did not endure long. 
United States v. Bagley (1985)127  
The Agurs distinction between specific request and general or no request situations was 
abandoned by the Court in this case. The standard of materiality was revisited by the 
Court, and held that the standard to show a Brady violation is the same: whether ‘there 
is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defence, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different.’ A ‘reasonable probability’ is a 
probability ‘sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’128 It is, however, 
important to note that the Court held that specific requests still matter, because the 
prosecution’s failure to respond may mislead the defence and thus impair the adversary 
process: the more specifically the defence requests certain evidence, thus putting the 
prosecutor on notice of its value, the more reasonable it is for the defence to assume 
from the nondisclosure that the evidence does not exist, and to make pre-trial and trial 
decisions on the basis of this assumption.129   
The Supreme Court explained that Brady is a rule of fairness, which is a ‘departure 
from a pure adversary model,’130 and which requires the prosecutor to ‘assist the 																																																								
127	 United	States	v.	Bagley,	473	U.S.	667	(1985).	
128	 ibid	at	682.	
129	 ibid	at	682-3.	
130	 ibid	at	675,	fn.6.	(The	Prosecutor	‘is	the	representative	not	of	an	ordinary	party	to	a	controversy,	but	
of	a	sovereignty	.	.	.	whose	interest	.	.	.	in	a	criminal	prosecution	is	not	that	it	shall	win	a	case,	but	that	
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defense in making its case.’131 This, in effect, narrowed the reach of Brady. For a Brady 
violation to result in the reversal of a conviction the suppressed evidence now had to be 
both ‘exculpatory’ and ‘material’. The evidence is material, Justice Blackmun wrote in 
Bagley, ‘only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to 
the defence, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’132 
Kyles v. Whitley (1995)133 
Kyles is a case in which the Court made clear that the duty of disclosure extended to the 
police and other governmental agencies. The Court imposed an affirmative duty to the 
prosecutors that they have ‘a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the 
others acting on the government’s behalf in a case.’134 
Another important clarification made by the Court is the meaning of the materiality 
standard: ‘a showing of materiality does not require demonstration by a preponderance 
that disclosure of the suppressed evidence would have resulted ultimately in the 
defendant’s acquittal whether based on the presence of reasonable doubt or acceptance 
of an explanation for the crime that does not inculpate the defendant.’135 The point is 
that materiality does not need to have a demonstration of acquittal, but rather, if the 
																																																																																																																																																																		
justice	shall	be	done.’	Citing	Berger	v.	United	States,	295	U.	S.	78,	295	U.	S.	88	(1935);	Brady	v.	Maryland,	
373	U.S.	at	373).	
131	 ibid.	
132	 ibid	at	682.	
133	 Kyles	v.	Whitley,	514	U.S.	419	(1995).	
134	 ibid	at	437.	
135	 ibid	at	434.	
		
 		
	
159 
suppressed evidence will undermine the integrity of a trial, and did not ‘result in a 
verdict worthy of confidence.’136 The Court concluded that disclosure of suppressed 
evidence in Kyles would have made a different result reasonably probable. 
Strickler v. Greene (1999)137  
In Strickler, it was found that although the State failed to disclose exculpatory evidence 
it did not violate the Brady rule. The Court reiterates the three key elements for a ‘true’ 
Brady violation: 1) the evidence must be favourable, including exculpatory or 
impeaching material; 2) it is suppressed by the State, either wilfully or inadvertently; 
and 3) prejudice has been ensued.138 
The Court stated that the first and second components were without dispute in this case. 
It was the third one, whether the necessary prejudice has been established, that has not 
been proved. By saying that it was the most difficult element of the Brady violation 
claims, the fact that the prosecution has suppressed documents which should have been 
disclosed to the accused alone was not enough; the documents had to be material for 
Brady purposes and the suppression must give rise to ‘sufficient prejudice to overcome 
the procedural default.’139 
																																																								
136	 ibid.	
137	 Strickler	v.	Greene,	527	U.S.	263	(1999).	
138	 ibid	at	263.	
139	 ibid	at	264.	
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Another point made clear by the Court was that the prosecution has a broad duty to 
disclose materials at the pre-trial stage; however, the standard to establish a Brady 
violation post-trial is not the same. In other words, although the government has a duty 
to disclose favourable evidence, not every violation of that duty will result in an unjust 
outcome. The confusing part is that the term ‘Brady violation’ is sometimes used to 
refer to any breach of the broad obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence – that is, to 
any suppression of so-called ‘Brady material’– although, strictly speaking, there is 
never a real Brady violation unless the nondisclosure was so serious that there is a 
reasonable probability that the suppressed evidence would have produced a different 
verdict.140  
B. The Curious Case of Brady v. Maryland 
1. Brady: a Unique Positive Obligation of Fairness 
It would seem that under Brady, as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court, the 
prosecution team, including the police and other law enforcement, is under an 
obligation to disclose favourable, material evidence to the defence. As a requirement 
based on due process, the disclosure of exculpatory evidence is crucial to a fair and just 
criminal system, no matter which trial model was adopted, because it has the important 
function of preventing a miscarriage of justice from occurring.141  
																																																								
140	 ibid	at	281.	
141	 Eugene	Cerruti,	‘Through	the	Looking-Glass	at	the	Brady	Doctrine:	Some	New	Reflections	on	White	
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Because this duty is accessed under the requirements of due process, the way it is 
handled is not very ideal, at least for from the point of view of the defence.142 Many 
will imagine the Brady rule as a discovery rule that requires prosecutors to turn over all 
exculpatory evidence to the defence prior to trial. However this is not the approached 
taken by the Supreme Court.  
Notwithstanding its good intention, Brady and its progeny cases perhaps have created 
more problems than it wished to solve. With each new interpretive turn by the Supreme 
Court, the academic literature has responded with a collective dissent.143 The critics 
mainly attacked the materiality standard established by the Supreme Court, which was 
considered a very heavy burden for the defence. But the standard, arguably, is not the 
greatest issue in the current criminal discovery system. For example, an underlying 
question for the Brady claim is, how does a defendant even know the existence of the 
favourable evidence at the first place? If the defence lawyer has nothing in his hand, 
how can he prove the evidence will have the character to be disclosed? The problem is 
on the prosecution. The American criminal discovery system places the fate of an 
accused on its opposing party, whose duty is, supposedly, to seek justice but not just 
victory. Since the prosecutor is the one who possess the materials and is also the one 
who decides what to disclose, if he wishes to conceal the information it is very likely 																																																																																																																																																																		
Queens,	Hobgoblins,	and	Due	Process’	(2005)	94	Kentucky	Law	Journal	211.	 	
142	 The	standard	used	for	due	process	claims	usually	is	‘harmless	error’.	See,	in	general,	Michael	T	Fisher,	
‘Harmless	Error,	Prosecutorial	Misconduct,	and	Due	Process:	There’s	More	to	Due	Process	than	the	
Bottom	Line’	[1988]	Columbia	Law	Review	1298.	
143	 Cerruti	(n	587).	
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that the defence will never be able to find out what evidence has been withheld. 
If, luckily, the defence somehow finds out the prosecution has not disclosed a piece of 
evidence, then the next question will be addressed: how to establish there is a Brady 
violation? According to the Court’s current approach, the burden is on the defence, and 
the standard of materiality is very difficult to reach. The failure of a prosecutor to 
disclose evidence does not automatically mean that there is a violation of the Brady rule, 
there must be a prejudice against the defendant. This gap between ‘the failure to 
disclose’ and ‘a violation has occurred’ generates the main difficulty for the defence, 
and gives the prosecutor space to play games.  
Assuming that eventually hidden evidence has come to light, and a violation is 
recognised, the judiciary`s relatively high degree of reluctance of the judiciary to 
impose sanctions on the prosecution is disappointing. The fact that a Brady violation 
does that mean the accused will necessarily be acquitted, usually the best he can get is a 
new trial. Except in rare occasions, the prosecutors who violated his Brady obligation 
do not get any sanctions from the Court, sometimes not even internal disciplines.144  
The prosecution’s constitutional obligation to disclose favourable evidence to the 
defence is not working as it intended to be. The problems will be addressed as follows. 
																																																								
144	 Keenan	and	others	(n	503)	217;	Daniel	S	Medwed,	Prosecution	Complex:	America’s	Race	to	Convict,	
and	Its	Impact	on	the	Innocent	(NYU	Press	2012)	30;	Richard	A	Rosen,	‘Disciplinary	Sanctions	Against	
Prosecutors	for	Brady	Violations:	A	Paper	Tiger’	(1986)	65	NCL	Rev.	693,	731;	Angela	J	Davis,	‘The	Legal	
Profession’s	Failure	to	Discipline	Unethical	Prosecutors’	(2007)	36	Hofstra	Law	Review.	
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2.  The Long, Hard Road to Find Evidence 
Brady material is, by definition, unknown to the defence. This has immense 
implications: since the defendant does not know if the prosecution possesses these 
materials in its case file, how can the defence claim they exist and try to find out the 
exculpatory evidence through a discovery motion? How does the defence know if the 
prosecution is playing a game of hide and seek? The answer is very unfortunate to most 
defendants: they do not know and cannot do anything if the prosecutors are withholding 
evidence, either intentionally or inadvertently. Reports have shown that, in the 
overwhelming majority of cases, the defence learns of Brady evidence by pure 
accident.145 
Previous studies show that the prosecution team routinely withheld evidence.146 
Scholars indicated that the current disclosure system has made it very easy for the 
prosecution to evade their Brady duty, and even encouraged them to do so.147 If 
withholding a piece of exculpatory material means that ‘the bad guys will be put behind 
bars’ or wining the case, why would any (sensible) prosecutor disclose evidence that 
could likely result in a personally undesirable outcome? This line of thinking is even 																																																								
145	 Michael	D	Cicchini,	‘Prosecutorial	Misconduct	at	Trial:	A	New	Perspective	Rooted	in	Confrontation	
Clause	Jurisprudence’	(2006)	37	Seton	Hall	l.	rev.	335,	339.	
146	 Bill	Moushey,	Win	at	All	Costs:	Government	Misconduct	in	the	Name	of	Expedient	Justice	(Pittsburgh	
Post-Gazette	1998).	He	examined	over	1500	cases	in	the	United	States,	discovered	that	many	
prosecutors	routinely	withhold	evidence	that	might	assist	to	prove	an	accused	innocent.	He	found	that	
prosecutors	intentionally	withheld	evidence	in	hundreds	of	cases	during	the	past	decade,	but	courts	
overturned	verdicts	in	only	the	most	extreme	cases).	Ken	Armstrong	and	Maurice	Possley,	‘The	Verdict:	
Dishonor’	(1999)	10	Chicago	Tribune	(a	national	study	from	1963	to	1999).	 	
147	 See	Gershman	(n	459);	Cerruti	(n	587);	Mary	Prosser,	‘Reforming	Criminal	Discovery:	Why	Old	
Objections	Must	Yield	to	New	Realities’	[2006]	Wis.	L.	Rev.	541.	 	
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encouraged by the fact that, the prosecution teams are aware, if they are willing to hide 
something, it is very unlikely for the evidence ever to come to light. 
3.  The Materiality Standard: A Bar too high  
A major problem with materiality as the standard for pre-trial disclosure is that it 
actively encourages non-disclosure.148 However, the defence counsel is not 
automatically in a better position after a piece of material is discovered. Simply 
claiming that the State failed to disclose exculpatory evidence in a timely manner is not 
enough for a Brady claim to succeed.  
Prejudice requirement 
This gap between the prosecution’s failure to disclose and the actual recognition of a 
Brady violation has been developed by the Supreme Court itself during the post-Brady 
cases. The requirement for evidence to be disclosable in Brady was ‘material’, but the 
Court in Brady did not specify what the actual standard should be. In Agurs, the Court 
attempted to set out a test for material that, in the case of nondisclosure, might have 
affected the outcome of the trial.149 Then in Bagley, the ‘reasonable probability’ test 
was formulated.150 This does not mean that the evidence has to be capable of reversing 
the conviction, as the Court clarified in Kyles: the materiality depends on whether the 																																																								
148	 Janet	C	Hoeffel	and	Stephen	I	Singer,	‘Activating	a	Brady	Pretrial	Duty	to	Disclose	Favorable	
Information:	From	the	Mouths	of	Supreme	Court	Justices	to	Practice’	(2014)	38	NYU	Rev.	L.	&	Soc.	
Change	467,	476;	Cerruti	(n	587)	214.	 	
149	 United	States	v.	Agurs,	427	U.S.	97	(1976).	
150	 United	States	v.	Bagley,	473	U.S.	667	(1985).	
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defence can prove that the absence of the evidence ‘undermines confidence’ in the 
verdict.151 
For the defence, in order to establish a Brady violation, there are three elements which 
must be demonstrated to the appellate Court:  
1) The evidence is favourable to the accused because it is exculpatory or 
impeaching; 
2) The evidence is suppressed by the Government, either intentionally or 
negligently; 
3) The suppression is prejudicial to the accused.152 
The key here is the ‘prejudice’ to the defence. This applies only if the suppressed 
evidence is ‘material.’ According to the Supreme Court, evidence is material only if 
‘there is a reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been different if 
the suppressed evidence had been disclosed to the defence.’153 
What the Supreme Court is doing here, is in fact asking the prosecution to make a 
pre-trial decision to disclose based on a post-trial assessment. While the wording in 
Brady seems to mean that the prosecutor should disclose all favourable evidence, the 
later amendment of the ‘prejudice’ element limited the possibility to make a successful 
Brady claim.154 
																																																								
151	 Kyles	v.	Whitley,	514	U.S.	419	(1995).	
152	 Strickler	v.	Greene,	527	US	263	(1999).	
153	 ibid	at	289.	
154	 It	is	because	Brady	carries	this	prejudice	requirement	that	some	courts	have	developed	the	so-called	
‘due	diligence’	rule.	For	a	list	of	courts	and	cases,	see	Kate	Weisburd,	‘Prosecutors	Hide,	Defendants	
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Making a Post-Trial Assessment at the Pre-Trial Stage 
One may wonder, how is one party, either the defence or prosecution, supposed to know 
what type of evidence is going to make a difference for the outcome even before the 
trial is over? It is difficult, if not impossible, to name the value of any piece of 
favourable information concerning the result of a trial, because the trial has not started 
yet. It is ludicrous to ask a prosecutor to make such determination.155  
This standard, apparently, is troublesome and has drawn lots of criticism among 
scholars.156 One main point is the high threshold of its appellate review standard, that is, 
merely demonstrating that the prosecutor is withholding a piece of evidence is not 
enough, and it must have an impact on the outcome. 
The test has put both parties in a difficult situation, in particular the defence. For the 
defendant, it means that he has to depend on a speculative post-trial review to determine 
the effect such evidence would have had on his case.157 The value of the undisclosed 
evidence to the defence is not always obvious in a post-trial review. An appellate court, 
without the benefit of knowing what the defence counsel knew, whether the undisclosed 
																																																																																																																																																																		
Seek:	The	Erosion	of	Brady	Through	the	Defendant	Due	Diligence	Rule’	(2012)	60	UCLA	L.	Rev.	138,	153–
4.	
155	 Alafair	S	Burke,	‘Improving	Prosecutorial	Decision	Making:	Some	Lessons	of	Cognitive	Science’	(2005)	
47	William	&	Mary	Law	Review:	1587,	1610	(‘requires	that	prosecutors	engage	in	a	bizarre	kind	of	
anticipatory	hindsight	review);	Cerruti	(n	587)	(decribing	the	process	as	a	‘looking	glass’).	See	also	Justice	
Scalia’s	comments	in	the	oral	argument	in	Kyles	v.	Whitley,	at	33:22.	 	
156	 See,	e.g.	Hoeffel	and	Singer	(n	594)	474.	
157	 Daniel	J	Capra,	‘Access	to	Exculpatory	Evidence:	Avoiding	the	Agurs	Problems	of	Prosecutorial	
Discretion	and	Retrospective	Review’	(1984)	53	Fordham	L.	Rev.	391.	
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evidence could have corroborated other evidence available to the defence, or why the 
defence counsel pursued certain strategies, has to speculate about how defence counsel 
might have made use of the undisclosed evidence.158 For the prosecutor, although 
originally it was expected that he would make prospective decisions and disclose all 
favourable evidence in his possession to the defence, the materiality standard in effect 
has limited the scope of his constitutional duty. A prosecutor would have to, prior to 
trial, use this appellate review standard to decide whether he should disclose 
exculpatory materials to the defence. 
Lower courts charged with enforcing the Brady mandate have repeatedly ruled that 
Brady does not require pre-trial disclosure even when the government is aware of the 
favourable evidence prior to trial.159 Prosecutors only need to disclose favourable 
evidence to the defence ‘in time for its effective use at trial.’160 According, prosecutors 
can, and sometimes will, intentionally withhold Brady evidence as long as they could, 
being completely aware that the essential information in their exclusive possession 
could crucially support the defendant case or seriously undermine the government’s 
case.161 
 																																																								
158	 Cerruti	(n	587).	
159	 United	States	v.	Coppa,	267	F.3d	132,	135	(2d	Cir.	2001);	US	v.	Presser,	844	F.2d	1275,	1283	(6th	Cir.	
1988);	Lafave	and	others	(n	476)	1143.	
160	 Coppa,	at	142.	
161	 E.g.	Padgett	v.	State,	668	So.	2d	78	(Ala.	Crim.	App.	1995);	People	v.	Jackson,	637	N.Y.S.2d	158	(N.Y.	
Sup.	Ct.	1995);	Page	v.	Roberts,	611	N.Y.S.2d	214	(N.Y.	App.	Div.	1994).	
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Encouraging Gamesmanship –‘Let’s play a game: I will win anyway’ 
Another worrying consequence is that this retrospective, post-conviction aspect of the 
materiality standard has added even more power into the hands of the prosecution, 
which further worsens the inequality of arms between the two adversaries, and 
encourages the prosecutors to play games. The materiality standard has been repeatedly 
condemned by scholars,162 some even used descriptions as strong as ‘perverse 
standard’.163  
By adopting this material standard to define the scope of the defendant’s constitutional 
right to certain evidence prior to trial, the Court has made it easier for prosecutors to 
evade their Brady duty simply by claiming that they believed it was inconceivable that 
any evidence they possessed would create a reasonable probability that the defendant 
would be found not guilty.164 As Justice Marshall criticised in Bagley, rather than 
promoting full and complete disclosure, the materiality standard legitimises 
non-disclosure by allowing prosecutors to determine which favourable evidence is not 
																																																								
162	 Often	on	the	premise	that:	it	all	too	easily	empowers	overzealous	prosecutors,	to	engage	in	
gamesmanship	to	dodge	their	obligations	to	disclose.	See	Gershman	(n	459)	(outlining	the	numerous	
methods	prosecutors	can	use	to	altogether	avoid	or	minimise	the	effects	of	disclosing	exculpatory	
evidence);	Scott	E	Sundby,	‘Fallen	Superheroes	and	Constitutional	Mirages:	The	Tale	of	Brady	v.	
Maryland’	(2001)	33	McGeorge	L.	Rev.	643,	647	(‘it’s	the	Court’s	materiality	decision	that	essentially	
have	robbed	Brady…	and	transformed	the	doctrine	from	a	pre-trial	discovery	right	into	a	post-trial	
remedy	for	government	misconduct’).	Similarly,	Cynthia	E	Jones,	‘A	Reason	to	Doubt:	The	Suppression	of	
Evidence	and	the	Inference	of	Innocence’	[2010]	The	Journal	of	Criminal	Law	and	Criminology	415	
(noting	that	non-disclosure	of	favourable	evidence	does	not	result	in	a	Brady	violation	unless	the	
defendant	can	establish	that	the	withheld	evidence	was	material	or	prejudicial	to	the	defendant).	
163	 Gershman	(n	459).	
164	 Bennett	L	Gershman,	‘Bad	Faith	Exception	to	Prosecutorial	Immunity	for	Brady	Violations’	[2010]	
Pace	Law	Faculty	Publications	635,	22.	 	
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material and can be constitutionally withheld.165 
4.  Prosecutors in Power  
The way this disclosure duty is designed is another problematic feature. As practice has 
shown, the prosecutors can easily violate the rules with little consequences. The 
materiality standard has been repeatedly condemned. However, it is submitted, the key 
towards a better disclosure system is not what standard should be applied, rather than 
who is applying it. 
It is the prosecution who has the exclusive possession of materials collected during the 
criminal investigation, and they alone are entrusted to determine whether favourable 
evidence exists. It is also the prosecutors’ discretion to decide when, if at all, this 
evidence will be disclosed to the defence. The prosecution not only has more cards in 
their hands, but also has the power to decide what their opponents, the defence, are 
allowed to see. This fact has made the prosecutors very powerful, and has given them 
room and possibility to abuse their power. Davis noted that prosecutors make most 
disclosure decisions behind closed doors and defence attorneys are ill equipped to 
discover potentially material evidence in the prosecutor’s possession.166  
Defence counsels, on the other hand, for all their incentives to find exculpatory 
																																																								
165	 Dissenting	opinion	of	Justice	Marshall	in	US	v.	Bagley,	473	U.	S.	685.	
166	 Angela	J	Davis,	Arbitrary	Justice:	The	Power	of	the	American	Prosecutor	(Oxford	University	Press	
2009)	432.	
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information, usually lack ‘the time, resources, or expertise’ to conduct the type of 
tremendous pre-trial investigation needed to uncover this evidence.167 As noted by 
Medwed, ‘when a prosecutor chooses not to disclose evidence, that decision is only 
seldom revealed to outsiders unless he or she later has a change of heart or it somehow 
finds its way into defence hands.’168 
It is important, however, to bear in mind the reasons for the prosecutors, police and 
other law enforcement to be in charge of these powers. Their function is to pursue 
justice, not to seek victory. Therefore, the constitutional right of criminal defendants to 
acquire exculpatory evidence for use at trial should not depend on sheer luck or the 
industriousness of the defence’s investigation team. As the Court recognised in Banks: 
‘[a] rule . . . declaring “prosecutor may hide, defendant must seek,” is not tenable in a 
system constitutionally bound to accord defendants’ due process.’169 
5. Judiciary’s permissive Approach 
The judicial evolution of the Brady rule has made it easier for prosecutors to violate 
Brady, and the lack of an effective mechanism to sanction or deter violations invites a 
rethinking of the perception in continuing to afford prosecutors the shield of absolute 
immunity for deliberate and serious Brady violations. Brady violations appear to be 																																																								
167	 Daniel	S	Medwed,	‘Brady’s	Bunch	of	Flaws’	(2010)	67	Washington	and	Lee	Law	Review	1533,	1541,	
citing	Davis,	ibid,	432.	
168	 ibid	1541,	2;	Gershman	(n	459)	537.	Noting	the	defendants	might	have	to	rely	on	chance	to	discover	
evidence	post-trial.	
169	 Banks	v.	Dretke,	540	U.S.	668	(2004)	at	695-698.	
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more common than ever and, as Justice White noted in his concurrence in Imbler, ‘the 
stakes are high.’170 Brady violations deny the defendant his right to a fair trial, 
undermine the integrity of the judicial process, and tarnish the public’s perception of the 
judicial process. Davis heavily criticised the Supreme Court for ‘fostering a cultural 
misconduct.’ By establishing nearly impossible standards for obtaining the necessary 
discovery to seek judicial review, the Supreme Court is covering these prosecutorial 
misconducts.171 
The lack of judicial oversight of Brady disclosure decisions is compounded by the fact 
that, absent extraordinary circumstances, it is very likely that the defence will never 
learn of the existence of favourable evidence and, accordingly, cannot seek leave of the 
court to compel disclosure. Nor are prosecutors required to seek an in camera review of 
potential Brady evidence prior to making the decision that evidence will not be 
disclosed.172 Consequently, the courts would only have a limited ability to make 
pre-trial determinations of whether the prosecutor has wholly adhered to Brady. 
C. Analysis  
1. A Task too noble for Prosecutors? 
The prosecution’s frequent violation of their Brady obligations, however, is 
																																																								
170	 Imbler	v.	Pachtman,	424	U.S.	409	(1976)	at	444.	
171	 See	Angela	J.	Davis,	The	American	Prosecutor:	Independence,	Power,	and	the	Threat	of	Tyranny,	
(2001)	86	IOWA	L.REV.	393,	414.	 	 	 	
172	 Jones	(n	608)	433.	
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unsurprising. As Jones noted, the duty to disclose Brady evidence is governed by ‘an 
unrealistic “honour code” system.’173 Also pointed out by Gershman, the criminal 
discovery system, in particular the disclosure of Brady evidence, as in other areas of 
criminal procedure, relies heavily on the ‘integrity, good faith, and professionalism of 
the prosecution for its effectiveness.’174 But this exactly is the problem here: are the 
expectations towards the American prosecutors too high? Studies of cognitive bias have 
shown that even a bona fide prosecutor ‘might underestimate the potential exculpatory 
value of the evidence whose disclosure is at issue.’175 Burke’s research pointed out that 
naturally, prosecutors will have cognitive bias towards guilt and the inevitable cognitive 
bias of human beings makes the noble task to achieve justice even more impossible.176 
The central failure of the Brady doctrine is, accordingly, its underlying commitment to 
an idealised regime of prosecutorial privilege, rather than to a modern regime of 
adversarial transparency and fair play. Scholars have written extensively about the 
failure of Brady. For example, Cerrutti has criticised that ‘the Brady doctrine has failed 
not only with respect to that it should be but even regard to what it purports to be.’177 
Brady is supposed to be a rule of constitutional discovery designed to entitle a criminal 
																																																								
173	 ibid	431–2.	
174	 Gershman	(n	459)	533.	
175	 Burke,	‘Improving	Prosecutorial	Decision	Making’	(n	601)	1612.	See	also	Ellen	Yaroshefsky,	
‘Foreword-New	Perspectives	on	Brady	and	Other	Disclosure	Obligations:	What	Really	Works?’	(2010)	31	
Cardozo	Law	Review	1943,	1950.	
176	 Burke,	‘Improving	Prosecutorial	Decision	Making’	(n	601)	1605–9;	Alafair	S	Burke,	‘Neuroscience,	
Cognitive	Psychology,	and	the	Criminal	Justice	System:	Prosecutorial	Agnosticism’	(2010)	8	Ohio	St.	J.	
Crim.	L.	79.	 	
177	 Cerruti	(n	587).	
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defendant to obtain favourable materials collected by the state to be used by the defence 
in order to prepare its case. Instead of being a rule to promote a fair and just criminal 
system, Brady is now a rule that encourages and shields pre-trial nondisclosure by the 
prosecutor. 
2. Undermining the Adversary System?  
The concept of this duty of disclosure is not compatible with the pure adversarial 
system settings.178 It requires the prosecution, to some extent, to assist the defence. 
Accordingly, it is often alleged that the duty will upset the adversary system,179 and 
prosecutors are doing jobs for the defence counsels.180 In order to address and rebut this 
argument, it would be useful to briefly examine the adversary system and its impact. 
The American criminal justice process is structured to adjudicate guilt through a process 
that is, in general, adversarial in character. Interestingly, disclosure rules are a product 
of the common law legal system but the idea itself is a departure of the traditional, 
adversarial model of criminal litigation.181 The adversary system is preferred because, 
as it is believed, it will produce more accurate verdicts. There are two main reasons for 
this superiority: firstly, the parties, motivated by self-interests, will ensure that all 
relevant evidence is produced, the strengths and weaknesses of the evidence will be 
																																																								
178	 ibid;	Prosser	(n	593);	Gershman	(n	459)	533.	
179	 Lafave	and	others	(n	476).	
180	 ibid.	
181	 United	States	v.	Bagley,	at	675,	fn.	6.	
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fully explored, and eventually the truth will come out.182 Secondly, it is argued that the 
adversary system avoids the kind of decision-maker bias likely to be found in 
inquisitorial proceedings. In the adversary system, the decision makers are much more 
neutral when assessing the evidence at hand and tend to postpone any decision until the 
case has been fully reviewed. This is largely due to the fact that they are not personally 
involved in the fact-finding process.183 
For the adversary system to operate perfectly, each side must have the resources needed 
to fully dispute the other. However, this is almost never the case in a criminal trial. As 
the critics pointed out, there is a serious inequality in the resources available to the two 
parties.184 The defence rarely possesses approximate equality with the prosecution, and 
there is no practical method of providing it. Nevertheless, there is little doubt that the 
system could be improved if the weaker litigant could know in advance the disputing 
points and to have access to all available information so that he could investigate 
properly beforehand. Until he knows what evidence is likely to be available for or 
against him, he cannot prepare to meet or insinuate objections. 
Since it is impossible, and not needed,185 to equip both parties in criminal trials with the 
																																																								
182	 Lafave	and	others	(n	476).	
183	 ibid	29.	This	is	challenged	of	course.	Disagreements	also	exist	as	to	whether	certain	obligations	
imposed	upon	both	sides,	detract	from	or	add	to	the	effectiveness	of	the	adversary	system	in	seeking	
the	truth.	 	
184	 E.g.	Traynor	(n	463).	
185	 McNeil	v.	Wisconsin,	501	U.S.	171,	183	(1991)	at	fn.2.	‘Our	system	of	justice	is,	and	has	always	been,	
an	inquisitorial	one	at	the	investigatory	stage	(even	the	grand	jury	is	an	inquisitorial	body),	and	no	other	
disposition	is	conceivable.’	
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same investigate facilities, the only reasonable way to attain advance equality in access 
to the evidence is through the system, that is, through a discovery procedure. In fact, 
taking a comparative look at civil procedure systems, this is exactly the route that is 
followed: the discovery of documents, interrogatories, oral examinations for discovery, 
medical examinations, and pre-trial production of documents in the hands of any person 
are all procedures in the system that provide discovery as of right and made it possible 
for the reasoning of the adversary model to be fulfilled.186 
In sum, because the adversary system is structured based on some flawed presumptions, 
such as both parties having equal resources, in order to make the system work in 
accordance with its design, both parties should have equal access to the evidence. Thus, 
the claim of undermining the adversary system is unfounded. Discovery will only aid it 
in achieving its purposes. 
3. The Presumption of Guilt 
A dominant perspective that explains this resistance and the overall limitations on 
discovery in criminal cases is the unspoken presumption of the defendant’s guilt. This 
line of thinking is well expressed in the claims of intimidating witness and perjury. It is 
based on the assumption that the defendant had committed a crime and, therefore, he 
must have all the information, so there is no need to disclose information to him. The 
																																																								
186	 See	e.g.	Stephen	Subrin,	‘Fishing	Expeditions	Allowed:	The	Historical	Background	of	the	1938	Federal	
Discovery	Rules’	(1998)	39	Boston	College	Law	Review	691.	
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idea behind this is: if the defendant found out what the prosecution has on him, he 
would tailor his testimony and even threaten the witness whose names are known to him. 
Then, using his protection under the constitutional law, he would not be compelled to 
tell the truth because he has the right not to incriminate himself, along with the right to 
remain silent. These advantages of an accused will put the prosecution in a severe 
disadvantage, and therefore the prosecution is entitled not to give up their evidence to 
the defence. Otherwise the burden on the prosecution will become even heavier – he 
already has to prove the defence is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt! 
This line of thinking partially unfolds the reasons behind the narrow federal discovery 
rules as it currently stands, and explains the inconsistencies and illogical reasoning in 
judgments. As exhibited in the early case law, the judges were not shy to show their 
hostile attitude toward criminal defendants, and focused on the disadvantages the State 
could be put in disadvantage if allow liberal disclosure rules.187 
V. Concluding Remarks 
This Chapter examined the law and practice of the criminal discovery system in the 
United States. Policy arguments against liberal criminal discovery rules were reviewed, 
and it was established that they lack merits. Nevertheless, U.S. Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure still provide a relatively narrow discovery regime compared to most 
States Rules.  																																																								
187	 See	above	statements	of	Judge	Learned	Hand	and	Judge	Vanderbilt.	
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The internal solution of many prosecution offices is to adopt an open file policy and 
voluntary disclose material to the defence, which is beyond their statutory obligation. 
Further internal training and resources for prosecutors with regard to discovery are also 
provided, and it would seem that most U.S. prosecutors intend to do their jobs properly. 
Recent high profile cases such as Ted Stevens, however, reveal that some prosecutors 
still withhold importance evidence from the accused without being held accountable. 
This is partly due to the Courts’ notorious high threshold in establishing a Brady 
violation, the materiality standard and prejudice requirement, which further encourages 
a gamesmanship. The key for the Brady obligations to work is the prosecutors must be 
acting bona fide; but this is hard to detect when the prosecutors are not fulfilling their 
obligations.  
Both the government and scholarship have attempted to find alternative solutions to the 
problem of prosecutorial misconducts such as internal disciplinary proceedings from the 
Bar Association or the Department of Justice,188 and legislative reforms. However, they 
were not successful, as the former treats Brady violations as a mere breach of 
prosecutors’ ethical standards, and the recent reform in 2012 died down for both 
political and legal reasons. Accordingly, it is submitted that the most possible solution 
is that the Courts should take a different approach, i.e. a lower standard than the current 
one, in dealing with Brady violations. 																																																								
188	 Rule	3.8(d)	of	the	Model	Rules	of	Professional	Conduct.	See	also	e.g.	Bank	of	Nova	Scotia	v.	United	
States,	487	U.S.	250,	263	(1988).	
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CHAPTER VI 	
THE PROSECUTION’S DUTY OF DISCLOSURE IN 
COMMON LAW JURISDICTIONS II – ENGLAND AND 
WALES 
 
I. Introduction: Pre-Trial Disclosure in England and Wales  
Disclosure of evidence at the pre-trial stage is a crucial part in adversarial criminal trials. 
The process of pre-trial disclosure will determine ‘who’ knows ‘what’ and ‘when’.  
Accordingly, the disclosure process will affect the parties’ strategies at trial. In England, 
the prosecution’s disclosure duty is one of the most important safeguards for the 
accused’s right to a fair trial.1 It also serves other purposes, such as preventing 
unnecessary surprises and facilitating the search for truth and trial procedural 
management.2 
It is worthwhile to note that, in England, the Courts have generally regarded the 
prosecution’s duty of disclosure as a basic requirement of natural justice,3 or the duty to 
																																																								
1	 E.g.	John	Sprack,	A	Practical	Approach	to	Criminal	Procedure	(14th	ed,	Oxford	University	Press	2012)	
para.9.01.	 	
2	 Ashworth	and	Redmayne	(n	29)	259.	
See	also	Robin	Auld,	Review	of	the	Criminal	Courts	of	England	and	Wales:	Report,	October	2001	
(Stationery	Office	2001)	Chapter	10,	para	115.	‘Advance	disclosure	by	the	prosecution	serves	two	main	
purposes.	The	first	is	its	contribution	to	a	fair	trial	looked	at	as	a	whole.	The	second	is	its	contribution	to	
the	efficiency,	including	the	speed,	of	the	pre-trial	and	trial	process	and	to	considerate	treatment	of	all	
involved	in	it.’	(footnotes	omitted)	.	
3	 John	Arnold	Epp,	Building	on	the	Decade	of	Disclosure	in	Criminal	Procedure	(Cavendish	Pub	2001)	50.	 	
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act fairly,4 in criminal proceedings.5 For example, in ex parte Hawthorn,6 the failure of 
prosecution’s disclosure was seen as a denial of natural justice, even though it was the 
fault of the prosecution and not of the Tribunal. In this case, the prosecutor failed to 
provide the defence witness statements which might have assisted the defence case and, 
as a consequence, the conviction was quashed. The notion of fairness has been central 
to the English legal systems for centuries. A trial must be fair, and this means the parties 
must be given a fair chance to prepare for the charges against him. In the words of Lord 
Widgery CJ in ex parte Peach,7 ‘it is elementary that if a charge is being made against 
a person, he must be given a fair chance of meeting it. That often means he must be 
given documents necessary for the purpose.’8   
The idea of the common law principle of natural justice fits roughly with Article 6 of 
the ECHR.9 In the European human rights context, it is broadly accepted that the 
obligation of the prosecution to disclose evidence to the defence prior to trial represents 
																																																								
4	 Matthews	and	Malek	(n	262)	23.	Citing	Brian	Harris,	Disciplinary	and	Regulatory	Proceedings	(Jordans	
2009)	Chapter	10.	
Natural	justice	is	an	old	principle	of	common	law,	it	also	means	procedural	fairness,	to	ensure	a	fair	
decision	could	be	reached	by	decision-makers,	instead	of	‘the	actual	outcome’.	It	requires	a	fair	and	
proper	procedure	be	used	when	making	a	decision.	 	
5	 Although,	as	pointed	out	by	Ashworth,	the	reasoning	behind	prosecution	disclosure	has	never	been	
entirely	clear.	See	Ashworth	(n	29)	32.	 	
6	 R	v	Leyland	Justices,	ex	parte	Hawthorn	[1979]	Q.B.	28.	
7	 R	v	H.M.	Coroner	for	Hammersmith,	ex	parte	Peach	[1980]	QB	211.	 	
8	 ibid,	Lord	Widgery	CJ,	at	286.	
9	 Article	6(1)	and	(3)(b)	and	(d)	of	the	ECHR	relates	to	disclosure	of	both	evidence	and	unused	material.	
Article	6(3)	(b):	to	have	adequate	time	and	facilities	for	the	preparation	of	his	defence;	(d)	to	examine	or	
have	examined	witnesses	against	him	and	to	obtain	the	attendance	and	examination	of	witnesses	on	his	
behalf	under	the	same	conditions	as	witnesses	against	him.	 	
Article	6(3)	(d):	to	examine	or	have	examined	witnesses	against	him	and	to	obtain	the	attendance	and	
examination	of	witnesses	on	his	behalf	under	the	same	conditions	as	witnesses	against	him.	
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an inherent part of the right to a fair trial.10 Although Article 6 of the ECHR itself does 
not explicitly contain ‘a right to disclosure’, the European Court of Human Right has 
confirmed this right in its jurisprudence.11 For example, in Natunen v Finland,12 it was 
held that ‘Article 6 § 1 requires that the prosecution authorities disclose to the defence 
all material evidence in their possession for or against the accused.’ In Jespers v 
Belgium,13 in line with the principle of equality of arms, the European Court of Human 
Right reasoned that due to the State’s superior resources the defence should have access 
to all relevant evidence that has been or could be gathered by the prosecution. 
In England, it is undisputed that fair disclosure to the defence is an inseparable part of a 
fair trial.14 As pointed out by Lord Steyn in R v Brown, in an adversarial system, it is 
the prosecution, including the police, which would be responsible for the investigatory 
process.15 Also recognizing the disparity of recourses between the prosecution, which 
has many investigative facilities at its disposal,16 and the accused, it is only fair if the 
defence is provided access to the prosecution materials, which could compensate for the 
inequality in resources and raise them to an approximately equal position.17 In order to 
achieve the equality of arms at its maximum, and the effort to guarantee a fair trial for 
																																																								
10	 See	Edwards	v	United	Kingdom	(1992)	15	EHRR	417;	Rowe	and	Davis	v	United	Kingdom	(2000)	30	
EHRR	1;	Jaspar	v	UK	(2000)	30	EHRR	441.	
11	 ibid.	
12	 Natunen	v	Finland	(2009)	49	EHRR	32,	para.	39.	
13	 Jespers	v	Belgium	(1981)	27	DR	61.	
14	 R	v	Brown	(Winston)	[1995]	1	Cr	App	R	191,	CA,	Steyn	LJ,	at	198.	 	
15	 ibid.	
16	 Sprack	(n	635)	para.9.01.	
17	 Ashworth	(n	29)	32.	
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the defendant, a common law duty of disclosure by the prosecution has been developed 
in England, and was then settled in its current statutory regime. However, because the 
entitlement to disclosure is not an absolute right,18 when competing interests (e.g. 
national security, sensitive information) come into play, the prosecution will seek to 
withhold evidence and, in that case, the defence’s right could be limited. The Criminal 
Cases Review Commission has recently noted that failure to disclose material to the 
defence to which they were entitled remains the biggest single cause of miscarriages of 
justice,19 and non-disclosure has been identified as one of the most common reasons for 
referring convictions to the Court of Appeal,20 which has noted that it hears ‘countless’ 
cases on the issue.21 
II.  The Prosecution’s Duty to Disclose Used Material 
In England, the prosecution’s duty of disclosure has two aspects. The used material, 
which forms the prosecution case before trial, and the unused material, which by 
definition means it is not part of the prosecution case, but might be useful for the 
defence to prepare its case. 
It has long been recognised that the prosecution is required to disclose its case, i.e. 
																																																								
18	 Rowe	and	Davis	v	United	Kingdom	(2000)	30	EHRR	1.	
19	 Judicial	Protocol	on	the	Disclosure	of	Unused	Material	in	Criminal	Case	2013,	available	at	 	
https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/JCO/Documents/Protocols/Disclosure+Protocol.pdf	
20	 Criminal	Cases	Review	Commission	Annual	Report	2012/13,	p.15,	available	at	
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/246539/0482.pdf	
21	 R	v	Pomfrett	[2009]	EECA	Crim	1471,	[4].	See,	e.g.,	R.	v	Giles	[2009]	EWCA	Crim	1388;	Tucker	v	CPS	
[2008]	EWCA	Crim	1368.	
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evidence he intends to rely, to the defence prior to trial.22 If the evidence is not 
disclosed in a proper manner, i.e. a bundle of witness statements presented after the case 
has been transferred, it may not be admissible at trial.23 This duty is also referred as the 
‘duty to provide advance information’.24 If there is any further evidence which the 
prosecution wishes to adduce as part of his case, he must notify the defence by way of a 
notice of additional evidence.25 The disclosure obligation of the prosecution is 
uncontroversial for trial on indictment whilst in summary trial26 has left with some 
ambiguity.27 
This obligation needs little justification. Due to the responsive nature of the defence’s 
case, it is vital for the accused to have knowledge of the prosecution’s case prior to the 
trial, if that were not the case, the defence would not be able to prepare his case nor call 
the evidence for trial.28  
III. The Prosecution’s Duty to Disclose Unused Material and its 
Development 																																																								
22	 Although	see	Auld	(n	636)	para.117-9.	(‘In	all	cases	there	is	a	legal	duty	on	or	a	practical	requirement	
for	a	prosecutor	to	supply	its	proposed	evidence	in	advance	of	the	hearing.	But	it	is	still	a	bit	of	a	
muddle.’)	
23	 Ashworth	and	Redmayne	(n	29)	259.	
24	 Sprack	(n	635)	9.01.	It	should	be	noted	that	in	England,	the	prosecution’s	duty	of	disclosure	generally	
refers	to	the	duty	to	disclose	the	evidence	the	prosecution	did	not	intend	to	rely	at	trial	(unused	
evidence).	See	Criminal	Procedure	Rules	2015,	part	15.	
25	 ibid.	
26	 See	Magistrates’	Courts	(Advance	information)	Rules	1985.	
27	 Ashworth	and	Redmayne	(n	29)	263;	Redmayne	(n	29).	For	a	summary	of	the	current	position,	see	
Sprack	(n	635)	9.54-56.	 	
28	 See	Criminal	Cases	Review	Commission,	Annual	Report	1999-2000	(2000)	11.	Also	see,	Laurie	Elks,	
Righting	Miscarriages	of	Justice?	Ten	Years	of	the	Criminal	Cases	Review	Commission	(Justice	2008)	309–
11.	 	
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What really troubles the English criminal trials is the application of the prosecution 
obligation to disclose unused material, that is, material gathered during the investigation 
but not put forward at trial. It is upon this aspect of the prosecution’s duty of disclosure 
which will be the focus in this Chapter. 
The duty of the prosecution to disclose unused material to the defence is firstly 
developed through common law in England. It is imperative to understand the historical 
development of the law of disclosure. Disclosure was dependent on the common law 
and the fairness of the prosecution concerned.29 Curiously, the duty of disclosure 
appeared rather late in England, which did not truly exist until the 1980s and, perhaps 
surprisingly, there was no formal system of disclosure until the Criminal Procedure and 
Investigations Act 1996 (‘CPIA 1996’).30 Originally, the position derived from the 
notion of ‘fair play’ which was considered a characteristic of all those who acted for the 
Crown in criminal cases.31 The premise was that the prosecutors would act as ‘ministers 
of justice whose prime concern is its fair and impartial administration.’32 Disclosure, 
therefore, was more of a professional courtesy than a proper legal duty which ‘depends 
on the integrity and skills of the prosecuting counsel.’33 
																																																								
29	 David	Rhodes,	‘Disclosure’	in	Madeleine	Colvin	and	Jonathan	Cooper	(eds),	Human	Rights	in	the	
Investigation	and	Prosecution	of	Crime	(Oxford	University	Press	2009)	para.10.13.	
30	 The	Criminal	Procedure	and	Investigations	Act	1996	(CPIA)	came	into	force	on	1	April	1997.	
31	 David	Corker	and	Stephen	Parkinson	(eds),	‘Disclosure	in	Criminal	Proceedings’	(Oxford	University	
Press	2009)	para.1.03.	
32	 Linton	Berry	v	R	[1992]	2	A.C.	364,	per	Lord	Lowry;	Randall	v	R	(Cayman	Islands),	[2002]	UKPC	19	
(noting	that	the	minister	of	justice	whose	prime	concern	is	its	fair	and	impartial	administration).	
33	 Corker	and	Parkinson	(n	665)	para.1.04.	 	
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A. The Emergence of the Duty 
The beginning of the change of attitude towards recognising an obligation to disclose 
was the case of Bryant and Dickson,34 which involved malicious prosecution due to the 
withholding of exculpatory material. The courts then began to identify the duty of the 
prosecution to disclose material which might affect the outcome of the result. In this 
case, it was established that while there was no duty on the prosecution to supply a copy 
of a witness statement which it did not intend to call evidence, it did have a duty to 
notify the defence of a witness whom the prosecution knew could give material 
evidence.35 Although the ruling of the case was quite narrow, it shows that the 
prosecution’s obligation of disclosure to the accused is slowly shifted from solely 
professional ethics to an individual right. 
The next important leading case was Dallison v Caffery.36 Lord Denning adopted a 
different approach than in Bryant and Dickson, holding that the statement of a credible 
witness should always be disclosed to the defence, and not simply their name and 
address.37 Although a distinction was drawn, if it is not a credible witness, then Bryant 
																																																								
34	 R	v	Bryant	and	Dickson	(1946)	31	Cr	App	R	146.	
35	 R	v	Bryant	and	Dickson	(1946)	31	Cr	App	R	146.	
36	 Dallison	v	Caffery	[1965]	1	Q.B.	348	CA.	
37	 Dallison	v	Caffery	[1965]	1	Q.B.	348,	369.	Lord	Denning:	‘The	duty	of	a	prosecuting	counsel	or	solicitor,	
as	I	have	always	understood	it,	is	this:	if	he	knows	of	a	credible	witness	who	can	speak	to	material	facts	
which	tend	to	show	the	prisoner	to	be	innocent,	he	must	either	call	that	witness	himself	or	make	his	
statement	available	to	the	defence.	It	would	be	highly	reprehensible	to	conceal	from	the	court	the	
evidence	which	such	a	witness	can	give.	If	the	prosecuting	counsel	or	solicitor	knows,	not	of	a	credible	
witness,	but	a	witness	whom	he	does	not	accept	as	credible,	he	should	tell	the	defence	about	him	so	
that	they	can	call	him	if	they	wish.’	
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and Dickson would continue to apply.38 The wider significance of Lord Denning was 
that he conceptualised disclosure in a new manner: disclosure was about ensuring that 
justice was done, not simply whether a particular rule was followed. The spirit of 
common law should prevail, not its letter.39 Accordingly, unless there were good 
reasons to believe that disclosure of witness statements was apt to cause injustice by 
facilitating an accused’s fabrication of false evidence, disclosure was necessary. 
However, because the two cases were conflicting with each other, it had caused some 
confusion in practice, and the issue of disclosure soon became one of the main grounds 
leading to an appeal. 40 By 1970s, the Court of Appeal had to deal with a great number 
of non-disclosure cases. In many of these cases, the Court of Appeal has emphasized the 
importance of full disclosure by the prosecution and of the accused being informed of 
material which might assist them in his or her defence.41 In R v Hennessy,42 with regard 
to the rules relating to disclosure by the prosecution, Lawton LJ stated that the courts 
must: ‘keep in mind that those who prepare and conduct prosecutions owe a duty to the 																																																																																																																																																																		
Cf.	Lord	Diplock:	‘A	prosecutor	is	under	no	such	duty.	His	duty	is	to	prosecute,	not	to	defend.	If	he	
happens	to	have	information	from	a	credible	witness	which	is	inconsistent	with	the	guilt	of	the	accused,	
or,	although	not	inconsistent	with	his	guilt,	is	helpful	to	the	accused,	the	prosecutor	should	make	such	
witness	available	to	the	defence.’	 	
	
See	Henry	LJ.	in	R	v	Saunders	(unreported)	29	September	1989,	recognizing	the	conflict	between	the	two	
Lords,	in	favour	of	Lord	Denning.	
	
38	 Dallison	v	Caffery	[1965]	1	Q.B.	348,	369.	
39	 Corker	and	Parkinson	(n	665)	para.1.14.	 	
40	 Patrick	O’Connor,	‘Prosecution	Disclosure:	Principle,	Practice	And	Justice’	(1992)	4	Criminal	Law	
Review	464,	469.	
41	 See,	e.g.	R	v	Hassan	and	Kotaish	(1968)	52	Cr	App	R	291	(failure	to	disclose	previous	convictions);	and	
see	the	case	of	Laszlo	Virag,	in	the	Devlin	Report	1969,	at	para.	1.20	and	3.108	(‘A	duty	of	disclosure	is	
not	discharged	by	frankness	in	cross-examination	if	the	point	happens	to	be	raised.’)	 	
42	 R	v	Hennessey	(Timothy)	(1978)	68	Cr	App	R	419.	
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courts to ensure that all relevant evidence of help to an accused is either led by them or 
made available to the defence. We have no reason to think that this duty is neglected; 
and if it ever should be, the appropriate disciplinary bodies can be expected to take 
action. The judges for their part will ensure that the Crown gets no advantage from 
neglect of duty on the part of the prosecution.’43 This demonstrates how, by 1978, the 
courts’ attitude to the subject of disclosure had moved on dramatically from that shown 
in Bryant and Dickson. As Corker puts it, ‘an accused’s right to disclosure, not the 
purported integrity and skill of prosecution counsel, was the best guarantor of fairness 
in criminal trials.’44 
B. Miscarriages of Justice  
During the 70s, the prosecution had been failing to disclose, in particular exculpatory, 
materials. These failures had led to several notorious ‘miscarriages of justice’ cases, e.g. 
the Birmingham Six,45 the Guildford Four,46 and the Maguire Seven.47 In light of the 
occurring of these miscarriages of justice cases, critics have provided assessments and 
recommendations outside the courts before a formalised system of disclosure was 
eventually established. For example, in both of the Devlin48 and the Fisher Reports49 																																																								
43	 ibid,	at	426.	
44	 Corker	and	Parkinson	(n	665)	para.1.16.	 	
45	 R	v	McIlkenny,	Hunter,	Walker,	Callaghan,	Hill	and	Power	(1991)	93	Cr	App	R	287	(‘the	Birmingham	
Six’).	
46	 R	v	Richardson,	Conlon,	Armstrong	and	Hill	EWCA	Crim	1989	(‘the	Guildford	Four’).	
47	 R	v	Anne	Maguire,	Patrick	Joseph	Maguire,	William	John	Smyth,	Vincent	Maguire,	Patrick	Joseph	Paul	
Maguire,	Patrick	O'Neill	and	Patrick	Conlon	(1991)	94	Cr	App	R	133	(‘the	Maguire	Seven’).	
48	 Lord	Devlin,	Report	to	the	Secretary	of	State	for	the	Home	Department	of	the	Departmental	
Committee	on	the	Evidence	of	Identification	in	Criminal	Cases	(London:	HMSO,	1976)	(reviewing	
wrongful	convictions	and	discussing	procedures	relating	to	identification	evidence).	
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the inadequacies in the disclosure system and the link with miscarriages of justice were 
highlighted. Later, in 1981, the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure made a 
report,50 which focused on the unethical police practices, however, it still expressed 
confidence in the prosecutors. The main theme of the Royal Commission Report 
suggested that the prosecution should have discretion in matters of the disclosure of 
information. These reports generally agreed that the situation would be improved if the 
prosecution disclosure system was properly defined and formalised. 
C. Attorney General’s Guidelines  
In an attempt to solve the confusing policy of disclosure by both the police and the 
prosecuting authorities, the Attorney General’s Guidelines (‘the Guidelines’) was issued 
in December 1981.51 The general idea was that the Guideline could improve the 
disclosure system comprehensively. In addition, to ensure that the rights of the defence 
will not be affected, it was stated that the application of the Guidelines would not be 
inconsistent with the rights of disclosure which was already established by the common 
law.52 It was hoped that the courts would also invoke the Guidelines as an authoritative 
																																																																																																																																																																		
49	 Hon.	Sir	Henry	Fisher,	Report	of	an	Inquiry	by	the	Hon.	Sir	Henry	Fisher	into	the	circumstances	leading	
to	the	trial	of	three	persons	on	charges	arising	out	of	the	death	of	Maxwell	Confait	and	thefire	at	27	
Doggett	Road,	London	SE6	(London:	HMSO,	1977)	(reviewing	the	circumstances	leading	to	the	trial	of	
three	persons	on	charges	arising	out	of	the	death	of	Maxwell	Confait).	Available	at	
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/228759/0090.pdf	
50	 Reports	of	Royal	Commission	on	Criminal	Procedure	(Philips	Commission)	1977-1981.	
51	 The	Attorney-General's	Guidelines,	issued	in	1982,	74	Cr	App	R	302	–	later	revoked	and	replaced,	the	
most	recent	is	AG	Guidelines	2013.	Available	at:	
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/262994/AG_Disclosur
e_Guidelines_-_December_2013.pdf	
52	 ibid.	
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source in their judgments, despite it did not have the force of law. However, without 
involving a proper new legislation, it seemed that the Government intended to change 
the situation in a soft manner without imposing any actual legal consequences on the 
prosecution. This soft approach induced the later failure of the Guidelines.  
The Guidelines still had a remarkable importance concerning the improvement of 
disclosure practice. It can be summarized as the following two points. Firstly, it used 
the term of ‘unused material’ and defined it in a distinctive way that basically stated that 
everything in the possession of the Crown should be disclosed. Secondly, it tried to set 
up a standard for the disclosability of such materials: ‘if it has some bearing on the 
offence charged.’53 This test was very wide and presumed automatic disclosure unless 
some exceptional circumstances, e.g. national security, the identity of informants, 
existed. 54 In the Guinness I case,55 it was held that the defence was entitled to see all 
preparatory notes and memoranda which led to the making of witness statements. The 
rationale was since the defence has the right to cross-examine on prior inconsistent 
statements, ‘so the defence should, as a general rule, in normal circumstances, be given 
the right to see information that would enable the right to be exercised, i.e. to give the 
right meaning.’56 This means that the scope of what should be disclosed has been put to 
its maximum by recognising that it was for the defence, not the prosecution, to decide 																																																								
53	 ibid.	
54	 R	v	Saunders	(unreported)	29	September	1989,	Henry	LJ:	‘it	is	hard	to	imagine	wider	words	than	that’,	
at	page	6D.	
55	 R	v	Saunders,	ibid.	
56	 R	v	Saunders,	at	page	4F.	
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whether unused material had some bearing on the case.57  
However, the Court’s ruling in Saunders did not fit into the other premise of the 
Guidelines: it would be in the prosecuting counsel’s discretion to decide what to 
disclose without referring to the court or the defence.58 A related problematic issue was 
that the Guidelines did not mention any principle such as Public Interest Immunity, and 
the prosecution can decide whether to disclose sensitive material depending on its own 
assessment of the assistance of the information to the defence case. In other words, the 
prosecution could withhold materials even if it is not in fact sensitive material. An 
interesting note here is the decision whether relevant material should be disclosed to the 
defence. The Guidelines gave this responsibility solely to the prosecuting barrister in the 
case, not to the investigators, nor to the Crown prosecution Service prosecutor. It seems 
to have the assumption that the criminal bar would and could act as ministers of justice, 
which could ensure fairness and impartiality in the disclosure decision-making.59  
Despite all the good intentions of the Guidelines, however, it appeared that the Courts 
were highly critical of the manner of the prosecuting counsels when they are exercising 
their discretion.60 In several occasions, the Court of Appeal had ruled that the 
prosecutor exercised his discretion improperly and, consequently, resulting in the 
																																																								
57	 ibid.	
58	 The	Guidelines	(n	51).	
59	 Corker	and	Parkinson	(n	665)	para.1.32.	 	
60	 ibid	para.1.33.	 	
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quashing of convictions.61 More fatally, the fundamental weakness of the Guidelines 
was that it lacked the force of law. Therefore, the Courts merely treated the Guidelines 
as instructions and did not make them binding at all.62  
D. The Common Law Development 
1. Ward: Expanding the Duty of Disclosure 
The case of Judith Ward63 – one of the most notorious miscarriage of justice cases – 
demonstrates the apparent link between miscarriage of justice and improper 
non-disclosure of the prosecution.64 Although the common duty in Ward is now 
superseded by the disclosure scheme set out in the CPIA 1996, it was an important case 
in the historical development regarding disclosure.65 The occurrence of Ward shows 
that the then disclosure regime was operating without fairness and, thus, causing 
wrongful convictions. More critically, the reoccurring of these miscarriage of justice 
cases appears to rebut the assumption that the prosecutors could be trusted to handle the 
disclosure process in a fair manner, which was the central premise in the Guidelines. 
It is generally considered that Ward managed to improve the flaws of the Guidelines, 
and expanded the scope of the prosecution’s obligation to disclose considerably. The 
																																																								
61	 E.g.	R	v	Lawson	[2005]	EWCA	Crim	1840;	R	v	Phillipson	(1989)	91	Cr	App	R	226.	
62	 See	e.g.	in	R	v	Brown	(n	648).	Steyn	LJ	said	it	is	merely	a	set	of	instructions	to	CPS	lawyers	and	
prosecuting	counsels.	
63	 R	v	Ward	(Judith)	[1993]	2	All	ER	577.	
64	 Roger	Leng,	‘The	Exchange	of	Information	and	Disclosure’	in	Michael	McConville	and	Geoffrey	Wilson	
(eds),	The	handbook	of	the	criminal	justice	process	(Oxford	University	Press	2002)	210.	 	
65	 ibid.	
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Guidelines’ concept of unused material was replaced by a new standard of ‘relevance’, 
or ‘materiality’, in which the court held that:  
‘We could emphasise that “all relevant evidence of help to the accused” is not 
limited to evidence which will obviously advance the accused's case. It is of help 
to the accused to have the opportunity of considering all the material evidence 
which the prosecution have gathered, and from which the prosecution have made 
their own selection of evidence to be led.’66  
The ruling in Ward, in effect, broadened the scope of the prosecution’s duty to disclose 
to include everything gathered and collected by the police during their investigation, 
with the sole exception of Public Interest Immunity.67 This wide entitlement to 
disclosure of all material evidence was later approved by House of Lords in R v 
Preston,68 and had been the common law standard of disclosure duty until the 
enforcement of the CPIA 1996. Although, note that the exact meaning of ‘material 
evidence’ appears to be less clear than the term ‘unused material’ in the Guidelines, and 
‘evidence’ in this context is not the same meaning in the procedural sense.69 
The most significant improvement of Ward, however, is the rejection of the broad 
concept of sensitive materials and the wide discretion of the prosecution. Instead, the 
																																																								
66	 R	v	Ward	(n	63),	601.	
67	 R	v	Ward	(n	697).	See	per	Gildewell	J.	
68	 R	v	Preston	[1993]	All	ER	638.	
69	 Corker	and	Parkinson	(n	665)	para.1.45.	 	
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principle of Public Interest Immunity was established which is a much narrower concept 
and would be supervised by the Court, not the prosecution.70 Since Ward, the 
prosecution can no longer withhold any material from disclosure on the ground of its 
‘sensitivity’ or ‘Public Interest Immunity’, unless obtaining a favourable ruling from the 
court. The Court recognised that the presumption ‘non-disclosure is a potent source of 
injustice’.71 As held by Gildewell J, ‘if, in a wholly exceptional case, the prosecution 
are not prepared to have the issue of Public Interest Immunity determined by a court, 
the result must inevitably be that the prosecution will have to be abandoned.’72 In other 
words, the unsatisfying procedure of the prosecution being both the player and referee 
was overcome by allocating this obligation to the court itself.  
In subsequent cases, e.g. R v Davis, Johnson, and Rowe,73 R v Keane,74 R v Brown, 75 
the Courts continued to expand and clarify the duty of the prosecution to disclose 
material in its possession to the defence. In R v Davis, Johnson, and Rowe,76 Lord 
Taylor summarized this change as follows: Before Ward, the defence would have been 
totally unaware that, within the prosecution authority, the question of whether to 
disclose sensitive material or not was being resolved. The effect of Ward is to give the 
court the role of monitoring the prosecution regarding what material could be withheld, 
																																																								
70	 For	an	introduction	of	the	doctrine	of	Public	Interest	Immunity,	see	Corker	and	Parkinson	(n	665).	 	
71	 R	v	Ward	(n	697)	at	599.	 	
72	 ibid	at	632-33.	 	
73	 R	v	Davis,	Johnson	and	Rowe	[1993]	Cr	App	R	110.	
74	 R	v	Keane	[1994]	1	WLR	746.	
75	 R	v	Brown	(Winston)	[1998]	1	Cr	App	R	66	HL.	 	
76	 R	v	Davis,	Johnson	and	Rowe	(n	707).	 	
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and it is for the court to decide.77  
2.  Keane: The Materiality Standard 
The standard of materiality was clarified further in R v Keane.78 Lord Taylor C. J. 
adopted the test in R v Melvin79 as to what documents are ‘material’ that should be 
prima facie disclosed by the prosecution: 1) to be relevant or possibly relevant to an 
issue in the case; 2) to raise or possibly raise a new issue whose existence is not 
apparent from the evidence the prosecution proposes to use; 3) to hold out a real (as 
opposed to a fanciful) prospect of providing a lead on evidence which goes to 1) or 2).80 
The common law duty of disclosure established in Keane reflected the requirements of 
Article 6 ECHR. Further clarifications of the terms were made in later cases. For 
instance, in R v Brown,81 Lord Steyn held that ‘an issue in the case’ is not to be 
construed as narrowly, as it is in civil proceedings;82 the duty to disclose applies 
equally to written and oral statements;83 and, in R v Preston, it was held that materiality 
is not dependent on the admissibility of the evidence.84  
																																																								
77	 R	v	Davis,	Johnson	and	Rowe	(n	73)	Lord	Taylor	of	Gosforth	CJ,	at	114.	
78	 R	v	Keane	(n	708).	
79	 Jowitt	J	in	R	v	Melvin	and	Dingle,	20	December	1993,	unreported,	at	p.5	of	the	transcript.	 	
80	 R	v	Keane	(n	74)	at	pp.751-752D.	Cf.	R	v	Hennessey	(n	42):	relevant	evidence	was	material	which	was	
helpful	to	the	accused;	Cf.	R	v	Ward	(n	697).	Material	evidence	meant	evidence	which	tend	to	weaken	
the	Prosecution	case	or	strengthen	the	defence	case,	and	relevant	evidence	was	not	limited	to	evidence	
which	would	obviously	advance	the	accused’s	case;	Cf.	AG	Guidelines	(n	51):	has	a	bearing	on	the	
offence	charged	and	the	surrounding	circumstances	of	that	case.	
81	 R	v	Brown	(n	648).	
82	 ibid.	See	per	Lord	Steyn,	198.	 	
83	 R	v	Brown	(n	75),	per	Lord	Hope,	p73.	
84	 R	v	Preston	(n	68).	
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3. Problems 
Although Keane has set out a much clearer standard for disclosure, however, the 
materiality test, in practice, was hard to apply because it was simply too wide and, 
indeed, more preparatory work was needed. Both the prosecution and the defence 
sought to the court regarding disclosure decisions, despite Lord Taylor’s ruling that the 
court should be asked to rule only in exceptional cases,85 the applications were not as 
exceptional as envisaged.86 This new workload apparently was undesirable for the 
Court of Appeal and, consequently, the Court of Appeal began to side with the 
prosecution and encouraged it to be more courageous in refusing disclosure.87  
Also, the common law standard attracted strong criticisms of the Government, which 
prompted the later legislation reform. The report of the Royal Commission on Criminal 
Justice 1993 concluded that the disclosure system could be open to abuse by the 
defence, and that the defence either hopes to cause delay or induce the prosecution to 
drop the case, rather than disclosure of the material concerned.88 In other words, the 
Government, at least partially, blamed the unworkability of the disclosure system on the 
defence, and was concerned that the common law system placed too much burden on 
the prosecution.  																																																								
85	 R	v	Keane	(n	708).	Lord	Taylor	CJ.	
86	 David	Ormerod,	‘Improving	the	Disclosure	Regime’	(2003)	7	International	Journal	of	Evidence	&	Proof	
102,	127.	
87	 For	an	example	of	this	Shift,	see	e.g.	R	v	Bromley	Magistrates	Court,	ex	parte	Smith	[1995]	1	WLR	944.	
88	 Lord	Runciman,	Report	of	the	Royal	Commission	on	Criminal	Justice	(Cm	1993)	93-97.	Available	at	 	
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/271971/2263.pdf	
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E. Statutory Regime: Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 
1. Limiting the Prosecution’s Duty of Disclosure  
The CPIA 1996 replaced the common law rules with a two-stage approach and entered 
into force in 1997. It provides the statutory framework governing the disclosure of 
unused material in criminal proceedings.89 It is supplemented by a Code of Practice90 
and the Attorney General’s Guidelines on Disclosure,91 which gives various details as 
to how relevant material obtained in a criminal investigation should be managed, 
including being recorded, retained and revealed to the prosecutor. The regime will apply 
once the accused has been committed, or sent, to Crown Court for trial on indictment.92 
The aim of the CPIA 1996 is to limit the scope of prosecution’s disclosure duty under 
common law, as mentioned previously starting from Ward, in order to lessen the 
workload of the prosecuting authorities, in particular the police.93 The police have been 
making claims that the common law disclosure of duty imposed too heavy a burden on 
them. The CPIA 1996 was introduced and presented to Parliament as a scheme designed 
to secure efficiency and sound judicial administration of the criminal trial process by 																																																								
89	 Rhodes	(n	663)	10.18;	Sprack	(n	635)	9.13.	
90	 The	Code	of	Practice,	made	under	Part	II	of	the	CPIA	1996.	
91	 Attorney	General’s	Guidelines	on	Disclosure	published	in	November	2000	and	updated	in	April	2005	
and	2011,	now	replaced	by	Attorney	General’s	Guidelines	December	2013.	It	provides	guidance	that	it	
some	areas	‘goes	beyond	the	requirements	of	the	legislation	where	experience	suggests	that	some	
guidance	is	desirable’.	Available	at	
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/262994/AG_Disclosur
e_Guidelines_-_December_2013.pdf	
92	 	 R	v	DPP	ex	parte	Lee	[1999]	2	CR	App	R	304	DC.	
93	 Ashworth	and	Redmayne	(n	29)	(noting	the	1996	reforms	were	introduced	as	t	result	of	claims	by	the	
police	that	the	common	law	disclosure	regime	imposed	too	heavy	a	burden	on	them);	Kate	Malleson,	
The	Legal	System	(Oxford	University	Press	2007)	145.	 	
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early identification of issues and as a way of eliminating unjustifiable defence tactics 
resulting in unmerited acquittals.94 Thus, the legislative reforms were widely perceived 
as having restricted the defence’s ability to access important information.95 Contrasting 
to the development of common law,96 which focuses on the link between 
non-disclosure and miscarriages of justice, the CPIA 1996 is rather concerned about not 
to overburden the prosecution with having to disclose massive material to the defence. 
The CPIA 1996 also introduces the requirements for defence Disclosure, to reduce the 
incidents of the so-called ‘ambush defences’.97 In addition, it attempts to limit the 
court’s supervisory powers over prosecution discretion in disclosure.98  
2. A Two-Stage Approach  
The original CPIA 1996 regime split the prosecution disclosure into two stages, namely, 
primary and secondary disclosure. Primary disclosure, in Section 3 of the CPIA, 
imposes a duty on the prosecution to disclose automatically any prosecution material 
which has not been previously disclosed and which in the prosecutor’s opinion might 
undermine the case for the prosecution against the accused. This test is a subjective one 
and the scope is limited.  
																																																								
94	 Tim	Owen,	‘Disclosure’,	Criminal	Justice,	Police	Powers	and	Human	Rights	(Blackstone	2001)	137.	
95	 Ashworth	(n	29)	260.	 	
96	 See,	R	v	DPP	ex	parte	Lee	(n	726).	In	this	case	the	court	examined	the	relationship	between	the	
common	law	rules	and	the	CPIA	1996.	
97	 Malleson	(n	727)	145.	 	
98	 See	Epp	(n	637)	2.	The	courts	have	no	power	at	that	stage	of	the	proceedings	to	direct	or	interfere	
with	a	prosecutor’s	decisions	concerning	primary	disclosure.	This	remained	unchanged	under	the	
Criminal	Justice	Act	2003.	
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The second stage is called ‘secondary disclosure’. After primary disclosure, the defence 
has to serve a defence statement under Section 5 of the CPIA,99 which should state the 
general nature of its case and matters in issues between the two parties. Following this, 
the prosecution must disclose any further material which might be reasonably expected 
to assist the accused’s defence as disclosed by the defence statement.100 However, if the 
defence failed to do so, or advances a defence differ from the content of such statement 
at trial, adverse inferences might be drawn101 and the prosecution need not to provide 
secondary disclosure.102 Contrary to primary disclosure, secondary disclosure is an 
objective test. If the Crown failed to provide such material, then the defence can apply 
to the Court for an order of specific disclosure.103 
As the standard applied by the CPIA 1996 is potentially confusing and somewhat 
overlapping between primary and secondary disclosure, the CPIA 1996 attracted several 
criticisms and was considered unsatisfactory.104 Consequently, the Government 
introduced the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (‘CJA’),105 which amended and slightly 
improved the disclosure regime of CPIA 1996 with a single, objective test for the 
prosecution duty of disclosure. The current test as set out in the new regime aims to 																																																								
99	 Note	that	in	Crown	Court	cases,	the	defence	case	statement	must	be	served;	in	Magistrate’s’	Courts,	
this	is	voluntary.	
100	 Section	7	of	CPIA	1996.	
101	 In	Crown	Court	cases,	the	jury	may	be	invited	to	draw	adverse	inferences	‘as	appear	as	proper’.	In	
both	Crown	&	Magistrates’	Court,	the	Prosecution	need	not	provide	any	secondary	disclosure.	
102	 Section	11	of	CPIA	1996.	
103	 Section	8	of	CPIA	1996.	 	 	 	
104	 Rhodes	(n	663)	paras.	10.24-32	(noting	the	incompatibility	of	CPIA	1996	with	the	ECHR);	Ormerod	(n	
720);	Leng	(n	698);	John	Sprack,	‘The	Criminal	Procedure	and	Investigations	Act	1996:	(1)	The	Duty	of	
Disclosure’	[1997]	Criminal	Law	Review	308.	 	
105	 Criminal	Justice	Act	2003.	 	
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determine whether the unused material ‘might reasonably be considered capable of 
undermining the prosecution case or of assisting the case for the accused’.106 Note that 
it specifically includes assistance to the defence case as criteria for disclosure.107 In 
addition, the prosecutor now has a continuing duty of disclosure under Section 7A of 
the CPIA, which meant that he must continuously keep the materials under review 
throughout the proceedings. Although the defence is still obligated to serve a defence 
case statement, the new test arguably removed the risk that the prosecution might 
withhold useful material on the grounds that the defence had not served a case 
statement.108  
3. Schedules 
The CPIA 1996 regime places an obligation on the police to prepare ‘schedules’ – they 
are charged with the responsibility in listing and describing the unused material, so that 
the prosecutors can make decisions regarding the disclosability of the material. The 
schedules, signed and dated by the disclosure officer, should be submitted to the 
prosecutor with a full file. The schedule is pivotal to the operation of the CPIA 
disclosure scheme. There are two separate schedules which should be listed, when 
applicable: any and non-sensitive unused material (MG6C) and sensitive unused 																																																								
106	 Section	3(1)(a)	of	CPIA:	(a)	‘disclose	to	the	accused	any	prosecution	material	which	has	not	
previously	been	disclosed	to	the	accused	which	might	reasonably	be	considered	capable	of	undermining	
the	case	for	the	prosecution	against	the	accused	or	of	assisting	the	case	for	the	accused.’	At	the	same	
time	section	7	was	repealed.	
107	 Redmayne	(n	29)	444.	 	
108	 Rhodes	(n	663)	para.10.22.	
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material (MG6D).109 The schedule itself is disclosed to the defence, and is thus the 
primary means by which the defence can make a claim that material relevant to its case 
has not been disclosed. This test should be kept under review. The defence has no 
access to the sensitive material. However, as pointed out by Ashworth and Redmayne, 
the heavy reliance on police is bound to cause problems since it requires a certain 
motivation on the part of the police to help the defence damaging the Crown’s case, 
which is unlikely to say the least. 110 The schedules are often incomplete or improperly 
categorised,111 as the defence would not have access to sensitive material and 
accordingly would not be able to request disclosure. The CPSI noted its concern about 
this, as only 20 per cent of cases are properly categorised as such, but the prosecutions 
would rarely question the accuracy of these schedules.112  
4. Sensitive Material and Public Interest Immunity 
In R v H and C,113 the House of Lords summarised the current state of the disclosure 
regime. It said that ‘fairness ordinarily requires that any material held by the 
prosecution which weakens its case or strengthens that of the defendant, if not relied on 
as part of its formal case against the defendant, should be disclosed to the defence. 
Bitter experience has shown that miscarriages of justice may occur where such material 																																																								
109	 Section	24	of	CPIA	1996.	
110	 Ashworth	and	Redmayne	(n	29)	262.	
111	 Michael	Zander,	Cases	and	Materials	on	the	English	Legal	System	(Cambridge	University	Press	2007)	
295.	
112	 Her	Majesty's	Crown	Prosecution	Service	Inspectorate,	Disclosure:	A	Thematic	Review	of	the	Duties	of	
Disclosure	of	Unused	Material	Undertaken	by	the	CPS	(London:	HMCPSI	2008),	51.	
113	 R	v	H	and	C	[2004]	2	AC	134.	
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is withheld from disclosure. The golden rule is that full disclosure of such material 
should be made.’114  
Following this ruling, the applications to the court for the withholding of sensitive 
material should be rare. If sensitive material is identified by the prosecutor as meeting 
the disclosure test, it should be disclosed. However, if the prosecution considers that 
there is sufficient evidence to show that disclosure would create a real risk of serious 
prejudice to an important public interest, the prosecution has the following options: 1) 
disclose the material in a way that does not compromise the public interest in question; 
2) obtain a court order to withhold the material; 3) abandon the case; 4) disclose the 
material because the overall public interest in pursuing the prosecution is greater than in 
abandoning it.115 
5. Neutral Material 
Despite the emphasis of the importance of full disclosure, the significance of R v H and 
C is that the Lords in fact limited the scope of unused material which the prosecution is 
obliged to disclose. It was held that ‘if material does not weaken the prosecution case or 
strengthen that of the defendant, there is no requirement to disclose it. […] Neutral 
material or material damaging to the defence need not be disclosed and should not be 
brought to the attention of the court.’116 Lord Bingham considered that this was not in 																																																								
114	 ibid,	at	147.	
115	 Disclosure	Manual	–	Crown	Prosecution	Service,	Chapter	13.	
116	 R	v	H	and	C	(n	112)	para.	35.	
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conflict with any principle of fairness, since a defendant cannot complain that the 
defence are not alerted to the existence of material which, if revealed, would lessen his 
chance of acquittal.117 
6. Defence Disclosure 
Another controversial feature of the CPIA regime is the introduction of the defence 
disclosure, which represents a substantial departure from the common law tradition118 
and gives rise to questioning its compatibility with the ECHR standards.119 Although 
defence disclosure is not in the realm of this thesis, it has some relevance here. In 
contrast to what critics have suggested,120 the reform of the CJA 2003 made the 
disclosure duties of the defence even more burdensome and, consequently, aggravates 
the disparity between the burdens on the prosecution and defence.121 The defence is 
now required to disclose his legal defence at an early stage, while the prosecution is 
under no such duty and may reverse their case at will during the trial. As to the previous 
concerns of the prosecution being ambushed by the defence,122 it is now the defence 
																																																								
117	 R	v	H	and	C	(n	112)	para.	17.	
118	 See	Leng	(n	698)	217;	Michael	Zander,	‘A	Note	of	Dissent’,	Royal	Commission	on	Criminal	Justice,	
Report	(Cm	2263,	HMSO	1993).	 	 Zander,	in	particular,	argued	that	it	would	be	‘contrary	to	principle’	to	
make	a	defendant	respond	to	the	prosecution	case	prior	to	trial.	It	is	not	the	job	of	the	defence	to	be	
helpful	either	to	the	system	of	the	prosecution,	at	para.	1-2.	
119	 E.g.	the	requirement	of	the	defence	to	notify	the	prosecution	of	an	intention	to	call	defence	
witnesses	[Section	6C]	and	the	names	of	any	expert	witness	consulted,	even	if	they	are	not	being	relied	
upon	[Section	6D].	All	of	those	duties	will	be	enforced	by	way	of	sanctions	for	failure	to	disclose	[S11].	
120	 E.g.	Leng	(n	698)	217;	Redmayne	(n	29).	 	
121	 E.g.	Richard	D	Taylor,	Martin	Wasik	and	Roger	Leng,	Blackstone’s	Guide	to	the	Criminal	Justice	Act	
2003	(Oxford	University	Press	2004)	para.3.01.	
122	 Home	Office	Consultation	Paper	Disclosure	(Cm	2864,	1995).	
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who might risk the possibility of legal ambush in Court under the CPIA regime.123 
Furthermore, the CPIA 1996 continues to turn a blind eye to the clear empirical research 
and anecdotal evidence of disclosure failure by the prosecution,124 and provides 
sanctions only for such failures by the accused.125 
In sum, although the CPIA have solved some problems of the disclosure duty under the 
common law, doubts arise concerning its workability and fairness. Ashworth and 
Redmanye have pointed out that there is no easy solution to the disclosure problems126 
Some commentators even contended that the CPIA has failed in achieving its objectives, 
that is, its intention to replace the former procedure in common law.127 Such aim, 
however, is dubious in itself, as common law exists in both rules and principles. While 
the former can be superseded, the latter cannot be abolished.128   
IV.  Analysis of the Disclosure System 
A. The Intersection between Pre-Trial and Trial 
The elephant in the room here is why disclosure problems are so difficult to resolve?129 
To answer this question, first, it is crucial to note that the disclosure system falls at the 
																																																								
123	 Taylor,	Wasik	and	Leng	(n	755)	para.3.01.	
124	 Joyce	Plotnikoff,	Richard	Woolfson	and	Great	Britain,	‘A	Fair	Balance’? :	Evaluation	of	the	Operation	
of	Disclosure	Law	(Home	Office	Research,	Development	and	Statistics	Directorate	2001).	
125	 Taylor,	Wasik	and	Leng	(n	755)	para.3.01.	
126	 Ashworth	and	Redmayne	(n	29)	262.	 	
127	 Leng	(n	698)	217.	
128	 Owen	(n	728)	140.	 	
129	 For	recent	cases,	see	e.g.	R	v	Sadakat	Ali	Malook	[2011]	EWCA	Crim	254;	R	v	Olu,	Wilson	&	Brooks	
[2010]	EWCA	Crim	2975.	
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intersection between the investigative and trial phases.130 These two phases have certain 
fundamental differences, as their objectives and the means to reach these aims can be 
very different, and they do not easily cope with each other. To start with, the focus at 
the investigation stage is to search for an offence and offender. The process is inherently 
sensitive in nature and normally requires secretive techniques, e.g. surveillance, 
informants, etc. and, accordingly, it is essential for the police to have the discretion in 
deciding how to conduct the investigation and which inquiry line they wish to pursue. 
By contrast, the main goal of the trial is to answer a particular, closed question: is the 
accused guilty of the offence charged? 131 It is very specific and, as a result, the trial 
process is a more formal, transparent and public one. Unlike the investigation phase, the 
trial process must ensure equality of arms and guarantee the requirement of fairness. 
Accordingly, at the investigation stage, in contrast to the individual the Crown would 
have an inherently larger power and the inequality of arms between the Crown and the 
accused is justified, at least to a certain extent.132 However, because the discrepancy of 
resources is a potential source of injustice, the prosecution should exercise its disclosure 
duty in a proper manner in order to cure the inequality between the two parties. 
B. ‘Trust Me, I am a Prosecutor’ - The Prosecutor’s Dual Role 
The prosecutors play a crucial role in the English criminal justice system. Their image is 
complicated, as they are portrayed as wearing two hats in modern adversarial criminal 																																																								
130	 Ormerod	(n	720)	103.	
131	 ibid	104.	
132	 ibid.	
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trials. On the one hand, traditionally, he is supposed to be a zealous advocate and 
actively pursuing criminals. On the other hand, he is expected to play a neutral role as 
the ‘minister of justice,’ to assist in the administration of justice, which follows that he 
must show respect for due process and look out for the interests of the defence 
simultaneously.133 
In theory, these dual characters of a prosecutor do not conflict with each other because 
prosecutors have no interests in convicting the innocent. The premise, which underlines 
the English criminal justice system, is that prosecutors can be trusted to act impartially 
and serve the interests of justice. It is also important to note that there has always been 
an ethical dimension to the duty to disclose. The decision in DPP ex parte Lee134 serves 
as a manifestation that this duty survives the introduction of the CPIA 1996, which aims 
to limit the scope of the obligation of prosecution’s disclosure.135 A Crown Prosecutor 
is personally responsible for conducting prosecutions fairly in accordance with the 
common law duty of the prosecutor.136  
Trusteeship 
Nevertheless, the reality is that tension does exist between the two roles in practice, 
which is demonstrated by the prosecution’s often-improper manner in disclosing unused 																																																								
133	 David	QC	Jeremy,	‘The	Prosecutor’s	Rock	and	Hard	Place’	[2008]	Criminal	Law	Review	925,	926.	 	
134	 R	v	DPP	ex	parte	Lee	[1999]	Cr	App	R	304.	
135	 Anthony	Hooper	and	David	C	Ormerod,	Blackstone’s	Criminal	Practice	2012	(Oxford	University	Press	
2011)	1491.	
136	 Owen	(n	728)	141.	
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material to the defence. One might ask why the prosecutors and the police should 
disclose collected information to the accused if it might damage the Crown’s case? The 
principle argument is that the police are regarded as ‘trustees.’137 The material and 
information gathered by the police during the investigation is a form of public property 
and, accordingly, does not belong to the Crown prosecution exclusively and the defence 
should also have access to it. That is, the Crown cannot claim the ‘ownership’ of the 
evidence, despite the information is in their possession and under their control. The 
concept of the police acting as trustees was best described in by Sopinka J of the 
Canadian Supreme Court in the landmark judgment Stinchcombe,138 which was adopted 
by Lord Hutton in Mills and Poole:139 ‘…the fruits of the investigation …are not the 
property of the Crown for use in securing conviction, but the property of the public to 
be used to ensure that justice is done.’140 Because the aim of the Crown is to pursue 
justice rather than winning or victory,141 there is nothing improper in opening up the 
evidence to the defence. However, if this ‘trusteeship’ doctrine is not accepted, the risk 
of repeating the notorious miscarriage of justice cases still remains.142 
 
																																																								
137	 O’Connor	(n	674)	476;	Ashworth	(n	29)	32;	Ashworth	and	Redmayne	(n	29)	260.	
138	 R	v	Stinchcombe	[1991]	3	SCR	326.	
139	 R	v	Mills	and	Poole	[1998]	1	Cr	App	R	43	HL.	
140	 Lord	Hutton,	in	R	v	Mills	and	Poole,	p.	62,	adopted	Sopinka	J,	in	Stinchcombe,	at	333.	
141	 R	v	H	and	C	[2004]	2	A.C.	132,	para.13;	Randall	v	The	Queen	[2002]	a	W.L.R.	2237,	para.10.	See	also	
Boucher	v	The	Queen	[1955]	S.C.R.	16,	23-24:	‘Counsels	have	a	duty	to	see	all	available	legal	proof	of	the	
fact	is	presented:	it	must	be	done	firmly	and	pressed	to	its	legitimate	strength	but	it	must	be	done	
firmly.’	
142	 Ashworth	(n	29)	32.	
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The Role of the Police 
In England, it is often argued that disclosure problems are more of a result of the police, 
rather than the Crown prosecution.143 Unsurprisingly, the police, and sometimes the 
Crown prosecutors, are reluctant to disclose materials that might be helpful to the 
defendants. The reason is both intentional and negligent. Some of the disclosure 
problems are caused by inadequate training and resources, and as noted by Quirk, 
adversarial attitudes make the police rather reluctant to share the information with the 
accused, and the idea that helping the accused to escape conviction certainly has an 
impact on their work.144 Meanwhile, the Crown Prosecutors might share this attitude.145 
Studies of investigation work and case construction have suggested that once the police 
has identified a suspect, there is a tendency to collect evidence pointing to that suspect, 
whilst ignoring alternative hypotheses and the lines of inquiry, which these might 
require.146 Furthermore, it is not difficult for the prosecuting authorities to hide 
information if they wish to do so. They may know that undisclosed material would 
often not be discovered and lack incentive to reveal information which might damage 
the Crown’s case.147 In addition, working cultures may also be taken into account.148 																																																								
143	 See	e.g.	Andrew	Sanders,	Richard	Young	and	Mandy	Burton,	Criminal	Justice	(Fourth	edition,	Oxford	
University	Press	2010)	388–93.	 	
144	 Hannah	Quirk,	‘The	Significance	of	Culture	in	Criminal	Procedure	Reform:	Why	the	Revised	
Disclosure	Scheme	Cannot	Work’	(2006)	10	International	Journal	of	Evidence	&	Proof	42,	48–50.	 	
145	 Blackburn	[2005]	EWCA	Crim	1349.	
146	 Michael	McConville,	Andrew	Sanders	and	Roger	Leng,	The	Case	for	the	Prosecution:	Police	Suspects	
and	the	Construction	of	Criminality	(Routledge	1991).	
147	 Although	the	CPSI	found	no	evidence	of	deliberate	non-disclosure	by	the	police,	Quirk’s	interview	
based	study	found	that	police	officers	admitted	that	they	were	reluctant	to	help	the	defence	through	
disclosure.	
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The Crown Prosecutors may not be even aware of the existence of such evidence 
because of the heavy reliance on police disclosure officers.149 Nevertheless, even if this 
is the case, the prosecutors are not supposed to sit back and leave the disclosure issues 
to the disclosure officers. The prosecutors should, as suggested by the Attorney General 
Guidelines, actively review schedules and, if necessary, take action to improve their 
quality and content, in order to facilitate proper disclosure.150 
Discretion of the Prosecutor 
The fundamental difficulty, however, lies in the fact that it is the prosecutor who has to 
make an initial assessment of what should be disclosed. The CPIA 1996 bestows a very 
wide discretion in the prosecution to determine relevance. Some have argued such 
design is problematic and might result in injustice, as the accused does not have free 
access to all material kept on the part of the prosecution.151 Instead, access depends 
upon a judgement of relevance made by the prosecutor. 
Critics have pointed out two main problematic aspects.152 Firstly, in an adversarial 
system, it is the defence who will be the best judge of whether or not evidence will be of 
assistance to its case. Leng, for example, has argued that it should be the function of the 
																																																																																																																																																																		
148	 Quirk	(n	778).	 	
149	 Zander	(n	745)	313	(noting	that	the	prosecutors	are	dependent	on	what	they	get	from	the	police).	
Quirk	stated	that	‘it	is	rare	for	prosecutors	to	examine	material	that	the	disclosure	officer	has	not	
identified	as	potentially	undermining	[the	prosecution	case].’	Quirk	(n	778)	52.	 	
150	 Hooper	and	Ormerod	(n	769)	1490.	
151	 Emmerson,	Ashworth	and	Macdonald	(n	206)	paras.	9-115.	
152	 E.g.	ibid	paras.	9-112-115;	Leng	(n	698)	216;	Rhodes	(n	663)	10.24-32.	 	
		
 		
	
208 
defence counsel to select evidence for the defence case.153 By placing this responsibility 
on the prosecution, the CPIA denies the accused that opportunity. Furthermore, leaving 
this with the prosecution is arguably a breach of Article 6(3)(b) and (c) ECHR, which 
entitles a defendant to ‘adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence’ 
and to ‘legal assistance of his own choosing.’ But it should be noted that disclosure is 
not an absolute right and Article 6 ECHR certainly did not provide such readings. 
Secondly, the procedure may be criticised on the ground that in the great majority of 
cases the task of vetting for the defence will be left to the non-legally trained police 
disclosure officer, as discussed previously.154 
The first point supports the contention for wide disclosure, although the Government 
argued that it might raise concerns of ‘fishing expeditions.’ It follows that the test for 
disclosure should not be too narrow. The original wording of the CPIA 1996 provided 
two possible interpretations, and the Crown had opted for the narrow one.155 The 
consequence is that in some cases certain material would be withheld from primary 
disclosure, which would then provide an incentive for the accused to disclose his 
defence in order to gain access to any further material that might assist him. In other 
																																																								
153	 Leng	(n	698)	216.	 	
154	 Plotnikoff,	Woolfson	and	Britain	(n	758)	11.	Plotnikoff	and	Woolson	noted	that	most	police	forces	
regard	the	training	that	they	provide	on	disclosure	as	inadequate;	the	average	length	of	training	given	to	
disclosure	in	volume	and	serious	crime	cases	is	less	than	a	day;	the	schedules	drawn	up	by	the	police	are	
often	incomplete	or	insufficiently	detailed,	prosecutors	judged	the	descriptions	on	the	principal	
schedule	to	be	poor	in	the	majority	of	case,	good	one	only	3	%.	Prosecutors	do	not	generally	have	the	
resources	to	chase	up	poor	schedules,	the	result	being	that	they	are	not	able	to	make	informed	
decisions.	
155	 Redmayne	(n	29)	442–3.	 	
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words, the CPIA 1996 regime makes the prosecution disclosure conditional on the 
service of a defence statement. This interpretation of the legislation was strongly 
criticised because it invites the prosecutor to play a tactical game with justice and also 
on the ground that it might prejudice some defendants who might genuinely be unaware 
of the matters which might support their defence. Furthermore, this reading is also 
incompatible with Article 6 of the ECHR, as the Article 6 duty of disclosure is not 
dependent on the disclosure of the defence case. The obligation on the defence to serve 
a defence case statement may, in itself, be considered a violation of the privilege of 
self-incrimination.156 
Total Disclosure? 
Similar to the movement in the United States, some commenters have been advocating 
for an approach of automatic disclosure, or at least an open access option.157 That is, the 
prosecution should disclose all the evidence in its possession to the defence. It is noted 
that, in practice, blanket disclosure is fairly common in England.158 However, it is 
submitted that the total disclosure approach might not be in the best interest for the 
defence. The Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate also does not endorse this as a 
solution, because the role of a prosecutor is fundamental, and it is the responsibility of 
																																																								
156	 Emmerson,	Ashworth	and	Macdonald	(n	206)	paras.	14-127	–	129;	Keir	Starmer,	Michelle	Strange	
and	Quincy	Whitaker,	Criminal	Justice,	Police	Powers	and	Human	Rights	(Blackstone	2001)	139.	 	
157	 Auld	(n	636)	paras.	449-54.	
158	 Her	Majesty's	Crown	Prosecution	Service	Inspectorate,	Disclosure:	A	Thematic	Review	of	the	Duties	of	
Disclosure	of	Unused	Material	Undertaken	by	the	CPS	(London:	HMCPSI	2008).	 	 	
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the prosecutor, not the defence counsels or the judges, to ensure the disclosure of any 
unused material which may assist defence’s case. The prosecutor must make decisions 
by applying the disclosure test on his own, and the wording and demands for disclosure 
contained in a defence statement should not be allowed to determine what is disclosable 
per se. The existing legal framework imposes such obligation on the prosecution for 
practical reasons, because if massive amounts of information are handed to the defence, 
resources will still be needed to cover defence claims on legal aid in relation to the 
scrutiny of the material.159 As summarised by the Attorney General’s Guidelines, ‘the 
prosecutors must not abdicate their role, nor allow it to be usurped.’160 
V.  Concluding Remarks 
It is clear that the prosecution’s duty to disclose unused material is well established in 
the English criminal system under both the common law and the CPIA 1996 as 
amended by the CJA 2003. The prosecution’s duty of disclosure, at least in principle, is 
not disputed. Interestingly, in the recent development, the focus is shifting to the issues 
arising from defence disclosure. 
In recent years, police and prosecutors have been accused of systematically concealing 
evidence collected by undercover officers. 161 As pointed out by commentators, there is 																																																								
159	 Ashworth	and	Redmayne	(n	29)	262.	
160	 Attorney	General's	Guidelines	on	Disclosure	(2005),	updated	in	2011.	Available	at	
https://www.gov.uk/guidance/attorney-general-s-guidelines-on-disclosure-2005-and-2011	 	
161	 For	a	recent	high	profile	case,	see	Prosecutors	improperly	withheld	crucial	evidence	from	trial	of	
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no obvious solution to the shortcomings of the disclosure regime, because the disclosure 
system will always be reliant on the police, and the police are inevitably reluctant to 
disclose unused material that may be helpful to the defence. However, this could be 
rectified by providing more training and funding to the police, as suggested by 
Plotnikoff and Woolfson. 
When a prosecutor makes a non-disclosure application, English judges usually require 
the prosecution to disclose unused material unless they can justify non-disclosure on the 
ground of Public Interest Immunity. In other words, the ‘golden rule’ is full disclosure 
and, in situations when the prosecution considers the material non-disclosable due to its 
sensitivity, but, from the viewpoint of the Court, does not fulfil the Public Interest 
Immunity requirements, the prosecution should still exercise full disclosure or abandon 
its case.   
																																																																																																																																																																		
http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/undercover-with-paul-lewis-and-rob-evans/2015/jun/10/prosec
utors-improperly-withheld-crucial-evidence-from-trial-of-protesters	
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 CHAPTER VII  	
THE PROSECUTION’S DUTY OF DISCLOSURE 
BEFORE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS 
 
I. Introduction 
Given the complexity of disclosure obligations and its importance to the right of a fair 
trial, it is unsurprising that disclosure issues have been one of the main causes for 
litigation before a criminal court. In the United Nations ad hoc Tribunals and the 
permanent International Criminal Court, almost every element of the rule has become a 
litigation point. Although the jurisprudence has established that the norm is to disclose 
relevant material and non-disclosure is the exception,1 the current practices in these 
Courts exhibit the opposite: redactions of prosecution witness statements are routinely 
applied instead of prompt and full disclosure. 
This Chapter is mainly built upon the jurisprudence of the ad hoc Tribunals with a 
supplement of the ICC jurisprudence. Rule 66 – 70 of the ICTY and ICTR RPEs 
																																																								
1	 Prosecutor	v	Thomas	Lubanga	Dyilo,	No.	ICC-01/04-01/06	(‘Lubanga	case’),	Appeals	Chamber,	
Judgment	on	the	Prosecutor’s	Appeal	of	the	Decision	of	Pre-Trial	Chamber	I	entitled	“Decision	
Establishing	General	Principles	Governing	Applications	to	Restrict	Disclosure	pursuant	to	Rule	81	(2)	and	
(4)	of	the	Rules	of	Procedure	and	Evidence	(13	October	2006),	at	para.	39;	Prosecutor	v	Katanga,	No.	
ICC-01/04-01/07—475	(OA)	(‘Katanga	case’),	Appeals	Chamber,	Judgment	on	the	Appeal	of	the	
Prosecutor	against	the	Decision	of	Pre-Trial	Chamber	I	entitled	“First	Decision	on	the	Prosecution	
Request	to	Redact	Witness	Statements”	(13	May	2008)	at	para.	70;	Lubanga	case,	Appeals	Chamber,	
Decision	on	Prosecutor’s	Second	Request	for	Redactions	for	the	Purposes	of	Disclosure	(14	November	
2014)	at	para.	8.	
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regulates the disclosure of evidence.2 Rule 66 is the heart of the disclosure regime at the 
ad hoc Tribunals, which regulates prosecution disclosure throughout the entire 
proceedings, including appeals. Nevertheless, despite being fairly prescriptive in setting 
out the prosecution’s disclosure obligations, the proper scope of Rule 66 is regularly 
litigated at both the trial and appellate level. Rule 68 sets out the obligation of the 
prosecution to disclose exculpatory evidence. This duty is central to the accused’s 
fundamental right to prepare his defence. The problem is that, it is extremely difficult 
for the defence to establish such violation of this duty when the prosecution fails to do 
so. In addition, the permissive attitude of the Chamber in imposing sanctions on the 
prosecution does not help to discourage further violations. Rule 69 and Rule 70 deals 
with exceptions to disclosure, that is, if exceptional circumstances exist, e.g. the 
protection of witnesses and victims, and other matters that are not subject to disclosure, 
e.g. work product of the prosecution. 
The ICC Statute moves certain disclosure obligations of the prosecution to a statutory 
level and introduced a two-stage disclosure system, that is, prior to the confirmation 
hearing ‘within a reasonable time’ and prior to the commencement of trial. These ICC 
specifics will be dealt with in a separate chapter. In addition, as mentioned in Chapter II, 
Article 54(1) (a) imposes a duty on the prosecution to investigate incriminating and 
exonerating circumstances equally. Otherwise, the ICC disclosure rules of the 
																																																								
2	 Rule	66-70	ICTY/R	RPEs,	titled	‘Production	of	Evidence’.	
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prosecution’s duty to disclose are similar to the ad hoc Tribunals. Rule 76,3 which is 
similar to Rule 66(A) ICTY/R RPEs, provides that the prosecution should disclose 
names and prior statements of prosecution witnesses. Rule 77 ICC RPEs4 is a copy of 
Rule 66(B) ICTY/R RPEs, which deals with inspection. Article 67 (2) of the ICC 
Statute5 addresses the prosecution’s duty to disclose exculpatory evidence6 to the 
defence ‘as soon as practicable’ which corresponds to Rule 68 of the ICTY/R RPEs, but 
replaced the requirement ‘in the actual knowledge of the prosecution’ with ‘in the 
prosecutor's possession or control’. Note that this obligation applies in addition to any 
other disclosure required by the Rome Statute.7  
																																																								
3	 Rule	76	ICC	RPEs—	‘Pre-Trial	disclosure	relating	to	prosecution	witnesses’	
1.	The	Prosecutor	shall	provide	the	defence	with	the	names	of	witnesses	whom	the	Prosecutor	intends	
to	call	to	testify	and	copies	of	any	prior	statements	made	by	those	witnesses.	This	shall	be	done	
sufficiently	in	advance	to	enable	the	adequate	preparation	of	the	defence.	
2.	The	Prosecutor	shall	subsequently	advise	the	defence	of	the	names	of	any	additional	prosecution	
witnesses	and	provide	copies	of	their	statements	when	the	decision	is	made	to	call	those	witnesses.	
4	 Rule	77	ICC	RPEs—	‘Inspection	of	material	in	possession	or	control	of	the	Prosecutor’	
The	Prosecutor	shall,	subject	to	the	restrictions	on	disclosure	as	provided	for	in	the	Statute	and	in	rules	
81	and	82,	permit	the	defence	to	inspect	any	books,	documents,	photographs	and	other	tangible	objects	
in	the	possession	or	control	of	the	Prosecutor,	which	are	material	to	the	preparation	of	the	defence	or	
are	intended	for	use	by	the	Prosecutor	as	evidence	for	the	purposes	of	the	confirmation	hearing	or	at	
trial,	as	the	case	may	be,	or	were	obtained	from	or	belonged	to	the	person.	
5	 Article	67	(2)	ICC	Statute—	‘Rights	of	the	accused’	
In	addition	to	any	other	disclosure	provided	for	in	this	Statute,	the	Prosecutor	shall,	as	soon	as	
practicable,	disclose	to	the	defence	evidence	in	the	Prosecutor's	possession	or	control	which	he	or	she	
believes	shows	or	tends	to	show	the	innocence	of	the	accused,	or	to	mitigate	the	guilt	of	the	accused,	or	
which	may	affect	the	credibility	of	prosecution	evidence.	In	case	of	doubt	as	to	the	application	of	this	
paragraph,	the	Court	shall	decide.	
6	 But	note	that,	the	ICTY	has	changed	the	wording	of	Rule	68	‘evidence’	to	‘material’	in	its	July	2001	
amendment,	which	reflected	the	ICTY	jurisprudence	to	interpret	the	word	‘evidence’	in	Rule	68	widely.	
The	Chambers	also	emphasized	that	‘It	is	not	restricted	to	material	which	is	in	a	form	that	would	be	
admissible	in	evidence’.	See	Prosecutor	v	Kordić	and	Čerkez,	No.	IT-65-14/2-A,	Decision	on	Motions	to	
extend	Time	for	filing	Appellant's	Briefs	(11	May	2001)	at	para.	9;	Prosecutor	v	Brdjanin	&	Talic,	No.	
IT-99-36-PT,	Decision	on	Motion	by	Momir	Talic	for	Disclosure	of	Evidence	(27	June	2000)	at	para.	8.	
7	 Tochilovsky,	‘Defence	Access	to	the	Prosecution	Material’	(n	192)	1089.	
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Many problems regarding prosecution disclosure in the ICC is almost identical to the 
ones in the ad hoc Tribunals, as they mostly concern the manner and timing of 
prosecution disclosure. The two-stage approach of disclosure, however, could place 
additional burden on the defence8 and, contrary to the original intention, make the 
proceeding unnecessarily lengthy.  
II. Rule 66 (A) ICTY RPEs— Disclosure by the Prosecutor 
ICTY Rule 66 (disclosure by the Prosecutor) reads as follows: 
(A) Subject to the provisions of Rules 53 and 69, the Prosecutor shall make available to the 
defence in a language which the accused understands  
(i) within thirty days of the initial appearance of the accused, copies of the supporting material 
which accompanied the indictment when confirmation was sought as well as all prior statements 
obtained by the Prosecutor from the accused; and 
(ii) within the time-limit prescribed by the Trial Chamber or by the pretrial Judge appointed 
pursuant to Rule 65 ter, copies of the statements of all witnesses whom the Prosecutor intends to 
call to testify at trial, and copies of all transcripts and written statements taken in accordance 
with Rule 92 bis, Rule 92 ter, and Rule 92 quater; copies of the statements of additional 
prosecution witnesses shall be made available to the defence when a decision is made to call 
those witnesses. 
(B) The Prosecutor shall, on request, permit the defence to inspect any books, documents, 
photographs and tangible objects in the Prosecutor’s custody or control, which are material to 
the preparation of the defence, or are intended for use by the Prosecutor as evidence at trial or 
were obtained from or belonged to the accused.  
																																																								
8	 Karim	AA	Khan	and	Anand	A	Shah,	‘Defensive	Practices:	Representing	Clients	before	the	International	
Criminal	Court’	(2013)	76	Law	and	Contemporary	Problems	191,	197.	
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(C) Where information is in the possession of the Prosecutor, the disclosure of which may 
prejudice further or ongoing investigations, or for any other reasons may be contrary to the 
public interest or affect the security interests of any State, the Prosecutor may apply to the Trial 
Chamber sitting in camera to be relieved from an obligation under the Rules to disclose that 
information. When making such application the Prosecutor shall provide the Trial Chamber (but 
only the Trial Chamber) with the information that is sought to be kept confidential. 
ICC Rule 76 (Pre-Trial disclosure relating to prosecution witnesses) read as follows: 
1. The Prosecutor shall provide the defence with the names of witnesses whom the Prosecutor 
intends to call to testify and copies of any prior statements made by those witnesses. This shall 
be done sufficiently in advance to enable the adequate preparation of the defence. 
2. The Prosecutor shall subsequently advise the defence of the names of any additional 
prosecution witnesses and provide copies of their statements when the decision is made to call 
those witnesses.   
3. The statements of prosecution witnesses shall be made available in original and in a language 
which the accused fully understands and speaks. 
4. This rule is subject to the protection and privacy of victims and witnesses and  the protection 
of confidential information as provided for in the Statute and rules 81 and 82. 
A. Purpose 
Rule 66 is of fundamental importance to the accused’s right to a fair trial. In particular, 
Rule 66(A) (ii) is to enable the defence to confront witnesses with all their prior 
statements and transcripts.9 It is an essential element of Rule 66(A) (ii) that the 
disclosures occur within a specific time limit so as to provide adequate time and 
																																																								
9	 Prosecutor	v	Stanišić	&	Župljanin,	No.	IT-08-91-PT,	Decision	on	Joint	Defence	Motion	Requesting	
Preclusion	of	Prosecution’s	New	Witnesses	and	Exhibits	(31	August	2009)	at	para.	19.	
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resources for the accused to examine the material and prepare its case.10 In Krajišnik 
and Plavšić, the Trial Chamber also held that disclosure obligations of the prosecution 
are necessary for the defence to be properly prepared. Non-disclosure may lead to a 
violation of the equality of arms principle.11 
B. The Duty to Disclose Copies of Inculpatory Materials 
According to Rule 66(A) ICTY RPEs, the prosecution shall disclose to the accused (i) 
(ii) supporting material, within thirty days of the initial appearance, and (iii) within the 
time-limit, disclose copies of the statements of prosecution witnesses, copies of all 
written statement – Rule 92bis, 92ter, 92quarter’ and subsequently, additional 
witnesses’ statements. Rule 66(A) of the ICTR RPEs has similar requirements, although 
the wording is slightly different.12 
Inculpatory Materials 
1. Copies of the Supporting Material which accompanied the Indictment 
when Confirmation was sought 																																																								
10	 Prosecutor	v	Karadžić,	No.	IT-95-5/18-T,	Decision	on	Accused’s	Second	Motion	for	Finding	Disclosure	
Violation	and	for	Remedial	Measures	(17	June	2010)	at	para.	8.	
11	 Prosecutor	v	Momčilo	Krajišnik	and	Biljana	Plavšić,	No.	IT-00-39-PT,	Decision	on	Prosecution	Motion	
for	Clarification	in	Respect	of	Application	of	Rules	65	ter,	66	(B)	and	67	(C)	(1	August	2001)	at	para.7.	
12	 Rule	66	ICTR	RPEs—	‘Disclosure	of	exculpatory	and	other	relevant	material’	
Subject	to	the	provisions	of	Rules	53	and	69;	
(A)	The	Prosecutor	shall	disclose	to	the	Defence:	
i)	Within	30	days	of	the	initial	appearance	of	the	accused	copies	of	the	supporting	material	which	
accompanied	the	indictment	when	confirmation	was	sought	as	well	as	all	prior	statements	obtained	by	
the	Prosecutor	from	the	accused,	and	
ii)	No	later	than	60	days	before	the	date	set	for	trial,	copies	of	the	statements	of	all	witnesses	whom	the	
Prosecutor	intends	to	call	to	testify	at	trial;	upon	good	cause	shown	a	Trial	Chamber	may	order	that	
copies	of	the	statements	of	additional	prosecution	witnesses	be	made	available	to	the	Defence	within	a	
prescribed	time.	
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‘Supporting material’ refers to the material, submitted to the confirming judge, upon 
which the charges are based.13 It does not include other material such as a brief of 
argument or statements of facts.14 The supporting material is supposed to contain the 
same information relied upon by the confirming judge.15  
2. Statements obtained from the Accused 
The prosecution is required to disclose the accused own statements in the pre-trial 
phase. Although the wording of the Rule seems to limit disclosure to ‘all prior 
statements obtained by the prosecution from the accused’, the Trial Chamber has read 
this language expansively, and held that the prosecution must disclose all statements 
made by the accused which are in the prosecution’s custody or control, regardless of 
whether they were made to the prosecution or to a third party.16 
Accordingly, an accused at the ad hoc Tribunals will be in possession of, at least, copies 
of all his own statements, as well as all materials (albeit might in redacted form) relied 
upon by the judge who confirmed the indictment against him, no later than 30 days after 
his initial appearance. However, given the lengthy gap which normally exists between 
																																																								
13	 Prosecutor	v	Kordić	and	Čerkez,	No.	IT-95-14/2-I,	Order	on	Motion	to	Compel	Compliance	by	the	
Prosecutor	with	Rules	66(a)	and	68	(26	February	1999)	at	p.3.	
14	 ibid.	
15	 Prosecutor	v	Nahimana	et	al,	No.	ICTR-99-52-T,	Decision	on	an	Oral	Application	by	Defence	Counsel	
Concerning	Witness	X	(19	January	2002),	at	para.7.	
16	 Prosecutor	v	Karemera	et	al,	No.	ICTR-98-44-PT,	Decision	on	the	Defence	Motion	for	Disclosure	of	
Items	Deemed	Material	to	the	Defence	of	the	Accused	(29	September	2003)	at	para.	11;	Prosecutor	v	
Nyiramasuhuko	et	al,	No.	ICTR-97-21-I,	Decision	on	Defence	Motion	for	Disclosure	of	Evidence	(1	
November	2000)	at	para.	36.	
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an initial appearance and the start of a trial before the international criminal tribunals, 
there is often a long wait for the accused before he receives any meaningful disclosure 
from the prosecution.17 
3. Prosecution Witnesses’ Statements 
A witness statement is ‘an account of a person’s knowledge of a crime which is 
recorded through due procedure in the course of an investigation into the crime.’18 The 
term ‘witness statements’ has been broadly interpreted by the Chambers, finding that 
‘nothing in the text of Rule 66(A)(ii) allows for differentiating the witnesses statements 
in the prosecution’s control on the basis of the form in which these statements exist.’19 
The same definition of a ‘statement’ of an accused applies to the definition of a 
‘statement’ of a witness.20 
Both Trial Chambers of the ad hoc Tribunals have gradually expanded Rule 66(A) (ii) 
through its jurisprudence, making the scope of prosecution disclosure unarguably broad. 
This is because the Chambers have recognised that the prosecutor’s disclosure 
obligations apply not only in his capacity as an organ of the Tribunal, but also as an 																																																								
17	 Kate	Gibson	and	Cainnech	Lussiaá-Berdou,	‘Disclosure	of	Evidence’	in	Karim	AA	Khan,	Caroline	
Buisman	and	Christopher	Gosnell	(eds),	Principles	of	Evidence	in	international	criminal	justice	(Oxford	
University	Press	2010)	318.	 	
18	 Prosecutor	v	Blaškić,	No.	IT-95-14-A,	Decision	on	the	Appellant's	Motions	for	the	Production	of	
Material,	Suspension	or	Extension	of	the	Briefing	Schedule,	and	Additional	Filings	(26	September	2000)	at	
para.	15.	
19	 Prosecutor	v	Karemera	et	al,	No.	ICTR-98-44-T,	Decision	on	the	Defence	Notification	of	Failure	to	
Comply	with	Trial	Chamber	Order	and	Motion	for	Remedial	Measures	(20	October	2003)	at	para.	5.	
20	 Prosecutor	v	Milutinovic	et	al,	No.	IT-05-87-T,	Decision	on	Prosecution	Motion	for	Leave	to	Amend	its	
Rule	65	ter	Witness	List	to	Add	Michael	Phillips	and	Shaun	Byrnes	(15	January	2007)	at	fn.	18.	
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organ of international criminal justice.21 This third category now has included a wide 
range of material. For instance, ‘witness statement’ also includes: 
a. As with statements of the accused, the prosecution is under an obligation to 
disclose all statements of prosecution witnesses in its possession, regardless of who 
took the statement.22  
b. Statements taken by national authorities in the course of other judicial proceedings 
involving a witness.23 Rule 66(A) (ii) does not distinguish between statements 
taken by the prosecutor and those taken by national authorities in the course of 
other judicial proceedings involving a witness.24 The same criteria as those 
identified in respect of the accused’s previous statements must apply mutatis 
mutandis to the previous statements of the witnesses also indicated in Sub-Rule 
66(A).25 In the ICTR, the Chamber has emphasised that it is the prosecutor who 
																																																								
21	 Prosecutor	v	Milutinovic	et	al,	No.	IT-05-87-T,	Decision	on	Ojdanic	Motion	for	Disclosure	of	Witness	
Statements	and	for	Finding	of	Violation	of	Rule	66(A)(ii)	(29	September	2006)	at	para.	13.	
22	 Prosecutor	v	Milutinovic	et	al,	No.	IT-05-87-T,	Decision	on	Ojdanic	Motion	for	Disclosure	of	Witness	
Statements	and	for	Finding	of	Violation	of	Rule	66(A)(ii)	(29	September	2006)	at	para.	15,	fn.	17;	
Prosecutor	v	Stanisic	&	Simatovic,	No.	IT-03-69-T,	Reasons	for	Decision	on	Postponement	of	Cross-	
Examination	of	the	Testimony	of	Witness	Milovanovic	(22	July	2010)	at	para.	8.	 	
23	 Prosecutor	v.	Karadžić,	No.	IT-95-5/18-T,	Decision	on	the	Accused’s	Motion	for	Order	to	Obtain	
Witness	Statements	and	Testimony	from	National	Courts	(12	January	2011)	at	para.	7.	
24	 Prosecutor	v	Nyiramasuhuko	et	al,	No.	ICTR-98-42-T,	Decision	on	the	Defence	Motion	for	the	
Disclosure	of	the	Declarations	of	the	Prosecutor’s	Witnesses	Detained	in	Rwanda	and	all	Other	
Documents	and	Information	Pertaining	to	the	Judicial	Proceedings	in	their	Respect	(18	September	2001)	
at	para.	6.	
25	 Prosecutor	v	Nyiramasuhuko	et	al,	No.	ICTR-98-42-T,	Decision	on	the	Defence	Motion	for	the	
Disclosure	of	the	Declarations	of	the	Prosecutor’s	Witnesses	Detained	in	Rwanda	and	all	Other	
Documents	and	Information	Pertaining	to	the	Judicial	Proceedings	in	their	Respect	(18	September	2001)	
at	para.	8.	
		
 		
	
221 
‘bears the responsibility of obtaining the said statements from the Rwandan 
Authorities and of providing them to the defence, pursuant to Rule 66(A)(ii).’26 
c. The transcripts or prior testimony of the witness in other trials.27 
d. Interview notes, if concerning a witness’ recollection of events also is ‘witness 
statement’ and therefore must be disclosed.28  
e. Statements given to sources other than the prosecution.29  
f. Statements of prosecution witnesses taken by humanitarian organisations and 
furnished to the prosecution.30 
g. Statements given by detained witnesses (including confessions).31 If the 
prosecution intends to call witnesses who are detained in third states, it is obliged 																																																								
26	 Prosecutor	v	Ndayambaje,	No.	ICTR-96-8-T,	Decision	on	the	Defence	Motion	Seeking	Documents	
Relating	to	Detained	Witnesses	or	Leave	of	the	Chamber	to	Contact	Protected	Detained	Witnesses	(15	
November	2001)	at	para.	25;	Prosecutor	v	Kajelijeli,	No.	ICTR-98-44A-T,	Decision	on	Juvenal	Kajelijeli’s	
Motion	Requesting	the	Recalling	of	Prosecution	Witness	GAO	(2	November	2001)	at	para.	20.	
27	 Prosecutor	v	Kupreskic	et	al,	No.	IT-95-16-T,	Decision	on	the	Prosecutor's	Request	to	Release	
Testimony	Pursuant	to	Rule	66	ofthe	Rules	of	Procedure	and	Evidence	Given	in	Closed	Session	Under	Rule	
79	of	the	Rules	(29	July	1998);	Prosecutor	v	Mpambara,	No.	ICTR-2001-65-I,	Decision:	Defence	Motion	
for	Disclosure	of	Documents	and	Objections	Regarding	the	Legality	of	Procedures	(28	February	2002)	at	
para.	23.	
28	 Prosecutor	v	Milutinovic	et	al,	No.	IT-05-87-T,	Decision	on	Prosecution	Motion	for	Leave	to	Amend	its	
Rule	65	ter	Witness	List	to	Add	Michael	Phillips	and	Shaun	Byrnes	(15	January	2007)	at	para.	12;	
Prosecutor	v	Karadžić,	No.	IT-95-5/18-T,	Decision	on	Accused’s	Third,	Fourth,	Fifth,	and	Sixth	Motions	for	
Finding	of	Disclosure	Violations	and	for	Remedial	Measures	(20	July	2010)	at	para.	42;	Prosecutor	v	
Haradinaj	et	al,	No.	IT-04-84bis-T,	Decision	on	Haradinaj	Motion	for	Disclosure	of	Exculpatory	Materials	
in	Relation	to	Witness	81	(18	November	2011)	at	para.	32.	
29	 Prosecutor	v	Nyiramasuhuko	et	al,	No.	ICTR-98-42-T,	Decision	on	the	Defence	Motion	for	the	
Disclosure	of	the	Declarations	of	the	Prosecutor’s	Witnesses	Detained	in	Rwanda	and	all	Other	
Documents	and	Information	Pertaining	to	the	Judicial	Proceedings	in	their	Respect	(18	September	2001)	
at	para.	6;	Prosecutor	v	Mpambara,	No.	ICTR-2001-65-I,	Decision:	Defence	Motion	for	Disclosure	of	
Documents	and	Objections	Regarding	the	Legality	of	Procedures	(28	February	2002)	at	para.	22;	
Prosecutor	v	Milutinovic	et	al,	No.	IT-05-87-T,	Decision	on	Ojdanic	Motion	for	Disclosure	of	Witness	
Statements	and	for	Finding	of	Violation	of	Rule	66(A)(ii)	(29	September	2006)	at	para.	15.	
30	 Prosecutor	v	Milutinovic	et	al,	No.	IT-05-87-T,	Decision	on	Ojdanic	Motion	for	Disclosure	of	Witness	
Statements	and	for	Finding	of	Violation	of	Rule	66(A)(ii)	(29	September	2006)	at	para.	14.	
31	 Prosecutor	v	Nyiramasuhuko	et	al,	No.	ICTR-98-42-T,	Decision	on	the	Defence	Motion	for	the	
Disclosure	of	the	Declarations	of	the	Prosecutor’s	Witnesses	Detained	in	Rwanda	and	all	Other	
Documents	and	Information	Pertaining	to	the	Judicial	Proceedings	in	their	Respect	(18	September	2001)	
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to have in its possession, or make all necessary efforts to procure and disclosure 
statements that might have been given to the national authorities of the third state.  
C. Problems 
Despite of the breadth of the obligation, there are still many concerns regarding the 
accused’s rights. The problems is that the defence teams might receive literally 
hundreds of statements from witnesses who may not even testify, and the use of 
redacted statements, which means the complete statements will not be disclosed until 30 
days prior to the witness’s testimony. However, the most significant concern as regards 
the application of Rule 66 is the lack of remedies in the case of violation by the 
prosecution.  
1. The (Over) Use of Redacted Witness Statements 
In order to conduct a proper examination of the witnesses, it is important for the defence 
to know the identity of the witness and the original version of the statement. In practice, 
however, the prosecution often used redacted version of witness statements to discharge 
its obligation with regard to disclose supporting material under Rule 66(A). The 
purpose of redactions is to prevent the disclosure of certain prosecution witnesses’ 
identity in case of concerns regarding safety of witnesses when his or her identity is 
revealed.32 This practice is permitted by the Chambers which confirmed that the 																																																																																																																																																																		
at	para.	6.	
32	 Prosecutor	v	Karadžić,	No.	IT-95-5/18-PT,	Decision	on	Accused	Motion	for	Full	Disclosure	of	
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delayed disclosure of the identity of witnesses is permissible even after the trial 
commences.33 
According to the case law of the ad hoc Tribunals, delaying the disclosure of a 
witness’s identity should be allowed only in ‘exceptional circumstances’ 
circumstances—specific evidence of an identifiable risk to the security and welfare of 
the particular witness or his family,34 which should be determined by a case-by-case 
basis and objectively.35 However, the Chambers normally would grant prosecution’s 
applications for redacted disclosure, and this practice have become the norm.36 The 
identity of the witness and the unredacted version of the statement, however, must still 
be disclosed to the defence in sufficient time to allow adequate time for preparation.37 																																																																																																																																																																		
Supporting	Material	(25	November	2008)	at	para.	19.	
33	 Prosecutor	v	Karadžić,	No.	IT-95-5/18-T,	Decision	on	Accused’s	Sixty-Sixth	Disclosure	Violation	Motion	
(8	February	2012)	at	para.	17.	
34	 Prosecutor	v	Haradinaj	et	al,	No.	04-84-PT,	Decision	on	Second	Haradinaj	Motion	to	Lift	Redactions	of	
Protected	Witness	Statements	(22	November	2006)	at	para.	2.	
35	 Prosecutor	v	Blaškić,	No.	IT-95-14-T,	Decision	of	Trial	Chamber	I	on	the	Applications	of	the	Prosecutor	
dated	24	June	and	30	August	1996	in	respect	of	the	Protection	of	Witnesses	(2	October	1996);	
Prosecutor	v	Radoslav	Brdanin	&	Momir	Talic,	No.	IT-99-36-PT,	Decision	on	Motion	by	Prosecution	for	
Protective	Measures	(3	July	2000)	at	para.	11	and	26;	Prosecutor	v	Gotovina,	No.	IT-01-45-PT,	Decision	
on	Prosecution	Motion	for	Non-Disclosure	to	Public	of	Materials	Disclosed	Pursuant	to	Rules	66	and	68	
(14	July	2006)	at	6-7.	
	
The	ICTR	sometimes	found	the	security	situation	in	Rwanda	or	other	countries	per	se	to	constitute	
exceptional	enough	to	justify	Rule	69	measures.	E.g.	Prosecution	v	Bizimungu,	No.	ICTR-99-50-T,	
Decision	on	the	Prosecutor's	Motion	for	Protective	Measures	for	Witnesses	(22	September	2000)	at	
para.	10;	Prosecutor	v	Rukundo,	No.	ICTR-2001-70-PT,	Decision	on	the	Prosecutor’s	Motion	for	Protective	
Measures	for	Victims	and	Witnesses	(24	October	2002)	at	para.16;	Prosecutor	v	Rukundo,	No.	
ICTR-2001-70-PT,	Decision	on	Prosecutor’s	Motion	for	Protective	Measures	for	Witnesses	CCF,	CCJ,	BLC,	
BLS,	and	BLJ	(28	November	2006);	Prosecutor	v	Ngirabatware,	No.	ICTR-99-54-T,	Decision	on	
Prosecution’s	Motion	for	Special	Protective	Measures	for	Prosecution	Witnesses	and	Others	(6	May	
2009)	at	paras.	15,	18-9;	Prosecutor	v	Muhimana,	No.	ICTR-95-1B-T,	Decision	on	Defence	Motion	for	
Protective	Measures	for	Defence	Witnesses	(6	July	2004)	at	paras.	2,	8-11.	
36	 E.g.	Prosecutor	v	Mpambara,	No.	ICTR-2001-65-I,	Decision:	Defence	Motion	for	Disclosure	of	
Documents	and	Objections	Regarding	the	Legality	of	Procedures	(28	February	2002),	at	para.	13	and	19.	
37	 Rule	69(C)	ICTY/R	RPEs:	 	
Subject	to	Rule	75,	the	identity	of	the	victim	or	witness	shall	be	disclosed	within	such	time	as	
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The ICTY Trial Chambers have now recognised the ‘en bloc’ disclosure of un-redacted 
statements and witness identities, which is normally 30 days prior to the 
commencement of trial, and not, as was the previous practice, on a rolling basis prior to 
the testimony of each witness.38 In contrast, some Trial Chambers of the ICTR still only 
require disclosure of original witness statements on a rolling basis, as the trial 
progresses.39 For example, in Karemera, the Chamber considered that the disclosure of 
unredacted statements 30 days before the beginning of the trial session at which the 
witness is to testify would not result in injustice.40 The practice of ‘rolling disclosure’ 
has attracted criticisms, since Rule 69 (C) only requires the disclosure to be made 
sufficient time left prior to trial.41 Some Chambers now also have opted for ‘en bloc’ 
disclosure of full statements and witness identities, particularly in single accused trials.42 
																																																																																																																																																																		
determined	by	the	Trial	Chamber	to	allow	adequate	time	for	preparation	of	the	Prosecution	or	Defence.	
38	 ‘Disclosure	of	identities	of	protected	witnesses	need	not	occur	until	30	days	before	trial	commences	
in	accordance	with	standard	practices	of	ICTY	trial	chambers.’	See	Prosecutor	v	Mrksic	et	al,	No.	
IT-95-13/1-PT,	Decision	on	Confidential	Prosecution	Motions	for	Protective	Measures	and	Non-Disclosure	
(9	March	2005)	at	page	4;	Prosecutor	v	Milutinovic	and	Others,	No.	IT-99-37-PT,	Decision	on	
Prosecution's	Motion	for	Protective	Measures	(17	July	2003)	at	para.	4.	
39	 Prosecutor	v	Ndindliyimana	et	al,	No.	ICTR-2000-56-T,	Decision	on	Bizimungu’s	Motion	for	
Reconsideration	of	the	Chamber’s	19	March	2004	Decision	on	Disclosure	of	Prosecution	Materials	(3	
November	2004);	Prosecutor	v	Ndindliyimana	et	al,	No.	ICTR-2000-56-T,	Decision	on	Bzimungu’s	Urgent	
Motion	Requesting	an	Adjournment	and	a	Review	of	the	Protective	Measures	Granted	to	Prosecution	
Witnesses	(7	April	2005)	at	para.	31	(Disclosure	of	the	identity	of	protected	witnesses	ordered	35	days	
prior	to	trial);	Prosecutor	v	Bagosora	et	al,	No.	ICTR-98-41-T,	Decision	and	Scheduling	Order	on	the	
Prosecution	Motion	for	Harmonisation	and	Modification	of	Protective	Measures	for	Witnesses	(5	
December	2001)	at	para.	22	(35	days	before	the	witness	is	to	testify);	Prosecutor	v	Renzaho,	No.	
ICTR-97-31-I,	Decision	on	the	Prosecutor’s	Motion	for	Protective	Measures	for	Victims	and	Witnesses	to	
Crimes	Alleged	in	the	Indictment	(17	August	2005)	at	para.16	(21	days);	Prosecutor	v	Nchamihigo,	No.	
ICTR-2001-63-T,	Decision	on	Defence	Motion	for	Protection	of	Defence	Witnesses	(20	March	2007)	at	
para.	12	(30	days).	
40	 Prosecutor	v	Karemera	et	al,	No.	ICTR-98-44-PT,	Decision	on	the	Defence	Motions	for	
Reconsideration	of	Protective	Measures	for	Prosecution	Witnesses	(29	August	2005)	at	para.	11.	
41	 Göran	Sluiter,	‘The	ICTR	and	the	Protection	of	Witnesses’	(2005)	3	Journal	of	International	Criminal	
Justice	962,	972.	
42	 E.g.	Prosecutor	v	Setako,	No.	ICTR-04-81-I,	Decision	on	Prosecution	Motion	for	Protective	Measures	
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The danger of a long gap between disclosure of the witness’s identity and his or her 
testimony is therefore substantially decreased.43 
It is evident that the redaction of identifying information by the prosecution from the 
supporting material without authorisation from a Chamber is not appropriate. One may, 
however, wonder to what extent the defence, once engaged in the trial, is still in a 
position to adequately prepare its defence in relation to that witness.44 Accordingly, 
disclosed supporting material often contains witness statements in redacted form, with 
this redaction receiving ex post facto sanction by the Trial Chamber upon ruling on 
motions for prosecution materials.45 
2. Time Limits / Untimely Disclosure of Witness Statements 
It is an essential element of Rule 66(A) (ii) that disclosure of material falling under this 
Rule must occur within a specific time limit.46 As held by the Court, the prosecutor is 
required to disclose to the defence as soon as possible and as they come into his or her 
possession, without waiting for a date to be set for the commencement of trial, copies of 																																																																																																																																																																		
(18	September	2007)	at	para.	6;	Prosecutor	v	Kalimanzira,	No.	ICTR-2005-88-I,	Decision	on	Prosecution	
Motion	for	Protective	Measures	(8	November	2007)	at	para.	6;	Prosecutor	v	Gatete,	No.	
ICTR-2000-61-PT,	Decision	on	Defence	Motion	for	the	Disclosure	of	Identifying	Information	in	Relation	
to	Witnesses	to	be	Called	by	the	Prosecution	at	Trial	(11	September	2009)	at	para.	15.	
43	 Gibson	and	Lussiaá-Berdou	(n	18)	317.	Prosecutor	v	Nchamihigo,	No.	ICTR-01-63-PT,	Decisions	on	
Motion	for	Protective	Measures	for	Prosecution	Witnesses	(26	July	2006)	at	para.	8;	Prosecutor	v	Aloys	
Simba,	No.	ICTR-2001-76-I,	Decision	on	Prosecution	Request	for	Protection	of	Witnesses	(4	March	2004)	
at	para.	6.	
44	 Prosecutor	v	Bagosora	et	al,	No.	ICTR-98-41-T,	Decision	and	Scheduling	Order	on	the	Prosecution	
Motion	for	Harmonisation	and	Modification	of	Protective	Measures	for	Witnesses	(5	December	2001)	at	
para.	22.	
45	 Gibson	and	Lussiaá-Berdou	(n	18)	317.	 	
46	 Prosecutor	v	Karadžić,	No.	IT-95-5/18-PT,	Decision	on	Accused’s	Motion	to	Set	Deadlines	for	
Disclosure	(1	October	2009)	at	para.	13.	
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all prior statements of all the witnesses she intends to call;47 or ‘at the earliest available 
opportunity, and at least prior to the date of testimony by the witness copy of any items 
she intends to use at trial during the testimony of its witnesses.’48 The purpose of the 
disclosure requirement is ‘to enable the defence to have sufficient notice of the case for 
which it has to prepare.’ 49 
Although Rule 66(A) (ii) of the ICTR RPEs stated ‘no later than 60 days before the date 
set for trial’, this sixty-day limit has been interpreted by the Trial Chamber as a final 
date for disclosure.50 The Trial Chamber expects that disclosure will be made prior to 60 
days if possible. In the ICTY, it is the Trial Chamber or a Pre-Trial judge who will 
determine the time frame. 
It is important to note that disclosure under Rule 66 is also continuous,51 and essential 
to the right to a fair trial. The ICTR Trial Chamber has emphasised that in essence, Rule 
66(A) (ii) is intended to assist the defence in its understanding of the case, in 
																																																								
47	 Prosecutorv	Nyiramasuhuko	et	al,	No.	ICTR-97-21-I,	Decision	on	Defence	Motion	for	Disclosure	of	
Evidence	(1	November	2000)	at	para.	39	
48	 Prosecutor	v.	Nsabimana,	No.	ICTR-97-29-T,	Decision	on	the	Defence	Motions	for	Disclosure	of	Copies	
of	the	Prosecutor’s	Exhibits	(18	September	2001)	at	para.22.	 	
49	 Prosecutor	v	Nahimana	et	al,	No.	ICTR-99-52-I,	Decision	on	the	Prosecutor’s	Application	to	Add	
Witness	X	to	its	List	of	Witnesses	and	for	Protective	Measures	(14	September	2001)	at	para.	17.	
50	 Prosecutor	v	Bisengimana,	No.	ICTR-2000-60-I,	Decision	on	Bisengimana’s	Motion	for	Disclosure	of	
Materials	(28	March	2003)	at	para.	9;	Prosecutor	v	Mpambara,	No.	ICTR-2001-65-I,	Decision:	Defence	
Motion	for	Disclosure	of	Documents	and	Objections	Regarding	the	Legality	of	Procedures	(28	February	
2002)	at	para.	24.	
51	 Prosecutor	v	Bisengimana,	No.	ICTR-2000-60-I,	Decision	on	Bisengimana’s	Motion	for	Disclosure	of	
Materials	(28	March	2003)	at	para.	9;	Prosecutor	v	Mpambara,	No.	ICTR-2001-65-I,	Decision:	Defence	
Motion	for	Disclosure	of	Documents	and	Objections	Regarding	the	Legality	of	Procedures	(28	February	
2002)	at	para.	24.	 	
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accordance with the accused’s rights under ICTR Articles 20 and 21.52 Accordingly, 
disclosure should be provided to the defence in advance of the trial in order to ensure 
sufficient time for case preparation and investigation. Late disclosure would constitute a 
violation of the disclosure duties. For example, in Nyiramasuhuko, after weighing the 
statutory rights of the defence to prepare their defence in sufficient time prior to trial 
with the orders for protective measures, the Chamber found the prosecution’s 
explanation for lack of disclosure unacceptable and ordered full disclosure of the 
prosecution witness statements accordingly.53 In Karadžić, the ICTY Trial Chamber 
also stated that disclosure of witness statements during trial and several months after 
they had been in the possession of the prosecution violated Rule 66(A) (ii) and was 
unacceptable.54 
D. Remedies 
When a disclosure violation occurs, other than ordering disclosure, there are several 
options as remedies for the Chamber to choose from, including postponement,55 
recalling witnesses,56 exclusion of evidence,57 and a stay of proceedings.58 To a great 																																																								
52	 Prosecutor	v	Nyiramasuhuko	et	al,	No.	ICTR-98-42-T,	Decision	on	Defence	Motions	by	Nyiramasuhuko,	
Ndayambaje,	and	Kanyabashi	on,	Inter	Alia,	Full	Disclosure	of	Unredacted	Prosecution	Witness	
Statements	(13	November	2001)	at	para.	16.	
53	 Prosecutor	v	Nyiramasuhuko	et	al,	No.	ICTR-98-42-T,	Decision	on	Defence	Motions	by	Nyiramasuhuko,	
Ndayambaje,	and	Kanyabashi	on,	Inter	Alia,	Full	Disclosure	of	Unredacted	Prosecution	Witness	
Statements	(13	November	2001)	at	para.	17.	
54	 Prosecutor	v	Karadžić,	No.	IT-95-5/18-T,	Decision	on	Accused’s	Eighty-Seventh	Disclosure	Violation	
Motion	(10	March	2014)	at	para.	12.	
55	 E.g.	Prosecutor	v	Nzabonimana	et	al,	No.	ICTR-98-44D-T,	Decision	on	Nzabonimana’s	Motion	for	Stay	
of	Proceedings	…(13	November	2009)	at	paras.	49-50.	
56	 E.g.	Prosecutor	v	Nyiramasuhuko	et	al,	No.	ICTR-98-42-T,	Decision	on	Elie	Ndayambaje’s	and	Alphonse	
Nteziryayo’s	Request	for	the	Recall	of	Witness	FAG	Following	the	Disclosure	of	a	New	Confessional	
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extent, the problem of prosecution’s failure to disclose evidence is owed to the 
Chamber’s unwillingness to employ meaningful sanctions. While the Chambers have 
been repeatedly recognising the importance of full and timely disclosure, they seem 
reluctant to take actions in discouraging the prosecution’s violation of these duties.59  
This situation is drastically different when one turns to the domestic level. In national 
courts, if a violation of disclosure obligations occurs, the Court would often exclude the 
evidence in question.60 However, the Trial Chambers have rarely opted for this measure. 
On the contrary, the Chamber has considered that exclusion of evidence is ‘at the 
extreme end of measures available.’61 Accordingly, the exclusion of witness testimony 
would only be used in exceptional circumstances,62 and only if the defence is able to 
demonstrate prejudice.63 
																																																																																																																																																																		
Statement	(18	June	2004).	
57	 E.g.	Prosecutor	v	Nyiramasuhuko	et	al,	No.	ICTR-98-42-T,	Decision	on	the	Prosecutor’s	Motion	to	Stay	
Disclosure	Until	Protection	Measures	are	Put	in	Place	(27	March	2002)	(Trial	Chamber	struck	witnesses	
from	witness	list	where	prosecutor	had	not	disclosed	their	statements	as	ordered	and	rejected	
prosecution	application	to	delay	disclosure	until	witnesses	could	be	located	or	persuaded	to	testify).	
58	 Prosecutor	v	Lukić	&	Lukić,	No.	IT-98-32/1-T,	Decision	on	Milan	Lukić’s	Notice	of	Verification	of	Alleged	
Victim	Survivors	and	Application	for	Stay	of	Proceedings…(12	March	2009)	at	para.	12	(A	stay	of	
proceedings	is	an	exceptional	measure.	The	Trial	Chamber	must	consider	whether	the	continuation	of	
the	trial	would	have	an	impact	on	the	conduct	of	a	fair	and	expeditious	trial).	
59	 Gibson	and	Lussiaá-Berdou	(n	18).	 	
60	 E.g.	England,	see	e.g.	Section	78	of	the	Police	and	Criminal	Evidence	Act,	1984.	
61	 Prosecutor	v	Karemera	et	al,	No.	ICTR-98-44-T,	Decision	on	Defence	Motion	to	Report	Government	of	
a	Certain	State	to	the	United	Nations	Security	Council	and	on	Prosecution	Motions	Under	Rule	66(C)	of	
the	Rules	(15	February	2006)	at	para.	25;	Prosecutor	v	Karemera	et	al,	No.	ICTR-98-44-T,	Decision	on	
Defence	Motion	for	Exclusion	of	Witness	GK’s	Testimony	or	for	Request	for	Cooperation	of	the	
Government	of	Rwanda	(27	Nov	2006)	at	paras.	3-4;	Prosecutor	v	Karemera	et	al,	No.	ICTR-98-44-T,	
Decision	on	Joseph	Nzirorera’s	Motion	to	Exclude	Testimony	of	Witness	QBG	(11	July	2007)	at	para.	6.	
62	 Prosecutor	v	Zigiranyirazo,	No.	ICTR-2001-73-T,	Decision	on	Prosecutor	Ex	Parte	Confidential	
Application	et	al	(10	October	2005).	
63	 Prosecutor	v	Karadžić,	No.	IT-95-5/18-T,	Decision	on	Accused’s	Second	Motion	for	Finding	Disclosure	
Violation	and	for	Remedial	Measures	(17	June	2010)	at	paras.	12-18;	Prosecutor	v	Karadžić,	No.	
IT-95-5/18-T,	Decision	on	Accused’s	Third,	Fourth,	Fifth,	and	Sixth	Motions	for	Finding	of	Disclosure	
Violations	and	for	Remedial	Measures	(20	July	2010)	at	para.	41;	Prosecutor	v	Karadžić,	No.	IT-95-5/18-	T,	
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The most common form of prosecution’s disclosure violations is late disclosure. As 
mentioned, despite the Courts’ repeated emphasis on prompt disclosure, the prosecution 
often failed to disclose witness statements in a timely manner. An ICTY Chamber has 
held that late disclosure of Rule 66(A) (ii) material could give rise to exclusion of the 
material from evidence or a decision not to allow the affected witness’ testimony at all.64 
But the judges have set the threshold for exclusion of testimony very high. Often, the 
prosecution would be given a chance to provide explanation for the late disclosure 
first.65  
Unless the defence can establish ‘prejudice’, the Courts rarely sanctions the prosecution 
for late disclosure, even if it was repeatedly and deliberately.66 For example, in 
Nahimana, the Chamber stated that, the aim of Rule 66 (a) is not frustrated by late 
disclosure ‘where the defence is not caught by surprise as to the nature of the evidence 
																																																																																																																																																																		
Decision	on	Accused’s	Seventh	and	Eighth	Motions	for	Finding	Disclosure	Violation	and	for	Remedial	
Measures	(18	August	2010);	Prosecutor	v	Karadžić,	No.	IT-95-5/18-T,	Decision	on	Accused’s	Ninth	and	
Tenth	Motions	for	Finding	Disclosure	Violation	and	for	Remedial	Measures	(26	August	2010);	Prosecutor	
v	Karadžić,	No.	IT-95-5/18-T,	Decision	on	Accused’s	Eleventh	through	Fifteenth	Motions	for	Finding	
Disclosure	Violation	and	for	Remedial	Measures	(24	September	2010);	Prosecutor	v	Karadžić,	No.	IT-95-	
5/18-T,	Decision	on	Accused’s	Twenty-Seventh	Disclosure	Violation	Motion	(17	November	2010)	at	
para.14;	Prosecutor	v	Karadžić,	No.	IT-95-5/18-T,	Decision	on	Accused’s	Twenty-Ninth	Disclosure	
Violation	Motion	(11	January	2011)	at	para.16;	Prosecutor	v	Karadžić,	No.	IT-95-5/18-T,	Decision	on	
Accused’s	Forty-Eighth	Disclosure	Violation	Motion	(30	May	2011)	at	para.	12	(Late	disclosure	of	items	
violated	Rule	66(A)(ii)	but	did	not	warrant	any	remedy	given	lack	of	prejudice	and	large	volume	of	
disclosure	in	the	case).	
64	 Prosecutor	v	Stanišić	&	Župljanin,	No.	IT-08-91-PT,	Decision	on	Joint	Defence	Motion	Requesting	
Preclusion	of	Prosecution’s	New	Witnesses	and	Exhibits	(31	August	2009)	at	para.	19.	
65	 Stanišić	&	Župljanin,	ibid,	at	para.	19.	
66	 E.g.	Prosecutor	v	Nzabonimana,	No.	ICTR-98-44D-T,	Decision	on	Nzabonimana’s	Motion	for	Stay	of	
Proceedings…	(13	November	2009)	at	paras.	49-50	(The	Chamber	found	that	the	prosecution	
deliberately	misled	the	Chamber	by	characterizing	the	witness	statement	as	Rule	66(B)	material).	
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to be given by the witness and is not unduly prejudiced.’67 Nevertheless, demonstrating 
specific prejudice has proven to be a remarkably difficult task for the defence. 
Accordingly, the Trial’s Chamber preferable remedy has been the postponement of 
testimony, and this remedy has generally been the only one granted.68 At times, the 
Chamber would provide the defence an opportunity to recall previously heard witnesses 
for cross-examination.69  
As demonstrated by the Chamber’s attitude towards prosecution disclosure failure, it 
seems that the Courts have little or no regard for the difficulties experienced by the 
defence, in particular, their struggles in trying to conduct last minute investigations on 
recently disclosed witness statements, whilst at the same time, being sympathetic to the 
same arguments when being used by the prosecution to explain the reasons for delays in 
disclosure.70 Even though sanctions are available to enforce compliance with disclosure 
obligations, the Chambers generally would choose for the minimal sanction, and refuse 
to hold the responsible prosecutor in contempt.71 In fact, the postponement of testimony, 																																																								
67	 Prosecutor	v	Nahimana	et	al,	No.	ICTR-99-52-I,	Decision	on	the	Prosecutor’s	Application	to	Add	
Witness	X	to	its	List	of	Witnesses	and	for	Protective	Measures	(14	September	2001)	at	para.	17.	(‘The	
purpose	of	the	disclosure….not	frustrated	by	late	disclosure	where	the	Defence…prejudiced.’)	
68	 Prosecutor	v	Karemera	et	al,	No.	ICTR-98-44-T,	Decision	on	the	Defence	Notification	of	Failure	to	
Comply	With	Trial	Chamber	Order	and	Motion	for	Remedial	Measures	(20	October	2003)	at	paras.	9-10.	
69	 Prosecutor	v	Nahimana	et	al,	No.	ICTR-99-52-I,	Decision	on	the	Prosecutor’s	Oral	Motion	for	Leave	to	
Amend	the	List	of	Selected	Witnesses	(26	June	2001)	at	para.	32;	Prosecutor	v	Nyiramasuhuko	et	al,	No.	
ICTR-98-42-T,	Decision	on	Elie	Ndayambaje’s	and	Alphonse	Nteziryayo’s	Request	for	the	Recall	of	
Witness	FAG	Following	the	Disclosure	of	a	New	Confessional	Statement	(18	June	2004)	at	para.	11.	
70	 Gibson	and	Lussiaá-Berdou	(n	18)	321.	 	
71	 E.g.	Prosecutor	v	Furundžija,	No.	IT-95-17-PT,	The	Trial	Chamber’s	Formal	Complaint	to	the	
Prosecutor	Concerning	the	Conduct	of	the	Prosecution	(5	June	1998)	at	para.	11.	The	Trial	Chamber,	
despite	its	explicit	disapproval	of	the	prosecutions	late	disclosure	of	witness	statements	(describing	the	
prosecution’s	conduct	as	‘falls	short	of	knowing	and	wilful	interference	with	the	administration	of	
justice’,	and	issued	a	formal	complaint	to	the	Prosecution,	did	not	hold	the	prosecution	in	contempt.	 	
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as well as recalling witnesses, has no practical effect on the conduct of the prosecution, 
or the overall record of evidence it builds against an accused, and as such will do 
nothing to encourage compliance with the rules.72 Therefore, without any meaningful 
sanctions, the utility of the numerous decisions issued by the Trial Chambers to both 
broaden and comprehensively delineate the scope of pre-trial disclosure is substantially 
reduced.73 
																																																								
72	 Gibson	and	Lussiaá-Berdou	(n	18)	322.	
73	 ibid.	 	
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III. Rule 66(B):74 The Right to Inspect 
ICTY Rule 66 (B) provides that 
‘The Prosecutor shall, on request, permit the defence to inspect any books, documents, 
photographs and tangible objects in the Prosecutor’s custody or control, which are material to 
the preparation of the defence, or are intended for use by the Prosecutor as evidence at trial or 
were obtained from or belonged to the accused.’ 
Similarly, ICTR Rule 66(B) provides that 
‘At the request of the Defence, the Prosecutor shall, subject to Sub-Rule (C), permit the 
Defence to inspect any books, documents, photographs and tangible objects in his custody or 
control, which are material to the preparation of the defence, or are intended for use by the 
Prosecutor as evidence at trial or were obtained from or belonged to the accused.’ 
ICC Rule 77 (inspection of material in possession or control of the Prosecutor) states 
that: 
‘The Prosecutor shall, subject to the restrictions on disclosure as provided for in   the Statute and 
in rules 81 and 82, permit the defence to inspect any books, documents, photographs and other 
tangible objects in the possession or control of the Prosecutor, which are material to the 
preparation of the defence or are intended for use by the Prosecutor as evidence for the purposes 
of the confirmation hearing or at trial, as the case may be, or were obtained from or belonged to 
the person.’ 
Rule 66(B) of the ICTY/R RPEs obliges the prosecution to permit the defence to inspect 
material in certain circumstances. It should be noted that, the defence is only required to 
show one of the three conditions enumerated in Rule 66(B) exists to obtain inspection: 																																																								
74	 Rule	66(B)	ICTY	RPEs:	‘The	Prosecutor	shall,	on	request,	permit	the	defence	to	inspect	any	books,	
documents,	photographs	and	tangible	objects	in	the	Prosecutor’s	custody	or	control,	which	are	material	
to	the	preparation	of	the	defence,	or	are	intended	for	use	by	the	Prosecutor	as	evidence	at	trial	or	were	
obtained	from	or	belonged	to	the	accused.’	 	
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(1) it is material to preparation of the defence; (2) it is intended to be used by the 
prosecution as evidence at trial; or (3) it was obtained from or belonged to the accused. 
The conditions are not cumulative. 
Here, the resemblance of Rule 66(B) and the U.S. Federal Rule 16 is noteworthy, 
although the scope of Rule 66(B) is broader than the U.S. Federal Rule 16. As 
mentioned, the extent of pre-trial discovery has been controversial and is a highly 
litigated issue in the U.S. criminal proceedings.75 Accordingly, U.S. Federal Rule 16 
has been amended several times due to its perplexity and lack of clarity. The fact that 
Rule 66(B) of the ICTY/R RPEs has become a battleground for the parties before the ad 
hoc Tribunals is hardly a surprise as measured by the domestic experience. 
I. Requirements  
1. Reciprocity  
ICTY Rule 67(C): [Original Deleted] 
ICTR Rule 67 (C): If the Defence makes a request pursuant to Rule 66 (B), the 
Prosecutor shall in turn be entitled to inspect any books, documents, photographs and 
tangible objects, which are within the custody or control of the Defence and which it 
intends to use as evidence at the trial. 
This sub-rule of the ICTY and ICTR RPEs has gone through several changes and the 
wording in the ICTY and ICTR is slightly different now. In the ICTY, in contrast with 																																																								
75	 See	Chapter	V.	
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the ICTR, the application of this Rule seems not to be subjected to Rule 66 (C) anymore. 
In addition, the original Rule 67 (C) of the ICTY was deleted,76 which would have 
triggered reciprocal disclosure. The ICTR still maintains Rule 67 (C), which stated if 
the defence makes a request pursuant to Rule 66 (B), the prosecutor shall in turn be 
entitled to inspect any books, documents, photographs and tangible objects, which are 
within the custody or control of the defence and which it intends to use as evidence at 
the trial.  
However, the ICTR has made clear that the prosecution’s Rule 66(B) disclosure 
obligation is not contingent on defence compliance with other disclosure rules, e.g. Rule 
73 ter.77 The ICC Chamber holds a similar position that the right of an accused to 
receive full prosecution disclosure is not contingent on his providing of any information 
as to his defence.78  
Note that although the Rule 77 of ICC RPEs is a copy of Rule 66(B), it is not subjected 
to a defence’s request. Unlike the rules of the ICTY and ICTR, the ICC prosecutor has 
an obligation to disclose items material to the preparation of the defence independently 
of any request of the defence.79 But the prosecution in the ICC also has broader 																																																								
76	 The	current	ICTY	67(C)	provides	that	‘Failure	of	the	Defence	to	provide	notice	under	this	Rule	shall	
not	limit	the	right	of	the	accused	to	testify	on	the	above	defences.’	
77	 Prosecutor	v	Karemera	et	al,	No.	ICTR-98-44-T,	Decision	on	Joseph	Nzirorera’s	Motion	for	Inspection:	
Michel	Bagaragaza	(10	July	2008)	at	para.	6.	
78	 Lubanga	case,	Appeals	Chamber,	Judgment	on	the	Appeal	of	Mr.	Lubanga	Dyilo	against	the	Oral	
Decision	of	Trial	Chamber	I	on	18	January	2008	(11	July	2008)	at	para.	50.	
79	 Prosecutor	v	Abdallah	Banda	Abakaer	Nourain	and	Saleh	Mohammed	Jerbo	Jamus,	Appeals	Chamber,	
No.	ICC-02/05-03/09,	Judgment	on	the	Appeal	of	Mr	Abdallah	Banda	Abakaer	Nourain	and	Mr	Saleh	
Mohammed	Jerbo	Jamus	against	the	Decision	of	Trial	Chamber	IV	of	23	January	2013	entitled	“Decision	
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inspection rights with regard to defence’s material than in the ad hoc Tribunals. 
2. Material to the Preparation of the Defence Case – Materiality test 
This is the pivotal element of the Rule 66(B) disclosure regime. In order to trigger the 
prosecution’s obligation under this Rule, the defence must, first, make a request for 
inspection to the prosecution.80 If the request is not successful, the defence can then 
turn to the Trial Chamber. 
With regard to the test of materiality, the Chambers have laid down three principal 
requirements, which are identical to the U.S. standard, in order to obtain an order 
pursuant to Rule 66(B). The defence must: (1) specifically identify the items sought; (2) 
demonstrate prima facie that the requested items are material to the preparation of the 
defence; and (3) demonstrate prima facie that the requested items are in the custody and 
control of the prosecution.81 Each requirement will be examined here. 
																																																																																																																																																																		
on	the	Defence's	Request	for	Disclosure	of	Documents	in	the	Possession	of	the	Office	of	the	Prosecutor”	
(28	August	2013)	at	para.	34.	
80	 ‘Request	for	inspection	must	be	made	to	the	prosecution	first	before	the	Trial	Chamber	will	entertain	
it’,	see	Prosecutor	v	Karadžić,	No.	IT-95-5/18-PT,	Decision	on	Accused	Motion	for	Inspection	and	
Disclosure	(9	October	2008);	Prosecutor	v	Karadžić,	No.	IT-95-5/18-PT,	Decision	on	Accused’s	Second	
Motion	for	Inspection	and	Disclosure:	Immunity	Issue	(17	December	2008)	at	para.	9;	Prosecutor	v	
Karemera	et	al,	No.	ICTR-98-44-T,	Decision	on	Joseph	Nzirorera’s	20th	Notice	of	Violation	of	Rule	66	and	
Motion	for	Remedial	and	Punitive	Measures:	Colonel	Felicien	Muberuka	(4	December	2008)	at	para.	5.	
81	 Prosecutor	v	Karadžić,	No.	IT-95-5/18-PT,	Decision	on	Accused’s	Second	Motion	for	Inspection	and	
Disclosure:	Immunity	Issue	(17	December	2008)	at	para.	10;	Karemera	et	al	v.	Prosecutor,	No.	
ICTR-98-44-AR73.18,	Decision	on	Joseph	Nzirorera’s	Appeal	from	Decision	on	Alleged	Rule	66(B)	
Violation	(17	May	2010)	at	para.	13;	Prosecutor	v	Bagosora	et	al,	No.	ICTR-96-7-T,	Decision	on	the	
Motion	by	the	Defence	Counsel	for	Disclosure	(27	November	1997);	
Prosecutor	v	Nyiramasuhuko	et	al,	No.	ICTR-98-42-T,	Decision	on	Arsene	Shalom	Ntahobali’s	Motion	for	
Disclosure	of	Documents	(31	January	2006)	at	para.	23;	Prosecutor	v	Karemera	et	al,	No.	ICTR-98-44-T,	
Decision	on	Defence	Motions	for	Disclosure	of	Information	Obtained	from	Juvenal	Uwilingiyimana	(27	
April	2006)	at	para.	15;	Prosecutor	v	Karemera	et	al,	No.	ICTR-98-44-T,	Decision	on	Joseph	Nzirorera’s	
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Specificity 
The defence must specify the items they wish to inspect. A request for production of 
documents should be sufficiently specific as to the nature of the evidence sought.82 The 
Trial Chambers of the ad hoc Tribunals have emphasised many times that Rule 66(B) is 
only triggered by a sufficiently specific request by the defence.83 Therefore, requests 
which lack sufficient specificity will be denied. The defence may not rely on a mere 
general description of the requested information but is required to define the parameters 
of its inspection request with sufficient detail. Suitable parameters for such specification 
may be an indication of a specific event or group of witnesses which the request focuses 
on, a time period and/or geographic location which the material refers to, or any other 
features defining the requested items with sufficient precision.84 For example, request 
for correspondence between prosecution witnesses and the prosecutor is considered 
insufficiently specific.85 Request for receipts showing the chain of custody of 
documents to be offered during testimony of defence investigator was sufficiently 
																																																																																																																																																																		
Motion	for	Inspection	of	Statement	of	Pierre	Celestin	Mbonankira	(20	September	2007)	at	para.	8;	
Prosecutor	v	Karemera	et	al,	No.	ICTR-98-44-T,	Decision	on	Joseph	Nzirorera’s	Motion	to	Exclude	the	
Testimony	of	Prosecution	Witness	Uphendra	Baghel	(30	October	2007)	at	para.	4	
82	 Prosecutor	v	Bagosora	et	al,	No.	ICTR-98-41-T,	Decision	on	Disclosure	of	Materials	Relating	to	
Immigration	Statements	of	Defence	Witnesses	(27	September	2005)	at	para.	3.	
83	 Prosecutor	v	Bagosora	et	al,	No.	ICTR-98-41-AR73,	Decision	on	Interlocutory	Appeal	Relating	to	
Disclosure	Under	Rule	66	(B)	of	the	Tribunal’s	Rules	of	Procedure	and	Evidence	(25	September	2006)	at	
para	10;	Prosecutor	v	Zigiranyirazo,	No.	ICTR-2001-73-T,	Decision	on	Defence	Motion	for	Disclosure	
Under	Rule	66	(B)	of	the	Rules	(21	February	2007)	at	paras.	8-9.	
84	 Karemera	et	al	v.	Prosecutor,	No.	ICTR-98-44-AR73.18,	Decision	on	Joseph	Nzirorera’s	Appeal	from	
Decision	on	Alleged	Rule	66(B)	Violation	(17	May	2010)	at	para.	32.	
85	 Prosecutor	v	Karemera	et	al,	No.	ICTR-98-44-PT,	Decision	on	Joseph	Nzirorera’s	Motion	to	Compel	
Inspection	and	Disclosure	(5	July	2005)	at	para.	10.	
		
 		
	
237 
specific.86 In Karadžić, the Trial Chamber considered the defence’s request for 
memoranda and correspondence related to a specific meeting too broad and stated that it 
did not meet the specificity requirement.87 In Bagosora, the Chamber held that request 
for all documents relevant to accused’s alibi is too vague for an order to be made for 
prosecution to produce such material prior to the testimony of the accused.88 However, 
inspection of a precise category of documents is permitted, as held in Karemera.89  
Materiality Test: Relevance 
The crucial question here is, what information is considered ‘material’ to the 
preparation of the defence under Rule 66(B)? As the experience of the discovery regime 
in the U.S. has demonstrated, materiality is the most problematic feature when applying 
this Rule. 
The ad hoc Tribunals have long recognised that the test for materiality is the ‘relevance 
of the documents sought to the preparation of the defence case.’90 ‘Preparation’ is a 
broad concept,91 but it generally includes information with regard to witnesses, both 																																																								
86	 Prosecutor	v	Karemera	et	al,	No.	ICTR-98-44-T,	Decision	on	Joseph	Nzirorera’s	Motion	to	Exclude	the	
Testimony	of	Prosecution	Witness	Uphendra	Baghel	(30	October	2007)	at	para.7.	
87	 Prosecutor	v	Karadžić,	No.	IT-95-5/18-PT,	Decision	on	Accused’s	Second	Motion	for	Inspection	and	
Disclosure:	Immunity	Issue	(17	December	2008)	at	para.	20.	
88	 Prosecutor	v	Bagosora	et	al	No.	ICTR-96-7-T,	Decision	on	Kabiligi	Motion	for	Inspection	of	Documents	
Under	Rule	66	(B)	(6	December	2006)	at	para.	5.	
89	 Prosecutor	v	Karemera	et	al,	No.	ICTR-98-44-T,	Decision	on	Joseph	Nzirorera’s	Motion	to	Exclude	the	
Testimony	of	Prosecution	Witness	Uphendra	Baghel	(30	October	2007)	at	para.	6.	
90	 Prosecutor	v	Karemera	et	al,	No.	ICTR-98-44-AR73.11,	Decision	on	the	Prosecutor’s	Interlocutry	
Appeal	Concerning	Disclosure	Obligations	(23	January	2008)	at	para.	14;	Prosecutor	v	Karemera	et	al,	
No.	ICTR-98-44-T,	Decision	on	Joseph	Nzirorera’s	Motion	for	Inspection:	Michel	Bagaragaza	(10	July	
2008)	at	para.	3.	
91	 Prosecutor	v	Nshogoza,	No.	ICTR-07-91-PT,	Decision	on	Defence	Motions	for	Disclosure	Under	Rules	
66	and	68	of	the	Rules	of	Procedure	and	Evidence	(22	December	2008)	at	para.	26;	Prosecutor	v	
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prosecution and defence. For instances, the preparation of the cross-examination of a 
witness,92 or the evaluation of whether to call a particular witness,93 are considered 
material. 
The defence can make an application pursuant to Rule 66(B) for disclosure of copies of 
witness interviews, either in the form of original tape recordings, and/ or transcripts of 
the tape recordings.94 The prosecution must allow the defence to inspect videotapes 
made during its investigation, which contain statements of persons who will testify as 
prosecution witnesses.95 Rule 66(B) also applies to witness statements taken by 
prosecution investigators who the prosecution does not intend to call.96 Where 
																																																																																																																																																																		
Nshogoza,	No.	ICTR-07-91-T,	Decision	on	Defence	Motion	for	Reconsideration	or	Certification	to	Appeal	
the	Chamber’s	Decision	of	22	December	2008	on	Disclosure	(19	February	2009)	at	para.	27.	
92	 Prosecutor	v	Nshogoza,	No.	ICTR-07-91-PT,	Decision	on	Defence	Motions	for	Disclosure	Under	Rules	
66	and	68	of	the	Rules	of	Procedure	and	Evidence	(22	December	2008)	at	para.	26.	
93	 Prosecutor	v	Karemera	et	al,	No.	ICTR-98-44-AR73.11,	Decision	on	the	Prosecutor’s	Interlocutry	
Appeal	Concerning	Disclosure	Obligations	(23	January	2008)	at	para.	14;	Prosecutor	v	Karemera	et	al,	
No.	ICTR-98-44-T,	Decision	on	Joseph	Nzirorera’s	Motion	for	Inspection:	Michel	Bagaragaza	(10	July	
2008)	at	para.	3.	
94	 Prosecutor	v	Kajelijeli,	No.	ICTR-98-44A-T,	Decision	on	Defense	Motion	Seeking	to	Interview	
Prosecutor’s	Witnesses	or	Alternatively	to	be	Provided	with	a	Bill	of	Particulars	(12	March	2001)	at	paras	
11-12.	But	see,	with	regard	to	the	disclosure	of	tape	recordings:	in	Prosecutor	v	Akayesu,	No.	
ICTR-96-4-A,	Judgement	(1	June	2001)	at	paras.	155-9,	the	Appeals	Chamber	agreed	with	the	Trial	
Chamber	that,	on	their	face,	the	Rules	do	not	provide	for	disclosure	of	tape	recordings	of	interviews	
conducted	with	witnesses.	The	Appeals	Chamber	stated	that	it	was	unclear	whether	the	Prosecution	
even	had	possession	of	the	tape	recordings,	but	even	if	they	did,	it	was	under	no	obligation	to	disclose	
them.	The	Appeals	Chamber	held	that	ultimately	each	case	had	to	be	determined	on	a	case	by	case	
basis.	In	contrast,	the	Trial	Chamber	in	Karemera	uses	a	more	definitive	language.	
95	 Prosecutor	v	Karemera	et	al,	No.	ICTR-98-44-T,	Decision	on	the	Motion	of	the	Defence	of	Joseph	
Nzirorera	for	Disclosure	of	Videotape	Regarding	Prosecution	Witnesses	(1	December	2003).	
96	 Prosecutor	v	Karemera	et	al,	No.	ICTR-98-44-T,	Decision	on	Defence	Motions	for	Disclosure	of	
Information	Obtained	from	Juvenal	Uwilingiyimana	(27	April	2006)	at	para.	14.	
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prosecution interviewed defence witnesses, their statements were material to the 
defence and inspection should be allowed.97  
There is no requirement for the defence to make independent efforts to obtain material 
prior to receiving requested disclosure under the Rules. The Chambers reasoned that a 
request under Rule 66(B) is one of the methods available to the defence for carrying out 
investigations.98 Furthermore, the defence is not obligated to explain how the 
information will affect its evaluation of the credibility of the potential witness.99  
prima facie showing of materiality  
The Rules itself did not define materiality. In the early days of the Tribunals, the Court 
sought domestic cases for support to interpret the meaning. In Delalić, the Trial 
chamber noted that the Rules provide no guidance regarding the process of determining 
the materiality of evidence.100 However, since Sub-Rule 66(B) is substantially similar to 
																																																								
97	 Prosecutor	v	Karemera	et	al,	No.	ICTR-98-44-AR73.11,	Decision	on	the	Prosecutor’s	Interlocutry	
Appeal	Concerning	Disclosure	Obligations	(23	January	2008)	at	paras.	14-16;	Prosecutor	v	Kamuhanda,	
No.	ICTR-99-54A-T,	Decision	on	Kamuhanda’s	Motion	for	Disclosure	of	Witness	Statements	and	Sanction	
of	the	Prosecutor	(29	August	2002)	at	para.	27;	Prosecutor	v	Karemera	et	al,	No.	ICTR-98-44-T,	Decision	
on	Joseph	Nzirorera’s	Motion	for	Inspection	of	Statement	of	Pierre	Celestin	Mbonankira	(20	September	
2007)	at	para.	11;	Prosecutor	v	Ngirabatware,	No.	ICTR-99-54-T,	Decision	on	Defence…Second	Motion	for	
Inspection	of	Materials	in	the	Prosecution’s	Custody	(27	September	2011)	at	para.	42.	
98	 Prosecutor	v	Karemera	et	al,	No.	ICTR-98-44-AR73.11,	Decision	on	the	Prosecutor’s	Interlocutry	
Appeal	Concerning	Disclosure	Obligations	(23	January	2008)	at	para	15;	Prosecutor	v	Bagosora	et	al,	
No.ICTR-98-41-AR73,	Decision	on	Interlocutory	Appeal	Relating	to	Disclosure	Under	Rule	66(B)	of	the	
Tribunal’s	Rules	of	Procedure	and	Evidence	(25	September	2006)	at	para	11;	Prosecutor	v	Zigiranyirazo,	
No.	ICTR-2001-73-T,	Decision	on	Defence	Motion	for	Disclosure	Under	Rule	66(B)	of	the	Rules	(21	
February	2007)	at	para.	10;	Prosecutor	v	Nshogoza,	No.	ICTR-07-91-PT,	Decision	on	Defence	Motions	for	
Disclosure	Under	Rules	66	and	68	of	the	Rules	of	Procedure	and	Evidence	(22	December	2008)	at	para.	7.	
99	 Prosecutor	v	Karemera	et	al,	No.	ICTR-98-44-T,	Decision	on	Joseph	Nzirorera’s	Motion	for	Inspection:	
Michel	Bagaragaza	(10	July	2008)	at	para.	8.	
100	 Prosecutor	v	Delalić,	No.	IT-96-21-T,	Decision	on	the	Motion	by	the	Accused	Zejnil	Delalić	for	the	
Disclosure	of	Evidence	(26	September	1996)	at	para.	6.	
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Rule 16(a) (1) (C) of the U.S. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, accordingly, 
interpretations of the U.S. rule as well as a review of its application will provide some 
guidance in analysing Sub-Rule 66(A).101  
In addition to the U.S. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and relevant U.S. case law, 
the Trial Chamber also referred to the standard applied by the English Court of Appeal 
in Keane, to support its test for materiality. They are: (1) to be relevant or possibly 
relevant to an issue in the case; 2) to raise or possibly raise a new issue whose existence 
is not apparent from the evidence the prosecution proposes to use; (3) to hold out a real, 
as opposed to fanciful, prospect of providing a lead on evidence which goes to (1) or 
(2).102 The Chamber then noted, by quoting a U.S. District Court case,103 ‘the phrase 
“material to the preparation of the defendant’s defense” is one that causes practical 
problems on both sides of the discovery equation.’  
The concept of materiality is considered by the Appeals Chamber in Bagosora. At trial, 
during the presentation of the defence case, the prosecution failed to provide certain 
defence witnesses’ immigration documents to the defence team, notwithstanding these 
documents were in its possession. The defence then made a disclosure request for those 
materials to the Trial Chamber but was denied on the grounds that, ‘immigration 
documents were not material to the preparation of the defence case because they did not 
																																																								
101	 ibid.	
102	 ibid	at	para.	7.	
103	 United	States	v.	Liquid	Sugars,	Inc.	&	Mooney,	158	F.R.D.	466	(U.S.	Dist.	Ct.	E.D.	Cal.	1994).	
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counter the prosecution’s evidence presented during its case-in-chief, but rather 
concerned the credibility of defence evidence.’104  
However, the Appeals Chamber reversed this decision, noting that in accord with the 
plain meaning of Rule 66(B), the test for materiality is the ‘relevance’ of the documents 
to the preparation of the defence case. Rule 66(B) does not necessarily require that the 
material itself counter the prosecution evidence.105 The Appeals Chamber then held that 
the immigration documents are material to the preparation of their defence because 
these documents ‘may improve their assessment of the potential credibility of their 
witnesses before making a final selection of whom to call in their defence’ and there are 
‘few tasks more relevant to the preparation of the defence case than selecting 
witnesses.’106 
This approach was later applied by a different ICTR Trial Chamber in Zigiranyirazo.107 
This Trial Chamber stated that the following categories are considered sufficiently 
specific: immigration-related materials, statements of prospective defence witnesses and 
Gacaca materials. But ‘other impeachment material’ of defence witnesses was not 
																																																								
104	 Prosecutor	v	Bagosora	et	al.,	ICTR-98-41-AR73,	Decision	on	Bagosora	Request	for	the	Government	of	
France	to	Authorize	the	Appearance	of	a	Witness	(20	October	2006)	at	paras.	5,	6.	
105	 Prosecutor	v	Bagosora	et	al.,	ICTR-98-41-AR73,	Decision	on	Interlocutory	Appeal	Relating	to	
Disclosure	under	Rule	66(B)	of	the	Tribunals	Rules	of	Procedure	and	Evidence	(25	September	2006)	at	
para.	9.	
106	 ibid	at	para.	9.	The	ICC	seems	to	adopt	a	similar	position	by	citing	the	decision	of	the	Appeals	
Chamber,	see	Prosecutor	v	Jean-Pierre	Bemba	Gombo,	No.	ICC-01/05-01/08	(‘Bemba’	case),	Public	
Redacted	version	of	Defence	request	for	a	stay	of	proceedings	and	request	for	further	disclosure	(19	
June	2015)	at	para.	7.	
107	 Decision	on	Defence	Motion	for	Disclosure	Under	Rule	66(B)	of	the	Rules	(TC))	(21	Feb	2007.)	
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specific enough.108 This decision is noteworthy because, while the categories are quire 
broadly drafted, this particular Trial Chamber recognised the need for the documents to 
be disclosed and their ‘materiality’ for the purpose of preparing the defence.109 Yet, at 
the same time, ICTR Trial Chamber I ‒ the same chamber that had seen its ruling 
overturned by the Appeals Chamber, refused to order the inspection of ‘personal 
agendas, diaries, travel documents and correspondence’ sent to or by the accused, 
considering the description too broad and vague to create an obligation.  
Accordingly, it is difficult to reconcile these two contemporary decisions, which 
together provide a clear example of the difficulties faced by both parties in determining 
whether evidence should properly be characterised as ‘material’ to defence preparation, 
and is the reason why litigation under this sub-rule continues to contribute to the 
prolongation of trials at the international courts.110 
Initial Determination  
It is the prosecutor who bears the responsibility to make the initial determination of 
materiality of evidence in its possession.111 This is due to the simple fact that the 
prosecution is the one who has the evidence. If the defence believes that the prosecution 
																																																								
108	 Prosecutor	v	Zigiranyirazo,	No.	ICTR-2001-73-T,	Decision	on	Defence	Motion	for	Disclosure	UnderRule	
66(B)	of	the	Rules	(21	February	2007)	at	paras.	8-9.	
109	 Gibson	and	Lussiaá-Berdou	(n	18)	324.	
110	 Ibid.	
111	 Prosecutor	v	Delalić,	No.	IT-96-21-T,	Decision	on	the	Motion	by	the	Accused	Zejnil	Delalić	for	the	
Disclosure	of	Evidence	(26	September	1996)	at	para.	11;	Prosecutor	v	Karemera	et	al,	No.	ICTR-98-44-T,	
Decision	on	Joseph	Nzirorera’s	Sixth,	Seventh,	and	Eighth	Notices	of	Disclosure	Violations	and	Motions	
for	Remedial,	Punitive,	and	Other	Measures	(29	November	2007)	at	para.	21.	
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has withheld evidence material to its preparation, it can challenge the prosecution by 
reasserting its right to the evidence. 
3. Intended for Uses at Trial 
The prosecution should let the defence inspect the information if he or she intends to 
use it at trial. It is to be noted that, the scope of 66(B) is wider than the U.S. Federal 
Rules 16, that is, Rule 66(B) does not limit itself to the prosecution case only, as is the 
case of the U.S. Rule.  
In Kristić, the Appeals Chamber held that the prosecution’s disclosure obligation under 
the Rules must be interpreted broadly in accord with their plain meaning.112 Nothing in 
Rule 66(B) limits an accused’s right to inspection only of material related to the 
prosecution’s case-in-chief. In this case, the prosecution refers extensively to domestic 
legal provisions, in particular United States Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a) 
(1) (E), in support of the Trial Chamber’s approach. However, the Appeals Chamber 
found the Trial Chamber’s ruling as an ‘unduly restrictive interpretation’ of Rule 66(B), 
since the language of Rule 66(B) does not support this restrictive approach. Therefore, 
documents the prosecution intends to uses as evidence during the cross of defence 
witnesses fall within the scope. 
																																																								
112	 Prosecutor	v	Karemera	et	al,	No.	ICTR-98-44-T,	Decision	on	Joseph	Nzirorera’s	Motion	to	Exclude	the	
Testimony	of	Prosecution	Witness	Uphendra	Baghel	(30	October	2007)	at	para.	6.	
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The ICTR Appeals Chamber in Bagosora also made clear that, ‘at trial’ indicates its 
applicability throughout the proceedings, and not only during the prosecution case.113 
As in the Krstić Appeals Judgment, the Chamber considers the meaning of Rule 66(B) 
to be sufficiently clear so as not to require resort to domestic legal provisions in 
determining its scope.114 The prosecution was obligated to disclose immigration records 
of defence witnesses upon request, and not simply at the commencement of cross 
examination.115   
A critical question which arises in the application of this category is the time frame 
within which the disclosure must be made. Evidence would only become ‘subject to 
inspection’ under this category from the moment the prosecution forms the intention to 
use it as evidence. However, as fairness considerations require that the prosecution 
provides disclosure to the defence within a reasonable period, the Trial Chamber in 
Butare held that the prosecution should permit inspection under Rule 66(B) as soon as 
practicable and ‘cannot argue that she intends to comply with…on her own 
timetable.’116 
4. Obtained from or Belonged to the Accused 
																																																								
113	 Prosecutor	v	Bagosora	et	al.,	ICTR-98-41-AR73,	Decision	on	Interlocutory	Appeal	Relating	to	
Disclosure	under	Rule	66(B)	of	the	Tribunals	Rules	of	Procedure	and	Evidence	(25	September	2006)	at	
para.	8.	
114	 ibid,	at	para.	8;	Prosecutor	v	Krstić,	No.	IT-98-33-A,	Judgement	(19	April	2004)	at	para.	179.	
115	 Prosecutor	v	Bagosora	et	al,	No.	ICTR-98-41-AR73,	Decision	on	Interlocutory	Appeal	Relating	to	
Disclosure	Under	Rule	66(B)	of	the	Tribunal’s	Rules	of	Procedure	and	Evidence	(25	September	2006).	
116	 Gibson	and	Lussiaá-Berdou	(n	18).	 	 	
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A plain interpretation of this rule can be concluded that as long as items are in custody 
of the prosecution at the time an inspection request is made, the prosecution needs not 
to be the authority that seized the item in the first place. Also, it is the right of the 
accused to demand access to items that were not intended to be used as evidence during 
the trial.117 
II. Limitation 
Since the prosecution’s disclosure obligation pursuant to Rule 66(B) is very broad in 
nature, as it covers both inculpatory and exculpatory materials, it can be too immense 
and difficult for the prosecution to comply sometimes. The prosecution has tried to limit 
its disclosure obligation in several occasions. For example, it had argued that Rule 
66(B) only encompasses material disclosable under Rule 66(A), but this argument was 
rejected by the Trial Chamber, reasoning that Rule 66(A) and (B) are independent 
sub-rules, therefore Rule 66(B) need not to be read in the context of Rule 66(A).118 
Another attempt made by the prosecution, by referring extensively to domestic legal 
provisions, is that attempting to limit its obligation to the examination-in-chief only. As 
mentioned, this argument was accepted by the Trial Chamber but overturned by the 
																																																								
117	 Prosecutor	v	Ngirumpatse,	No.	ICTR-98-44-I,	Decision	on	the	Defence	Motion	Challenging	the	
Lawfulness	of	the	Arrest	or	Detention	and	Seeking	Return	or	Inspection	of	Seized	Items	(10	December	
1999)	at	para.	76;	Prosecutor	v	Ntagerura	et	al,	No.	ICTR-98-46-I,	Decision	on	the	Defence	Motion	by	
Emmanuel	Bagambiki	for	the	Restitution	of	Documents	and	Other	Personal	and	Family	Property	(26	
September	2000)	at	para.	7	Prosecutor	v	Karemera	et	al,	No.	ICTR-98-44-T,	Decision	on	Defence	Third	
Motion	for	Return	of	Property	and	Sanctions	for	Violation	of	Court	Order	(13	October	2003)	at	para.	33.	
118	 Prosecutor	v	Karemera	et	al,	No.	ICTR-98-44-T,	Oral	Decision	on	the	Motion	for	Inspection	of	
Non-Rule	68	Material	(9	March	2006).	
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Appeals Chamber, which considered the meaning of Rule 66(B) to be sufficiently clear 
so as not to require resort to domestic legal provisions in determining its scope.119  
Nonetheless, after facing the seemingly endless disclosure motions, the Courts decided 
to lay down some restrictions itself to limit the scope of this Rule. The Trial Chamber in 
Bagosora has expressed its concern regarding this issue and held that, Rule 66(B) 
cannot be interpreted as laying down a blanket obligation for the prosecution to disclose 
documents pertinent to its cross examination of defence witnesses.120 In particular, with 
regard to materiality, the Trial Chamber in Karadžić held that an item will only be 
material to the preparation of the defence where it is used in an argument that has some 
prospect of success.121  
It is important to note that a showing of materiality by the defence is not required 
pursuant to Rule 66(B) for the disclosure of evidence that is (i) intended for use as 
evidence by the prosecution at trial or (ii) that was obtained from or belonged to the 
accused.122 Thus, the materiality test only applies to the first part of Rule 66(B).123 
																																																								
119	 Prosecutor	v	Bagosora	et	al.,	ICTR-98-41-AR73,	Decision	on	Interlocutory	Appeal	Relating	to	
Disclosure	under	Rule	66(B)	of	the	Tribunals	Rules	of	Procedure	and	Evidence	(25	September	2006)	at	
para.	8;	Prosecutor	v	Krstić,	No.	IT-98-33-A,	Judgement	(19	April	2004)	at	para.	179.	
120	 Prosecutor	v	Bagosora	et	al,	No.	ICTR-98-41-T,	Decision	on	Disclosure	of	Materials	Relating	to	
Immigration	Statements	of	Defence	Witnesses	(27	September	2005)	at	para.	6.	
121	 Prosecutor	v	Karadžić,	No.	IT-95-5/18-PT,	Decision	on	Accused’s	Second	Motion	for	Inspection	and	
Disclosure:	Immunity	Issue	(17	December	2008)	at	para.	23.	
122	 See	Prosecutor	v	Delalić,	No.	IT-96-21-T,	Decision	on	the	Motion	by	the	Accused	Zejnil	Delalić	for	the	
Disclosure	of	Evidence	(26	September	1996)	at	para.	5.	 	
123	 Jones	and	Powles	(n	64)	654.	
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III. Overlap with Rule 68 
Another point which should be emphasised here is that Rule 66(B) might contain both 
inculpatory and exculpatory material. That is to say, the information falling within Rule 
68 will also necessarily be material to the preparation of the defence under Rule 
66(B).124 The concept of materiality, in the U.S. practices, is examined both under 
Brady and Rule 16. Many scholars also noted that the materiality standard in Rule 16 is 
similar to Brady.125 However, as seen in the domestic practices, the scope of 
exculpatory material is usually broad, notwithstanding the difficulty to establish a 
disclosure violation by the prosecution.   
																																																								
124	 Prosecutor	v	Karadžić,	No.	IT-95-5/18-PT,	Decision	on	Accused’s	Second	Motion	for	Inspection	and	
Disclosure:	Immunity	Issue	(17	December	2008)	at	para.	14.	
125	 E.g.	Jones	and	Powles	(n	64)	653.	
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IV. Rule 68 – Disclosure of Exculpatory Material 
Rule 68 of the ICTY RPEs regulates the proseuction’s ‘disclosure of exculpatory 
material’. It reads as follows: 
 
Subject to the provisions of Rule 70, 
(i) the Prosecutor shall, as soon as practicable, disclose to the Defence any material which 
in the actual knowledge of the Prosecutor may suggest the innocence or mitigate the 
guilt of the accused or affect the credibility of Prosecution evidence; 
(ii) without prejudice to paragraph (i), the Prosecutor shall make available to the defence, 
in electronic form, collections of relevant material held by the Prosecutor, together 
with appropriate computer software with which the defence can search such 
collections electronically; 
(iii) the Prosecutor shall take reasonable steps, if confidential information is provided to 
the Prosecutor by a person or entity under Rule 70 (B) and contains material referred 
to in paragraph (i) above, to obtain the consent of the provider to disclosure of that 
material, or the fact of its existence, to the accused;  
(iv) the Prosecutor shall apply to the Chamber sitting in camera to be relieved from an 
obligation under paragraph (i) to disclose information in the possession of the 
Prosecutor, if its disclosure may prejudice further or ongoing investigations, or for any 
other reason may be contrary to the public interest or affect the security interests of 
any State, and when making such application, the Prosecutor shall provide the Trial 
Chamber (but only the Trial Chamber) with the information that is sought to be kept 
confidential;  
(v) Notwithstanding the completion of the trial and any subsequent appeal, the Prosecutor 
shall disclose to the other party any material referred to in paragraph (i) above. 
 
Similarly, Rule 68 of the ICTR RPEs (‘Disclosure of Exculpatory and other relevant 
Material’) reads as follows: 
(A) The Prosecutor shall, as soon as practicable, disclose to the Defence any material, which in 
the actual knowledge of the Prosecutor may suggest the innocence or mitigate the guilt of the 
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accused or affect the credibility of Prosecution evidence. 
(B) Where possible, and with the agreement of the Defence, and without prejudice 
to paragraph (A), the Prosecutor shall make available to the Defence, in electronic form, 
collections of relevant material held by the Prosecutor, together with appropriate computer 
software with which the Defence can search such collections electronically. 
(C) The Prosecutor shall take reasonable steps, if confidential information is provided to the 
Prosecutor by a person or entity under Rule 70 (B) and contains material  referred to in 
paragraph (A) above, to obtain the consent of the provider to disclosure of that material, or the 
fact of its existence, to the accused. 
(D) The Prosecutor shall apply to the Chamber sitting in camera to be relieved from an 
obligation under the Rules to disclose information in the possession of the Prosecutor, if its 
disclosure may prejudice further or ongoing investigations, or for any other reason may be 
contrary to the public interest or affect the security interests of any State, and when making such 
application, the Prosecutor shall provide the Trial Chamber (but only the Trial Chamber) with 
the information that is sought to be kept confidential. 
(E) Notwithstanding the completion of the trial and any subsequent appeal, the Prosecutor shall 
disclose to the other party any material referred to in paragraph (A) above. 
 
As to the ICC, Article 67(2) of the Rome Statute provides that: 
‘In addition to any other disclosure provided for in this Statute, the Prosecutor shall, as soon as 
practicable, disclose to the defence evidence in the Prosecutor's possession or control which he 
or she believes shows or tends to show the innocence of the accused, or to mitigate the guilt of 
the accused, or which may affect the credibility of prosecution evidence. In case of doubt as to 
the application of this paragraph, the Court shall decide.’ 
This provision should be read together with Rule 83: ‘The Prosecutor may request as soon as 
practicable a hearing on an ex parte basis before the Chamber dealing with the matter for the 
purpose of obtaining a ruling under article 67, paragraph 2.’ 
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Rule 68 of the ICTY and ICTR RPEs regulates the duty of the prosecution to disclose 
exculpatory evidence.126 The ICC has upgraded this obligation to a statutory level; now 
this disclosure obligation is explicitly set out in Article 67 paragraph 2, under the title of 
‘Rights of the Accused’. The wording ‘he or she believes shows or tends to show’ is 
slightly different from Rule 68 ICTY RPEs, which the subjective requirement of the 
prosecutor is ‘in the actual knowledge of the Prosecutor’. 
A. Importance of the Duty 
It is well recognised that the disclosure of exculpatory material is fundamental and of 
paramount importance to the fairness of proceedings before the international criminal 
tribunals.127 As one of the most demanding responsibilities of the prosecution, the 
disclosure of exculpatory evidence should always be interpreted broadly since it is 
indispensable to a fair trial.128 The Tribunals have held that considerations of fairness 
are the overriding factor in any determination of whether the governing Rule has been 
																																																								
126	 See	Rule	68	ICTY/R	RPEs.	
127	 Renzaho	v	Prosecutor,	No.	97-31-A,	Judgement	(1	April	2011)	at	para.	172;	Prosecutor	v	Orić,	No.	
IT-03-68-T,	Decision	on	Ongoing	Complaints	About	Prosecutorial	Non-Compliance	With	Rule	68	of	the	
Rules	(13	December	2005)	at	para.	20;	Lubanga	case,	Appeals	Chamber,	Decision	on	Request	of	the	
Defence	in	relation	to	Investigations	Conducted	Pursuant	to	Article	70...	(17	June	2014)	at	para.	22.	
128	 Prosecutor	v	Lukić	&	Lukić,	No.	IT-98-32/1-A,	Decision	on	Milan	Lukić’s	Motion	for	Remedies	Arising	
out	of	Disclosure	Violations	by	the	Prosecution	(12	May	2011)	at	para.	13;	Prosecutor	v	Karemera	et	al,	
No.	ICTR-98-44-AR73.7,	Decision	on	Interlocutory	Appeal	Regarding	the	Role	of	the	Prosecutor’s	
Electronic	Disclosure	Suite	in	Discharging	Disclosure	Obligations	(30	June	2006)	at	para.	9;	Prosecutor	v	
Karemera	et	al,	No.	ICTR-98-44-T,	Decision	on	Joseph	Nzirorera’s	Notices	of	Rule	68	Violation	and	
Motions	for	Remedial	and	Punitive	Measures	(25	October	2007)	at	para.	6;	Prosecutor	v	Karemera	et	al,	
No.	ICTR-98-44-T,	Decision	on	Joseph	Nzirorera’s	Sixth,	Seventh,	and	Eighth	Notices	of	Disclosure	
Violations	and	Motions	for	Remedial,	Punitive,	and	Other	Measures	(29	November	2007)	at	para.	7;	
Mugenzi	&	Mugiraneza	v	Prosecutor,	No.	ICTR-99-50-A,	Decision	on	Motions	for	Relief	for	Rule	68	
Violations	(24	September	2012)	at	para.	7.	
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breached.129 It is also emphasised many times that the onus on the prosecution, to 
comply with Rule 68, to the best of its ability, is not a secondary obligation; the 
prosecution’s obligation to disclose under Rule 68 is as important as the obligation to 
prosecute.130  
The rationale of this duty is that the prosecution has superior – and sometimes even sole 
– access to the exculpatory information.131 The prosecution’s duty to disclose 
exculpatory evidence is one of the best available ways to rebalance the inequality of 
arms between the two parties.  
B. Continuing Obligation 
The prosecution’s duty to disclose exculpatory evidence is a continuing, ongoing one.132   
It extends to the post-trial stage, including appeals,133 and even to the point after a final 
																																																								
129	 Prosecutor	v	Stakić,	No.	IT-97-24-A,	Judgement	(22	March	2006)	at	para.	188.	
130	 Prosecutor	v	Kordić	and	Čerkez,	No.	IT-65-14/2-A,	Judgement	(17	December	2004)	at	para.	183,	242;	
Prosecutor	v	Brdjanin,	No.	IT-99-36-A,	Decision	on	Appellant’s	Motion	for	Disclosure	Pursuant	to	Rule	68	
and	Motion	for	an	Order	the	Registrar	to	Disclose	Certain	Materials	(7	December	2004);	Prosecutor	v	
Karadžić,	No.	IT-95-5/18-T,	Decision	on	Prosecution’s	Request	for	Reconsideration	of	Trial	Chamber’s	11	
November	2010	Decision	(10	December	2010)	at	para.	10;	Ndindabahizi	v	Prosecutor,	No.	ICTR-01-71-A,	
Judgement	(16	January	2007)	at	para.	72.	
131	 Prosecutor	v	Kordić	and	Čerkez,	No.	IT-65-14/2-A,	Decision	on	Appellant’s	Notice	and	Supplemental	
Notice	of	Prosecution’s	Non-Compliance	with	its	Disclosure	Obligation	Under	Rule	68	of	the	Rules	(11	
February	2004)	at	para.	17.	
132	 ‘Continuous	nature’	Prosecutor	v	Bizimungu	et	al,	No.	ICTR-99-50-T,	Decision	on	Prosper	
Mugiraneza’s	Motion	Pursuant	to	Rule	68	for	Exculpatory	Evidence	Related	to	Witness	GKI	(14	
September	2004)	at	para.	8;	‘Ongoing’Prosecutor	v	Bizimungu	et	al,	No.	ICTR-99-50-T,	Decision	on	Justin	
Mugenzi’s	Motion	for	the	Recall	of	the	Prosecution	Fidele	Uwizeye	for	Further	Cross	Examination	(9	
October	2007)	at	para.	16.	
133	 Prosecutor	v	Brdjanin,	No.	IT-99-36-A,	Decision	on	Appellant’s	Motion	for	Disclosure	Pursuant	to	Rule	
68	and	Motion	for	an	Order	the	Registrar	to	Disclose	Certain	Materials	(7	December	2004);	Prosecutor	v	
Kordić	and	Čerkez,	No.	IT-65-14/2-A,	Decision	on	Appellant’s	Notice	and	Supplemental	Notice	of	
Prosecution’s	Non-Compliance	with	its	Disclosure	Obligation	Under	Rule	68	of	the	Rules	(11	February	
2004)	at	para.	17;	Prosecutor	v	Bralo,	No.	IT-95-17-A,	Decision	on	Motions	for	Access	to	Ex-Parte	Portions	
of	the	Record	on	Appeal	and	for	Disclosure	of	Mitigating	Material	(30	August	2006)	at	para.	29;	
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judgement.134 The term ‘continuing obligation’ has been defined to be understood as 
‘the Prosecution must, on a continuous basis, search all material known to the 
Prosecution, including all its files, in whatever form and in relation to all accused, for 
the existence or may affect the credibility of Prosecution evidence, and disclose the 
existence of such material completely to the defence.’135  
The focus on the continuity of the prosecution’s disclosure obligations underlines the 
rationale of disclosure in general. As held by the Court, the prosecution has the duty ‘to 
participate in the process of administering justice and to assist the Tribunal to arrive at 
the truth and to do justice for the international community, victims, and the accused.’136 
Note that, the fact that the prosecution has a continuing duty to disclose exculpatory 
evidence does not suggest that the prosecution can delay disclosure of material already 
in its possession or identify and disclose exculpatory material on a ‘rolling basis’.137 
																																																																																																																																																																		
Prosecutor	v	Karadžić,	No.	IT-95-5/18-T,	Decision	on	Prosecution’s	Request	for	Reconsideration	of	Trial	
Chamber’s	11	November	2010	Decision	(10	December	2010)	at	para.	11;	Niyitegeka	v	Prosecutor,	No.	
ICTR-96-14-R,	Decision	on	the	Prosecutor’s	Motion	to	Move	for	Decision	on	Niyitegeka’s	Requests	for	
Review	Pursuant	to	Rules	120	and	121	(28	September	2005)	at	page	8;	Prosecutor	v	Karemera	et	al,	No.	
ICTR-98-44-AR73.7,	Decision	on	Interlocutory	Appeal	Regarding	the	Role	of	the	Prosecutor’s	Electronic	
Disclosure	Suite	in	Discharging	Disclosure	Obligations	(30	June	2006)	at	para.	13.	
134	 Prosecutor	v	Milosević,	No.	IT-98-29/1-A,	Decision	on	Motion	Seeking	Disclosure	of	Rule	68	Material	
(7	September	2012)	at	para.	10.	The	Appeals	Chamber	also	held	that	the	stage	of	a	proceeding	is	not	a	
factor	to	be	considered	when	discharging	the	prosecution’s	disclosure	obligations.	ibid,	at	para.	12.	
135	 Prosecutor	v	Blagojević	&	Jokic,	No.	IT-02-60-T,	Joint	Decision	on	Motions	Related	to	Production	of	
Evidence	(12	December	2002)	at	para.	29;	Prosecutor	v	Blaškić,	No.	IT-95-14-T,	Decision	on	the	Defence	
Motion	for	Sanctions	for	the	Prosecutor's	Failure	to	Comply	with	Rule	66	(A)	of	the	Rules	and	the	
Decision	of	27	January	1997	Compelling	the	Production	of	all	Statements	of	the	Accused	(15	July	1998).	
136	 Prosecutor	v.	Karemera	et	al.,	Case	No.	ICTR-98-44-AR73.7,	Decision	on	Interlocutory	Appeal	
Regarding	the	Role	of	the	Prosecutor's	Electronic	Disclosure	Suite	in	Discharging	Disclosure	Obligations	
(30	June	2006)	at	para.9.	
137	 Prosecutor	v	Karadžić,	No.	IT-95-5/18-T,	Decision	on	Prosecution’s	Request	for	Reconsideration	of	
Trial	Chamber’s	11	November	2010	Decision	(10	December	2010)	at	para.	11;	Prosecutor	v	Karadžić,	
No.IT-95-5/18-T,	Decision	on	Accused’s	Seventeenth	bis	and	Twenty-Eighth	Disclosure	Violation	Motions	
(16	December	2010)	at	para.	23;	Prosecutor	v	Karadžić,	No.	IT-95-5/18-T,	Decision	on	Accused’s	47th	
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However, this seems to be the current practice of the ad hoc Tribunals. 
C. Initial Determination 
Similar to Rule 66 (B), it is the prosecutor who makes the initial determination whether 
a particular piece of material is exculpatory under Rule 68. It is primarily a fact-based 
judgement which the prosecutor is supposed to be acting in good faith.138 The 
prosecution is not under any legal obligation to consult with an accused to reach a 
decision on which material constitutes exculpatory. The Trial Chambers observed that, 
in view of the imperative to provide a fair trial to an accused, considerations of fairness 
must be the overriding factor in making that determination.139 Accordingly, the Courts 
will not intervene in the prosecution’s exercise of his freedom in such matters, unless it 
can be proved that there is an error in the prosecutor’s judgement.140 If the prosecution 
states that the requested material was reviewed and no exculpatory information was 
																																																																																																																																																																		
Motion	for	Finding	of	Disclosure	Violation	and	for	Further	Suspension	of	Proceedings	(10	May	2011)	at	
para.	11.	
138	 Prosecutor	v	Kordić	and	Čerkez,	No.	IT-65-14/2-A,	Judgement	(17	December	2004)	at	para.	183;	
Prosecutor	v	Oric,	No.	IT-03-68-T,	Decision	on	Ongoing	Complaints	About	Prosecutorial	Non-Compliance	
With	Rule	68	of	the	Rules	(13	December	2005)	at	para.	21;	Prosecutor	v	Bralo,	No.	IT-95-17-A,	Decision	
on	Motions	for	Access	to	Ex-Parte	Portions	of	the	Record	on	Appeal	and	for	Disclosure	of	Mitigating	
Material	(30	August	2006)	at	para	30;	Prosecutor	v	Karemera	et	al,	No.	ICTR-98-44-AR73.6,	Decision	on	
Joseph	Nzirorera’s	Interlocutory	Appeal	(28	April	2006)	at	paras.	16-17;	Prosecutor	v	Bagosora	et	al,	No.	
ICTR-98-41-T,	Decision	on	the	Ntabakuze	Motion	for	Disclosure	of	Various	Categories	of	Documents	
Pursuant	to	Rule	68	(6	October	2006)	at	para.	2;	Prosecutor	v	Setako,	No.	ICTR-04-81-I,	Decision	on	
Defence	Motions	on	Rule	68	Disclosure	(5	October	2007)	at	para.	5.	
139	 Prosecutor	v	Oric,	No.	IT-03-68-T,	Decision	on	Ongoing	Complaints	About	Prosecutorial	
Non-Compliance	With	Rule	68	of	the	Rules	(13	December	2005)	at	para.	21.	
140	 Prosecutor	v	Bagilishema,	No.	ICTR-95-1A-A,	Decision	On	the	Motion	for	a	Review	of	the	Decision	by	
the	President	of	the	Appeals	Chamber;	on	the	Motion	Pursuant	to	Article	73	of	the	Rules	of	Procedure	
and	Evidence	Praying	the	Chamber	to	Order	the	Prosecutor	to	Disclose	to	the	Defence	the	Tapes	
Containing	the	Recordings	of	Radio	Muhabura;	On	the	Motion	for	a	Review	of	the	Decision	by	the	
President	of	the	Appeals	Chamber	(6	February	2002)	
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found, the Trial Chamber will accept it so.141  
In addition, the Trial Chamber has the discretion to order the prosecution to disclose 
material which contains information contradicting a prosecution witness, but it would 
not be wrong if the Trial Chamber refuses to do so.142 It is also not necessary for the 
Trial Chamber to conduct an in camera inspection of the disputed material, given that 
the prosecution has the primary responsibility for determining whether material falls 
within Rule 68.143  
Nonetheless, there are certain categories of material that do not fall in the prosecution 
freedom of determination as to whether they constitute exculpatory or not. An ICTR 
Chamber has considered that witness’ criminal records, guilty pleas, confessions to 
crimes, or inconsistent statements are exculpatory as a matter of law and therefore must 
be disclosed to the defence.144 The ultimate determination of whether such evidence 
actually affects the credibility of prosecution evidence is for the Chamber in its final 
assessment.145 The premise is that the prosecution is acting bona fide; although the 
presumption is rebuttable,146 in effect, means that the accused will be under a heavy 
																																																								
141	 Prosecutor	v	Bagosora	et	al,	No.	ICTR-98-41-T,	Decision	on	the	Ntabakuze	Motion	for	Disclosure	of	
Various	Categories	of	Documents	Pursuant	to	Rule	68	(6	October	2006).	
142	 Prosecutor	v	Karemera	et	al,	No.	ICTR-98-44-AR73.6,	Decision	on	Joseph	Nzirorera’s	Interlocutory	
Appeal	(28	April	2006)	at	para.	17.	
143	 ibid,	at	para.	20.	
144	 Prosecutor	v	Bizimungu	et	al,	No.	ICTR-99-50-T,	Decision	on	Jerome-lement	Bicamumpaka’s	Urgent	
Motion	for	Disclosure	of	Exculpatory	Material	(9	February	2009)	at	paras.	9-10.	
145	 Prosecutor	v	Karadžić,	No.	IT-95-5/18-PT,	Decision	on	Accused’s	Forty-Ninth	and	Fiftieth	Disclosure	
Violation	Motions	(30	June	2011)	at	para.	39.	 	
146	 Prosecutor	v	Mladić,	No.	IT-09-92-AR73.2,	Decision	on	Defence	Interlocutory	Appeal	Against	the	Trial	
Chamber’s	Decision	on	EDS	Disclosure	Methods	(28	November	2013)	at	para.	24.	
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burden to prove a disclosure violation.   
D. Requirements of Rule 68  
In the ad hoc Tribunals, the test now to be applied for disclosure under Rule 68 is 
threefold: First, if the defence believes that the prosecution has not complied with Rule 
68, it must establish that additional evidence exists that might prove exculpatory or 
mitigating for the accused and is in the possession of the prosecution. Second, it must 
present a prima facie case which would make probable the exculpatory nature of the 
materials sought.147 Third, the items requested by the defence must be sufficiently 
specific.  
The defence can challenge the prosecution’s compliance with Rule 68 at any time. 
Although the duty to disclose material is on the prosecution, the burden to prove the 
breach of this duty is on the defence.148 The problem of disclosure violation is similar to 
the situation in the U.S., that there is a gap between recognising a disclosure failure and 
an imposition of remedy. With regard to the establishment of disclosure violations 
under Rule 68, the Courts have set out the above conditions for the defence to fulfil. But 
when it comes to addressing the appropriate remedy, the Chambers held an additional 
																																																								
147	 Prosecutor	v	Kordić	and	Čerkez,	No.	IT-65-14/2-A,	Judgement	(17	December	2004)	at	para	179;	
Prosecutor	v	Tihomir	Blaškić,	No.	IT-95-14-PT,	Decision	on	the	Production	of	Discovery	Materials	(27	
January	1997)	at	para.	49;	 	
Proseutor	v	Brdjanin,	No.	IT-99-36-A,	Decision	on	Appellant's	Motion	for	Disclosure	Pursuant	to	Rule	68	
and	Motion	for	an	Order	to	the	Registrar	to	Disclose	Certain	Materials	(7	December	2004)	p.3;	
Prosecutor	v	Bralo,	No.	IT-95-17-A,	Decision	on	Motions	for	Access	to	Ex-Parte	Portions	of	the	Record	on	
Appeal	and	for	Disclosure	of	Mitigating	Material	(30	August	2006)	at	para.	31.	
148	 E.g.	Prosecutor	v	Kordić	and	Čerkez,	No.	IT-65-14/2-A,	Judgement	(17	December	2004)	at	para	179.	
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requirement: even if the defence can establish that the prosecution has violated its duty 
under Rule 68, the Chamber will further examine whether the defence has been 
prejudiced by that breach of Rule 68.149  ICTY has added Rule 68bis to address the 
power of the Chamber to impose sanctions on a party should a disclosure violation 
occur. These requirements will be examined now.  
1. Exculpatory Nature 
The jurisprudence of the ad hoc Tribunals, reflecting the text of the Rule itself, has 
established the ambit of exculpatory evidence. That is, if information tends to suggest 
the innocence or mitigate the guilt of the accused, or affects the credibility of 
prosecution evidence, it will fall within the scope of Rule 68.  
However, as the countless disclosure motions demonstrated, there is still a degree of 
uncertainty regarding the actual scope of which type of material should be disclosed. 
Interestingly, the Chamber of the SCSL considers the plain meaning of what constitute 
exculpatory material to be ‘clear and ambiguous’.150 The SCSL Chamber held that 
under Rule 68, exculpatory evidence is simply evidence favourable to the accused.151 																																																								
149	 Prosecutor	v	Kordić	and	Čerkez,	No.	IT-65-14/2-A,	Judgement	(17	December	2004)	at	para.	179;	
Prosecutor	v	Blaškić,	No.	IT-95-14-A,	Judgement	(29	July	2004)	at	para.	268;	Prosecutor	v	Brdjanin	&	Talic,	
No.	IT-99-36-T,	Decision	on	“motion	for	relief	from	rule	68	violations	by	the	prosecutor	and	for	sanctions	
to	be	imposed	pursuant	to	rule	68bis	and	motion	for	adjournment	while	matters	affecting	justice	and	a	
fair	trial	can	be	resolved”	(30	October	2002)	at	para.	23;	Prosecutor	v	Bralo,	No.	IT-95-17-A,	Decision	on	
Motions	for	Access	to	Ex-Parte	Portions	of	the	Record	on	Appeal	and	for	Disclosure	of	Mitigating	
Material	(30	August	2006)	at	para.	31.	
150	 Prosecutor	v	Norman,	Fofana,	Kondewa,	No.	SCSL-04-14-T,	Request	for	Full	Review	of	Prosecution	
Evidence	to	Identify	Rule	68	Material	for	Disclosure	(6	November	2006)	at	para.	3.	
151	 Prosecutor	v	Norman,	Fofana,	Kondewa,	No.	SCSL-04-14-T,	Decision	on	Motion	to	Compel	the	
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This seems to be inconsistent with the reality of the ad hoc Tribunals. 
2. Not Admissibility 
It is important to note that Rule 68 material is not restricted to those which would be 
admissible in evidence. Rather, according to the Chambers, it includes all information 
that tends to ‘suggest the innocence or mitigate the guilt of an accused or may affect the 
credibility of prosecution evidence in any way, as well as material which may put an 
accused on notice that such material exists’.152 In addition, as clarified by the Trial 
Chamber, the threshold for disclosure of exculpatory material under Rule 68 is much 
higher than the standard for admissibility of evidence under Rule 89(C).153  
3. Standard: Relevance 
According to the ad hoc Tribunals’ jurisprudence, the standard for evaluating a certain 
piece of information to be considered exculpatory is whether there is any possibility, in 
light of the submissions of the parties, that the given material could be relevant to the 
defence of the accused.154 This standard of relevancy, however, is very difficult to 																																																																																																																																																																		
Production	of	Exculpatory	Witness	Statements,	Witness	Summaries	and	Materials	Pursuant	to	Rule	68	(8	
July	2004)	at	para.	23.	
152	 Prosecutor	v	Krstić,	No.	IT-98-33-A,	Judgement	(19	April	2004)	at	para.	178;	Prosecutor	v	Gotovina	et	
al,	No.	IT-06-90-T,	Decision	on	Ivan	Cermak’s	Motion	Requesting	the	Trial	Chamber	to	Order	the	
Prosecution	to	Disclose	Rule	68	Material	to	the	Defence	(7	August	2009)	at	para.	6;	Prosecutor	v	Kordić	
and	Čerkez,	No.	IT-65-14/2-A,	Decision	on	Motion	by	Dario	Kordic	for	Access	to	Unredacted	Portions	of	
October	2000	Interviews	With	Witness	AT	(23	May	2003)	at	para.	24.	
153	 Prosecutor	v	Karemera	et	al,	No.	ICTR-98-44-T,	Decision	on	Joseph	Nzirorera’s	Motions	for	Admission	
of	Written	Statements	and	Witness	Testimony	(15	July	2009)	at	para.	106.	
154	 Prosecutor	v	Lukić	&	Lukić,	No.	IT-98-32/1-A,	Decision	on	Milan	Lukić’s	Motion	for	Remedies	Arising	
out	of	Disclosure	Violations	by	the	Prosecution	(12	May	2011)	at	para.	14;	Prosecutor	v	Karemera	et	al,	
No.	ICTR-98-44-AR73.13,	Decision	on	Joseph	Nzirorera’s	Appeal	from	Decision	on	Tenth	Rule	68	Motion	
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implement, as seen in the practices before the domestic criminal courts and Rule 66 (B). 
The Chambers have to assess the exculpatory nature often on a case-by-case basis.  
There are three main categories of exculpatory evidence qualified in Rule 68: (i) 
evidence which might suggest the innocence of the accused, (ii) mitigate his guilt, or 
(iii) discredit the prosecution’s evidence. Given that the chances to establish defences in 
cases of international crimes are almost futile, the defence teams tend to adopt the 
strategy of the third type, to undermine the prosecution’s case. In this context, it is 
crucial for the accused to have access to all material that possibly might have this effect. 
As long as the material is favourable to the accused in the preparation of his defence, 
the prosecutor should disclose it, regardless of the nature and type of the material.155 In 
addition, Rule 68 does not merely require the prosecution to disclose to the defence the 
existence of exculpatory evidence, but to physically disclose any such evidence in the 
prosecution’s control, custody or possession.156 
																																																																																																																																																																		
(14	May	2008)	at	para.	12;	Prosecutor	v	Karemera	et	al,	No.	ICTR-98-44-T,	Decision	on	Joseph	Nzirorera’s	
Notices	of	Rule	68	Violation	and	Motions	for	Remedial	and	Punitive	Measures	(25	October	2007)	at	para.	
6;	Prosecutor	v	Karemera	et	al,	No.	ICTR-98-44-T,	Decision	on	Joseph	Nzirorera’s	13th,	14th,	and	15th	
Notices	of	Rule	68	Violation	and	Motions	for	Remedial	and	Punitive	Measures:	ZF,	Michel	Bakuzakundi,	
and	Tharcisse	Renzaho	(18	February	2009)	at	para.	3;	Prosecutor	v	Karemera	et	al,	No.	
ICTR-98-44-AR73.13,	Decision	on	Joseph	Nzirorera’s	Appeal	from	Decision	on	Tenth	Rule	68	Motion	(14	
May	2008)	at	para.	12;	Prosecutor	v	Bagosora	et	al,	No.	ICTR-98-	41-T,	Decision	on	Disclosure	of	Defence	
Witness	Statements	in	the	Possession	of	the	Prosecution	Pursuant	to	Rule	68(A)	(8	March	2006)	at	para.	
5;	Prosecutor	v	Karemera	et	al,	No.	ICTR-98-44-T,	Decision	on	Joseph	Nzirorera’s	Eleventh	Notice	of	Rule	
68	Violation	and	Motion	for	Stay	of	Proceedings	(11	September	2008)	at	para.	6;	Prosecutor	v	Karemera	
et	al,	No.	ICTR-98-44-T,	Decision	on	Prosecutor’s	Rule	68(D)	Application	and	Joseph	Nzirorera’s	12th	
Notice	of	Rule	68	Violation	(26	March	2009)	at	para.	12.	
155	 Prosecutor	v	Bizimungu	et	al,	No.	ICTR-99-50-T,	Decision	on	Prosper	Mugiraneza’s	Motion	Pursuant	
to	Rule	68	for	Exculpatory	Evidence	Related	to	Witness	GKI	(14	September	2004)	at	para.	8.	
156	 Prosecutor	v	Karemera	et	al,	No.	ICTR-98-44-I,	Decision	on	the	Defence	Motion	for	Disclosure	of	
Exculpatory	Evidence	(7	October	2003)	at	para.	8.	
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4. Suggests innocence and Mitigation of Guilt or Sentence 
If the information might suggest the innocence of the accused, it should be disclosed. 
The Chambers have pointed out that the disclosure obligation under Rule 68 is not 
limited to material which is exculpatory on its face. For material to fall within the ambit 
of Rule 68, it is not required that it in fact suggests the innocence of the accused; it is 
sufficient that it may so suggest.157 
Recordings or notes of meetings at which the accused claimed he was promised 
immunity if he resigned from public office may mitigate an eventual sentence and was 
within Rule 68.158 
5. Affecting the Credibility of the Prosecution’s Evidence  
Contradicts Prosecution Evidence 
What kind of material will ‘affect the credibility of the prosecution’s evidence’? As 
clarified by the ICTY Chambers, if the said evidence could undermine the case 
presented by the prosecution at trial.159 This is in line with the jurisprudence of the 
																																																								
157	 Prosecutor	v	Krajisnik,	No.	IT-00-39-T,	Decision	on	Defence	Motion	on	Rule	68	of	the	Rules	of	
Procedure	and	Evidence	(2	June	2006)	at	para.	9;	Prosecutor	v	Gotovina	et	al,	No.	IT-06-90-T,	Decision	on	
Ivan	Cermak’s	Motion	Requesting	the	Trial	Chamber	to	Order	the	Prosecution	to	Disclose	Rule	68	
Material	to	the	Defence	(7	August	2009)	at	para.	11.	
158	 Prosecutor	v	Karadžić,	No.	IT-95-5/18-PT,	Decision	on	Accused’s	Second	Motion	for	Inspection	and	
Disclosure:	Immunity	Issue	(17	December	2008)	at	para.	21.	
159	 Prosecutor	v	Krstić,	No.	IT-98-33-A,	Judgement	(19	April	2004)	at	para.	178;	Prosecutor	v	Gotovina	et	
al,	No.	IT-06-90-T,	Decision	on	Ivan	Cermak’s	Motion	Requesting	the	Trial	Chamber	to	Order	the	
Prosecution	to	Disclose	Rule	68	Material	to	the	Defence	(7	August	2009)	at	para.	6.	
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common law countries.160 Accordingly, information which contradicts or calls into 
doubt the information provided by any prosecution witness, or which affects their 
credibility, as well as any information tending to show that the accused attempted to 
stop the killings would qualify as exculpatory evidence.161  
Inconsistency 
In the context of the ICTY and ICTR, it is common for the witnesses to testify in 
multiple proceedings, the testimonies of that witness given in other trials must be 
disclosed pursuant to Rule 68.162 If there are any inconsistencies in a witness’s account, 
the prosecution has a general obligation to make a record of it and disclose it to the 
defence. For example, notes of a prior witness statement which was inconsistent with 
the later statement;163 if a witness statement was contradictory to testimonies of other 
prosecution witnesses;164 if a witness statement contradicts facts judicially noticed, they 
must be disclosed.165 Information contradicting the testimony of a prosecution witness, 																																																								
160	 See	Chapter	V	and	VI.	
161	 Prosecutor	v	Karemera	et	al,	No.	ICTR-98-44-I,	Decision	on	the	Defence	Motion	for	Disclosure	of	
Exculpatory	Evidence	(7	October	2003)	at	para.	12-13;	Prosecutor	v	Karemera	et	al,	No.	ICTR-98-44-PT,	
Decision	on	Joseph	Nzirorera’s	Motion	to	Compel	Inspection	and	Disclosure	(5	July	2005)	at	para.	15;	
Prosecutor	v	Karemera	et	al,	No.	ICTR-98-44-T,	Oral	Decision	on	Disclosure	of	Material	from	Joseph	
Serugendo	(30	May	2006);	Prosecutor	v	Karemera	et	al,	No.	ICTR-98-44-T,	Decision	on	Defence	Motions	
for	Disclosure	of	Information	Obtained	from	Juvenal	Uwilingiyimana	(27	April	2006)	at	para.	9.	
162	 Prosecutor	v	Kordić	and	Čerkez,	No.	IT-65-14/2-A,	Decision	on	Appellant’s	Notice	and	Supplemental	
Notice	of	Prosecution’s	Non-Compliance	with	its	Disclosure	Obligation	Under	Rule	68	of	the	Rules	(11	
February	2004)	at	para.20.	
163	 Prosecutor	v	Haradinaj	et	al,	No.	IT-04-84bis-T,	Decision	onHaradinaj	Motion	for	Disclosure	of	
Exculpatory	Materials	in	Relation	to	Witness	81	(18	November	2011)	at	para.	33;	Prosecutor	v	Bizimungu	
et	al,	No.	ICTR-99-50-T,	Judgement	(30	September	2011)	at	paras.	146,	148.	
164	 Prosecutor	v	Oric,	No.	03-68-T,	Decision	on	Alleged	Prosecution	Non-Compliance	With	Disclosure	
Obligations	Under	Rule	66(B)	and	68(i)	(29	September	2005).	
165	 Prosecutor	v	Karadžić,	No.	IT-95-5/18-T,	Decision	on	Accused’s	Ninety-Fourth	Disclosure	Violation	
Motion	(14	October	2014)	at	para.	14.	
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even if that testimony was later excluded, were required to be disclosed because it 
nevertheless affects the credibility of the prosecution witness. 166 
The burden is on the prosecution to refute the possibility that disclosure of prior 
testimony of a witness in another case at the Tribunal contains exculpatory evidence or 
affects the credibility of prosecution witnesses.167 
Benefits to prosecution witnesses 
Any material in the possession of the prosecution establishing that the prosecution has 
provided or may provide any objective form of assistance, such as benefits or promises, 
to prosecution witnesses or their families would fall squarely within the purview of 
Rule 68.168 If a witness has requested and/or received benefits from being a prosecution 
witness, it may affect the credibility of the said witness and therefore should be 
disclosed pursuant to Rule 68.169 For example, letter or the request of a letter which 
																																																								
166	 Prosecutor	v	Karemera	et	al,	No.	ICTR-98-44-T,	Decision	on	Joseph	Nzirorera’s	13th,	14th,	and	15th	
Notices	of	Rule	68	Violation	and	Motions	for	Remedial	and	Punitive	Measures:	ZF,	Michel	Bakuzakundi,	
and	Tharcisse	Renzaho	(18	February	2009)	at	para.	8.	
167	 Prosecutor	v	Karemera	et	al,	No.	ICTR-98-44-PT,	Decision	on	Juvenal	Kajelijeli’s	Motion	for	Disclosure	
of	Open	and	Closed	Session	Testimony,	Exhibits,	and	Pre-Trial	Statements	of	Prosecution	Witnesses	GBU	
and	GFA	(24	November	2004).	
168	 Prosecutor	v	Haradinaj,	No.	IT-04-84bis-T,	Decision	on	Joint	Defence	Motion	for	Relief	from	Rule	68	
Violations	by	the	Prosecution	and	for	Sanctions	Pursuant	to	Rule	68	bis	(12	October	2011)	at	para.	45;	
Prosecutor	v	Karemera	et	al,	No.	ICTR-98-44-I,	Decision	on	the	Defence	Motion	for	Disclosure	of	
Exculpatory	Evidence	(7	October	2003)	at	para.	16.	
169	 Prosecutor	v	Karadžić,	No.	IT-95-5/18-T,	Decision	on	Accused’s	Sixtieth,	Sixty-First,	Sixty-Third,	and	
Sixty-Fourth	Disclosure	Violation	Motions	(22	November	2011)	at	para.	23;	Prosecutor	v	Karadžić,	No.	
IT-95-5/18-T,	Decision	on	Accused’s	Sixty-Fifth	Disclosure	Violation	Motion	(12	January	2012)	at	para.16;	
Prosecutor	v	Karadžić,	No.	IT-95-5/18-T,	Decision	on	Accused’s	Sixty-Sixth	and	Sixty-Seventh	Disclosure	
Violation	Motions	(1	March	2012)	at	para.	17.	
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would assist a witness’s asylum application, must be disclosed.170 
The burden of showing that undisclosed benefits have been given to witnesses is, 
however, on the defence.171 Undoubtedly, proving the existence of such undisclosed 
benefits is far from easy for the defence team, due to the simple fact that this would 
require undisclosed information. When dealing with situations concerning the 
prosecution payments to the witnesses, the ICTR has set up a high threshold. For 
example, in Karemera, the Chamber held that the payments need only be disclosed 
when they are beyond reasonable payments required for the management of witnesses 
such as expenses for transportation in connection with investigation and hearings.172 
From a practical point of view, it is difficult to imagine how the defence team will be 
able to prove such ‘beyond reasonable payments’, since the defence simply will not 
have such information available.  
In contrast, the approach taken by the ICTY appears to be more reasonable. For instance, 
in Halilović, the prosecution was ordered by the Trial Chamber to provide the defence 
with ‘a list identifying those proposed witnesses who have entered into favourable 
																																																								
170	 Prosecutor	v	Haradinaj,	No.	IT-04-84bis-T,	Decision	on	Joint	Defence	Motion	for	Relief	from	Rule	68	
Violations	by	the	Prosecution	and	for	Sanctions	Pursuant	to	Rule	68	bis	(12	October	2011)	at	para.51;	
Prosecutor	v	Karadžić,	No.	IT-95-5/18-T,	Decision	on	Accused’s	Sixtieth,	Sixty-First,	Sixty-Third,	and	
Sixty-Fourth	Disclosure	Violation	Motions	(22	November	2011)	at	paras.	25,27,29,31;	Prosecutor	v	
Karadžić,	No.	IT-95-5/18-T,	Decision	on	Accused’s	Eighty-Third	Disclosure	Violation	Motion	(21	
November	2013)	at	para.	10.	
171	 Prosecutor	v	Karemera	et	al,	No.	ICTR-98-44-PT,	Decision	on	Defence	Motion	for	Full	Disclosure	of	
Payments	to	Witnesses	and	to	Exclude	Testimony	from	Paid	Witnesses	(23	August	2005)	at	para.	7.	
172	 Prosecutor	v	Karemera	et	al,	No.	ICTR-98-44-PT,	Decision	on	Defence	Motion	for	Full	Disclosure	of	
Payments	to	Witnesses	and	to	Exclude	Testimony	from	Paid	Witnesses	(23	August	2005)	at	para.	6.	
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arrangements’.173 
The witnesses might be recalled for cross-examination after late disclosure of the 
promises or benefits. However, it must be shown that witness’ statements or testimonies 
have materially changed after the promise or benefit relating to their immigration 
status.174 Records of the detention of the witness in Rwanda may affect his credibility 
where he may have sought a benefit by cooperating with the Tribunal, and such records 
ordered disclosed pursuant to Rule 68.175 
With regard to the record of payments made to witness protection programs, the Trial 
Chamber will decide in camera whether they should be disclosed to the defence.176 In 
Bizimungu, the Chamber ordered the prosecution to disclose to the defence amounts 
paid for witness protection as well as future payments.177 
Criminal records 
Criminal records of prosecution witnesses also fall under Rule 68 of the Rules in that 
they may affect the credibility of prosecution evidence.178 The character of the witness, 
including evidence of involvement in crimes, is relevant to and therefore ’may affect’ 																																																								
173	 Prosecutor	v	Halilović,	No.	IT-01-48-PT	Decision	on	Defence	Motion	for	Identification	of	Suspects	and	
other	Categories	Among	its	Proposed	Witnesses,	(14	November	2003)	at	para.	3.	
174	 Prosecutor	v	Karadžić,	No.	IT-95-5/18-T,	Decision	on	Accused’s	Sixty-Fifth	Disclosure	Violation	Motion	
(12	January	2012)	at	para.	23;	Prosecutor	v	Karadžić,	No.	IT-95-5/18-T,	Decision	on	Accused’s	
Eighty-Third	Disclosure	Violation	Motion	(21	November	2013)	at	para.	11.	
175	 Prosecutor	v	Bizimungu	et	al,	No.	ICTR-99-50-T,	Decision	on	Justin	Mugenzi’s	Motion	for	the	Recall	of	
the	Prosecution	Fidele	Uwizeye	for	Further	Cross	Examination	(9	October	2007)	at	para.	17.	
176	 Prosecutor	v	Bizimungu	et	al,	No.	ICTR-99-50-T,	Decision	on	Prosper	Mugiraneza’s	Motion	for	
Records	of	all	Payments	Made	Directly	or	Indirectly	to	Witness	D	(28	September	2006).	
177	 Prosecutor	v	Bizimungu	et	al,	No.	ICTR-99-50-T,	Decision	on	Prosper	Mugiraneza’s	Motion	for	
Records	of	all	Payments	Made	Directly	or	Indirectly	to	Witness	D	(18	February	2008)	at	para.	8.	
178	 Prosecutor	v	Karemera	et	al,	No.	ICTR-98-44-I,	Decision	on	the	Defence	Motion	for	Disclosure	of	
Exculpatory	Evidence	(7	October	2003)	at	para.	19.	
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the witness’ credibility. Moreover, desires to obtain lesser punishment or shift blame for 
one’s crimes to another are motives which may affect a witness’ credibility. 179 
Alibi 
If the prosecution has information which might support an alibi of the accused, it must 
disclose them. In Niyitegeka, the Chamber found that the prosecutor violated its 
disclosure obligation by failing to disclose documents once it had learned of the 
specifics of the alibi.180  
Failure to implicate the accused 
If an item fails to mention the presence of the accused at a particular event, it is not 
considered exculpatory.181 However, the absence of any reference to the accused in the 
testimony with regard to the same events examined in another trial is potentially 
exculpatory.182 In addition, in the context of the ICTR, documents indicating that the 
United States government was not aware of evidence that genocide was planned was 
exculpatory considering that United States government conducted active intelligence 
																																																								
179	 Prosecutor	v	Bizimungu	et	al,	No.	ICTR-99-50-T,	Decision	on	Jerome-Clement	Bicamumpaka’s	Urgent	
Motion	for	Disclosure	of	Exculpatory	Material	(9	February	2009)	at	para.	8.	
180	 Niyitegeka	v	Prosecutor,	No.	ICTR-96-14-R,	Decision	on	Request	for	Review	(7	March	2007)	at	para.29;	
Niyitegeka	v	Prosecutor,	No.	ICTR-96-14-R,	Decision	on	Third	Request	for	Review	(23	January	2008)	at	
para.	26.	
181	 Niyitegeka	v	Prosecutor,	No.	ICTR-96-14-R,	Decision	on	Request	for	Review	(30	June	2006)	at	para.70;	
Prosecutor	v	Kalimanzira,	No.	ICTR-05-88-T,	Oral	Decision	on	Defence	Motion	to	Exclude	Evidence	or	
Recall	Witnesses	Filed	on	9	February	2009	(13	February	2009).	
182	 Kalimanzira	v	Prosecutor,	No.	ICTR-05-88-A,	Judgement	(20	October	2010)	at	para.	20.	
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gathering in Rwanda, and failure to disclose it violated Rule 68.183 
Public Material 
An attempted limitation put forth by the prosecution is that public material should be 
exempted from its disclosure duty pursuant to Rule 68. The prosecution often contended 
that its Rule 68 obligations are relieved if it feels that the accused might be able to find 
the information on his own.184 The ICTY seemed to accept this contention. In the 
Blaškić Appeals Judgment, the Chamber further made a distinction between ‘material of 
a public character in the public domain’ and ‘material reasonably accessible to the 
defence’. Only when the material is available to the defence through the exercise of due 
diligence, then the prosecution may be relived from its duty.185 The Appeals Chamber, 
citing its reason pursuant to a previous Blaškić decision,186 stated that there would be no 
prejudice to the defence ‘if the exculpatory nature of the evidence is known and the 
material is accessible to the accused.’187 For example, when the material is already 
																																																								
183	 Prosecutor	v	Karemera	et	al,	No.	ICTR-98-44-T,	Decision	on	Motion	for	Partial	Reconsideration	of	the	
Decision	on	Joseph	Nzirorera’s	Tenth	Notice	of	Rule	68	Violation	(16	April	2008)	at	para.	10.	
184	 E.g.	Prosecutor	v	Blaškić,	No.IT-95-14-A,	Judgement	(29	July	2004)	at	para.	287.	
185	 Prosecutor	v	Bralo,	No.	IT-95-17-A,	Decision	on	Motions	for	Access	to	Ex-Parte	Portions	of	the	Record	
on	Appeal	and	for	Disclosure	of	Mitigating	Material	(30	August	2006)	at	para.	30;	Niyitegeka	v	The	
Prosecutor,	No.	ICTR–96–14–R,	Decision	on	Request	for	Review	(30	June	2006)	at	para.	51;	Prosecutor	v	
Brdjanin,	No.	IT-99-36-A,	Decision	on	Appellant’s	Motion	for	Disclosure	Pursuant	to	Rule	68	and	Motion	
for	an	Order	the	Registrar	to	Disclose	Certain	Materials	(7	December	2004)	at	para.	4;	Prosecutor	v	
Blaškić,	No.IT-95-14-A,	Judgement	(29	July	2004)	at	para.	296.	
186	 Prosecutor	v	Blaškić,	No.	IT-95-14-A,	Decision	on	the	Appellant's	Motions	for	the	Production	of	
Material,	Suspension	or	Extension	of	the	Briefing	Schedule,	and	Additional	Filings	(26	September	2000).	
187	 Prosecutor	v	Bralo,	No.	IT-95-17-A,	Decision	on	Motions	for	Access	to	Ex-Parte	Portions	of	the	Record	
on	Appeal	and	for	Disclosure	of	Mitigating	Material	(30	August	2006)	at	para.	30.	
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available on the Tribunal website, the Rule 68 obligation is considered relieved.188 
This view, however, is not completely shared by the ICTR.189 One Trial Chamber 
recalls that the duty to disclose exculpatory material is of a positive and continuing 
nature and, therefore, the public nature of the material should have no impact upon the 
issue of whether the prosecution has discharged its disclosure obligations under Rule 
68.190 Another Trial Chamber found that the prosecution has a duty to disclose the 
material open session testimony from another trial when it is exculpatory, even though 
transcripts may be publicly available unless it can show that the accused was put on 
notice of the testimony.191 
The central question then boils down to the determination of whether the particular 
exculpatory material is reasonably accessible, and whether its existence is known to the 
defence. This would require a careful examination, depending on the relevant 
circumstances.192 As regard with the ICC, the single judge in Katanga held that the 
																																																								
188	 Prosecutor	v	Gotovina	et	al,	No.	IT-06-90-T,	Decision	on	Ivan	Cermak’s	Motion	Requesting	the	Trial	
Chamber	to	Order	the	Prosecution	to	Disclose	Rule	68	Material	to	the	Defence	(7	August	2009)	at	para.	
12.	
189	 Prosecutor	v	Karemera	et	al,	No.	ICTR-98-44-T,	Decision	on	Joseph	Nzirorera’s	13th,	14th,	and	15th	
Notices	of	Rule	68	Violation	and	Motions	for	Remedial	and	Punitive	Measures:	ZF,	Michel	Bakuzakundi,	
and	Tharcisse	Renzaho	(18	February	2009)	at	para.	21	(The	Chamber	disagrees	with,	and	finds	absolutely	
lacking	in	merit,	the	prosecution’s	contention	that	it	does	not	have	to	abide	by	established	Rule	68	
obligations	when	it	feels	that	the	accused	might	be	able	to	find	the	information	on	his	own.)	
190	 Prosecutor	v	Bizimungu	et	al,	No.	ICTR-99-50-T,	Decision	on	Justin	Mugenzi’s	Motion	to	Admit	
Transcript	Extracts	of	General	Romeo	Dallaire‘s	Evidence	in	the	Ndindilyimana	Proceedings	(4	November	
2008)	at	paras.	10,	19.	
191	 Prosecutor	v	Niyitegeka,	No.	ICTR-96-14-R,	Decision	on	Third	Request	for	Review	(23	January	2008)	at	
para.	27.	
192	 Prosecutor	v.	Karemera	et	al.,	Case	No.	ICTR-98-44-AR73.7,	Decision	on	Interlocutory	Appeal	
Regarding	the	Role	of	the	Prosecutor's	Electronic	Disclosure	Suite	in	Discharging	Disclosure	Obligations,	
30	June	2006,	para.15.	
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prosecution is obligated to disclose exculpatory material regardless of whether it is in 
the public domain.193 
6. Possession of the Prosecution 
Rule 68 requires the prosecution to disclose material which is in its ‘actual knowledge’. 
This term, however, was narrowly interpreted by the ad hoc tribunals, to mean material 
which was within the ‘custody, control or possession’ of the prosecution. The Trial 
Chamber in Bagilishema recognised that, thereby adopting a literal interpretation of 
Rule 68, extreme circumstances would allow for innumerable motions to engage the 
prosecutor into investigating materials in the hands of a third party. This would affect 
the independency of the prosecution. Therefore, the Trial Chamber decided to treat the 
term ‘known’ as ‘custody, control of possession’. This interpretation, as stated by the 
Chamber, is also in line with the wording used in Rules 66 (B) and 67 (C) of the Rules. 
The point being, the disclosure obligation of the prosecution will only be effective when 
the prosecutor is in actual custody, control or possession of the said evidence. The 
prosecution cannot disclose that which he does not have.194 
The main effect of this requirement, is that there is no presumption of possession ‒ the 
																																																								
193	 Katanga	case,	Single	Judge:	Decision	on	the	19	June	2008	Prosecution	Information	and	Other	Matters	
concerning	Articles	54(3)(e)	and	67(2)	of	the	Statute	and	Rule	77	of	the	Rules	(25	June	2008)	at	para.	11.	
194	 Prosecutor	v	Bagilishema,	No.	ICTR-95-1A-T,	Decision	on	the	Request	of	the	Defence	for	an	Order	for	
Disclosure	by	the	Prosecutor	of	the	Admissions	of	Guilt	of	Witnesses	Y,	Z	and	AA	(8	June	2000)	at	paras.	
6-7;	Prosecutor	v	Kajelijeli,	No.	ICTR-98-44A-T,	Decision	on	Kajelijeli’s	Urgent	Motion	and	Certification	
with	Appendices	in	Support	of	Urgent	Motion	for	Disclosure	of	Materials	Pursuant	to	Rule	66(B)	and	Rule	
68	of	the	Rules	of	Procedure	and	Evidence	(5	July	2001)	at	para.	14.	
		
 		
	
268 
accused must show that a document claimed to be exculpatory is in the possession of 
the prosecution.195 In addition, Rule 68 prima facie obliges the prosecution to monitor 
the testimony of witnesses, and to disclose material relevant to the impeachment of the 
witness, during or after testimony. If the amount of material is extensive, the parties are 
entitled to request an adjournment in order to properly prepare themselves.196  
Specificity 
Similar to Rule 66(B), a request for materials pursuant to Rule 68 must be specific as to 
the nature of the evidence sought and its being in the possession of the prosecution, but 
need not precisely identify which documents should be disclosed.197 Accordingly, the 
request for evidence of all crimes committed by Serb forces in the South sector from 
1991-95 was sufficiently specific under Rule 68.198 However, in some cases it might 
prove difficult to assess what is specific enough for the Chambers. For example, in 
Karadžić, despite the trial Chamber found that the evidence of agreement that the 
accused would not be prosecuted at ICTY was relevant to mitigation, the request for 
‘any items in the possession of the prosecution supporting the accused’s contention that 
such an agreement was made’ was considered insufficiently specific to require 																																																								
195	 Kanyurikiga	v	Prosecutor,	No.	ICTR-2002-78-AR73,	Decision	on	Kanyurikiga’s	Interlocutory	Appeal	of	
Decision	on	Disclosure	and	Return	of	Exculpatory	Documents	(19	February	2010)	at	para.	16.	
196	 Prosecutor	v	Krstić,	No.	IT-98-33-A,	Judgement	(19	April	2004)	at	para.	206;	Prosecutor	v	Lukić	&	
Lukić,	No.	IT-98-32/1-A,	Decision	on	Milan	Lukić’s	Motion	for	Remedies	Arising	out	of	Disclosure	
Violations	by	the	Prosecution	(12	May	2011)	at	para.	14.	
197	 Prosecutor	v	Bralo,	No.	IT-95-17-A,	Decision	on	Motions	for	Access	to	Ex-Parte	Portions	of	the	Record	
on	Appeal	and	for	Disclosure	of	Mitigating	Material	(30	August	2006)	at	para.	30.	
198	 Prosecutor	v	Gotovina	et	al,	No.	IT-06-90-T,	Decision	on	Ivan	Cermak’s	Motion	Requesting	the	Trial	
Chamber	to	Order	the	Prosecution	to	Disclose	Rule	68	Material	to	the	Defence	(7	August	2009)	at	
para.10.	
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production pursuant to Rule 68.199 
E. Form of Disclosure  
The purpose of Rule 68 could only be properly fulfilled if the prosecution identify the 
relevant exculpatory part and disclose the material in its original form. As noted by 
Zappalà, ‘the very heart of the disclosure of exculpatory material is their identification 
and characterisation as exculpatory.’200 However, the current practice seems to be 
somewhat unclear in the ad hoc tribunals.  
Identification 
The early practice of the ICTY indicates that the prosecution should identify the 
exculpatory material in light of its general disclosure duty. The Trial Chamber, in 
Krajisnik, noted that albeit Rule 68 is silence on its face, ‘as a matter of practice and in 
order to secure a fair and expeditious trial, the prosecutor should normally indicate 
which material it is disclosing under the Rule and it is no answer to say that the defence 
are in a better position to identify it.’201 In the same vain, in Brdanin, the Chamber 
stated ‘the prosecution alone is responsible for identifying which evidence might be 
																																																								
199	 Prosecutor	v	Karadžić,	No.	IT-95-5/18-PT,	Decision	on	Accused	Motion	for	Interview	of	Defence	
Witness	and	Third	Motion	for	Disclosure	(9	April	2009)	at	para.	27.	
200	 Salvatore	Zappalà,	‘The	Prosecutor’s	Duty	to	Disclose	Exculpatory	Materials	and	the	Recent	
Amendment	to	Rule	68	ICTY	RPE’	(2004)	2	J.	Int’l	Crim.	Just.	620,	620.	
201	 Prosecutor	v	Krajisnik	and	Plavsic,	No.	IT-00-39&40-PT,	Decision	on	Motion	from	Momcilo	Krajisnik	to	
Compel	Disclosure	of	Exculpatory	Evidence	Pursuant	to	Rule	68	(19	July	2001)	at	page	2.	
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exculpatory and for disclosing Rule 68 material.’202  
This position seems to be changed by the Kristić Appeals Chamber in 2004. It held, 
instead, that while it might be fairer for the prosecution to do so, Rule 68 does not 
require the prosecution to identify the material being disclosed to the defence as 
exculpatory.203 It is interesting to note that the Kristić judgment is delivered after the 
December 2003 amendment to Rule 68, which introduced Rule 68(B), stating that the 
prosecution can disclose exculpatory material via electronic means.204 This created a 
new field of disclosure disputes before the Trial Chambers. The prosecution, equipped 
with the judgement in Kristić and a new mandate to disclose electronically, starting to 
make claims that they have fulfilled its Rule 68 obligation by placing the material on the 
Electronic Disclosure System (‘EDS’).205 However, in Karemera, the Appeals Chamber 
did not accept this argument. It made clear that the EDS does not relieve the prosecution 
from complying with its obligations under Rule 68(A) to disclose ‘as soon as 
practicable’.206 Rule 68(B) disclosure is merely the ‘digital equivalent’ of disclosure 																																																								
202	 Prosecutor	v	Brdanin	&	Talic,	No.	IT-99-36-T	Decision	on	“Motion	for	Relief	from	Rule	68	Violation	by	
the	Prosecutor	and	for	Sanctions	to	be	Imposed	Pursuant	to	Rule	68bis	and	Motion	for	Adjournment	
while	Matters	affecting	Justice	and	a	Fair	Trial	can	be	Resolved”	(30	October	2002)	at	para.	23.	This	is	
later	confirmed	by	the	ICTR	Appeals	Chamber.	See	Prosecutor	v	Karemera	et	al.,	No.	 	
ICTR-98-44-AR73.7,	Decision	on	Interlocutory	Appeal	Regarding	the	Role	of	the	Prosecutor’s	Electronic	
Disclosure	Suite	in	Discharging	Disclosure	Obligations	(30	June	2006)	at	para.	9.	 	
203	 Prosecutor	v	Krstić,	No.	IT-98-33-A,	Judgement	(19	April	2004)	at	para.	190.	
204	 Tochilovsky,	‘Defence	Access	to	the	Prosecution	Material’	(n	192)	1089.	
205	 Gibson	and	Lussiaá-Berdou	(n	18)	330.	See	e.g.	Prosecutor	v	Karemera,	No.	ICTR-98-44-AR.73.7,	
Prosecutor’s	Interlocutory	Appeal	of	the	Trial	Chamber	s	Decision	Given	Orally	on	16	February	2006	
Regarding	the	Role	of	the	Electronic	Disclosure	Suite	in	Discharging	the	Prosecution’s	Disclosure	
Obligations	(6	March	2006)	at	paras.	2,	20,	26.	
206	 Prosecutor	v	Karemera	et	al,	No.	ICTR-98-44-AR73.7,	Decision	on	Interlocutory	Appeal	Regarding	the	
Role	of	the	Prosecutor’s	Electronic	Disclosure	Suite	in	Discharging	Disclosure	Obligations	(30	June	2006)	
at	para.	10;	Prosecutor	v	Karemera	et	al,	No.	ICTR-98-44-PT,	Decision	on	Joseph	Nzirorera’s	Motion	to	
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under Rule 68(A). It does not provide a license to fail to identify the exculpatory 
material to the defence.207 Accordingly, placing a particular piece of material on the 
EDS does not necessarily make that piece of material ‘reasonably accessible’ to a 
particular accused.208  
After few years of litigations, it has been established that the EDS cannot be used as a 
substitute for positive disclosure.209 However, the Trial Chamber seems to accept that 
the prosecution’s Rule 68 obligations are satisfied if the material on the EDS is placed 
in a separate folder and if the accused is notified of that material posted on the EDS. 210 
The Chamber considered that disclosure on the EDS is, however, insufficient if the 
defence has not consented.211 The conclusion is that the prosecution’s Rule 68 
obligations extend beyond simply making available its entire evidence collection in 
searchable format. 212 In addition, the prosecution cannot use its failure to update its 
																																																																																																																																																																		
Compel	Inspection	and	Disclosure	(5	July	2005)	at	para.	15;	Prosecutor	v	Karemera	et	al,	No.	
ICTR-98-44-T,	Decision	on	Joseph	Nzirorera’s	Tenth	Notice	of	Disclosure	Violations	and	Motion	for	
Remedial	and	Punitive	Measures	(5	February	2008)	at	para.	8.	
207	 Prosecutor	v	Karemera	et	al,	No.	ICTR-98-44-AR73.7,	Decision	on	Interlocutory	Appeal	Regarding	the	
Role	of	the	Prosecutor’s	Electronic	Disclosure	Suite	in	Discharging	Disclosure	Obligations	(30	June	2006)	
at	para.	13.	
208	 Prosecutor	v	Karemera	et	al,	No.	ICTR-98-44-AR73.7,	Decision	on	Interlocutory	Appeal	Regarding	the	
Role	of	the	Prosecutor’s	Electronic	Disclosure	Suite	in	Discharging	Disclosure	Obligations	(30	June	2006)	
at	para.	15.	
209	 Prosecutor	v	Mladic,	No.	IT-09-92-AR73.2,	Decision	on	Defence	Interlocutory	Appeal	Against	the	Trial	
Chamber’s	Decision	on	EDS	Disclosure	Methods	(28	November	2013)	at	para.	25.	
210	 Prosecutor	v	Karadžić,	No.	IT-95-5/18-PT,	Decision	on	Motions	for	Rule	68	Material	and	
Reconsideration	of	Decision	on	Adequate	Facilities	(10	March	2009)	at	para.	20;	Prosecutor	v	Mladic,	No.	
IT-09-92-AR73.2,	Decision	on	Defence	Interlocutory	Appeal	Against	the	Trial	Chamber’s	Decision	on	EDS	
Disclosure	Methods	(28	November	2013)	at	para.	25.	
211	 Prosecutor	v	Nzambonimana,	No.	ICTR-98-44D-PT,	Oral	Decision	on	Dislcosure	Motion	(29	June	2009)	
at	p.3.	
212	 Prosecutor	v	Karemera	et	al,	No.	ICTR-98-44-AR73.7,	Decision	on	Interlocutory	Appeal	Regarding	the	
Role	of	the	Prosecutor’s	Electronic	Disclosure	Suite	in	Discharging	Disclosure	Obligations	(30	June	2006)	
at	para.	10.	
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electronic records as an excuse for failing to comply with its Rule 68 obligations. 213 It 
is essential that the prosecution actively review the material in its possession for 
exculpatory material, and, at the very least, inform the accused of its existence.214 
From another perspective, Rule 68(B) does not create new disclosure obligations on the 
prosecution. The Trial Chamber in Bizimungu observed that, the provision does not give 
the defence the right to conduct an unrestricted search of the electronic databases of the 
prosecution. It merely provides for the use of modern technology to discharge existing 
obligations of the prosecution under Rules 66 and 68.215  
As to the ICC, although Article 67(2) did not explicitly require the prosecution to 
identify which part of the material is exculpatory, the Chamber has held that the 
prosecution is required to highlight the exculpatory portion of the document being 
disclosed under Article 67(2).216 Proper identification of exculpatory material is in line 
with the purpose of securing a fair and expeditious trial.217 
Original Form 
																																																								
213	 Niyitegeka	v	Prosecutor,	No.	ICTR-96-14-R,	Decision	on	Request	for	Review	(30	June	2006)	at	para.61.	
214	 Prosecutor	v	Karemera	et	al,	No.	ICTR-98-44-AR73.7,	Decision	on	Interlocutory	Appeal	Regarding	the	
Role	of	the	Prosecutor’s	Electronic	Disclosure	Suite	in	Discharging	Disclosure	Obligations	(30	June	2006)	
at	para.	10;	Prosecutor	v	Karemera	et	al,	No.	ICTR-98-44-T,	Decision	on	Joseph	Nzirorera’s	Tenth	Notice	
of	Disclosure	Violations	and	Motion	for	Remedial	and	Punitive	Measures	(5	February	2008)	at	para.	8.	
215	 Prosecutor	v	Bizimungu,	No.	ICTR-99-50-T,	Decision	on	the	Motion	of	Bicamumpaka	and	Mugenzi	for	
Disclosure	of	Relevant	Material	(1	December	2004)	at	para.	9.	
216	 Gbagbo	case,	Single	Judge:	Decision	Establishing	a	Disclosure	System	and	a	Calendar	for	Disclosure	
(24	January	2012)	at	para.	25.	
217	 Prosecutor	v	Mrkšić	et	al.,	No.	IT-95-1	/1-PT,	Order	Setting	a	Time-Limit	for	Disclosure	Pursuant	to	
Rule	66(A)(ii)	(24	November	2004)	at	p.3;	Prosecutor	v	Krajišnik	and	Plavšić,	No.	IT-00-39	&	40-PT,	
Decision	on	Motion	from	Momcilo	Krajisnik	to	compel	Disclosure	of	exculpatory	Evidence	pursuant	to	
Rule	68	(19	July	2001)	at	p.	2.	
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The position of the ad hoc Tribunals is that the prosecution should disclose exculpatory 
material in its original form, and not in the form of a summary, as implied by the Rule 
68 obligation.218 For example, if a witness statement contains exculpatory material, the 
statement needs to be disclosed. For the material to be effectively useful for the defence, 
the prosecution should provide the defence the material in its original form, although 
some parts might be redacted when the prosecution deems appropriate. That is, the 
sections which might contain exculpatory material should be provided to the defence, 
the entire piece is not necessary. The redacted versions of exculpatory material that will 
be disclosed should however be ‘sufficiently cohesive, understandable and usable and 
not taken out of context.’219  
F. Overlapping with Rule 66 (B)  
Another important point to make here is that information falling within Rule 68 will 
also necessarily be material to the preparation of the defence under Rule 66(B).220 In a 
Blaškić Decision, the Trial Chamber held the view that material of an exculpatory 
nature will always be material for the preparation of the defence.221 In addressing this 																																																								
218	 Vladimir	Tochilovsky,	‘Prosecution	Disclosure	Obligations	in	the	ICC	and	Relevant	Jurisprudence	of	
the	Ad	Hoc	Tribunals’	in	José	Doria,	Hans-Peter	Gasser	and	M	Cherif	Bassiouni	(eds),	The	Legal	Regime	of	
the	International	Criminal	Court:	Essays	in	Honour	of	Professor	Igor	Blishchenko	(BRILL	2009)	846–7.	
219	 Prosecutor	v	Blagojević	&	Jokic,	No.	IT-02-60-T,	Joint	Decision	on	Motions	Related	to	Production	of	
Evidence	(12	December	2002)	at	para.	24;	Prosecutor	v	Brdjanin	&	Talic,	No.	IT-99-36-T,	Decision	on	
“motion	for	relief	from	rule	68	violations	by	the	prosecutor	and	for	sanctions	to	be	imposed	pursuant	to	
rule	68bis	and	motion	for	adjournment	while	matters	affecting	justice	and	a	fair	trial	can	be	resolved”	
(30	October	2002)	at	para.26;	Prosecutor	v	Blaškić,	No.	IT-95-14-T,Decision	on	the	Defence	Motion	to	
admit	into	Evidence	the	prior	Statement	of	Deceased	Witness	Midhat	Haskic	(29	April	1998)	at	para.	19.	
220	 Prosecutor	v	Karadžić,	No.	IT-95-5/18-PT,	Decision	on	Accused’s	Second	Motion	for	Inspection	and	
Disclosure:	Immunity	Issue	(17	December	2008)	at	para.	14.	
221	 Prosecutor	v	Thomir	Blaškić,	IT-95-14-PT,	Decision	on	the	Production	of	Discovery	Materials	(27	
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issue, it is necessary to consider the context of Rule 66 or disclosure duty in general, 
that any request by the defence for exculpatory material alleged to be in the prosecutor’s 
possession, custody or control must be specific as to such material. 
The Chamber in Karemera found that, in the context of Rule 68, material relevant to the 
defence of the accused, should be understood to be material ‘which may tend to dispute 
a material fact against the accused, undermine the credibility of evidence intended to 
prove these material facts, or even serve to sustain a valid excuse or justification for the 
alleged criminal conduct. ’ Therefore, information which may or may not be useful to 
the defence case is better treated under Rule 66.222 
However, if the evidence contains a mixture of exculpatory and inculpatory material, it 
should be disclosed pursuant to Rule 68. In Karemera, the Appeals Chamber found that 
the Trial Chamber, by reasoning that exculpatory material in a document could be 
rendered nugatory by the existence of inculpatory material, applied an incorrect legal 
standard which resulted in an abuse of its discretion.223 
 
																																																																																																																																																																		
January	1997)	at	para.	50,	where	Trial	Chamber	I	decided	that	the	defence	‘must	submit	to	the	Trial	
Chamber	all	prima	facie	proof	tendering	to	make	it	likely	that	the	evidence	is	exculpatory	and	is	in	the	
Prosecutor’s	possession.’	
222	 Prosecutor	v	Karemera	et	al,	No.	ICTR-98-44-T,	Decision	on	Prosecutor’s	Rule	68(D)	Application	and	
Joseph	Nzirorera’s	12th	Notice	of	Rule	68	Violation	(26	March	2009)	at	para.	19.	
223	 Prosecutor	v	Karemera	et	al,	No.	ICTR-98-44-AR73.13,	Decision	on	Joseph	Nzirorera’s	Appeal	from	
Decision	on	Tenth	Rule	68	Motion	(14	May	2008)	at	para.	12.	
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IV. Problems 
1. Voluminous Nature  
A special feature of international criminal trials, which distinguishes it from its national 
counterpart, is the size and scale of the trial. The cases in the ICTY, ICTR and the ICC 
have often involved a significant number of victims in a long lasting or even ongoing 
conflict. This is different from the domestic criminal cases, that usually only involve a 
single victim. In order to build a case before an international criminal tribunal, the 
prosecutor normally spends several years conducting the investigation, collecting 
material and interviewing witness. With regard to evidence, there are often millions or 
even billions of pages of documents and other material for the parties to process.  
The prosecution has tried to justify its disclosure failure by mentioning the ‘voluminous 
nature’ of this obligation. The Chambers, however, did not accept this argument. It was 
held, in multiple occasions, voluminous material is no excuse for failing to disclose 
exculpatory material.224 The Appeals Chamber also noted that the voluminous nature of 
materials in the possession of the prosecutor does not excuse the prosecution from its 
obligation to review and assess it,225 although it might give rise to delays in 																																																								
224	 Prosecutor	v	Karemera	et	al,	No.	ICTR-98-44-T,	Decision	on	Joseph	Nzirorera’s	Eleventh	Notice	of	Rule	
68	Violation	and	Motion	for	Stay	of	Proceedings	(11	September	2008)	at	para.	19;	Prosecutor	v	
Karemera	et	al,	No.	ICTR-98-44-T,	Decision	on	Joseph	Nzirorera’s	13th,	14th,	and	15th	Notices	of	Rule	68	
Violation	and	Motions	for	Remedial	and	Punitive	Measures:	ZF,	Michel	Bakuzakundi,	and	Tharcisse	
Renzaho	(18	February	2009)	at	para.	24.	
225	 Prosecutor	v	Karemera	et	al,	No.	ICTR-98-44-AR73.7,	Decision	on	Interlocutory	Appeal	Regarding	the	
Role	of	the	Prosecutor’s	Electronic	Disclosure	Suite	in	Discharging	Disclosure	Obligations	(30	June	2006)	
at	para.	10,	fn	33;	Prosecutor	v	Karemera	et	al,	No.	ICTR-98-44-T,	Decision	on	Joseph	Nzirorera’s	Eleventh	
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disclosure.226 The proper way to deal with extensive amount of material is, as held by 
the Appeals Chamber in Blaškić and later in Kristić, that the parties should request an 
adjournment in order to properly prepare themselves.227 
A similar issue is the effect of cumulative documents. Although the Chamber held that 
even if the accused already had the same information in other documents, the 
prosecution’s Rule 68 obligation is not exempt.228 These types of disclosure violation, 
however, are rarely considered as prejudicing the accused, and no remedy would be 
warranted.229 This, in effect, means that the prosecutor will just simply not disclose the 
documents, since non-disclosure has no consequences. 
2. Late Disclosure 
As mentioned in the previous discussion regarding disclosure under Rule 66, late 
disclosure is one of the most problematic features. The Appeals Chamber has held that 
notwithstanding the practical difficulties, the prosecution is required to disclose 
evidence of an exculpatory nature to the defence forthwith.230 In addition, regardless of 
the prosecution’s internal practices, Rule 68 requires that disclosure be made as soon as 																																																																																																																																																																		
Notice	of	Rule	68	Violation	and	Motion	for	Stay	of	Proceedings	(11	September	2008)	at	para.	19.	
226	 Kalimanzira	v	Prosecutor,	No.	ICTR-05-88-A,	Judgement	(20	October	2010)	at	para.	21.	
227	 Prosecutor	v	Blaškić,	No.IT-95-14-A,	Judgement	(29	July	2004)	at	para.	301;	Prosecutor	v	Krstić,	No.	
IT-98-33-A,	Judgement	(19	April	2004)	at	para.	206.	
228	 Prosecutor	v	Karemera	et	al,	No.	ICTR-98-44-T,	Decision	on	Joseph	Nzirorera’s	13th,	14th,	and	15th	
Notices	of	Rule	68	Violation	and	Motions	for	Remedial	and	Punitive	Measures:	ZF,	Michel	Bakuzakundi,	
and	Tharcisse	Renzaho	(18	February	2009)	at	para.	24.	
229	 Prosecutor	v	Karadžić,	No.	IT-95-5/18-T,	Decision	on	Accused’s	Eighty-Seventh	Disclosure	Violation	
Motion	(10	March	2014)	at	paras.	13-14.	
230	 Prosecutor	v	Kordić	and	Čerkez,	No.	IT-65-14/2-A,	Judgement	(17	December	2004)	at	para.	243.	
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practicable.231 The Trial Chamber in Karadžić also stated that it is no excuse for the 
failure to make timely disclosure of exculpatory material that the accused had requested 
a large volume of disclosure under Rule 66(B).232 However, even if a violation of the 
Rule is recognised, the defence must be able to demonstrate that the accused suffered 
material prejudice as a result of the late disclosure, in order to receive remedies.233  
It is clear that the prosecution’s repeated violations of its obligations under Rule 68 
could have negative impact on the conduct of the proceedings and prejudiced the 
interests of justice.234 The Appeals Chambers have firmly emphasised its expectation 
that the prosecution should take the necessary steps to prevent such disclosure 
violations from occurring in the future,235 and that any further violations of the 
prosecution’s disclosure obligation under Rule 68 could lead to appropriate sanctions, if 
warranted in the circumstances.236 However, despite the Chambers have been 
																																																								
231	 Prosecutor	v	Karadžić,	No.	IT-95-5/18-T,	Decision	on	Prosecution’s	Request	for	Reconsideration	of	
Trial	Chamber’s	11	November	2010	Decision	(10	December	2010)	at	para.	11.	
232	 Prosecutor	v	Karadžić,	No.	IT-95-5/18-T,	Decision	on	Accused’s	Eighteenth	to	Twenty-First	Disclosure	
Violation	Motions	(2	November	2010)	at	para.	30;	Prosecutor	v	Karadžić,	No.	IT-95-5/18-T,	Decision	on	
Accused’s	Twenty-Second,	Twenty-Fourth,	and	Twenty	–Sixth	Motions	for	Disclosure	Violation	(11	
November	2010)	at	para.	31;	Prosecutor	v	Karadžić,	No.	IT-95-5/18-T,	Decision	on	Prosecution’s	Request	
for	Reconsideration	of	Trial	Chamber’s	11	November	2010	Decision	(10	December	2010)	at	para.	14.	
233	 Prosecutor	v	Karemera	et	al,	No.	ICTR-98-44-T,	Decision	on	Joseph	Nzirorera’s	Notices	of	Rule	68	
Violation	and	Motions	for	Remedial	and	Punitive	Measures	(25	October	2007)	at	para.	17;	Prosecutor	v	
Karemera	et	al,	No.	ICTR-98-44-T,	Decision	on	Joseph	Nzirorera’s	Eleventh	Notice	of	Rule	68	Violation	
and	Motion	for	Stay	of	Proceedings	(11	September	2008)	at	para.	21;	Prosecutor	v	Karemera	et	al,	No.	
ICTR-98-44-T,	Decision	on	Joseph	Nzirorera’s	13th,	14th,	and	15th	Notices	of	Rule	68	Violation	and	
Motions	for	Remedial	and	Punitive	Measures:	ZF,	Michel	Bakuzakundi,	and	Tharcisse	Renzaho	(18	
February	2009)	at	para.	18;	Prosecutor	v	Karemera	et	al,	No.	ICTR-98-44-T,	Decision	on	Joseph	
Nzirorera’s	25th	Notice	of	Violation	of	Rule	66	and	Motion	for	Remedial	and	Punitive	Measures:	Witness	
T	(24	March	2009)	at	para.	3.	
234	 Mugenzi	&	Mugiraneza	v	Prosecutor,	No.	ICTR-99-50-A,	Judgement	(4	February	2013)	at	para.	63.	
235	 Prosecutor	v	Lukić	&	Lukić,	No.	IT-98-32/1-A,	Decision	on	Milan	Lukić’s	Motion	for	Remedies	Arising	
out	of	Disclosure	Violations	by	the	Prosecution	(12	May	2011)	at	para.	23.	
236	 Mugenzi	&	Mugiraneza	v	Prosecutor,	No.	ICTR-99-50-A,	Decision	on	Motions	for	Relief	for	Rule	68	
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constantly reminding the prosecution of the paramount importance of its positive and 
continuous obligation to disclose exculpatory material under Rule 68, the prosecution 
seems indifferent to this duty.  
3. Certification  
A related issue is, does the prosecution need to certify it has completed its disclosure 
obligations?  
It is within a Chamber’s discretion to order the prosecution to submit a signed report to 
certify it has fulfilled its obligation under Rule 68. In Krnojelac, before the Pre-Trial 
judge, the prosecution was ordered to certify that ‘a full search has been conducted 
throughout the materials in the possession of the prosecution or otherwise within its 
knowledge for the existence of such evidence. ’  However, this practice was not 
followed by the Appeals Chamber, for example, in Blaškić, the Appeals Chamber 
considered this type of order rare, and denied the defence request since the defence 
could not satisfy the Chamber in proving that the prosecution had failed to discharge its 
obligations.237 Later in Kordic, the Appeals chamber held that, there is no requirement 
for the prosecution to certify that it has met its disclosure obligations, and it is not for 
the Chamber to impose such requirement.238  
																																																																																																																																																																		
Violations	(24	September	2012)	at	para.	40.	
237	 Blaškić,	Decision	on	the	Appellant's	Motions	for	the	Production	of	Material,	Suspension	or	Extension	
of	the	Briefing	Schedule,	and	Additional	Filings	(26	September	2000)	at	para.45.	
238	 Prosecutor	v	Kordić	and	Čerkez,	No.	IT-65-14/2-A,	Judgement	(17	December	2004)	at	para.	182.	
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In contrast, the practice in the ICTR seems to be more relaxed, although the Chambers 
also stated that it would not require the prosecution to certify that it has complied with 
its Rule 68 obligations unless the defence can show that the obligations under this rule 
have not been complied with.239 Nonetheless, it was found that a certification is deemed 
necessary for the adequate enforcement of Rule 68 in certain circumstances. For 
example, in Bizimungu, the prosecution was ordered, either to disclose exculpatory 
material related to witness who had given inconsistent testimony in subsequent trial, or 
to certify that none of the materials related to the witness contained exculpatory 
information.240 In Nshogoza, the Chamber ordered the prosecution to certify, in writing, 
that it had complied with Rules 66 and 68 after earlier disclosure violations.241 
V. Remedy: Rule 68 bis—Failure to Comply with Disclosure Obligations  
Rule 68 bis ICTY RPEs provides that ‘the pre-trial Judge or the Trial Chamber may 
decide proprio motu, or at the request of either party, on sanctions to be imposed on a 
																																																								
239	 Prosecutor	v	Rwamakuba	et	al,	No.	ICTR-98-44-T,	Decision	on	Defence	Motion	for	Disclosure	(15	
January	2004)	at	para.	8;	Prosecutor	v	Bizimungu	et	al,	No.	ICTR-99-50-T,	Decision	on	Justin	Mugenzi’s	
Motion	for	Further	Certified	Disclosure	and	Leave	to	Reopen	his	Defence	(10	June	2008)	at	para.	24.	
240	 Prosecutor	v	Bizimungu	et	al,	No.	ICTR-99-50-T,	Decision	on	Justin	Mugenzi’s	Motion	for	the	Recall	of	
the	Prosecution	Fidele	Uwizeye	for	Further	Cross	Examination	(9	October	2007)	at	page	6.	
241	 Prosecutor	v	Nshogoza,	No.	ICTR-2007-91-PT,	Order	to	the	Prosecution	to	Conduct	a	Thorough	
Review	and	Certify	that	it	has	Complied	with	its	Disclosure	Obligations	(5	February	2009).	In	this	case	the	
Prosecution	previously	claimed	that	an	audio	recording	of	a	particular	witness	did	not	exist,	but	after	
the	Defence	filed	a	motion,	it	explained	that	the	information	was	overlooked	and	then	disclosed	it.	
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party which fails to perform its disclosure obligations pursuant to the Rules.’242 The 
Rules do not require a showing of malice before sanctions may be imposed.243 
1. Prejudice requirement 
The most fatal component for the defence to acquire a remedy for disclosure violation is 
the prejudice requirement. As the U.S. Supreme Court cases have demonstrated, it is 
almost impossible to establish this requirement. It is often seen that while on the one 
hand the Courts recall the fundamental importance of the duty to disclose exculpatory 
evidence and recognise the prosecution failure to discharge its duty pursuant to Rule 68, 
on the other hand, the Courts often find that the defence suffer no prejudice and 
therefore no remedies are warranted. So the question is, what will constitute prejudice to 
the accused, in the eyes of a Chamber? In the Karemera Judgment, the ICTR Trial 
Chamber has considered the following:  
In determining whether the defence was prejudiced by the late disclosure or 
nondisclosure of exculpatory material, relevant considerations include: the potentially 
low probative value of the evidence; whether the defence had sufficient time to analyse 
the material and the opportunity to challenge it during cross-examination; whether the 
defence could seek admission of the material as additional evidence; and whether the 
defence could call the relevant witnesses to testify. Also relevant is the extent to which 
																																																								
242	 Rule	68bis	ICTY	RPEs.	
243	 Prosecutor	v	Stakić,	No.	IT-97-24-A,	Judgement	(22	March	2006)	at	para.	190.	
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the defence knew about the exculpatory evidence and if the defence was able to access 
it.244 For example, when a newly disclosed document is found, the Trial Chamber will 
consider if it adds anything new to the material already available to the accused, or if 
the accused has the opportunity to use the document through another witness. If the 
answer is no, then the Chamber will hold that the accused has suffered no prejudice 
from the late disclosure.245 The Chamber also found that there is no prejudice from 
disclosure violation where the accused will have the opportunity to introduce the 
information in its defence case.246 
But, one may ask, is the prosecution, or the Chamber, really in a position to decide if 
the accused is prejudiced from the late disclosure? In the Karadžić case, the defence 
team has filed nearly 100 disclosure motions.247 In these disclosure motions, the Trial 
Chamber usually found that there is some information which is potentially exculpatory 
and that the prosecution has violated its disclosure obligations pursuant to Rule 68. 
However, the accused was not prejudiced by this disclosure violation because ‘this 
material adds nothing new or of significance to material already disclosed to the 
Accused.’ Therefore, ‘in the absence of prejudice to the Accused, there is no basis to 
																																																								
244	 Prosecutor	v	Karemera	&	Ngirumpatse,	No.	ICTR-98-44-T,	Judgement	and	Sentence	(2	February	2012)	
at	para.	818;	Kalimanzira	v	Prosecutor,	No.	ICTR-05-88-A,	Judgement	(20	October	2010)	at	para.	20.	
245	 Prosecutor	v	Karadžić,	No.	IT-95-5/18-PT,	Decision	on	Accused’s	Forty-Ninth	and	Fiftieth	Disclosure	
Violation	Motions	(30	June	2011)	at	para.	48;	Prosecutor	v	Karadžić,	No.	IT-95-5/18-T,	Decision	on	
Accused’s	Eighty-Fifth	Disclosure	Violation	Motion	(21	January	2014)	at	para.	22.	
246	 Prosecutor	v	Karadžić,	No.	IT-95-5/18-T,	Decision	on	Accused’s	Fifty	Fifth	Disclosure	Violation	Motion	
(19	August	2011)	at	para.	12.	
247	 Until	November	2015,	there	are	103	of	them,	the	most	recent	one:	see	Prosecutor	v	Karadžić,	No.	
IT-95-5/18-T,	Decision	on	Accused's	102nd	and	103rd	Disclosure	Violation	Motions	(4	November	2015).	
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grant the remedies sought by the Accused for this specific violation or as a sanction 
against the prosecution.’ The typical result is granting the disclosure motion in part 
(recognising a disclosure violation) but denying the rest – no remedies. The Presiding 
Judge, Judge Kwon even, in most situations, dissents that in the absence of prejudice to 
the Accused, the Motion should be dismissed ‘in its entirety’.248 
2. Difference to the Outcome 
The ICTR Chambers, in some cases, has opted for the U.S. standard: even if the 
accused can satisfy that the information is exculpatory and in the possession of the 
prosecution, if the undisclosed material would not make a difference to the outcome, 
there will be no prejudice from the prosecution’s violation of Rule 68.249 For example, 
when the undisclosed material was unlikely to have significantly affected the 
testimonies, the Chamber considers no material prejudice was present. 
3. Other Remedies 
Some have suggested appointing a special master250 to supervise disclosure, however, 																																																								
248	 E.g.	Prosecutor	v	Karadžić,	No.	IT-95-5/18-T,	Partially	Dissenting	Opinion	in	the	Decision	on	Accused’s	
Thirty-Seventh	to	Forty-Second	Disclosure	Violation	Motions	with	Partially	Dissenting	Opinion	of	Judge	
Kwon	(29	March	2011).	
249	 Niyitegeka	v	Prosecutor,	No.	ICTR-96-14-R,	Decision	on	Request	for	Review	(30	June	2006)	at	para.57;	
Mugenzi	&	Mugiraneza	v	Prosecutor,	No.	ICTR-99-50-A,	Decision	on	Motions	for	Relief	for	Rule	68	
Violations	(24	September	2012)	at	paras.	15,22,27,33,38.	
250	 Similar	to	the	appointment	of	Special	Counsel	in	England.	For	some	time,	judges	in	England	and	
Wales	have	had	power	to	call	for	special	counsel	to	safeguard	the	interests	of	the	defendant	in	ex	parte	
PII	hearings	(ie	type	2	and	type	3	hearings).	At	present	this	power	is	normally	used	in	certain	categories	
of	cases	involving	national	security,	such	as	cases	involving	offences	under	the	Terrorism	Act	2000.	
Special	counsel	are	appointed	and	funded	by	the	Attorney	General.	In	R	v	H	and	C,	the	House	of	Lords	
held	that	appointment	of	special	counsel	should	only	be	ordered	if	the	trial	judge	was	satisfied	that	no	
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the Chambers did not view it as an appropriate remedy for Rule 68 violations.251 As to 
the remedy of a stay of proceedings, the ad hoc Tribunals rarely consider it appropriate 
for disclosure violations, as it is understood that Rule 68 material may appear as the trial 
proceeds.252 This is also due to the Tribunals’ completion strategy,253 as the goal is to 
finish the trials. 
VI. Concluding Remarks 
This chapter provided a detailed review of the prosecution’s duty of disclosure and the 
relevant practice in international criminal tribunals. The importance of the prosecution’s 
duty of disclosure to the defence’s right to a fair trial has long been recognised and 
established. However, it is apparent that the prosecution often failed to disclose in a 
timely and proper manner, as exhibited by the numerous disclosure violation decisions. 
As shown, the main difficulty for the defence is that although the prosecution has 
repeatedly violated its disclosure obligations, it is hard to demonstrate prejudice in order 
to persuade the Chamber to impose meaningful remedies, let alone to sanction the 																																																																																																																																																																		
other	course	would	adequately	meet	the	overriding	requirement	of	fairness	to	the	defendant.	On	this	
view,	the	use	of	special	counsel	will	always	be	exceptional	and	a	course	of	last	resort.	
251	 Prosecutor	v	Karadžić,	No.	IT-95-5/18-T,	Decision	on	Accused’s	Forty-Ninth	and	Fiftieth	Disclosure	
Violation	Motions	(30	June	2011)	at	para.	52.	
252	 Prosecutor	v	Karemera	et	al,	No.	ICTR-98-44-T,	Decision	on	Joseph	Nzirorera’s	13th,	14th,	and	15th	
Notices	of	Rule	68	Violation	and	Motions	for	Remedial	and	Punitive	Measures:	ZF,	Michel	Bakuzakundi,	
and	Tharcisse	Renzaho	(18	February	2009)	at	para.	31.	
253	 See	e.g.	Fausto	Pocar,	‘Completion	or	Continuation	Strategy?	Appraising	Problems	and	Possible	
Developments	in	Building	the	Legacy	of	the	ICTY’	(2008)	6	Journal	of	International	Criminal	Justice	655;	
Erik	Møse,	‘The	ICTR’s	Completion	Strategy—challenges	and	Possible	Solutions’	(2008)	6	Journal	of	
International	Criminal	Justice	667;	Dominic	Raab,	‘Evaluating	the	ICTY	and	Its	Completion	Strategy	
Efforts	to	Achieve	Accountability	for	War	Crimes	and	Their	Tribunals’	(2005)	3	Journal	of	International	
Criminal	Justice	82.	
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prosecution. This is similar to the situation in the U.S courts, since the standard adopted 
by the international criminal tribunals is almost identical to the U.S. ones. On the other 
hand, for the prosecution, it is common to complain that the voluminous nature of the 
documents, in light of the context of international crimes, causes their failure to disclose 
material in a timely fashion. Although the Chambers have ruled that this is not an 
acceptable justification, it nevertheless rarely provides any remedies other than 
adjournment. Another problematic practice is the heavy reliance of redacted witness 
identities and statements, which should only be permitted in exceptional circumstances; 
it has however become a norm in the ad hoc Tribunals and routinely applied in the ICC. 
This apparently has a significant negative impact on the accused’s ability to prepare his 
or her case and, accordingly, the right to a fair trial.  
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CHAPTER VIII 	
DISCLOSURE ISSUES BEFORE THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
 
I. Introduction 
 It has been established that the prosecution’s duty to disclose evidence is essential 
to an accused’s right to a fair trial. In both domestic and international criminal 
proceedings, courts have recognized the importance of the proper implementation of 
this duty. Not only should the prosecutors disclose relevant material, they must meet 
this obligation in a timely fashion. Full disclosure is the rule, whereas non-disclosure 
should be exercised with care and only in exceptional circumstances. However, 
prosecutorial practice regarding the obligation to disclose is often half-hearted and, 
unsurprisingly, has turned out to be one of the controversial matters in criminal 
litigations.  
 
The experience of the ad hoc tribunals further illustrates that because of the high 
complexity of international criminal cases, disclosure issues are more problematic 
before international criminal courts than its national counterparts. It is observed that the 
context of the ICC gives rise to even higher hurdles than the ad hoc Tribunals, as the 
ICC has to deal with situations where the conflict is still ongoing, and the issues pertain 
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to protection of witnesses and victims are more pressing. Hence, prosecutors have often 
argued that there are more challenges and obstacles to the fulfilment of their disclosure 
obligations and, as a result, non-disclosure and redactions instead of full disclosure to 
the defence were justifiable. Late disclosure by the prosecution is also a common 
practice before the international criminal courts. Because of the international context, 
the ICC Chambers are more likely to accept these late or non-disclosure applications, 
which could have a negative impact on the accused’s right to a fair trial. 
Since disclosure issues have resulted in numerous litigations before the ad hoc tribunals, 
in addition to its unfamiliarity with civil law background practioners, during the 
negotiation of the Rome Statute, alternatives models had been proposed and discussed, 
such as the use of a dossier.1 Nevertheless, the main disclosure framework has not been 
changed in the ICC. The ICC Statute and its RPEs has maintained the majority of the 
disclosure provisions that are similar to the ones at the ad hoc Tribunals. As a 
consequence, disclosure issues before the ICC in general most closely approximate 
those at the ICTY and ICTR, and, therefore, will not be further analysed here. However, 
there are several areas that distinguish the ICC trials from the ad hoc Tribunals. These 
will be the focus of this chapter.  
 
																																																								
1	 See	the	French	proposal	at	Preparatory	Commission	Proposal	by	France	on	Rules	of	Procedure	and	
Evidence	(PCINCC/1999/DP.8)	See	Kate	Gibson	and	Cainnech	Lussiaá-Berdou,	‘Disclosure	of	Evidence’	in	
Karim	AA	Khan,	Caroline	Buisman	and	Christopher	Gosnell	(eds),	Principles	of	Evidence	in	international	
criminal	justice	(Oxford	University	Press	2010)	311–2.	
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This Chapter will be divided into four parts, the prosecution’s duty to search for 
both incriminating and exculpatory pursuant to Article 54(1); the prosecution’s duty to 
disclose exculpatory material under Article 67(2) and its potential conflict between 
Article 54(3)(e); the duty to disclose inculpatory material at the confirmation hearing, 
and the issue of redactions; protective measures concerning intermediaries. It will be 
shown that from the ICC’s very first case, Lubanga, to the recent case Kenyatta, 
disclosure has proved to be one of the most controversial issues, drawing wide attention 
in the academia. 
 
II. The Duty to Search for Both Incriminating and Exculpatory 
Evidence  
A distinct feature of the ICC is the prosecution’s duty to search for both incriminating 
and exonerating evidence. The scope of disclosure obligations of the ICC prosecutors 
has been expanded because of this duty to search for evidence equally. Article 54(1)(a) 
of the ICC Statute states that, the Prosecutor shall:  
‘(a) In order to establish the truth, extend the investigation to cover all facts and 
evidence relevant to an assessment of whether there is criminal responsibility under this 
Statute, and, in doing so, investigate incriminating and exonerating circumstances 
equally.’ 
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It is noted that certain aspects of the ICC discourse framework shows a greater 
combination of civil and common law characteristics. This is, arguably the result of the 
greater involvement of lawyers from the Continent when negotiating the Rome Statute 
and its Rules of Procedure and evidence of the ICC.2 Article 54(1) is a clear illustration 
of such ‘melding of judicial paradigms’,3 a blend of the adversarial prosecutor and the 
inquisitorial prosecutor of various continental models.4  
Article 54(1) regulates the role of the prosecutor. In common law systems, the 
prosecutor is seen as a zealous advocate and a party of the proceeding. However, the 
ICC Statute put more emphasis on its role of searching the truth. Germany, in particular, 
insisted upon the ‘duty of the prosecutor to ascertain not only incriminating but also 
exonerating circumstances.5 Focusing on searching for both inculpatory and 
exculpatory material, this provision shows the greater commitment of finding the truth 
and, hence, giving the Prosecutor greater power and responsibility.   
 
The jurisprudence of the ad hoc Tribunals shows the different expectation regarding the 
role of a prosecutor As noted by a Trial Chamber at the ICTY, the obligation to 
disclosure exculpatory evidence ‘is not intended to serve as means through which the 
prosecution is forced to replace the defence in conducting investigations or gathering 																																																								
2	 ibid	350–1.	
3	 William	Schabas,	The	International	Criminal	Court :	A	Commentary	on	the	Rome	Statute	(Oxford	
University	Press	2010)	673.	
4	 Morten	Bergsmo	and	Pieter	Kruger,	‘Article	54’	in	Otto	Triffterer	(ed),	Commentary	on	the	Rome	
Statute	of	the	International	Criminal	Court:	Observers’	Notes	(2nd	edn,	CH	Beck	2008)	1078.	
5	 UNGA	‘German	proposal	to	Article	44	of	the	Draft	Statute	for	an	International	Criminal	Court	in	the	
Report	of	the	Preparatory	Committee	on	the	Establishment	of	an	International	Criminal	Court,	Vol.	II	
(Compilation	of	proposals)’	51	Session,	Supplement	(1996)	UN	Doc.	22A	(A/51/22)	207.	
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material that may assist the Defence.’6 Another ICTR Trial Chamber stated that, the 
prosecutor has no obligation ‘to hunt for and disclose materials which are not in its 
possession or control’ unless the defence can specifically identify such requested 
material, and establish that the prosecutor is in a better position than the defence to 
procure the material.7 
At least in theory, such an approach would not be applicable in the ICC since the 
prosecution has the duty to investigate both inculpatory and exculpatory material 
equally. However, it is arguable if such imposition on the ICC prosecutor is that 
different from the ones at the ad hoc Tribunal. Some ICC prosecutors have expressed 
the view that, in practice, the Article 54(1)(a) obligation to investigate incriminating and 
exonerating circumstances ‘equally’ did not mean that prosecutors must regard their 
duty to search out exculpatory material as equal to the search for inculpatory 
information.8 This way of interpretation the Article 54 duty indicates that the 
prosecutorial obligation might not vary considerable from the common law approach, 
that is, to investigate anything exculpatory that one comes across in the course of an 
																																																								
6	 Prosecutor	v	Blagojević	&	Jokic,	No.	IT-02-60-T,	Joint	Decision	on	Motions	Related	to	Production	of	
Evidence	(12	December	2002)	at	para.	26.	
7	 Prosecutor	v	Bizimungu	et	al,	No.	ICTR-99-50-T,	Decision	on	Jerome-Clement	Bicamumpaka's	Motion	
for	Judicial	Notice	of	8th	December	2000	Rwandan	Judgement	and	in	the	Alternative	Order	Disclosure	of	
Exculpatory	Evidence	(15	Dec	2004)	at	paras.	22	and	26;	Prosecutor	v	Bizimungu	et	al,	No.	ICTR-99-50-T,	
Decision	on	Motion	of	Accused	Bicamumpaka	for	Disclosure	of	Exculpatory	Evidence	(23	April	2004)	at	
para.	9.	
8	 John	D	Jackson	and	Yassin	M	Brunger,	‘Fragmentation	and	Harmonization	in	the	Development	of	
Evidentiary	Practices	in	International	Criminal	Tribunals’	in	Elies	van	Sliedregt	and	Sergey	Vasiliev	(eds),	
Pluralism	in	International	Criminal	Law	(Oxford	University	Press	2014)	181.	
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investigation and then disclose it.9 But under this interpretation, the obligation does not 
extend as far as proactively seeking out information that counteracts what the evidence 
is pointing to, as that is what the defence is there to do. As observed by Jackson and 
Summers, perhaps this serves as an enlightening example of how lawyers ‘harmonize 
practice with what they have been used to doing previously in work at another 
tribunal.’10  
It should be borne in mind that the ICC Statute expects that the prosecutors play a 
stronger role in the course of achieving justice. As summarised brilliantly by Professor 
Cassese:  
‘The Prosecutor is not simply, or not only, an instrument of executive justice, a party to 
the proceedings whose exclusive interest is to present the facts and evidence as seen by 
him or her in order to accuse and to secure the indictee’s conviction. The Prosecutor is 
rather conceived of as both a party to the proceedings and also an impartial truth-seeker 
or organ of justice.’11 
 
 
																																																								
9	 	 John	D	Jackson	and	Sarah	J	Summers,	The	Internationalisation	of	Criminal	Evidence:	Beyond	the	
Common	Law	and	Civil	Law	Traditions	(Cambridge	University	Press	2012)	307–10.	
10	 Jackson	and	Brunger	(n	8)	181.	
11	 Antonio	Cassese,	‘The	Statute	of	the	International	Criminal	Court:	Some	Preliminary	Reflections’	
(1999)	10	European	Journal	of	International	Law	144,	168.	
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III. The Potential Conflict between Article 67(2) and Article 54(3)(e)  
  As mentioned, the Rome Statute has upgraded the prosecution’s duty to disclose 
exculpatory information to the statutory level. This duty is closely related to the 
obligation imposed by Article 54(l)(a). Article 67(2) reads that: 
 
‘In addition to any other disclosure provided for in this Statute, the Prosecutor shall, as 
soon as practicable, disclose to the defence evidence in the Prosecutor's possession or 
control which he or she believes shows or tends to show the innocence of the accused, 
or to mitigate the guilt of the accused, or which may affect the credibility of prosecution 
evidence. In case of doubt as to the application of this paragraph, the Court shall 
decide.’12 
  However, Article 54(3)(e) seems to create an exception to this rule, by which the 
Prosecutor is enabled to promise information providers that their evidence is given on a 
confidential basis. Article 54(3)(e) provides that:  
‘The Prosecutor may ‘agree not to disclose, at any stage of the proceedings, documents 
or information that the Prosecutor obtains on the condition of confidentiality and solely 
for the purpose of generating new evidence, unless the provider of the information 
consents.’ 																																																								
12	 ‘In	addition	to	its	other	disclosure	duty	required	by	Rome	Statute’,	other	duties	includes	Articles	61(3),	
64(3)(c).	See	also	Rule	76	77	of	the	ICC	Rules	of	Procedure	and	Evidence.	
Article	61(3):	‘Within	a	reasonable	time	before	the	hearing,	the	person	shall:	(a)	Be	provided	with	a	copy	
of	the	document	containing	the	charges	on	which	the	Prosecutor	intends	to	bring	the	person	to	trial;	
and	(b)	Be	informed	of	the	evidence	on	which	the	Prosecutor	intends	to	rely	at	the	hearing.	The	
Pre-Trial	Chamber	may	issue	orders	regarding	the	disclosure	of	information	for	the	purposes	of	the	
hearing.’	
	
Article	64(3)(c):	
‘Upon	assignment	of	a	case	for	trial	in	accordance	with	this	Statute,	the	Trial	Chamber	assigned	to	deal	
with	the	case	shall:	(c)		Subject	to	any	other	relevant	provisions	of	this	Statute,	provide	for	disclosure	of	
documents	or	information	not	previously	disclosed,	sufficiently	in	advance	of	the	commencement	of	the	
trial	to	enable	adequate	preparation	for	trial.	
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This provision empowers the Prosecutor; it does not act as a bar to the production of 
evidence.13 Rule 82 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence completes this provision.14 
As noted by the Lubanga Appeals Chamber, Art 54(3)(e) serves as an important 
investigative tool for the Prosecutor,15 particularly with respect to investigations in 
countries such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo that are dangerous for the 
prosecutor to enter.16 It is noted that in the context of the ICC, the prosecutor’s 
investigations often occurred during an active armed conflict, necessitating reliance on 																																																								
13	 Schabas	(n	3)	678.	But	see,	for	the	contrary	view,	Lubanga	(ICC-01/04-01/06	(OA	6)),	Separate	
Opinion	by	Judge	Georghios	M.	Pikis,	14	December	2006,	at	para.	12.	
14	 Rule	82	of	ICC	RPEs	reads:	
	
1.	Where	material	or	information	is	in	the	possession	or	control	of	the	Prosecutor	which	is	protected	
under	article	54,	paragraph	3	(e),	the	Prosecutor	may	not	subsequently	introduce	such	material	or	
information	into	evidence	without	the	prior	consent	of	the	provider	of	the	material	or	information	and	
adequate	prior	disclosure	to	the	accused.	
2.	If	the	Prosecutor	introduces	material	or	information	protected	under	article	54,	paragraph	3	(e),	into	
evidence,	a	Chamber	may	not	order	the	production	of	additional	evidence	received	from	the	provider	of	
the	initial	material	or	information,	nor	may	a	Chamber	for	the	purpose	of	obtaining	such	additional	
evidence	itself	summon	the	provider	or	a	representative	of	the	provider	as	a	witness	or	order	their	
attendance.	
3.	If	the	Prosecutor	calls	a	witness	to	introduce	in	evidence	any	material	or	information	which	has	been	
protected	under	article	54,	paragraph	3	(e),	a	Chamber	may	not	compel	that	witness	to	answer	any	
question	relating	to	the	material	or	information	or	its	origin,	if	the	witness	declines	to	answer	on	
grounds	of	confidentiality.	4.	The	right	of	the	accused	to	challenge	evidence	which	has	been	protected	
under	article	54,	paragraph	3	(e),	shall	remain	unaffected	subject	only	to	the	limitations	contained	in	
sub-rules	2	and	3.	5.	A	Chamber	dealing	with	the	matter	may	order,	upon	application	by	the	defence,	
that,	in	the	interests	of	justice,	material	or	information	in	the	possession	of	the	accused,	which	has	been	
provided	to	the	accused	under	the	same	conditions	as	set	forth	in	article	54,	paragraph	3	(e),	and	which	
is	to	be	introduced	into	evidence,	shall	be	subject	mutatis	mutandis	to	sub-rules	1,	2	and	3.	
	
15	 Prosecutor	v	Thomas	Lubanga	Dyilo,	No.	ICC-01/04-01/06	(‘Lubanga’	case)	Appeals	Chamber:	
Judgment	on	the	appeal	of	the	Prosecutor	against	the	decision	of	Trial	Chamber	I	entitled	‘Decision	on	
the	consequences	of	non-disclosure	of	exculpatory	materials	covered	by	Article	54(3)(e)	agreements	and	
the	application	to	stay	the	prosecution	of	the	accused,	together	with	certain	other	issues	raised	at	the	
Status	Conference	on	10	June	2008’(21	October	2008)	at	para.	42.	See	also	Bureau	of	Democracy,	
Human	Rights,	and	Labor	-	US	Department	of	State,	2009	Human	Rights	Reports:	DEMOCRATIC	
REPUBLIC	OF	THE	CONGO	(2010)	(commenting	on	the	DRC’s	poor	human	rights	record	and	serious	
abuses	of	security	forces).	Milan	Markovic,	‘The	ICC	Prosecutor’s	Missing	Code	of	Conduct’	(2011)	47	
Texas	International	Law	Journal	215–6;	Karim	AA	Khan	and	Caroline	Buisman,	‘Sitting	on	Evidence:	
Systematic	Failings	in	the	ICC	Disclosure	Regime	-	Time	for	Reform’	in	Carsten	Stahn	(ed),	The	Law	and	
Practice	of	the	International	Criminal	Court	(OUP	Oxford	2015)	1060–2.	
16	 Lubanga	case,	Ibid.,	at	para.	42.	
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third parties to suggest leads, identify potential witnesses, and directly provide evidence 
in some cases.17 Commentators have supported the prosecutor’s claim of the central 
importance of this power under Article 54(3)(e).18 
The language of Article 54(3)(e) suggested that inculpatory material, which the 
prosecution case is based on, obtained through Article 54(3)(e) would not be able to be 
produced at trial without the consent of the provider and adequate disclosure to the 
accused.19 However, controversy forms when the prosecutor enters into a 
confidentiality agreement, and the material turns out to be potentially exculpatory, in 
which case the duty under Article 67(2) arises. The problem is that the information 
provider may deny permission to disclose the relevant material, placing the prosecutor 
in a difficult position, whereby he cannot comply with his duty under Article 67(2). The 
stay imposed by the Lubanga Trial Chamber illustrated this issue between the 
prosecution’s obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence under Article 67(2) and the 
prosecution’s duty not to disclose if entered into confidentiality agreement under Article 
54(3)(e).  
 																																																								
17	 Heikelina	Verrijn	Stuart,	‘The	ICC	in	Trouble’	(2008)	6	Journal	of	International	Criminal	Justice	409,	414;	
Markovic	(n	15)	216;	Alex	Whiting,	‘Lead	Evidence	and	Discovery	before	the	International	Criminal	Court:	
The	Lubanga	Case’	(2009)	14	UCLA	J.	Int’l	L.	Foreign	Aff.	207,	210.	
18	 Whiting	(n	17)	227–30;	Otto	Triffterer	(ed),	‘Commentary	on	the	Rome	Statute	of	the	International	
Criminal	Court’	[2008]	Beck/Hart	1086.	
19	 Prosecutor	v	Germain	Katanga	and	Mathieu	Ngudjolo	Chui,	No.	ICC-01/04-01/07	(‘Katanga’	case),	
Single	Judge,	Decision	Requesting	Observations	concerning	Article	54(3)(e)	Documents	Identified	as	
Potentially	Exculpatory	or	Otherwise	Material	for	the	Defence’s	Preparation	for	the	Confirmation	Hearing	
(02	June	2008)	at	para.	20.	
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The Lubanga Saga – First Stay 
Lubanga was the first case before the ICC. Mr. Lubanga was charged with war crimes, 
mainly for enlisting child soldiers in the Democratic Republic of Congo.20 On 13 June 
2008, shortly before the commencement of the trial, the Trial Chamber found a 
‘wholesale and serious abuse’21 by the prosecution, and imposed a stay on the 
proceedings claiming a fair trial is not possible.22 On 2 July 2008, the Trial Chamber 
ordered the release of Mr. Lubanga.23 The prosecution immediately appealed this 
decision.24 The Appeal Chamber affirmed the stay on 21 October 2008,25 but reversed 
the release order after the prosecution appealed the Trial Chamber’s decision.26 This 
case has drawn a lot of attention and was widely discussed among academics.27 
																																																								
20	 Lubanga	Case,	Pre-Trial	Chamber:	Decision	on	the	Confirmation	of	Charges	(20	January	2007).	
21	 Lubanga	case,	Trial	Chamber:	Decision	on	the	consequences	of	non-disclosure	of	exculpatory	
materials	covered	by	Article	54(3)(e)	agreements	and	the	application	to	stay	the	prosecution	of	the	
accused,	together	with	certain	other	issues	raised	at	the	Status	Conference	on	10	June	2008	(13	June	
2008)	(hereinafter	‘Decision	on	the	Consequences	of	Non-Disclosure	of	Exculpatory	Materials)	at	para.	
73.	
22	 Lubanga	case,	Trial	Chamber:	Decision	on	the	Consequences	of	Non-Disclosure	of	Exculpatory	
Materials,	at	paras.	37,	39	(‘impossible	to	piece	together	the	constituent	elements	of	a	fair	trial’).	
23	 Lubanga	Case,	Trial	Chamber:	Decision	on	the	release	of	Thomas	Lubanga	Dyilo	(02	July	2008).	
24	 Lubanga	case,	Prosecution’s	Appeal	against	“Decision	on	the	release	of	Thomas	Lubanga	Dyilo”	and	
Urgent	Application	for	Suspensive	Effect	(02	July	2008)	
25	 Lubanga	case,	Appeals	Chamber:	Judgment	on	the	appeal	of	the	Prosecutor	against	the	decision	of	
Trial	Chamber	I	entitled	‘Decision	on	the	consequences	of	non-disclosure	of	exculpatory	materials	
covered	by	Article	54(3)(e)	agreements	and	the	application	to	stay	the	prosecution	of	the	accused,	
together	with	certain	other	issues	raised	at	the	Status	Conference	on	10	June	2008’(21	October	2008).	
26	 Lubanga	Case,	Appeals	Chamber:	Judgment	on	the	appeal	of	the	Prosecutor	against	the	decision	of	
Trial	Chamber	I	entitled	“Decision	on	the	release	of	Thomas	Lubanga	Dyilo”	(21	October	2008).	
27	 See	e.g.	Rachel	Katzman,	‘Non-Disclosure	of	Confidentiality	Exculpatory	Evidence	and	the	Lubanga	
Proceedings:	How	the	ICC	Defense	System	Affects	the	Accused’s	Right	to	a	Fair	Trial,	The’	(2009)	8	Nw.	
UJ	Int’l	Hum.	Rts.	77;	Whiting	(n	17);	Kai	Ambos,	‘Confidential	Investigations	(Article	54	(3)(e)	ICC	Statute)	
vs.	Disclosure	Obligations:	The	Lubanga	Case	and	National	Law’	(2009)	12	New	Criminal	Law	Review:	An	
International	and	Interdisciplinary	Journal	543;	Markovic	(n	15);	Jenia	Iontcheva	Turner,	‘Accountability	
of	International	Prosecutors’	in	Carsten	Stahn	(ed),	Law	and	Practice	of	the	International	Criminal	Court	
(Oxford	University	Press	2014);	Michele	Caianiello,	‘Disclosure	before	the	ICC:	The	Emergence	of	a	New	
Form	of	Policies	Implementation	System	in	International	Criminal	Justice?’	(2010)	10	International	
Criminal	Law	Review	23.	
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The reason for this seemly drastic decision was the prosecution’s failure to disclose 
exculpatory material to the accused which the prosecution had obtained by widely using 
Article 54(3)(e) to enter confidentiality agreements with information providers. It was 
found that the prosecution obtained a large amount (more than 50%) of evidence 
through the United Nations mission in Congo and several NGOs, promising that these 
documents will remain confidential.28 Some of these documents contain exculpatory 
information, but the prosecutor, subject to its confidentiality agreement with the 
information providers, was unable to disclose them to the defence. 
The Trial Chamber decided that this practice of the prosecution violated the accused’s 
right to a fair trial and that the prosecution had incorrectly applied this provision.29 
Emphasizing that Article 54(3)(e) only allows the prosecution to receive evidence 
confidentially ‘in very restrictive circumstances’, the Trial Chamber held that Article 
54(3) should be used exceptionally,30 as its sole purpose is to generate new evidence’.31 
It was found that instead of using Article 54(3)(e) solely for the purpose of generating 
new evidence, the prosecution seemed to use this provision as a standard mechanism to 
obtained evidence.32 Considering that the prosecution’s approach is questionable, the 
Trial Chamber held that:  
																																																								
28	 Sabine	Swoboda,	‘The	ICC	Disclosure	Regime–A	Defence	Perspective’,	Criminal	Law	Forum	(Springer	
2008)	468.	
29	 Lubanga	case,	Trial	Chamber:	Decision	on	the	Consequences	of	Non-Disclosure	of	Exculpatory	
Materials,	at	paras.	71–72.	
30	 Ibid.,	at	para.	73.	But	see	Whiting	(n	17)	217–9.	
31	 Ibid.,	at	paras.	71–72.	
32	 Ambos	(n	27)	554–56.	
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  ‘The prosecution's general approach has been to use Article 54(3)(e) to 
obtain a wide range of materials under the cloak of confidentiality, in order to 
identify from those materials evidence to be used at trial (having obtained the 
information- provider's consent). This is the exact opposite of the proper use of 
the provision, which is, exceptionally, to allow the prosecution to receive 
information or documents which are not for use at trial but which are instead 
intended to “lead” to new evidence.’33 
 
In Katanga, the Single Judge made similar remarks regarding the practice of the 
prosecution.34 This approach was described as ‘reckless’, given the potential for 
conflict with the obligation to disclose, especially when exculpatory evidence is 
concerned.35 The prosecutor conceded that this was ‘excessive’36 and stated that 
corrective measures have since been taken.37 As a result of the failure to disclose 
exculpatory evidence, which flowed from the prosecutor’s undertakings, the Trial 
Chamber found that there was no prospect that a fair trial could be held.38 The Appeals 
																																																								
33	 Lubanga	case,	Trial	Chamber:	Decision	on	the	Consequences	of	Non-Disclosure	of	Exculpatory	
Materials,	at	para.	73.	
34	 Katanga	case,	Single	Judge:	Decision	on	Article	54(3)(e)	Documents	Identified	as	Potentially	
Exculpatory	or	Otherwise	Material	to	the	Defence’s	Preparation	for	the	Confirmation	Hearing	(20	June	
2008)	at	paras.	9–12.	
35	 Ibid.,	at	para	56.	
36	 Lubanga	case,	Transcript	(02	October	2007)	p.	2,	lines	6–9.	
37	 Katanga	case,	Transcript	(03	June	2008)	p.	26,	lines	5–8.	
38	 Lubanga	case,	Trial	Chamber:	Decision	on	the	Consequences	of	Non-Disclosure	of	Exculpatory	
Materials,	at	para	39.	
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Chamber confirmed this finding.39  
In addition, the prosecution also refused to provide the documents to the judges of the 
Trial Chamber, by invoking Article 18(3) of the Negotiated Relationship Agreement 
with the United Nations.40 Article 18(3) essentially repeats the terms of Article 54(3)(e), 
but adds that any documents or information provided on a confidential basis ‘shall not 
be disclosed to other organs of the Court or to third parties, at any stage of the 
proceedings or thereafter, without the consent of the United Nations’.41 However, the 
Trial Chamber did not accept this argument. The Chamber implied that this was an 
invalid clause, as its effect will impede the Chamber in exercising its jurisdiction in 
accordance with Articles 64(2), Article 64(3)(c) and Article 67(2), in that it could not 
determine whether non-disclosure of potentially exculpatory material constituted a 
breach of the right to a fair trial.42  
Facing the real possibility of releasing its first accused, the prosecution managed to 
secure the consent of most of the information providers.43 On 18 November 2008, the 
Trial Chamber lifted the stay and ordered the prosecution to disclose to the defence all 																																																								
39	 Lubanga	case,	Appeals	Chamber:	Judgment	on	the	appeal	of	the	Prosecutor	against	the	decision	of	
Trial	Chamber	I	entitled	‘Decision	on	the	consequences	of	non-disclosure	of	exculpatory	materials	
covered	by	Article	54(3)(e)	agreements	and	the	application	to	stay	the	prosecution	of	the	accused,	
together	with	certain	other	issues	raised	at	the	Status	Conference	on	10	June	2008’(21	October	2008)	
paras.	37ff.	
40	 Lubanga	case,	Trial	Chamber:	Decision	on	the	Consequences	of	Non-Disclosure	of	Exculpatory	
Materials,	at	para.	44.	
41	 Schabas	(n	3)	63–86.	
42	 Lubanga	case,	Trial	Chamber:	Decision	on	the	Consequences	of	Non-Disclosure	of	Exculpatory	
Materials,	at	para.	92.	Approved	by	the	Appeals	Chamber,	at	paras.	45,	48.	
43	 Lubanga	Case,	Trial	Chamber:	Reasons	for	Oral	Decision	lifting	the	stay	of	proceedings	(23	January	
2009)	at	para.	30.	
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the evidence that was the subject of the stay of proceedings.44 The prosecution had two 
days to comply.45 Accordingly, the prosecution turned over the evidence,46 and trial 
proceedings began on 26 January 2009. 
Although the issue was largely resolved in Lubanga, the Chambers did not provide a 
definite answer in the event when the prosecution is unable to gain the consent of 
information provider. The Appeals Chamber has rejected the Prosecutor’s argument that 
Article 67(2) is inapplicable to material obtained on the basis of confidentiality.47 The 
Trial Chamber remarked that if used appropriately, any tension between Article 54(3)(e) 
and the disclosure obligation under Article 67(2) was likely to be insignificant. It stated 
that:  
 ‘Although exculpatory material may be included in the springboard or lead 
evidence, in the limited circumstances in which this provision should be used, it is 
likely that a mechanism can be established which facilitates all necessary 
disclosure; for instance, the prosecution may need to make arrangements with the 
information provider for disclosure of such parts of the Article 54(3)(e) material 
as will enable it to provide any potentially exculpatory evidence to the accused’.48 
The Appeals Chamber set out the methodology for dealing with conflicts between 																																																								
44	 Lubanga	case,	Prosecution’s	Notification	of	Disclosure	of	Exculpatory	and	Rule	77	Material	to	the	
Defence	on	18	and	20	November	2008(	21	November	2008)	at	para.	1.	
45	 Ibid.	
46	 Ibid.,	at	paras.	2-4	
47Lubanga	case,	Appeals	Chamber:	Judgment	on	the	appeal	of	the	Prosecutor	against	the	decision	of	
Trial	Chamber	I	entitled	‘Decision	on	the	consequences	of	non-disclosure	of	exculpatory	materials	
covered	by	Article	54(3)(e)	agreements	and	the	application	to	stay	the	prosecution	of	the	accused,	
together	with	certain	other	issues	raised	at	the	Status	Conference	on	10	June	2008’(21	October	2008)	at	
para.	44.	
48	 Lubanga	case,	Trial	Chamber:	Decision	on	the	Consequences	of	Non-Disclosure	of	Exculpatory	
Materials,	at	para.	76.	
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Article 67(2) and Article 54(3)(e). It emphasised that agreements by the Prosecutor 
would have to be respected, and that a Chamber could not order disclosure if 
confidentiality was promised. It said that the issue would be litigated before the 
Chamber in ex parte proceedings with only the prosecutor present. However, it is left 
unclear whether a Chamber could order the prosecutor to provide the material in 
question, and whether agreements requiring the Prosecutor not to reveal such materials, 
even to the judges, were contrary to the Statute. 
 
After playing a major role in the ICC’s first case, Article 54(3)(e) is unlikely to have a 
similarly starring role in future litigation.49 In light of the undeniable importance of the 
disclosure of exculpatory material to the rights of the accused, the judges in Lubanga 
made it clear that the prosecutor’s disclosure obligations should prevail if in conflict 
with confidentiality agreement under Article 54(3)(e). This serve as a powerful 
reminder for the prosecution that they should exercise its power with extreme care when 
gathering information under this provision.50 In the event where disclosure of the 
material to the defence is deemed necessary, but the prosecution is unable to obtain the 
information providers’ consent, the prosecution should disclose the relevant material to 
the Chamber. Then the judges will decide ‘whether and, if so, which counterbalancing 
																																																								
49	 Alex	Whiting,	‘Disclosure	Challenges	at	the	ICC’	in	Carsten	Stahn	(ed),	The	Law	and	Practice	of	the	
International	Criminal	Court	(Oxford	University	Press,	USA	2014)	1016.	
50	 Katanga	case,	Single	Judge:	Decision	on	Article	54(3)(e)	Documents	Identified	as	Potentially	
Exculpatory	or	Otherwise	Material	to	the	Defence’s	Preparation	for	the	Confirmation	Hearing	(20	June	
2008)	at	para.	36.	
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measures can be taken to ensure that the rights of the accused are protected and that the 
trial is fair, in spite of the nondisclosure of the information’.51  
 
IV. A Two-Stage Disclosure Framework: Disclosure prior to 
Confirmation of Charges Hearing 
One aspect that distinguishes the proceedings in the ICC from the ad hoc Tribunals is its 
two-stage disclosure framework. Disclosure is separated into two phases, one prior to 
the confirmation hearing and one prior to trial. This section will mainly addresses the 
disclosure issues prior to the confirmation hearing, as the one prior to trial has already 
been discussed. 
1. Timing 
According to Article 61 of the ICC Statute, the Pre-Trial Chamber shall hold a hearing 
to confirm the charges.52 This provision should be read together with Rule 121 
(Proceedings before the confirmation hearing).53 Article 61(3) sets out the requirements 
for prosecution disclosure at this stage, providing that: 																																																								
51	 Lubanga	case,	Appelas	Chamber:	Judgment	on	the	appeal	of	the	Prosecutor	against	the	decision	of	
Trial	Chamber	I	entitled	‘Decision	on	the	consequences	of	non-disclosure	of	exculpatory	materials	
covered	by	Article	54(3)(e)	agreements	and	the	application	to	stay	the	prosecution	of	the	accused,	
together	with	certain	other	issues	raised	at	the	Status	Conference	on	10	June	2008’	(21	October	2008)	at	
para.	48.	
52	 Article	61(1):	Subject	to	the	provisions	of	paragraph	2,	within	a	reasonable	time	after	the	person's	
surrender	or	voluntary	appearance	before	the	Court,	the	Pre-Trial	Chamber	shall	hold	a	hearing	to	
confirm	the	charges	on	which	the	Prosecutor	intends	to	seek	trial.	The	hearing	shall	be	held	in	the	
presence	of	the	Prosecutor	and	the	person	charged,	as	well	as	his	or	her	counsel.	
53	 Rule	121	ICC	RPEs.	
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 ‘[W]ithin a reasonable time before the hearing, the person shall: (a) be provided 
with a copy of the document containing the charges on which the Prosecutor intends to 
bring the person to trial; and (b) be informed of the evidence on which the Prosecutor 
intends to rely at the hearing. The Pre-Trial Chamber may issue orders regarding the 
disclosure of information for the purposes of the hearing. 
Rule 121(3) reads that: ‘the Prosecutor shall provide to the Pre-Trial Chamber and the 
person, no later than 30 days before the date of the confirmation hearing, a detailed 
description of the charges together with a list of the evidence which he or she intends to 
present at the hearing.’ 
In addition, Article 61(4) and (5) of the ICC Statute regulates the prosecution’s 
amendments to the charges and the list of evidence. If the prosecution intends to do so, 
it must notify the Pre-Trial Chamber and the person no later than 15 days before the 
date of the hearing.54 Article 61(6) sets out the deadline for the defence to provide a list 
of evidence it wishes to present at the confirmation hearing.55 
In comparison with the disclosure framework at the ad hoc Tribunals, these are short 
deadlines. At the ICTY, Rule 66 ICTY RPEs obligates the prosecution to disclose the 
material it intends to rely upon to obtain the indictment against the accused within 30 
																																																								
54	 Article	61(4):	Where	the	Prosecutor	intends	to	amend	the	charges	pursuant	to	article	61,	paragraph	4,	
he	or	she	shall	notify	the	Pre-Trial	Chamber	and	the	person	no	later	than	15	days	before	the	date	of	the	
hearing	of	the	amended	charges	together	with	a	list	of	evidence	that	the	Prosecutor	intends	to	bring	in	
support	of	those	charges	at	the	hearing.	
5.	Where	the	Prosecutor	intends	to	present	new	evidence	at	the	hearing,	he	or	she	shall	provide	the	
Pre-Trial	Chamber	and	the	person	with	a	list	of	that	evidence	no	later	than	15	days	before	the	date	of	
the	hearing.	
55	 Article	61(6):	If	the	person	intends	to	present	evidence	under	article	61,	paragraph	6,	he	or	she	shall	
provide	a	list	of	that	evidence	to	the	Pre-Trial	Chamber	no	later	than	15	days	before	the	date	of	the	
hearing.	The	Pre-Trial	Chamber	shall	transmit	the	list	to	the	Prosecutor	without	delay.	The	person	shall	
provide	a	list	of	evidence	that	he	or	she	intends	to	present	in	response	to	any	amended	charges	or	a	
new	list	of	evidence	provided	by	the	Prosecutor.	
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days of his or her initial appearance.56 By contrast, Rule 121(3) ICC RPEs imposes a 
timeframe of ‘30 days before the date of the confirmation hearing’. Because Article 
61(3) of the Statute requires the prosecution to disclose all inculpatory material ‘within 
a reasonable time’, it leaves room for the interpretation regarding the timing of 
prosecution’s disclosure. In practice, the prosecution has been using the 30 days before 
the confirmation hearing under Rule 121(3), rather than Article 61(3), as its timeframe 
for disclosure. 
This practice is problematic for the defence, as they have their own deadlines to meet 
pursuant to Article 61(6). The defence is required to file its list of evidence 15 days 
prior to the commencement of the confirmation hearing.57 With the prosecution 
disclosing that late, it left the defence with very little time to prepare for the 
confirmation hearing and conduct its investigation. In addition, as previously noted, 
defence teams suffer inequality of arms in terms of time and resources. The defence 
teams usually are understaffed and have to analyse and digest thousands of documents 
within a very short period of time. In some cases, for example Abu Gardu, the defence 
did not even have access to the states where the alleged crimes took place.58 
Defence counsels have argued that the prosecution’s interpretation of these provisions is 
																																																								
56	 Rule	66(A)	ICTY	RPEs.	
57	 Article	61(6)	ICC	Statute.	
58	 Prosecutor	v	Abdallah	Banda	Abakaer	Nourain	and	Saleh	Mohammed	Jerbo	Jamus,	No.	
ICC-02/05-03/09	(‘Banda’	case),	Defence	Request	for	a	Temporary	Stay	of	Proceedings,	Defence	teams	of	
Abdallah	Banda	Abakaer	Nourain	and	Saleh	Mohammed	Jerbo	Jamus	(06	January	2012).	
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hardly satisfying as it could ‘significantly hamper effective defence preparation and the 
material ability to effectively confront charges.’59 As suggested by Khan and Buismann, 
the prosecution should disclose the relevant information to the defence at the earliest 
opportunity, and then Rule 121(3) should apply. As originally intended, it should serve 
as a ‘final cut-off point’ for the prosecution to identify the evidence it wishes to rely 
upon at the confirmation hearing.60  
2. Purpose and Scope 
The purpose and scope of the confirmation hearing has to be distinguished from the trial 
proceedings. The main purpose of the confirmation hearing is to streamline and 
expedite the proceeding by filtering the prosecution’s allegations and separating the 
cases which should proceed to trial from those which should not.61 It has a limited 
purpose and is not intended to be a ‘mini-trial’ or a trial before the trial,62 but merely as 
a means to protect suspects against ‘wrongful and wholly unfounded charges’.63 
Perhaps ironically, in practice, the confirmation hearings have been long and 
																																																								
59	 Khan	and	Buisman	(n	15)	1032.	
60	 ibid.	
61	 Prosecutor	v	Callixte	Mbarushimana,	No.	ICC-01/04-01/10	(‘Mbarushimana’	case)	Pre-Trial	Chamber:	
Decision	on	the	Confirmation	of	Charges	(16	December	2011)	at	para.	41;	Prosecutor	v	Francis	Kirimi	
Muthaura,	Uhuru	Muigai	Kenyatta,	and	Mohammed	Hussein	Ali,	No.	ICC-01/09-02/11	(‘Kenyatta’	case),	
Pre-Trial	Chamber:	Decision	on	the	Confirmation	of	Charges	(26	January	2012)	at	para.	52;	Prosecutor	v	
William	Samoei	Ruto,	Henry	Kiprono	Kosgey,	and	Joshua	Arap	Sang,	No.	ICC-01/09-01/11	(“Ruto”	case),	
Pre-Trial	Chamber,	Decision	on	the	Confirmation	of	Charges	Pursuant	to	Article	61(7)(a)	and	(b)	of	the	
Rome	Statute	(23	January	2012)	at	para.	40;	Prosecutor	v	Laurent	Gbagbo,	No.	ICC-02/11-01/11	
(‘Gbagbo’	case),	Pre-Trial	Chamber:	Decision	Adjourning	the	Hearing	on	the	Confirmation	of	Charges	
pursuant	to	article	61(7)(c)(i)	of	the	Rome	Statute	(3	June	2013)	at	para.	18.	
62	 Katanga	case,	Pre-Trial	Chamber:	Decision	on	the	confirmation	of	charges	(30	September	2008)	at	
para.	64.	
63	 Ibid.,	at	para.	63.	
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time-consuming instead of shortening the trial preparation.64 
In line with this objective, the scope of disclosure for confirmation hearing is different 
from the one at trial. Pursuant to Article 61, the standard of proof at the confirmation 
stage is ‘substantial grounds to believe’,65 while the standard at trial is ‘beyond 
reasonable doubt’ – a much higher standard – as the purpose is to secure convictions. A 
Pre-Trial Chamber held that if it applied such high standard at the confirmation hearing, 
it would not be compatible with the standard under Article 61(7).66 ‘Substantial 
grounds to believe’ has been interpreted as meaning strong grounds for believing.67 
Hence, in view of the nature of a confirmation hearing, the Appeals Chamber held that 
it is permissible to withhold material from the defence which would not be able to be 
withheld at the trial.68 As a consequence, an accused is not entitled to disclosure of the 
full prosecution file of the investigation and case in preparation for the confirmation 
hearing. 
																																																								
64	 Ignaz	Stegmiller,	‘Confirmation	of	Charges’	in	Carsten	Stahn	(ed),	The	Law	and	Practice	of	the	
International	Criminal	Court	(Oxford	University	Press	2015)	892.	
65	 Article	61(5)	ICC	Statute.	
66	 Prosecutor	v	Bahr	Idriss	Abu	Garda,	No.	ICC-02/05-02/09,	Pre-Trial	Chamber:	Decision	on	the	
Confirmation	of	Charges	(8	February	2010)	at	para.	40.	
67	 Mbarushimana	case,	Pre-Trial	Chamber:	Decision	on	the	Confirmation	of	Charges	(16	December	2011)	
at	para.	40;	Prosecutor	v	Jean-Pierre	Bemba	Gombo,	Aime	Kilomo	Mussamba,	Jean-Jacques	Mangenda	
Kabongo,	Fidele	Babala	Wandu,	and	Narcisse	Arido,	No.	ICC-01/05-01/13	(‘Kilolo’	case),	Pre-Trial	
Chamber:	Decision	pursuant	to	Article	61(7)(a)	and	(b)	of	the	Rome	Statute	(11	November	2014)	at	para.	
25.	
68	 Katanga	case,	Appeals	Chamber:	Judgment	on	the	Appeal	of	the	Prosecutor	Against	the	Decision	of	
Pre-Trial	Chamber	I	entitled	“First	Decision	on	the	Prosecution	Request	to	Redact	Witness	Statements”	
(13	May	2008)	at	para.	68.	
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3. Summary and Documentary Evidence 
Article 61(5) explicitly permits the use of summary and documentary evidence at the 
confirmation hearing. Article 61(5) reads that  
‘[A]t the hearing, the Prosecutor shall support each charge with sufficient evidence 
to establish substantial grounds to believe that the person committed the crime charged. 
The Prosecutor may rely on documentary or summary evidence and need not call the 
witnesses expected to testify at the trial.’ 
Although at this stage the Prosecution is under an obligation to disclose inculpatory 
material to the defence, it is not required to submit the entirety of the material in his 
possession that is relevant to the charges. At the confirmation hearing, the prosecution 
has been heavily relying on this provision as grounds to provide huge amounts of 
summaries and redacted statements instead of full disclosure to the defence.69 Since 
these summaries tend to be very brief,70 from a defence perspective, it is exceedingly 
difficult to conduct proper investigations in preparation of the confirmation hearing.  
It should be noted that with regard to exculpatory material, there is no longer a 
distinction between pre-confirmation hearings and trial. The prosecutor’s duty to 
disclosure exculpatory evidence is a continuing one and has to be met ‘as soon as 
practicable’.71 In the beginning, the Pre-Trial Chamber adopted the ‘bulk’ rule of 																																																								
69	 See	e.g.	Katanga	Case,	Pre-Trial	Chamber:	Public	redacted	version	of	the	‘Decision	on	the	Use	of	
Summaries	of	the	Statements	of	Witnesses	267	and	243’	issued	on	3	April	2008	(25	June	2008),	
authorizing	the	use	of	summaries	for	witnesses	267	and	243.	
70	 Khan	and	Buisman	(n	15)	1036	(noting	that	in	the	Katanga	and	Kenya	I	and	II	confirmation	
proceedings,	such	summaries	were	often	no	longer	than	one	page).	
71	 Article	67(2)	ICC	Statute.	
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disclosure. For example, in Katanga and Ngudjolo, the Single Judge held that, given the 
limited nature of the confirmation hearing, only ‘the bulk’ of the prosecution’s evidence 
must be disclosed before the confirmation hearing.72 Subsequent Pre-Trial Chambers, 
however, have taken a different view and considered that there is no legal or practical 
reason as to why the prosecution would be unable to comply with its duty to disclose all 
exculpatory and relevant materials in its possession prior to the confirmation hearing.73 
Nevertheless, it is observed that the consequences of breaches of this obligation may be 
more severe when they occur closer, or in the course of trial, than during the 
confirmation stage.74  
V. Protective measures and the Use of Intermediaries  
1. The Duty to Disclose v The Need to Protect Witnesses 
The prosecution’s duty to disclose evidence and the need to protect witnesses and their 
families has proved to be a particularly challenging issue at the ICC. It is observed that 
the need to protect witnesses appears to be one of the major obstacles to full disclosure 
of evidence at the ICC, as it has become apparent in the Kenyan cases.75 These needs 
																																																								
72	 Katanga	case,	Single	Judge:	Decision	on	Article	54(3)(e)	Documents	Identified	as	Potentially	
Exculpatory	or	Otherwise	Material	to	the	Defence’s	Preparation	for	the	Confirmation	Hearing	(20	June	
2008)	at	paras.	8-10.	
73	 Ruto	case,	Pre-Trial	Chamber:	Decision	on	the	‘Prosecution’s	Application	for	Leave	to	Appeal	the	
“Decision	Setting	the	Regime	for	Evidence	Disclosure	and	Other	Related	Matters”	(02	May	2011)	at	paras	
24–8.	
74	 See	Katanga	case,	Single	Judge:	Decision	on	Art	54(3)(e)	Documents	Identified	as	Potentially	
Exculpatory	or	Otherwise	Material	to	the	Defence's	Preparation	for	the	Confirmation	Hearing	(20	June	
2008)	at	paras	8,	65–6,	70,	and	124–5.	
75	 E.g.	Kenyatta	case,	Prosecution	notification	of	withdrawal	of	the	charges	against	Francis	Kirimi	
Muthaura,	Muthaura	and	Kenyatta	(11	March	2013)	at	para.	11.	
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are exacerbated by the fact that many international prosecutions relate to ongoing 
conflicts. Accordingly, it is often asserted that there is a need to balance the defendant’s 
right to adequate time and facilities to prepare for trial by redactions and other 
protective measures.76 
The ICC Statute provides protective measures for witnesses. Right after Article 67 titled 
the rights of the accused, Article 68 regulates’ the protection of victims and witnesses 
and their participation’.77 Article 68(5) states the situation when disclosing information 
may lead to security issues of the witnesses, providing that:  
																																																								
76	 Håkan	Friman,	‘Trial	Procedures’	in	Carsten	Stahn	(ed),	The	Law	and	Practice	of	the	International	
Criminal	Court	(Oxford	University	Press	2015)	924.	
77	 Article	68	ICC	Statute—protection	of	victims	and	witnesses	and	their	participation:	
1. The	Court	shall	take	appropriate	measures	to	protect	the	safety,	physical	and	psychological	
well-being,	dignity	and	privacy	of	victims	and	witnesses.	In	so	doing,	the	Court	shall	have	regard	
to	all	relevant	factors,	including	age,	gender	as	defined	in	article	7,	paragraph	3,	and	health,	
and	the	nature	of	the	crime,	in	particular,	but	not	limited	to,	where	the	crime	involves	sexual	or	
gender	violence	or	violence	against	children.	The	Prosecutor	shall	take	such	measures	
particularly	during	the	investigation	and	prosecution	of	such	crimes.	These	measures	shall	not	
be	prejudicial	to	or	inconsistent	with	the	rights	of	the	accused	and	a	fair	and	impartial	trial.	
2. As	an	exception	to	the	principle	of	public	hearings	provided	for	in	article	67,	the	Chambers	of	
the	Court	may,	to	protect	victims	and	witnesses	or	an	accused,	conduct	any	part	of	the	
proceedings	in	camera	or	allow	the	presentation	of	evidence	by	electronic	or	other	special	
means.	In	particular,	such	measures	shall	be	implemented	in	the	case	of	a	victim	of	sexual	
violence	or	a	child	who	is	a	victim	or	a	witness,	unless	otherwise	ordered	by	the	Court,	having	
regard	to	all	the	circumstances,	particularly	the	views	of	the	victim	or	witness.	
3. Where	the	personal	interests	of	the	victims	are	affected,	the	Court	shall	permit	their	views	and	
concerns	to	be	presented	and	considered	at	stages	of	the	proceedings	determined	to	be	
appropriate	by	the	Court	and	in	a	manner	which	is	not	prejudicial	to	or	inconsistent	with	the	
rights	of	the	accused	and	a	fair	and	impartial	trial.	Such	views	and	concerns	may	be	presented	
by	the	legal	representatives	of	the	victims	where	the	Court	considers	it	appropriate,	in	
accordance	with	the	Rules	of	Procedure	and	Evidence.		
4. The	Victims	and	Witnesses	Unit	may	advise	the	Prosecutor	and	the	Court	on	appropriate	
protective	measures,	security	arrangements,	counselling	and	assistance	as	referred	to	in	article	
43,	paragraph	6.		
5. Where	the	disclosure	of	evidence	or	information	pursuant	to	this	Statute	may	lead	to	the	grave	
endangerment	of	the	security	of	a	witness	or	his	or	her	family,	the	Prosecutor	may,	for	the	
purposes	of	any	proceedings	conducted	prior	to	the	commencement	of	the	trial,	withhold	such	
evidence	or	information	and	instead	submit	a	summary	thereof.	Such	measures	shall	be	
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‘Where the disclosure of evidence or information pursuant to this Statute may 
lead to the grave endangerment of the security of a witness or his or her family, the 
Prosecutor may, for the purposes of any proceedings conducted prior to the 
commencement of the trial, withhold such evidence or information and instead 
submit a summary thereof. Such measures shall be exercised in a manner which is 
not prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a fair and 
impartial trial.’ 
Another relevant provision here is Article 64(2) of the Rome Statute, which states that it 
is the function and power of a Trial Chamber to ‘ensure that a trial is fair and 
expeditious and is conducted with full respect for the rights of the accused and due 
regard for the protection of victims and witnesses.’ The Trial Chamber is thus given the 
responsibility and power to determine what protective measures are necessary and 
appropriate in each case. 
From the languages of the two Articles, it would seem that the framework of the ICC 
Statute places the need to protect witnesses subordinated to the rights of the accused. It 
is submitted that, at least in theory, this is less controversial as the wording of the Rome 
Statute appeared to suggest that the fair trial rights of the accused should have primacy 
over witnesses.78 When the prosecution withholds information pursuant to Article 
68(5), it should be strictly limited to the exigencies of the situation, and not infringe the 
																																																																																																																																																																		
exercised	in	a	manner	which	is	not	prejudicial	to	or	inconsistent	with	the	rights	of	the	accused	
and	a	fair	and	impartial	trial.		
6. A	State	may	make	an	application	for	necessary	measures	to	be	taken	in	respect	of	the	
protection	of	its	servants	or	agents	and	the	protection	of	confidential	or	sensitive	information.	
78	 See	Salvatore	Zappalà,	‘The	Rights	of	Victims	v.	the	Rights	of	the	Accused’	(2010)	8	Journal	of	
International	Criminal	Justice	137.	
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rights of the defence.79  
Furthermore, Article 68(5) only allows the prosecution to withhold evidence ‘for the 
purposes of any proceedings conducted prior to the commencement of the trial’. In 
other words, the relevant information regarding the witnesses must still be disclosed to 
the defence in due time prior to trial. However, in practice, these material are usually 
withheld until shortly before the trial begins, and sometimes even later. This practice 
may impede the defence’s ability to prepare its case. Similar to the practice in the ad 
hoc Tribunals, the identities of the witnesses and their statements would only be 
revealed shortly before they testify at trial.  
2. Redactions – Rule 81  
Article 61 does not permit the use of redactions at the confirmation of charges phase. If 
the prosecution wishes to redact certain documents or witness statements, it must apply 
to the relevant Chamber for approval under Rule 81. Rule 81 (Restrictions on 
Disclosure) reads: 
1. Reports, memoranda or other internal documents prepared by a party, its assistants 
or representatives in connection with the investigation or preparation of the case are 
not subject to disclosure. 																																																								
79	 Lubanga	Case,	Single	Judge:	Decision	Establishing	General	Principles	Governing	Applications	to	
Restrict	Disclosure	pursuant	to	Rule	81(2)	and	(4)	of	the	Statute	(26	May	2006);	Lubanga	Case,	Single	
Judge:	Decision	on	the	Final	System	of	Disclosure	and	the	Establishment	of	a	Timetable	(15	May	2006);	
Lubanga	Case,	Appeals	Chamber:	Judgment	on	the	Appeal	of	Mr	Thomas	Lubanga	Dyilo	against	the	
Decision	of	Pre-Trial	Chamber	I	entitled	‘First	Decision	on	the	Prosecution	Requests	and	Amended	
Requests	for	Redactions	under	Rule	81’(14	December	2006)	at	para.	34	(the	Chamber	must	assess	
whether	the	redactions	are	‘prejudicial	to	or	inconsistent	with	the	rights	of	the	accused	and	a	fair	and	
impartial	trial’).	
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2. Where material or information is in the possession or control of the Prosecutor 
which must be disclosed in accordance with the Statute, but disclosure may prejudice 
further or ongoing investigations, the Prosecutor may apply to the Chamber dealing 
with the matter for a ruling as to whether the material or information must be 
disclosed to the defence. The matter shall be heard on an  ex parte basis by the 
Chamber. However, the Prosecutor may not introduce such material or information 
into evidence during the confirmation hearing or the trial without adequate prior 
disclosure to the accused.  
3. Where steps have been taken to ensure the confidentiality of information, in 
accordance with articles 54, 57, 64, 72 and 93, and, in accordance with article 68, to 
protect the safety of witnesses and victims and members of their families, such 
information shall not be disclosed, except in accordance with those articles. When the 
disclosure of such information may create a risk to the safety of the witness, the 
Court shall take measures to inform the witness in advance.  
4. The Chamber dealing with the matter shall, on its own motion or at the request of 
the Prosecutor, the accused or any State, take the necessary steps to ensure the 
confidentiality of information, in accordance with articles 54, 72 and 93, and, in 
accordance with article 68, to protect the safety of witnesses and victims and 
members of their families, including by authorizing the non-disclosure of their 
identity prior to the commencement of the trial.  
5. Where material or information is in the possession or control of the Prosecutor 
which is withheld under article 68, paragraph 5, such material and information may 
not be subsequently introduced into evidence during the confirmation hearing or the 
trial without adequate prior disclosure to the accused. 
It should be noted that redactions would not be authorized if the evidence contained 
exculpatory material.80 In Lubanga, the Single Judge held that potentially exculpatory 																																																								
80	 Lubanga	case,	Single	Judge:	Decision	on	the	Prosecution	Amended	Application	Pursuant	to	Rule	81(2)	
(2	August	2006)	at	p.	6	
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excerpts from statements of witnesses upon whom the prosecution intends to rely at the 
confirmation hearing may not be redacted.81  
Redactions will only be granted if they satisfy the following requirements, as set out by 
the Trial Chamber: (i) the existence of an objectively justifiable risk to the safety of the 
person or interest concerned, or which may prejudice further or ongoing investigations; 
(ii) the risk must arise from disclosing the particular information to the receiving party, 
as opposed to the public; (iii) the infeasibility or insufficiency of less restrictive 
protective measures and (iv) an assessment as to whether the redactions sought are 
prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a fair and impartial trial. 
Additionally, if the redaction is granted, there is an ongoing obligation to periodically 
review the decision authorising the redactions should circumstances change.82  
It should be noted that ‘general security concerns in a region’ alone does not suffice to 
justify redactions from disclosure to the defence.83 Unless it could be shown that such 
security problems are prompted by the defendant.84 The Chamber must determine on a 
case-by-case basis based on the criteria above.  																																																								
81	 Lubanga	case,	Single	Judge:	Decision	Establishing	General	Principles	Governing	Applications	to	
Restrict	Disclosure	pursuant	to	Rule	81(2)	and	81(4)	of	the	Statute	(19	May	2006)	at	para.	38.	
82	 Kilolo	case,	Trial	Chamber:	Decision	on	Modalities	of	Disclosure	(22	May	2015)	at	para.	11.	
83	 Lubanga	case,	Appeals	Chamber:	Judgment	on	the	Appeal	of	Mr	Thomas	Lubanga	Dyilo	against	the	
Decision	of	Pre-Trial	Chamber	I	entitled	‘First	Decision	on	the	Prosecution	Requests	and	Amended	
Requests	for	Redactions	under	Rule	81’	(14	December	2006)	at	para.	21;	Katanga	Case,	Trial	Chamber:	
Public	Redacted	Version	of	the	Decision	on	the	Prosecutor’s	Application	to	Redact	Information	Falling	
under	Art	67(2)	of	the	Statute	and	Rule	77	of	the	Rules	of	Procedure	and	Evidence	(Witnesses	6,	83,	102,	
and	221)	of	18	May	2009	(23	December	2009)	at	para.	9.	
84	 Katanga	Case,	Appeals	Chamber:	Judgment	on	the	appeal	of	the	Prosecutor	against	the	decision	of	
Pre-Trial	Chamber	I	entitled	‘First	Decision	on	the	Prosecution	Request	for	Authorisation	to	Redact	
Witness	Statements’(13	May	2008)	at	para.	71.	
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In addition, the Single Judge in Katanga has considered that providing summaries of the 
statements of witnesses to be preferable to providing redacted statements, since the 
approval of redactions is a time consuming task falling upon the Single Judge, 
eventually delaying the confirmation hearing.85 
Despite redaction applications made under Rule 81 should be subjected to strict judicial 
supervision, the ICC practice shows that redactions requests from the prosecution are 
generally granted before the Chamber during the confirmation hearing.86 This is partly 
because the review of redaction applications is a time-consuming process. In the 
Kenyan cases, in order to minimise the burden and delays, the Trial Chamber approved 
a proposal by the parties in which redactions to certain standard categories of 
information were imposed inter partes, without the chamber’s direct involvement.87 As 
a consequence, until the trial stage of Ruto and Sang and Kenyatta cases, the practice of 
the ICC pre-trial and trial chambers had been to approve each and every redaction 
applied for by the prosecution for, at the very least, all inculpatory disclosure.88 In 
Al-Mahdi, the Pre-Trial Chamber devised a procedure for redactions. The prosecution 
can make redactions under Rule 81(2) and Rule 81(4) without application to the 
																																																								
85	 Katanga	case,	Single	Judge:	Decision	on	the	Evidentiary	Scope	of	the	Confirmation	Hearing,	Preventive	
Relocation,	and	Disclosure	under	Article	67(2)	of	the	Statute	and	Rule	77	of	the	Rules	(25	April	2008)	at	
para.	110.	
86	 Karim	AA	Khan	and	Anand	A	Shah,	‘Defensive	Practices:	Representing	Clients	before	the	International	
Criminal	Court’	(2013)	76	Law	and	Contemporary	Problems	191,	213.	
87	 Ruto	case,	Trial	Chamber:	Decision	on	the	protocol	establishing	a	redaction	regime	(27	September	
2012);	Kenyatta	Case,	Trial	Chamber:	Decision	on	the	protocol	establishing	a	redaction	regime	(27	
September	2012)	at	para.	13-15.	
88	 Ibid.	 	
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Chamber. Although the defence may challenge the redactions, the Chamber held that 
the defence should approach the prosecutor and try to resolve the redactions issue 
informally first.89 If they are unable to agree, the prosecutor then has the burden to 
justify redaction and five days to request authorization for the redaction from the 
Pre-Trial Chamber.90 However, this does not apply to the non-disclosure of the 
witnesses’ identities prior to the commencement of trial and to the non-disclosure of 
entire items of evidence.91  
It is submitted that this practice is problematic for the defence as a high volume of 
redactions has been approved even without the review of a chamber at the ICC. Defence 
counsels are particularly concerned with this prosecutorial practice of redactions, 
contending that summary, redacted evidence and anonymous witness evidence might be 
‘significantly lacking in substance, coherence, or both.’92 The complaints of the 
defence are not unfound. This is because, in case of heavily redacted items, it is 
tremendously difficult for the defence counsels to analyse the disclosed materials and 
conduct investigations.93 In addition, it switches the burden to lift the redactions falling 
upon the defence, which is indeed a very heavy one.  
It should be reminded that the overriding principle is full disclosure and authorization 																																																								
89	 Al-Mahdi	case,	Single	Judge:	Decisions	on	Issues	Related	to	Disclosure	and	Exceptions	Thereto	(30	
September	2015)	at	paras.	4,6.	
90	 Ibid.,	at	para.	6.	
91	 Ibid.,	at	para.7.	
92	 Khan	and	Shah	(n	86)	200.	
93	 Khan	and	Buisman	(n	15)	1036.	
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for non-disclosure is the exception, rather than the rule.94 The practice of routinely 
applied redactions has proved to be prejudicial to the fair-trial rights of the accused, as 
significant time and investigatory opportunities would be lost as a result of the delayed 
lifting of these redactions. Furthermore, the manner in which the redactions are applied, 
even at the trial stage, may render the disclosed material of limited value to the 
defence.95 This is particularly concerning when comparing with the ad hoc tribunals, 
the ICC has adopted a permissive approach in authorizing redactions from and defence, 
sometimes even on a permanent basis.96 
																																																								
94	 Katanga	case,	Appeals	Chamber:	Judgment	on	the	Appeal	of	the	Prosecutor	Against	the	Decision	of	
Pre-Trial	Chamber	I	entitled	“First	Decision	on	the	Prosecution	Request	to	Redact	Witness	Statements”	
(13	May	2008)	at	para.	70;	Lubanga	case,	Appeals	Chamber:	Decision	on	Prosecutor’s	Second	Request	for	
Redactions	for	the	Purposes	of	Disclosure	(14	November	2014)	at	para.	8.	
95	 Khan	and	Shah	(n	86)	208.	
96	 Katanga	case,	Trial	Chamber:	Public	Redacted	Version	of	the	Decision	on	the	Prosecutor’s	Application	
to	Redact	Information	in	the	Second	Statement	of	Prosecution	Witness	249	of	18	May	2009	(13	January	
2010)	at	para.	27;	Katanga	case,	Trial	Chamber:	Decision	on	the	Prosecutor’s	Application	to	Redact	
Information	under	Art	67(2)	of	the	Statute	or	Rule	77	of	the	Rules	of	Procedure	and	Evidence	(18	
November	2009)	at	paras	26–7;	Katanga	case,	Trial	Chamber:	Decision	on	the	Prosecutor’s	Application	
to	Redact	Information	and	to	Maintain	and	Reinstate	Redacted	Passages	in	Certain	Documents	under	
Rule	77	of	the	Rules	of	Procedure	and	Evidence	(Witnesses	26,	36,	158,	and	180)	(18	November	2009)	at	
para.	21.	See	also	Katanga	case,	Trial	Chamber:	Decision	on	the	Defence	Request	to	Redact	the	Identity	
Source	of	DRC-D03-0001-0707	(22	August	2011)	at	9,	where	the	permanent	redaction	of	a	defence	
source	was	authorized	for	the	first	time	in	international	justice.	But	see	Katanga	case,	Trial	Chamber:	
Decision	on	the	Prosecutor’s	Application	to	Redact	Information	from	Certain	Evidence	under	Art	67(2)	of	
the	Statute	or	Rule	77	of	the	Rules	of	Procedure	and	Evidence	(30	December	2009)	at	paras	13–18;	
Decision	on	the	Prosecutor’s	Application	to	Redact	Information	under	Art	67(2)	of	the	Statute	or	Rule	77	
of	the	Rules	of	Procedure	and	Evidence	(5	May	2009).	
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3. The Use of Intermediaries97  
In both the Lubanga and the Katanga case, it was found that the prosecutor had relied 
excessively on intermediaries whose identities were unknown.98  
The Second Stay of Lubanga 
On 8 July 2010, the Trial Chamber suspended the Lubanga proceedings again. This 
time is due to the prosecution’s repeated refusal to comply with the Chamber’s order to 
disclose the identity of an intermediary to the defence. The Trial Chamber found that 
‘fair trial of the accused [was] no longer possible, and justice [could not] be done,’99 
and subsequently ordered the release of Mr. Lubanga.100 The prosecutor soon appealed 
on this decision.101 On 8 October 2010, the Appeals Chamber reversed the stay, 
considering that less drastic measures were available for the Trial Chamber as 
sanctions.102 Notwithstanding the reversal, the Appeals Chamber held that the 
prosecution should comply with the Trial Chamber’s order, and that the ultimate 																																																								
97	 An	intermediary	is	a	person	who	provides	assistance	to	the	Office	of	the	Prosecutor	with	discrete	
aspects	of	its	investigations,	including	by	identifying	leads	or	witnesses.	Intermediaries	are	considered	
crucial	to	the	investigations	of	the	ICC	prosecutions,	because	they	perform	many	tasks	that	the	OTP	
would	not	otherwise	have	the	capacity	or	the	resources	to	perform.	Further,	they	have	often	been	
present	in	an	affected	area	for	a	long	period	of	time,	have	a	deep	understanding	of	the	historical	and	
prevailing	conditions	of	that	area,	and	have	the	trust	of	the	communities	in	which	they	work.	See	Elena	
A.	Baylis,	‘Outsourcing	Investigations’	(2009)	14	UCLA	Journal	of	International	and	Foreign	Affairs	121,	
144.	
98	 Khan	and	Buisman	(n	15)	1051.	
99	 Lubanga	case,	Trial	Chamber:	Decision	on	the	Prosecution’s	Urgent	Request	for	Variation	of	the	Time-	
Limit	to	Disclose	the	Identity	of	Intermediary	143	or	Alternatively	to	Stay	Proceedings	Pending	Further	
Consultations	with	the	VWU	(08	July	2010)	at	para.	31.	
100	 Lubanga	case,	Trial	Chamber	oral	decision	to	release	Mr	Thomas	Lubanga	Dyilo	(15	July	2010)	p.17,	
line	8	to	p.	22,	line	8.	 	
101	 Lubanga	case,	Prosecution’s	Appeal	against	Trial	Chamber	I’s	oral	decision	to	release	Thomas	
Lubanga	Dyilo	and	Urgent	Application	for	Suspensive	Effect	(16	July	2010).	
102	 Lubanga	case,	Appeals	Chamber:	Judgment	on	the	Appeal	of	the	Prosecutor	Against	the	Decision	of	
Trial	Chamber	I	of	8	July	2010	entitled	Decision	on	the	Prosecution’s	Urgent	Request	for	Variation	of	the	
Time-Limit	to	Disclose	the	Identity	of	Intermediary	143	or	Alternatively	to	Stay	(08	October	2010)	.	
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decision of whether or not to disclose an identity of a witness lies with the Chamber, not 
the prosecution.103 
The disclosure order is mainly regarding prosecution’s intermediary 143. The judges of 
the Trial Chamber have ordered the prosecution twice that his identity is to be disclosed 
to the defence. Without knowing the identity of intermediary 143, the Lubanga defence 
team would not be in a position to conduct effective cross-examinations against another 
intermediary who was currently testifying before the court.104 
The ICC prosecutorial practice of using intermediaries could be questionable. As 
claimed by some defence counsels, the identities of these intermediaries were withheld 
from the defence for a long period of time and, to a great extent, during the trial phase, 
notwithstanding various attempts on the part of the defence to have them disclosed;105 
some have never been disclosed.106 The Chambers both in Lubanga and in Katanga 
ordered disclosure of the identities of the intermediaries only in cases when their 
																																																								
103	 Ibid.,	at	paras	47-8.	
104	 Lubanga	case,	Trial	Chamber:	Decision	on	the	Prosecution’s	Urgent	Request	for	Variation	of	the	
Time-Limit	to	Disclose	the	Identity	of	Intermediary	143	or	Alternatively	to	Stay	Proceedings	Pending	
Further	Consultations	with	the	VWU	(08	July	2010)	at	para.	12	
105	 See	e.g.	Lubanga	case,	Trial	Chamber:	Public	Submissions	and	Decision	(7	July,	2010,	15–22;	Lubanga	
case,	Trial	Chamber:	Redacted	Decision	on	Intermediaries	(31	May	2010)	at	paras	5,	6,	15–16,	34,	50,	56,	
66–74,	81,	85–7,	112,	and	115.	
106	 For	instance,	the	identity	of	intermediary	P-310	in	the	Katanga	and	Ngudjolo	case	has	not	been	
disclosed	to	the	defence.	In	Lubanga,	the	defence	is	still	unaware	of	the	identities	of	intermediaries	81,	
123,	154,	254,	and	290.	See	Lubanga	case,	Trial	Chamber:	Redacted	Decision	on	Intermediaries	(31	May	
2010)	at	paras	139-40	and	145-6;	Lubanga	case,	Trial	Chamber:	Judgment	Pursuant	to	Art	74	of	the	
Statute	(14	March	2012)	at	para.	293.	Katanga	case,	Second	Corrigendum	to	the	Defence	Closing	Brief	
(29	June	2012)	at	paras	487,	488,	492,	and	509–10.	
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credibility was put in question.107 Furthermore, it is noted that in both Lubnaga and 
Katanga cases, some of the defence witnesses have testified that they had been paid or 
coached by the prosecution’s intermediaries to lie.108 Some witnesses also alleged that 
part of their motive for giving false statements and testimony was that the intermediary 
who contacted them promised them money, education, and free re-housing.109 
Therefore, in order to enable Lubanga’s team to fully investigate these allegations, the 
judges ordered the prosecution to disclose the identity of certain intermediaries. 
The Lubanga Trial Chamber also expressed its concern regarding the prosecution's 
practice in this matter. It is of the view that the prosecution should not have delegated 
its investigative responsibilities to the intermediaries, notwithstanding the extensive 
security difficulties it faced. The prosecution’s negligence in failing to verify and 
scrutinize this material sufficiently before it was introduced led to significant 
expenditure on the part of the Court. An additional consequence of the lack of proper 
oversight of the intermediaries is that they were potentially able to take advantage of the 
witnesses they contacted. Given their youth and likely exposure to conflict, the 
witnesses were vulnerable to manipulation.110 
																																																								
107	 Lubanga	case,	Trial	Chamber:	Redacted	Decision	on	Intermediaries	(31	May,	2010)	at	paras.	5,	6,	
138–9,	and	150.	 	
108	 Opening	statement	of	Thomas	Lubanga	Dyilo’s	defence	team	(27	January	2010).	
109	 Lubanga	case,	Trial	Chamber:	Judgment	Pursuant	to	Art	74	of	the	Statute	(14	March	2012)	at	
para.293;	Lubanga	case,	Trial	Chamber:	Redacted	Decision	on	Intermediaries	(31	May,	2010)	at	paras	
140	and	146;	Katanga	case,	Second	Corrigendum	to	the	Defence	Closing	Brief	(29	June	2012)	at	paras	
487,	488,	492,	and	509–10.	
110	 Lubanga	case,	Trial	Chamber:	Judgment	Pursuant	to	Art	74	of	the	Statute	(14	March	2012)	at	para.	
482.	
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Nevertheless, the prosecution deliberately refused to comply with the Chamber’s order, 
claiming that if the identity of intermediary 143 were revealed without protective 
measures in place, his life would be at risk.111 In fact, negotiations were still ongoing 
regarding intermediary 143 protective measures. The implementation of the protection 
measures were delayed by intermediary 143 himself, as he wanted more protection and 
did not want his identity to be disclosed.112  
More problematically, it reflected the prosecution’s attitude that it seems to consider it 
has the autonomy to decide whether or not to comply with the Trial Chamber’s orders 
under Article 68. Thus, the Trial Chamber found it necessary to stay the proceedings as 
these circumstances constituted an abuse of the process of the Court because of the 
material non-compliance with the Trial Chamber's orders, and more generally, because 
of the prosecution had ‘clearly evinced an intention not to implement the Trial 
Chamber’s orders made in the context of article 68, if it considers they conflict with 
their interpretation of the prosecution’s other obligations.’113 
The Appeals Chamber reversed the decision to stay, however, because it considered that 
the Trial Chamber had not lost control of the proceedings. Instead, the Appeals 
																																																								
111	 Lubanga	case,	Prosecution’s	Document	in	Support	of	Appeal	against	Trial	Chamber	I’s	decision	of	8	
July	2010	to	stay	the	proceedings	for	abuse	of	process	(30	July	2010).	
112	 Lubanga	case,	Trial	Chamber:	Decision	on	the	Prosecution’s	Urgent	Request	for	Variation	of	the	
Time-Limit	to	Disclose	the	Identity	of	Intermediary	143	or	Alternatively	to	Stay	Proceedings	Pending	
Further	Consultations	with	the	VWU	(08	July	2010)	at	paras	2–17.	
113	 Ibid.,	at	para.	31.	 	
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Chamber found that fines or other sanctions would be appropriate under Article 71,114 
in order to ensure the prosecution’s compliance with the Trial Chamber’s orders and 
maintaining control of proceedings.115 It should be noted that the Appeals Chamber 
essentially agreed with the Trial Chamber’s finding that the prosecution should comply 
with the Chamber’s order, stating that ‘there is no exception to the general principle that 
the Prosecutor must follow the orders of the Trial Chamber when it comes to issues of 
protection.’116 
The Appeals Chamber further emphasized that although Article 68 imposes protective 
obligations on the prosecution when investigating and prosecuting crimes, these remain 
subject to the Trial Chamber’s overarching responsibility to ensure that the accused 
receives a fair trial.117 It also noted that the protections available to witnesses and 
intermediaries under article 68 may not be absolute. In other words, the ICC cannot 
grant protective measures which would be ‘prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights 
																																																								
114	 Article	71—sanctions	for	misconduct	before	the	court	
1.	The	Court	may	sanction	persons	present	before	it	who	commit	misconduct,	including	disruption	of	its	
proceedings	or	deliberate	refusal	to	comply	with	its	directions,	by	administrative	measures	other	than	
imprisonment,	such	as	temporary	or	permanent	removal	from	the	courtroom,	a	fine	or	other	similar	
measures	provided	for	in	the	Rules	of	Procedure	and	Evidence.	
2.	The	procedures	governing	the	imposition	of	the	measures	set	forth	in	paragraph	1	shall	be	those	
provided	for	in	the	Rules	of	Procedure	and	Evidence.	
115	 Lubanga	case,	Appeals	Chamber:	Judgment	on	the	Appeal	of	the	Prosecutor	Against	the	Decision	of	Trial	Chamber	I	of	8	July	2010	entitled	Decision	on	the	Prosecution’s	Urgent	Request	for	Variation	of	the	Time-Limit	to	Disclose	the	Identity	of	Intermediary	143	or	Alternatively	to	Stay	(08	October	2010)	at	para.	59.	
116	 Ibid.,	at	para.	50.	
117	 Lubanga	case,	Trial	Chamber:	Decision	on	the	Prosecution’s	Urgent	Request	for	Variation	of	the	
Time-Limit	to	Disclose	the	Identity	of	Intermediary	143	or	Alternatively	to	Stay	Proceedings	Pending	
Further	Consultations	with	the	VWU	(08	July	2010)	at	para.	27.	 	
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of the accused and a fair and impartial trial.’118 
VI. Concluding Remarks 
The Rome Statute has granted more power to the ICC prosecution in order to fulfill its 
role of the organ of justice. Alongside with these powers come greater obligations. The 
problem is that these obligations might not all sit well together. The potential conflict 
between the prosecution’s duty to disclose exculpatory evidence to the defence and the 
duty not to disclose under confidentiality agreement reflects the difficulty in 
international prosecutions. Nevertheless, as stated by the Chambers, the prosecution 
should exercised its power with extremely care and carefully follow the law, this 
potential conflict would only be negligible.  
Despite the ICC Statute requires the prosecution to disclose information to the defence 
within a certain timeframe, and redactions regarding the witnesses identities and 
statements should only be applied in restrictive circumstances, in practice, this 
exceptional measure has been routinely applied. Particularly by comparison with the ad 
hoc tribunals, the ICC has adopted a permissive approach in authorizing redactions from 
and defence, sometimes even on a permanent basis.119 
																																																								
118	 Article	68(5)	ICC	Statute.	
119	 Katanga	case,	Trial	Chamber:	Public	Redacted	Version	of	the	Decision	on	the	Prosecutor’s	Application	
to	Redact	Information	in	the	Second	Statement	of	Prosecution	Witness	249	of	18	May	2009	(13	January	
2010)	at	para.	27;	Katanga	case,	Trial	Chamber:	Decision	on	the	Prosecutor’s	Application	to	Redact	
Information	under	Art	67(2)	of	the	Statute	or	Rule	77	of	the	Rules	of	Procedure	and	Evidence	(18	
November	2009)	at	paras	26–7;	Decision	on	the	Prosecutor’s	Application	to	Redact	Information	and	to	
Maintain	and	Reinstate	Redacted	Passages	in	Certain	Documents	under	Rule	77	of	the	Rules	of	Procedure	
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Therefore, it is submitted that redactions should be approached more prudently. The 
ICC prosecution has been redacted too much material and given too few justifications 
support such measures. Since lifting the redactions is a time-consuming task for both 
the defence and prosecution, and burdensome for the work of the Chamber, the 
prosecutions should limited its use of redactions. 
 
																																																																																																																																																																		
and	Evidence	(Witnesses	26,	36,	158,	and	180)	(18	November	2009)	at	para.	21.	 	
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CHAPTER IX 	
CONCLUSION 
 
‘Quis custodiet ipsos custodies (Who will guard the Guardians)?’ 
— Juvenal, Satire VI. 
 
I. Disclosure, Fairness and Legitimacy 
This research puts forward the question ‘is the current disclosure regime workable in the 
international criminal tribunals? If not, how so?’ To answer this question, this thesis 
analysed the current disclosure framework in the international criminal tribunals, and 
found certain problems, unworkability, and lack of coherence in them. It highlighted the 
pluralist nature of international criminal law and assessed the disclosure problems both 
in the context of public international law and the context of criminal law. Also, this 
research focussed on the unique challenges and problems of international criminal law 
that derive from its political framework, paying particular attention to the unique 
expectations in form of the wider goals the courts have to live up to that are largely 
unknown in the national context.   
Disclosure is one, if not the only, of the most important methods to redress the strucutal 
imbalance between the prosecution and defence. Regardless the procedural model, since 
the structure of most criminal justice systems heavily relys on the prosecution to 
conduct investigations and carry out the importance task of searching the truth, the 
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prosecutor enjoys a lot of investigative resources and tools at his disposal. Sometimes 
the prosecutor even has the sole access to certain material. However, this creates a 
structural gap between the two parties and an inequality of arms. As a consequence, the 
prosecutor is under a duty to disclose evidence to the defence. Without proper 
disclosure from the prosecution, the inequality of arms between the prosecution and 
defence could not be rectified, and there is a danger that the accused would not receive a 
fair trial. Due to the context of international investigations, it is further observed that the 
inequality is more significant before the international criminal tribunals, and the 
importance of this duty could not be gainsaid. 
It has been established that the prosecution’s duty to disclose relevant material to the 
defence is inextricably linked to the accused’s right to a fair trial. As stated explicitly in 
the Blaškić Discovery Decision, the purpose of disclosure is to enable the defence to 
‘have a clear and cohesive view of the prosecution’s strategy and to make the 
appropriate preparations’.1 Only by making essential information available to the 
defence should he or she be able to prepare the case. Evidently, any violation of this 
duty has a negative influence on the accused’s rights and directly affects the ability to 
prepare the defence. Despite the imperativeness of this duty and its significance to the 
defence, the prosecutors routinely keep the cards to themselves and enjoy tactical 
advantages at trial at the expense of the accused rights and, equally questionable, 																																																								
1	 Prosecutor	v	Tihomir	Blaškić,	No.	IT-95-14-T,	Decision	on	the	Production	of	Discovery	Materials	(27	
January	1997)	at	para.	22.	
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fundamental principles of law like the right to a fair trial and the presumption of 
innocence.  
In a criminal justice system where the prosecutors are considered as the ‘guardian of 
justice’, naturally, they possess power and discretion. While the necessity of this 
allocation of power is not in dispute, like in every institution that was legitimatized to 
wield power over others by a political body, one question arises from a democratic point 
of view: who controls those who control power? Given the plenitude of the prosecutor’s 
power, who ensures that that this power is not being abused? When we assess the 
possibilities and the likelihood of an abuse of power, we have to take a look on the 
motivations of the prosecutors both in general and with regard to conduct proceedings 
in a proper manner.  
As to the motivation in general, the current system bears a certain flaw. The prosecutor 
is on the one hand entrusted with fairness and to guarantee fundamental rights of the 
accused but on the other hand he feels the pressure of winning the case. This is even 
truer considering the high political pressure the international criminal tribunals have to 
face and the implications of the wider goals. Since evidence has a great bearing on the 
outcome of the trial, one wonders if the prosecutor can always be trusted to disclose 
exculpatory evidence, which might harm its own case. As this thesis has demonstrated, 
there are many cases where the prosecutors failed to do so motivated by the goal of 
being in a strategically better position. It is submitted that this is at the expense of the 
		
 		
	
325 
accused’s rights to a fair trial and is in great conflict with fundamental principles of law. 
Ultimately, this could jeopardize the legitimacy of the international criminal courts 
themselves.  
Regarding the point of the prosecutor’s motivation to refrain from such abuse of power, 
this thesis observes the sanctions of the court in case such an abuse occurred. It was 
shown that in many cases despite the formal disapproval of the court the prosecutors 
where not sanctioned in a manner proportional to the abuse of power. If anything, the 
prosecutors were only rebuked by the court. To only have blind faith that the 
prosecutors will behave in good faith is not enough. It is submitted that the courts 
should be more active in supervising the prosecutors, especially with regard to the 
disclosure of evidence.  
Nevertheless, the Chambers seem to be tolerant of this problematic prosecutorial 
disclosure practice. Although the judges explicitly disapprove of such practices in their 
statements, sanctions are rarely imposed. In the event of the judges do sanction the 
prosecutors, they usually opt for the least severe option and therefore do not accomplish 
any real effects in discouraging disclosure violations.  
The context of international criminal justice indeed brings numerous challenges to the 
operation of the international criminal courts. While many commentators have focused 
on the obstacles faced by the Tribunals and the prosecution, this thesis assessed the 
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impediments to the defence. The political pressure to secure convictions on the 
Tribunals and the international prosecutors is immense; however, it should not serve as 
an excuse to hinder the defence rights. Besides, the implementation of the wider goals, 
apparently, is causing the Courts to lower standards of fairness thereby setting aside 
fundamental principles of law. Ironically, the underlying wish to create institutions that 
can serve as universal and public symbols of justice led to a system that must accept 
lower standards of justice to fulfil this very goal. 
This thesis examined the common arguments in favour of a different treatment of the 
accused compared to national jurisdictions owing to the special context of international 
criminal justice. In particular: 
The Reliance on State Cooperation 
This paper underscored the disadvantaged position of the defence before the 
international criminal tribunals. As mentioned, there is a noteworthy inequality of arms 
between the prosecution and the defence, which could only be improved by the proper 
disclosure of evidence. Furthermore, the international accused has to deal with much 
more unfavourable circumstances than his or her national counterpart as the preparation 
of its case is often obstructed by cross-states investigations.  
It is true that both parties rely on States’ cooperation in evidentiary matters, in particular 
regarding to collecting evidence and interviewing witnesses. However, it is submitted 
		
 		
	
327 
that the current discourse is paying too much attention to the challenges faced by the 
prosecution. It is also observed that when it comes to state cooperation and the impact 
on the parties’ ability to present their case, the disparity between the prosecution and 
defence has often been downplayed. Whilst this thesis recognizes the difficulty at the 
prosecution side, it should be reminded that the defence suffers as much as, if not more, 
than the prosecution. Since the lack of state cooperation could affect both the 
prosecution and defence in preparation of their case, the courts should assess this 
argument on a case-by-case basis. 
It is submitted that the state cooperation argument should not be over-emphasized, as 
the issue essentially depends on the particular state. For example, in the context of the 
ICTY, states are in generally more inclined to cooperate with the prosecution. In Tadić, 
the defence has alleged that they are significantly more in need to call in the assistance 
of the Tribunal than the prosecution when dealing with non-cooperation; however, the 
Appeals Chamber merely emphasised that the equality of arms principle is not 
applicable to matters beyond the control of the Court. But in the Kenyan cases, although 
there is not enough proof concerning Kenyatta’s direct involvement in witness 
intimidation, there are reports showing that his people is paying off witnesses; 
threatening the families of witnesses who have accepted witness protection; publicising 
the identity of witnesses; and violence against witnesses, including mysterious 
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disappearances.2 However, the ICC prosecutor’s strategy of using intermediaries, 
without timely and propoer disclosure caused the failure to prosecute Kenyatta and 
Ruto. 
Politically Motivated Goals 
It is submitted that the importance of the so-called wider goals should not be 
overemphasised. A potential danger of focusing on these wider goals is that it could 
lead to a so-called ‘balanced’ approach of international criminal justice. As seen, many 
have already contended that the defence rights should be balanced against these goals. 
However, this thesis questioned whether it is appropriate to ‘balance away’ the 
fundamental rights of the defence to achieve these politically motivated goals. It is 
highlighted that they can create unrealistic expectations of what a criminal court can be 
capable of achieving. Also, from a practical point of view, the effectiveness of these 
goals is hard to evaluate.  
This is not to suggest that these wider goals should not be pursued at all, but rather they 
should not overtake the primary objective ‒ to adjudicate a person’s guilt in a fair and 
just manner. To attach such excessive importance to these wider goals could easily risk 
the Court to be overstretched and to give in to compromises right up to a point where 
																																																								
2	 See	‘Claims	of	Witnesses	in	Kenya	ICC	Trial	“Disappearing”’	BBC	News	(8	February	2013)	
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-21382339>.	‘Disappearance	of	Key	Witness	Raises	Concerns	
Over	Tampering	in	ICC	Kenya	Case’	(VICE	News)	
<https://news.vice.com/article/disappearance-of-key-witness-raises-concerns-over-tampering-in-icc-ke
nya-case>.	
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objectives cannot be fulfilled at all or only on a rudimentary level. Ultimately, if the 
Courts cannot guarantee fairness to the accused, the integrity of the proceedings could 
be compromised.  
Compromised Procedures 
This thesis noted the awkward position of the international accused resulting from the 
hybrid nature of international criminal procedure. While many have recognised that 
international criminal procedure is a sui generis system, it should be reminded that the 
procedure adopted for these courts is essentially a mixture between the common and 
civil law models. It is therefore not a ‘new’ system but more a combination of existing 
rules.  
The application of such hybrid, or indeed compromised, procedures could be incoherent 
and confusing. This is exacerbated by the fact that practitioners before international 
criminal tribunals come from different legal cultural backgrounds and, naturally, have 
different approaches to similar issues. More problematically, the sui generis claim could 
have the effect of disregarding or overlooking the traditional safeguards provided for 
the accused in domestic jurisdictions. Although international criminal tribunals are 
entitled to have their own procedure as they see fit, it should be highlighted that such 
departures require justifications, especially when the rights of the defence are affected. 
In other words, being sui generis as such is not a valid justification for departing from 
the existing fundamental principles and the current sui generis claim failed to provide 
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such justifications. 
As to the contention that the unique circumstances of international criminal justice 
ought to justify a departure from the traditional standard of fairness, this thesis has 
rebutted that this departure lacks substantial grounds. The complexity and hardship in 
securing reliable evidence for international prosecution does not in itself warrant a 
lower evidentiary standard, although this is already the case in the ad hoc Tribunals. 
The International Criminal Court is on a similar path. It further argued that there is a 
danger in advocating such contextual claims regarding the application of fairness, as not 
only the accused would be affected, but also the very legitimacy of the international 
criminal tribunals themselves. 
 
II.  Analysis  
There are three main findings for the research question ‘why is the current disclosure 
regime unworkable?’  
The Context of International Criminal Justice 
The complexity of the international context seems to give rise to the belief that a lower 
standard of fairness could be justified. Firstly, the international community is generally 
more sympathised with the prosecution. The ghastly nature of international crimes can 
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easily affect people’s attitude towards fairness and the presumption of innocence. 
Although this may be understandable from a human standpoint, the Courts must not 
give in to such subjective opinions. This would contradict fundamental principles of law. 
Justice is impartial – there is a good reason why Justitia is wearing a blindfold. Despite 
the horrendous and disturbing nature of the crimes, justice can only prevail if objectivity 
and impartiality are upheld.  
It should be emphasised that the prosecution has considerably more support and 
recourses than the defence. This is particularly more so in the context of the 
international criminal tribunals: the institutional designs, the allocation of budget, the 
number of staff, assistance from the NGOs, cooperation of States and other international 
institutions, etc. all points to a noteworthy disparity of resources between the 
prosecution and the defence. Although, admittedly, the principle of equality of arms 
cannot possibly be satisfied to the fullest extent by virtue of the nature of criminal 
prosecution, an imbalance that great is very questionable. 
Secondly, the gravity and magnitude of international crimes further broadens people’s 
expectations of what a criminal court ought to achieve. The wider objectives that are 
imposed on international criminal tribunals in light of these expectations often impede 
the primary objective. This can rarely be observed in national criminal courts. As things 
stand, it would seem that the international criminal courts themselves are somewhat 
uncertain what their priorities are. 
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The third point refers to the argument that the difficulties and challenges of international 
prosecutions justify both a lower standard of fairness and quality of justice. However, 
this argument could go both ways, since similar obstructions equally apply to the 
defence. Whilst this research acknowledged the struggles of the international 
prosecutors, the thesis argued that the affliction on the international defence is 
significantly higher than the one on the prosecution. Nonetheless, much less attention is 
paid to the international accused. As the desire to secure convictions is much higher in 
the international context, certain defence rights are even seen as hurdles to achieve 
‘justice’ or the ‘truth’.  
The Nature of the Prosecutor’s Role  
Criminal justice systems rely on prosecutors to make several key decisions. This is true 
in both the domestic and the international context,3 regardless which procedural model 
has been adopted. However, the nature of the role of the prosecutor in the adversarial 
settings, which is employed in the common law jurisdictions and international criminal 
tribunals, is more conflicting than the prosecutors in civil law countries. This is because 
the adversarial system expects the prosecutors to wear two hats: he must be a zealous 
advocate, who pursues criminals valiantly and also aims to win;4 and at the same time, 
																																																								
3	 See	Antonio	Cassese,	Address	to	the	General	Assembly	of	the	United	Nations	(Nov.	14,	1994),	1994	
ICTY	Y.B.	134,	137,	UN	Sales	No.	E.95.III.	p.2	(describing	the	prosecution	is	‘the	key	to	the	Tribunal's	
action’).	
4	 See	e.g.	Ken	Armstrong	and	Maurice	Possley,	‘Trial	and	Error:	How	Prosecutors	Sacrifice	Justice	to	Win’	
[1999]	Chicago	Tribune	10.	
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he is the minister of justice, who has a duty to do and seek justice.5 By comparison, the 
inquisitorial model places more faith in the prosecutor’s ability to act as a minister of 
justice and substantially less in his role as an advocate.  
Theoretically, these two hats can be worn together, since the duty to seek justice could 
be equal to the conviction of guilty persons. However, in reality it is difficult to know if 
the ‘criminal’ is in fact guilty at all. Because a prosecutor’s conviction rate signifies his 
competence,6 if a prosecutor successfully secures a conviction of someone he believes 
to be guilty, but factually innocent, he succeeds as his role as an advocate, but fails his 
task of doing justice. After all, justice would not be achieved if innocent people were 
convicted while the persons responsible remain free. Also demonstrated by empirical 
cognitive research,7 even an ethical prosecutor could not avoid cognitive bias to 
influence his decision-making. Accordingly, there is a high degree of tension between 
																																																								
5	 In	the	US,	there	is	extensive	discussions	regarding	the	Prosecutor’s	role,	see	e.g.	Fred	C	Zacharias,	
‘Structuring	the	Ethics	of	Prosecutorial	Trial	Practice:	Can	Prosecutors	Do	Justice’	(1991)	44	Vanderbilt	
Law	Review	45.	Here	is	worth	to	mention	Berger	v.	United	States	again,	the	Court’s	description	of	the	
role	of	the	prosecutor:	
	
‘[The	Prosecution]	is	the	representative	not	of	an	ordinary	party	to	a	controversy,	but	of	a	sovereignty	
whose	obligation	to	govern	impartially	is	as	compelling	as	its	obligation	to	govern	at	all;	and	whose	
interest,	therefore,	in	a	criminal	prosecution	is	not	that	it	shall	win	a	case,	but	that	justice	shall	be	done.	
As	such,	he	is	in	a	peculiar	and	very	definite	sense	the	servant	of	the	law,	the	twofold	aim	of	which	is	
that	guilt	shall	not	escape	or	innocence	suffer.	He	may	prosecute	with	earnestness	and	vigor-indeed,	he	
should	do	so.	But,	while	he	may	strike	hard	blows,	he	is	not	at	liberty	to	strike	foul	ones.	It	is	as	much	his	
duty	to	refrain	from	improper	methods	calculated	to	produce	a	wrongful	conviction	as	it	is	to	use	every	
legitimate	means	to	bring	about	a	just	one.’	
	
Berger	v.	United	States	295	U.S.	78	(1935),	at	88.	
6	 See	e.g.	Eric	Rasmusen,	Manu	Raghav	and	Mark	Ramseyer,	‘Convictions	versus	Conviction	Rates:	The	
Prosecutor’s	Choice’	(2009)	11	American	Law	and	Economics	Review	47.	
7	 See	e.g.	Quirk	(n	778);	Burke,	‘Improving	Prosecutorial	Decision	Making’	(n	601);	Paul	C	Giannelli,	
‘Independent	Crime	Laboratories:	The	Problem	of	Motivational	and	Cognitive	Bias’	[2010]	Utah	Law	
Review	247.	
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the two roles of the prosecutor and disclosure has been one of the tactical advantages at 
his or her disposal. The result turns out to be: the prosecutor is both the player as well as 
the referee and, unsurprisingly, he is expected to win the game.  
As stated at the outset of this thesis, information is power. What makes the prosecutors 
powerful is their possession of vital information which the defence does not have. The 
prosecutor knows and owns most of the cards in the game and he is the one dealing 
them. Why should he give the defence a wining hand when he is supposed to win the 
game? The prosecutors can hide exculpatory evidence from the defence, delay the 
disclosure of inculpatory evidence, hinder the preparation of the defence’s case and 
even provide falsified evidence which could lead to a wrongful conviction. However, 
prosecutors who violate disclosure rules are rarely held accountable. This is true for 
both domestic and international prosecutors. Nevertheless, it appears that, so far, there 
are no better options than to rely on the prosecutors to perform their duties in good faith. 
What is called for is to make the prosecutors more accountable in their decisions 
making,8 together with more judicial supervision. To impose more severe sanctions 
when the prosecutors fail to disclose evidence to the defence could arguably motivate 
the prosecutors to do their jobs more properly. 
Attitudes of the Courts 
The third reason for the unworkability of the disclosure regimes is the permissive 																																																								
8	 See	Turner	(n	31).	 	
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attitudes of the judges. Both national and international criminal judges are reluctant to 
impose severe sanctions on the prosecutors who fail to perform their disclosure duties. 
An application for a permanent stay of the proceedings is rarely granted, since it is in 
public interests to reach the conclusion of a trial. The Courts will only do so when they 
consider a fair trial is not possible. In other words, the purpose of sanctions or remedies 
is not to ‘punish’ a prosecutor, but to guarantee a fair trial. However, it would seem that 
some prosecutors have been exploiting this fact as they are aware they can get away 
with violations of their disclosure duties without any serious consequences. 
For the international criminal tribunals, political pressure and other practical concerns 
certainly have influenced their judgments regarding the appropriate remedies for 
prosecutor’s disclosure violations. Factors such as the influence of the Security Council, 
the resistance of particular States in handing over information due to national security 
concerns, and the fact that the Tribunals have to operate with limited budgets and 
resources, all affect the Tribunals’ decisions. The pressure on the ICC is particularly 
high, since the conflict could be still ongoing and the ICC Prosecutor might have to 
pursue someone who is still in power. To cope with these concerns, the Tribunals strive 
to reach a legally and politically balanced decision. However, from a legal point of view, 
this represents a highly doubtful development.  
National practice also shows that domestic judges are unwilling to adopt drastic 
measures against the prosecutors. This is particularly so in the U.S. practice, as 
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generally the judicial branch tends to not interfere with the decisions of the 
administrative branch. Also, since the presumption is that the prosecutor is acting in 
good faith, the standard to reverse a prosecution’s decisions is a very high one. Even 
decades after Brady v Maryland, the U.S courts still rarely sanction prosecutions’ 
failures to disclose exculpatory evidence. Instead, the courts employ a demanding 
threshold of a showing of ‘materiality’ and the establishment of ‘prejudice’, which 
makes the defence claims almost impossible to be successful. In addition, internal 
solutions are preferred in domestic jurisdictions.9  Accordingly, it would be fair to say 
that this issue is not entirely unique to the international criminal tribunals. No court can 
be completely independent from the boundaries of political reality.  
The problem of this permissive attitude is that it is shifting the burden of proof to the 
defence. Since the prosecution’s applications for redactions and summaries are normally 
granted when involving the protection of victims and witnesses, even though they 
should only be authorised in exceptional circumstances, this practice has become the 
norm. The result is that the defence has to apply for lifting such redactions and seek full 
disclosure, which has an acute impact on its ability to access information and prepare its 
case. Others also noted the use of redactions has been excessive and often proved to be 
unnecessary in these international criminal tribunals.10   
																																																								
9	 Finally,	the	ICC	passed	the	Code	of	Conduct	for	the	Office	of	the	Prosecution	in	2013,	entry	into	force:	
5	September	2013.	Available	at	https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/oj/otp-COC-Eng.PDF	
10	 E.g.	Buisman	(n	37).	She	noted	that	the	defence	is	‘genuinely	prejudiced	by	excessive	redactions’.	 	
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In the event of a disclosure violation, in practice, there is usually a high degree of 
judicial tolerance. Although the Chambers often reprimand the prosecutors that their 
‘disclosure practice had not been satisfactory’11 or the repeated disclosure violations 
‘reflected badly on the Prosecution’, the judges normally consider there is no prejudice 
and therefore remedies are not needed. It is clear that this permissive attitude of the 
judges has a detrimental impact on the accused’s right to a fair trial. As Zahar puts it, 
the accused’s fundamental rights have been redefined and a ‘reduced fairness’ is applied 
to the international defendant.12 
From a defence point of view, such results are plainly frustrating. It is very difficult to 
access information hold by the prosecution in the first place: how could the defence 
know and identify the prosecution material that would or could be useful to its case? 
Even after successful identification, the defence must prove to the Court that the 
prosecution indeed failed to disclose evidence. For both the parties and the Courts, 
disclosure motion is a burdensome and time-consuming process. If the prosecution has 
done its jobs properly in the first place, everyone in the criminal justice system can save 
a lot of time and resources. 
 																																																								
11	 Prosecutor	v	Orić,	INo.	IT-03-68-T,	Judgment	(30	June	2006)	at	para.	815;	or	such	as	‘the	numerous	
disclosure	violations	reflected	badly	on	the	Prosecution,	see	e.g.	see	Prosecutor	v	Karadžić,	IT-95-5/18-I,	
Decision	on	Accused’s	Motion	for	New	Trial	for	Disclosure	Violations	(3	September	2012)	at	para.	14.	
12	 Alexander	Zahar,	‘Pluralism	and	the	Rights	of	the	Accused	in	International	Criminal	Proceedings’	in	
Elies	van	Sliedregt	and	Sergey	Vasiliev	(eds),	Pluralism	in	International	Criminal	Law	(Oxford	University	
Press	2014)	237.	
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III. Recommendations  
This thesis concludes that the current prosecutorial practice concerning disclosure is 
problematic and has severely interfered with the accused’s fundamental rights. 
Alongside to the impact on the defence the repeated failure of the prosecution to 
disclose important evidence can also lead to devastating consequences for the 
international criminal tribunals, as their abilities to reach fair and just decisions are put 
into question. If international trials serve as a symbol of justice for the world to be seen, 
how can the international courts live up to these high standards if fairness is impaired? 
In turn, the legitimacy of these courts could be significantly weakened. With the two ad 
hoc Tribunals drawing to a close, the world is looking at the International Criminal 
Court more closely than ever. 
The conclusion can only be that the disclosure regime in the International Criminal 
Court calls for a complete review.13 However, despite the difficulties arising from the 
prosecution’s disclosure obligations, this thesis does not recommend the use of a dossier 
as employed in most civil law systems. In addition to the procedural difficulty and 
complexity of amending the ICC Statute and Rules, at a theoretical level, this will not 
solve the core problem. In that, it is still the prosecution who will be collecting the 
evidence, making an initial assessment of whether a piece of information is relevant, 
																																																								
13	 Commentators	have	also	proposed	a	reform:	see	Karim	AA	Khan	and	Caroline	Buisman,	‘Sitting	on	
Evidence:	Systematic	Failings	in	the	ICC	Disclosure	Regime	-	Time	for	Reform’	in	Carsten	Stahn	(ed),	The	
Law	and	Practice	of	the	International	Criminal	Court	(OUP	Oxford	2015)	1060–2.	
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and be responsible for preparing the dossier. Similar reviews have been provided in 
both England and the US, regarding whether or not to adopt an open file policy.14  
Rather, this thesis is in the view that the disclosure regimes in fact could work in the 
International Criminal Court. For this purpose significant efforts would be required 
from both the Office of the Prosecutor and the Chamber. 
Firstly, the Office of the Prosecutor at the ICC should examine its internal disclosure 
practice and devise an adequate disclosure system. It is suggested that the Office of the 
Prosecutor assigns a disclosure officer in each team and have a ‘Schedule’ system, as 
applied in England,15 to certify that disclosure obligations have been fulfilled, in 
particular when exculpatory information is involved. Whiting, a former prosecutor at 
the ICTY, has suggested that assigning a senior lawyer to manage disclosure would be 
ideal.16 Training concerning proper disclosure should also be considered.  
Secondly, when making applications of protective measures and redaction, the 
prosecution should address its reasons in a clear and proper manner. In addition, the use 
of intermediaries should be exercised with much more care and only under specific 
conditions.  
On the side of the Chamber, it should ensure that the prosecution provides full 																																																								
14	 See	Chapter	V.	
15	 See	Chapter	VI.	
16	 Whiting	(n	142)	1026.	In	addition,	he	suggested	that	‘the	OTP	must	focus	on	devising	an	adequate	
disclosure	system	to	manage	all	of	the	disclosure	challenges	outlined	in	this	chapter,	in	addition	to	
ensuring	that	individual	prosecutors	are	properly	trained	and	motivated	to	do	their	work.’	
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disclosure to the accused in a timely fashion. If the prosecutors fail to do so, the 
Chambers should impose more serious and sustainable remedies, and consider 
appropriate sanctions. For example, if the prosecution has repeatedly been disclosing 
inculpatory material late, the material in question could be excluded from evidence. In 
addition, the Chamber can take disciplinary action against the individual prosecutor, or 
delay the approval of warrants of arrest and the confirmation of charges.17 Prior to Trial, 
the Chamber could set up a deadline for unredacted disclosure of all material which the 
prosecutor intends to rely on at trial, as it is essential to the defence’s case preparations. 
Also, Rule 81(4) should be interpreted restrictively regarding the non-disclosure of 
identities of ‘innocent third parties’, ‘potential witnesses’, and ‘prosecution sources’. As 
proposed by Khan and Buisman,18 these types of redactions should only be withheld 
from the defence for a limited period of time. Without pressure from the judges, the 
prosecution lacks motivation to perform their disclosure duty properly.  
As to a more technical matter, regarding the materiality test, this thesis considers that 
the current standard applied by the international criminal courts is too high, as it 
requires the defence to demonstrate prejudice. As mentioned, the ad hoc Tribunals have 
been applying the standard similar to the one before the U.S. Supreme Court, which is 
in fact applying an appellate prejudice standard to determine pre-trial disclosure. It is 
noted that this standard imposes an unnecessarily high burden on the defence, impeding 																																																								
17	 Scheffer	(n	240)	162.	
18	 Khan	and	Buisman	(n	1)	1060.	
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the purpose of the prosecution’s duty of disclosure. Numerous disclosure decisions at 
the ICTY and ICTR demonstrated that whilst the Chambers regularly found the 
prosecution violating its disclosure obligation, it is reluctant to impose any meaningful 
remedy to the defence, because the ‘prejudice’ requirement was not met. 
It is to be recalled that similar discussions took place in the American context. The U.S. 
Supreme Court in Brady v Maryland first set out the prosecution’s duty to disclose to 
the defence favourable evidence, which is a due process requirement. However, in a 
later case Bagley, the Supreme Court read a prejudice requirement into the language of 
‘material’ from the Brady v Maryland ruling. The consequence was that the Court 
would not consider undisclosed exculpatory evidence to be ‘material’ unless there is a 
‘reasonable probability’ that the result of the trial would have been different. In Kyles v 
Whitley, although Kyles was ordered a new trial, the Court held that the prosecutor’s 
duty to disclose favourable evidence pretrial is limited to materiality, and that by 
claiming ‘the prosecution knew of an item of favorable evidence unknown to the 
defense does not amount to a Brady violation’.19 The ‘prejudice’ requirement is 
confirmed and elaborated in Strickler v Greene.20 However, this standard in the US has 
																																																								
19	 Kyles	v	Whitley	514	U.S.	at	437.	Further,	the	Court	stated	that	“the	rule	in	Bagley	(and	hence	Brady)	
requires	less	of	the	prosecution	than	the	ABA	Standards	for	Criminal	Justice,	which	call	generally	for	
prosecutorial	disclosures	of	any	evidence	tending	to	exculpate	or	mitigate.”	Id.	
20	 Quoting	Kyles	(at	435),	in	Strickler,	it	was	asked	‘whether	the	 	 ‘favorable	 	 evidence	 	 could	 	
reasonably	 	 be	 	 taken	 	 to	put	 	 the	 	 whole	 	 case	 	 in	such	 	 a	 	 different	 	 light	 	 as	 	 to	 	
undermine	 	 confidence	 	 in	 	 the	 	 verdict.’	Strickler	failed	to	satisfy	this	burden	and	was	executed	by	
lethal	injection.	
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drawn significant criticism among commentators, often being described as ‘perverse’21 
because it turns a due process right of the accused into an entitlement of the prosecution 
to withhold favourable evidence. This is hardly satisfying as it could lead to potential 
miscarriages of justice. 
Hence, it is submitted that the standard applied by England is arguably better and more 
suitable to be applied at the international criminal tribunals. In contrast to the high 
standard applied by the U.S. Supreme Court, the current English law requires the 
prosecution to disclose to the accused any prosecution material ‘which might reasonably 
be considered capable of undermining the case for the prosecution against the accused 
or of assisting the case for the accused.’22 When English courts apply the law, the 
defendant is not required to establish a prejudice requirement. If the prosecution has 
material that ‘might reasonably be considered capable of undermining the prosecution 
case or of assisting the case for the accused’, it should be disclosed. In the event when 
the prosecution fails to disclose evidence, the courts have the power to impose different 
sanctions.23 
To conclude, the task of both prosecuting and defending international accused is not for 
the faint-hearted. It is noted that the ICC Prosecutor and her Office is under numerous 
																																																								
21	 See,	e.g.	Eugene	Cerruti,	‘Through	the	Looking-Glass	at	the	Brady	Doctrine:	Some	New	Reflections	on	
White	Queens,	Hobgoblins,	and	Due	Process’	(2005)	94	Kentucky	Law	Journal	211,	469.	
22	 5.23	Section	3(1)(a)	of	the	CPIA	1996,	as	amended	by	the	Criminal	Justice	Act	2003	
23	 Of	course,	there	is	also	room	for	improvement	in	England.	See,	e.g.	Chris	Taylor,	‘Disclosure	Sanctions	
Review:	Another	Missed	Opportunity’	(2013)	17	International	Journal	of	Evidence	&	Proof	272.	
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political pressure to investigate and prosecute international crimes, however, at the same 
time the defendant’s fundamental rights should be respected. ‘Not only must justice be 
done; it must also be seen to be done.’24 
																																																								
24	 R	v	Sussex	Justices,	Ex	parte	McCarthy	[1923]	All	ER	Rep	233	
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Trial Chamber I entitled ‘Decision on the consequences of non-disclosure of 
exculpatory materials covered by Article 54(3)(e) agreements and the application to 
stay the prosecution of the accused, together with certain other issues raised at the 
Status Conference on 10 June 2008’ (21 October 2008) 
• Appeals Chamber: Decision on Request of the Defence in relation to Investigations 
Conducted Pursuant to Article 70 (17 June 2014)  
• Appeals Chamber: Decision on Prosecutor’s Second Request for Redactions for the 
Purposes of Disclosure (14 November 2014)  
 
• Trial Chamber: Decision on the Consequences of Non-Disclosure of Exculpatory 
Materials covered by Article 54(3) (e) Agreements and the Application to stay the 
Prosecution of the Accused, together with certain other issues raised at the Status 
Conference on 10 June 2008 (13 June 2008)  
• Trial Chamber: Decision on the release of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (02 July 2008) 
• Trial Chamber: Decision on the Prosecutions Application for the Admission of the 
Prior Recorded Statements of Two Witnesses (15 January 2009) 
• Trial Chamber: Reasons for Oral Decision lifting the stay of proceedings (23 January 
2009) 
• Trial Chamber: Redacted Decision on Intermediaries (31 May 2010)  
• Trial Chamber: Public Submissions and Decision (07 July 2010) 
• Trial Chamber: Decision on the Prosecution’s Urgent Request for Variation of the 
Time-Limit to Disclose the Identity of Intermediary 143 or Alternatively to Stay 
Proceedings Pending Further Consultations with the VWU (08 July 2010)  
• Trial Chamber oral decision to release Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (15 July 2010)  
• Trial Chamber: Judgment Pursuant to Art 74 of the Statute (14 March 2012) 
 
• Single Judge: Decision on the Final System of Disclosure and the Establishment of a 
Timetable (15 May 2006)  
• Single Judge: Decision Establishing General Principles Governing Applications to 
Restrict Disclosure pursuant to Rule 81(2) and (4) of the Statute (26 May 2006) 
• Single Judge: Decision on the Prosecution Amended Application Pursuant to Rule 
81(2) (2 August 2006)  
• Pre-Trial Chamber: Decision on the Final System of Disclosure and the 
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Establishment of a Time Table (15 May 2006) 
• Pre-Trial Chamber: Decision on the confirmation of charges (29 January 2007) 
  
• Opening statement of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo’s defence team (27 January 2010). 
• Prosecution’s Appeal against “Decision on the release of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo” 
and Urgent Application for Suspensive Effect (02 July 2008) 
• Prosecution’s Notification of Disclosure of Exculpatory and Rule 77 Material to the 
Defence on 18 and 20 November 2008 (21 November 2008)  
• Prosecution’s Appeal against Trial Chamber I’s oral decision to release Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo and Urgent Application for Suspensive Effect (16 July 2010). 
Prosecution’s Document in Support of Appeal against Trial Chamber I’s decision of 
8 July 2010 to stay the proceedings for abuse of process (30 July 2010) 
 
 
Prosecutor v Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta (ICC-01/09-02/11)  
• Trial Chamber: Decision on the protocol establishing a redaction regime (27 
September 2012)  
• Trial Chamber: Decision on the withdrawal of charges against Mr Kenyatta (13 
March 2015) 
• Prosecution notification of withdrawal of the charges against Francis Kirimi 
Muthaura, Muthaura and Kenyatta (11 March 2013) 
 
Prosecutor v William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey, and Joshua Arap Sang 
(ICC-01/09-01/11) 
• Trial Chamber: Decision on the protocol establishing a redaction regime (27 
September 2012)  
• Pre-Trial Chamber: Decision Setting the Regime for Evidence Disclosure and Other 
Related Matters (6 April 2011) 
• Pre-Trial Chamber: Decision on the ‘Prosecution’s Application for Leave to Appeal 
the “Decision Setting the Regime for Evidence Disclosure and Other Related 
Matters” (02 May 2011)  
• Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 
61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute (23 January 2012) 
 
 
 
Situation in Uganda (ICC-02/04-01/05-20-US-Exp) 
Pre-Trial Chamber: Decision on Prosecutor's Application for Leave to Appeal in part 
Pre-Trial Chamber II's Decision on the Prosecutor's Applications for Warrants of 
Arrest under Article 58 Unsealed pursuant to Decision ICC-02/04-01/05-52 dated 13 
October 2005 (19 August 2005)  
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Prosecutor v Zlatko Aleksovski (IT–95–14/1) 
Appeals Chamber  
• Decision on Prosecutor's Appeal on Admissibility of Evidence (16 February 1999) 
• Judgement (24 March 2000) 
 
Prosecutor v Vidoje Blagojević and Dragan Jokić (IT-02-60) 
Trial Chamber Joint Decision on Motions Related to Production of Evidence (12 
December 2002)  
 
Prosecutor v Tihomir Blaškić (IT-95-14) 
Trial Chamber 
• Decision of Trial Chamber I on the Applications of the Prosecutor dated 24 June and 
30 August 1996 in respect of the Protection of Witnesses (2 October 1996) 
• Decision on the Production of Discovery Materials (27 January 1997) 
• Decision on the Objection of the Republic of Croatia to the Issuance of Subpoena 
duces Tecum (18 July 1997) 
• Decision on the Defence Motion for Sanctions for the Prosecutor's Failure to 
Comply with Rule 66 (A) of the Rules and the Decision of 27 January 1997 
Compelling the Production of all Statements of the Accused (15 July 1998) 
• Decision on the Defence Motion to Admit into Evidence the prior Statement of 
Deceased Witness Midhat Haskic (29 April 1998)  
 
Appeals Chamber  
• Judgement on the Request of the Republic of Croatia for Review of the Decision of 
Trial Chamber II of 18 July 1997 (29 October 1997) 
• Decision on the Appellant's Motions for the Production of Material, Suspension or 
Extension of the Briefing Schedule, and Additional Filings (26 September 2000)  
• Judgement (29 July 2004)  
 
Prosecutor v Ljube Boškoski and Johan Tarčulovski (IT-04-82) 
Trial Chamber Decision on the motions on fair trial and extensions of time (19 May 
2006) 
 
Prosecutor v Miroslav Bralo (IT-95-17)  
Appeals Chamber Decision on Motions for Access to Ex-Parte Portions of the Record 
on Appeal and for Disclosure of Mitigating Material (30 August 2006)  
 
Prosecutor v Radoslav Brđanin and Momir Talić (IT-99-36) 
Trial Chamber 
• Decision on Motion by Momir Talić for Disclosure of Evidence (27 June 2000)  
• Decision on Motion by Prosecution for Protective Measures (3 July 2000) 
• Public version of the confidential decision on the alleged illegality of rule 70 of 6 May 
2002 (23 May 2002) 
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• Decision on “Motion for Relief from Rule 68 Violation by the Prosecutor and for 
Sanctions to be Imposed Pursuant to Rule 68bis and Motion for Adjournment while 
Matters affecting Justice and a Fair Trial can be Resolved” (30 October 2002)  
 
Appeals Chamber Decision on Appellant’s Motion for Disclosure Pursuant to Rule 68 
and Motion for an Order the Registrar to Disclose Certain Materials (7 December 
2004)  
 
Prosecutor v Zejnil Delalić et al (IT-96-21) 
Trial Chamber 
• Order on Defence Applications for Amendment of the Directive on Assignment of 
Defence Counsel, Forwarding the Documents in the Language of the Accused and 
Confirmation of the Status of the Witnesses for the Defence (31 May 1996) 
• Decision on the Motion by the Accused Zejnil Delalić for the Disclosure of Evidence 
(26 September 1996) 
• Decision on the Prosecution’s Motion for an Order Requiring Advance Disclosure of 
Witnesses by the Defence (4 February 1998) 
• Judgement (16 November 1998) 
 
Prosecutor v Anto Furundžija (IT-95-17) 
Trial Chamber The Trial Chamber’s Formal Complaint to the Prosecutor Concerning 
the Conduct of the Prosecution (5 June 1998)  
 
Prosecutor v Ante Gotovina, Ivan Čermak and Mladen Markač (IT-06-90)  
Trial Chamber  
• Decision on Prosecution Motion for Non-Disclosure to Public of Materials 
Disclosed Pursuant to Rules 66 and 68 (14 July 2006) 
• Decision on Ivan Cermak’s Motion Requesting the Trial Chamber to Order the 
Prosecution to Disclose Rule 68 Material to the Defence (7 August 2009)  
 
Prosecutor v Sefer Halilović (IT-01-48) 
Trial Chamber Decision on Defence Motion for Identification of Suspects and other 
Categories Among its Proposed Witnesses (14 November 2003)  
 
Prosecutor v Ramush Haradinaj, Idriz Balaj and Lahi Brahimaj (IT-04-84) 
Appeals Chamber 
• Judgement (19 July 2010)  
• A Corrigendum to Judgement of 19 July 2010 (23 July 2010) 
 
Trial Chamber  
• Decision on Second Haradinaj Motion to Lift Redactions of Protected Witness 
Statements (22 November 2006)  
• Decision on Joint Defence Motion for Relief from Rule 68 Violations by the 
Prosecution and for Sanctions Pursuant to Rule 68 bis (12 October 2011)  
• Decision on Haradinaj Motion for Disclosure of Exculpatory Materials in Relation 
to Witness 81 (18 November 2011)  
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Prosecutor v Radovan Karadžić (IT-95- 5/18) 
Trial Chamber 
• Decision on Accused’s Seventh and Eighth Motions for Finding Disclosure Violation 
and for Remedial Measures (18 August 2010) 
• Decision on Accused’s Twenty-Seventh Disclosure Violation Motion (17 November 
2010)  
• Decision on Accused Motion for Inspection and Disclosure (9 October 2008) 
• Decision on Accused Motion for Full Disclosure of Supporting Material (25 
November 2008)  
• Decision on Accused’s Second Motion for Inspection and Disclosure: Immunity Issue 
(17 December 2008)  
• Decision on Motions for Rule 68 Material and Reconsideration of Decision on 
Adequate Facilities (10 March 2009) 
• Decision on Accused Motion for Interview of Defence Witness and Third Motion for 
Disclosure (9 April 2009)  
• Decision on Accused’s Motion to Set Deadlines for Disclosure (1 October 2009) 
• Decision on Accused’s Second Motion for Finding Disclosure Violation and for 
Remedial Measures (17 June 2010)  
• Decision on Accused’s Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Motions for Finding of 
Disclosure Violations and for Remedial Measures (20 July 2010)  
• Decision on Accused’s Seventh and Eighth Motions for Finding Disclosure Violation 
and for Remedial Measures (18 August 2010) 
• Decision on Accused’s Ninth and Tenth Motions for Finding Disclosure Violation 
and for Remedial Measures (26 August 2010) 
• Decision on Accused’s Eleventh through Fifteenth Motions for Finding Disclosure 
Violation and for Remedial Measures (24 September 2010) 
• Decision on Accused’s Eighteenth to Twenty-First Disclosure Violation Motions (2 
November 2010)  
• Decision on Accused’s Twenty-Second, Twenty-Fourth, and Twenty–Sixth Motions 
for Disclosure Violation (11 November 2010)  
• Decision on Accused’s Twenty-Seventh Disclosure Violation Motion (17 November 
2010)  
• Decision on Prosecution’s Request for Reconsideration of Trial Chamber’s 11 
November 2010 Decision (10 December 2010)  
• Decision on Accused’s Seventeenth bis and Twenty-Eighth Disclosure Violation 
Motions (16 December 2010) 
• Decision on Accused’s Twenty-Ninth Disclosure Violation Motion (11 January 2011)  
• Decision on the Accused’s Motion for Order to Obtain Witness Statements and 
Testimony from National Courts (12 January 2011)  
• Partially Dissenting Opinion in the Decision on Accused’s Thirty-Seventh to 
Forty-Second Disclosure Violation Motions with Partially Dissenting Opinion of 
Judge Kwon (29 March 2011) 
• Decision on Accused’s Forty-Eighth Disclosure Violation Motion (30 May 2011)  
• Decision on Accused’s Forty-Ninth and Fiftieth Disclosure Violation Motions (30 
June 2011)  
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• Decision on Accused’s Fifty Fifth Disclosure Violation Motion (19 August 2011)  
• Decision on Accused’s 47th Motion for Finding of Disclosure Violation and for 
Further Suspension of Proceedings (10 May 2011) 
• Decision on Accused’s Sixtieth, Sixty-First, Sixty-Third, and Sixty-Fourth Disclosure 
Violation Motions (22 November 2011)  
• Decision on Accused’s Sixty-Fifth Disclosure Violation Motion (12 January 2012)  
• Decision on Accused’s Sixty-Sixth Disclosure Violation Motion (8 February 2012) 
• Decision on Accused’s Sixty-Sixth and Sixty-Seventh Disclosure Violation Motions (1 
March 2012)  
• Decision on Accused’s Eighty-Third Disclosure Violation Motion (21 November 
2013) 
• Decision on Accused’s Eighty-Fifth Disclosure Violation Motion (21 January 2014)  
• Decision on Accused’s Eighty-Seventh Disclosure Violation Motion (10 March 2014)  
• Decision on Accused’s Ninety-Fourth Disclosure Violation Motion (14 October 
2014)  
• Decision on Accused's 102nd and 103rd Disclosure Violation Motions (4 November 
2015) 
 
Prosecutor v Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić (IT-95-5-R61, IT-95-18-R61) 
Trial Chamber Review of the Indictments pursuant to Rule 61 (11 July 1996) 
 
Prosecutor v Dario Kordić and Mario Čerkez (IT-95-14/2) 
Appeals Chamber 
• Decision on Appeal Regarding Statements of a Deceased Witness (21 July 2000) 
• Decision on Motions to extend Time for filing Appellant's Briefs (11 May 2001)  
• Decision on Application by Mario Čerkez for Extension of Time to File his 
Respondent's Brief (11 September 2001)  
• Decision on Motion by Dario Kordic for Access to Unredacted Portions of October 
2000 Interviews With Witness AT (23 May 2003)  
• Decision on Appellant’s Notice and Supplemental Notice of Prosecution’s 
Non-Compliance with its Disclosure Obligation Under Rule 68 of the Rules (11 
February 2004)  
• Judgement (17 December 2004)  
 
Trial Chamber Order on Motion to Compel Compliance by the Prosecutor with Rules 
66(a) and 68 (26 February 1999) 
 
Prosecutor v Momčilo Krajišnik and Biljana Plavšić (IT-00-39 & 40) 
Trial Chamber 
• Decision on Motion from Momcilo Krajišnik to compel Disclosure of exculpatory 
Evidence pursuant to Rule 68 (19 July 2001)  
• Decision on Prosecution Motion for Clarification in respect of Application of Rules 
65ter, 66(B) and 67(C) (1 August 2001) 
• Decision on Defence Motion on Rule 68 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (2 
June 2006)  
 
		
 		
	
435 
Prosecutor v Radislav Krstić (IT-98-33) 
Appeals Chamber Judgement (19 April 2004) 
 
Prosecutor v Zoran Kupreškić, Mirjan Kupreškić, Vlatko Kupreškić, Drago Josipović 
and Vladimir Šantić (IT-95-16) 
Trial Chamber Decision on the Prosecutor's Request to Release Testimony Pursuant to 
Rule 66 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence Given in Closed Session Under Rule 79 
of the Rules (29 July 1998) 
 
Prosecutor v Milan Lukić and Sredoje Lukić (IT-98-32/1) 
Appeals Chamber Decision on Milan Lukić’s Motion for Remedies Arising out of 
Disclosure Violations by the Prosecution (12 May 2011)  
 
Trial Chamber Decision on Milan Lukić’s Notice of Verification of Alleged Victim 
Survivors and Application for Stay of Proceedings…(12 March 2009)  
 
Prosecutor v Dragomir Milošević (IT-98-29/1) 
Appeals Chamber Decision on Motion Seeking Disclosure of Rule 68 Material (7 
September 2012) 
 
Prosecutor v Slobodan Milošević (IT-02-54) 
Appeals Chamber Reasons for Refusal of Leave to Appeal from Decision to Impose 
Time Limit (16 May 2002)  
 
Trial Chamber Decision in relation to Severance, Extension of Time and Rest (12 
December 2005) 
 
Prosecutor v Milan Milutinović, Nikola Šainović, Dragoljub Ojdanić, Nebojša 
Pavković, Vladimir Lazarević and Sreten Lukić (IT-99-37) 
Appeals Chamber Decision on Interlocutory Appeal on Motion for Additional Funds 
(13 November 2003)  
 
Trial Chamber 
• Decision on Prosecution's Motion for Protective Measures (17 July 2003)  
• Decision on Ojdanic Motion for Disclosure of Witness Statements and for Finding of 
Violation of Rule 66(A)(ii) (29 September 2006)  
• Decision on Prosecution Motion for Leave to Amend its Rule 65 ter Witness List to 
Add Michael Phillips and Shaun Byrnes (15 January 2007)  
 
Prosecutor v Ratko Mladić (IT-09-92) 
Appeals Chamber Decision on Defence Interlocutory Appeal Against the Trial 
Chamber’s Decision on EDS Disclosure Methods (28 November 2013)  
 
Prosecutor v Momčilo Krajišnik and Biljana Plavšić (IT-00-39) 
Trial Chamber Decision on Prosecution Motion for Clarification in Respect of 
Application of Rules 65ter, 66 (B) and 67(C) (1 August 2001) 
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Prosecutor v Mile Mrkšić, Miroslav Radić and Veselin Šljivančanin (IT-95-1 /1) 
Trial Chamber  
• Order Setting a Time-Limit for Disclosure Pursuant to Rule 66(A)(ii) (24 November 
2004)  
• Decision on Confidential Prosecution Motions for Protective Measures and 
Non-Disclosure (9 March 2005) 
 
Prosecutor v Naser Orić (IT-03-68) 
Appeals Chamber Interlocutory Decision on Length of Defence Case (20 July 2005)  
 
Trial Chamber  
• Decision on Alleged Prosecution Non-Compliance With Disclosure Obligations 
Under Rule 66(B) and 68(i) (29 September 2005) 
• Decision on Ongoing Complaints About Prosecutorial Non-Compliance With Rule 
68 of the Rules (13 December 2005)  
 
Prosecutor v Momčilo Perišić, (IT-04-81) 
Trial Chamber Decision on Motion to Appoint Amicus Curiae to Investigate Equality 
of Arms (18 June 2007)  
 
Prosecutor v Jadranko Prlić et al (IT-04-74) 
Appeals Chamber  
• Decision on Prosecution Appeal Concerning the Trial Chamber’s Ruling Reducing 
Time for the Prosecution Case (6 February 2007)  
• Decision on Slobodan Prajlak’s Appeal Against the Trial Chamber’s Decision of 16 
May 2008 on Translation of Documents (4 September 2008) 
 
Prosecutor v Milomir Stakić (IT-97-24) 
Appeals Chamber Judgement (22 March 2006)  
 
Prosecutor v Jovica Stanišić and Franko Simatović (IT-03-69) 
Trial Chamber Reasons for Decision on Postponement of Cross- Examination of the 
Testimony of Witness Milovanovic (22 July 2010)  
 
Prosecutor v Mićo Stanišić and Stojan Župljanin (IT-08-91) 
Trial Chamber Decision on Joint Defence Motion Requesting Preclusion of 
Prosecution’s New Witnesses and Exhibits (31 August 2009)  
 
Prosecutor v Duško Tadić (IT-94-1) 
Appeals Chamber 
• Judgement (15 July 1999)  
• Separate Opinion of Judge Vohrah on Prosecution Motion for Production of Defence 
Witness Statements (27 Nov 1996) 
 
Trial Chamber Decision on the Prosecutor’s Motion Requesting Protective Measures 
for Victims and Witnesses (10 August 1995) 
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C. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA 
 
Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu (ICTR-96-4) 
Appeals Chamber Judgement (1 June 2001)  
 
Prosecutor v Ignace Bagilishema (ICTR-95-1A) 
Appeals Chamber Decision On the Motion for a Review of the Decision by the 
President of the Appeals Chamber; on the Motion Pursuant to Article 73 of the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence Praying the Chamber to Order the Prosecutor to Disclose to 
the Defence the Tapes Containing the Recordings of Radio Muhabura; On the Motion 
for a Review of the Decision by the President of the Appeals Chamber (6 February 
2002) 
Trial Chamber Decision on the Request of the Defence for an Order for Disclosure by 
the Prosecutor of the Admissions of Guilt of Witnesses Y, Z and AA (8 June 2000)  
 
Prosecutor v Théoneste Bagosora et al. (ICTR-96-7) 
Trial Chamber 
• Decision on the Motion by the Defence Counsel for Disclosure (27 November 1997) 
• Decision and Scheduling Order on the Prosecution Motion for Harmonisation and 
Modification of Protective Measures for Witnesses (5 December 2001) 
• Decision on Disclosure of Materials Relating to Immigration Statements of Defence 
Witnesses (27 September 2005) 
• Decision on Disclosure of Defence Witness Statements in the Possession of the 
Prosecution Pursuant to Rule 68(A) (8 March 2006)  
• Decision on the Ntabakuze Motion for Disclosure of Various Categories of 
Documents Pursuant to Rule 68 (6 October 2006) 
• Decision on Kabiligi Motion for Inspection of Documents Under Rule 66(B) (6 
December 2006)  
 
Appeals Chamber Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Relating to Disclosure Under 
Rule 66(B) of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence (25 September 2006) 
   
Prosecutor v Paul Bisengimana (ICTR-2000-60) 
Appeals Chamber Decision on Bisengimana’s Motion for Disclosure of Materials (28 
March 2003)  
 
Prosecutor v Casimir Bizimungu, Justin Mugenzi, Jérôme-Clément Bicamumpaka 
and Prosper Mugiraneza (ICTR-99-50) 
 
Trial Chamber 
• Decision on the Prosecutor's Motion for Protective Measures for Witnesses (22 
September 2000) 
• Decision on Motion of Accused Bicamumpaka for Disclosure of Exculpatory 
Evidence (23 April 2004) 
• Decision on Prosper Mugiraneza’s Motion Pursuant to Rule 68 for Exculpatory 
Evidence Related to Witness GKI (14 September 2004) 
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• Decision on the Motion of Bicamumpaka and Mugenzi for Disclosure of Relevant 
Material (1 December 2004) 
• Decision on Jerome-Clement Bicamumpaka's Motion for Judicial Notice of 8th 
December 2000 Rwandan Judgement and in the Alternative Order Disclosure of 
Exculpatory Evidence (15 December 2004) 
• Prosecutor v Bizimungu et al, No. ICTR-99-50-T, Decision on Prosper 
Mugiraneza’s Motion for Records of all Payments Made Directly or Indirectly to 
Witness D (28 September 2006) 
• Decision on Justin Mugenzi’s Motion for the Recall of the Prosecution Fidele 
Uwizeye for Further Cross Examination (9 October 2007)  
• Decision on Prosper Mugiraneza’s Motion for Records of all Payments Made 
Directly or Indirectly to Witness D (18 February 2008) 
• Decision on Justin Mugenzi’s Motion for Further Certified Disclosure and Leave to 
Reopen his Defence (10 June 2008) 
• Decision on Justin Mugenzi’s Motion to Admit Transcript Extracts of General 
Romeo Dallaire‘s Evidence in the Ndindilyimana Proceedings (4 November 2008)  
• Decision on Jerome-Clement Bicamumpaka’s Urgent Motion for Disclosure of 
Exculpatory Material (9 February 2009)  
• Judgement (30 September 2011) 
 
 
Prosecutor v Jean-Baptiste Gatete (ICTR-2000-61) 
Trial Chamber Decision on Defence Motion for the Disclosure of Identifying 
Information in Relation to Witnesses to be Called by the Prosecution at Trial (11 
September 2009)  
 
Prosecutor v Juvénal Kajelijeli (ICTR-98-44A) 
Trial Chamber  
• Decision on Defense Motion Seeking to Interview Prosecutor’s Witnesses or 
Alternatively to be Provided with a Bill of Particulars (12 March 2001)  
• Decision on Kajelijeli’s Urgent Motion and Certification with Appendices in Support 
of Urgent Motion for Disclosure of Materials Pursuant to Rule 66(B) and Rule 68 of 
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (5 July 2001)  
• Decision on Juvenal Kajelijeli’s Motion Requesting the Recalling of Prosecution 
Witness GAO (2 November 2001) 
 
Prosecutor v Callixte Kalimanzira (ICTR-05-88) 
Appeals Chamber  
• Decision on Prosecution Motion for Protective Measures (8 November 2007)  
• Judgement (20 October 2010) 
 
Trial Chamber Oral Decision on Defence Motion to Exclude Evidence or Recall 
Witnesses Filed on 9 February 2009 (13 February 2009) 
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Prosecutor v Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda (ICTR-99-54A) 
Trial Chamber Decision on Kamuhanda’s Motion for Disclosure of Witness 
Statements and Sanction of the Prosecutor (29 August 2002) 
 
Prosecutor v Gaspard Kanyurikiga (ICTR-2002-78) 
Appeals Chamber Decision on Kanyurikiga’s Interlocutory Appeal of Decision on 
Disclosure and Return of Exculpatory Documents (19 February 2010) 
 
Prosecutor v Édouard Karemera, Matthieu Ngirumpatse and Joseph Nzirorera 
(ICTR-98-44)  
Appeals Chamber  
• Decision on the Defence Motion for Disclosure of Exculpatory Evidence (7 October 
2003) 
• Prosecutor’s Interlocutory Appeal of the Trial Chamber s Decision Given Orally on 
16 February 2006 Regarding the Role of the Electronic Disclosure Suite in 
Discharging the Prosecution’s Disclosure Obligations (6 March 2006) 
• Decision on Joseph Nzirorera’s Interlocutory Appeal (28 April 2006)  
• Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Regarding the Role of the Prosecutor’s Electronic 
Disclosure Suite in Discharging Disclosure Obligations (30 June 2006) 
• Decision on the Prosecutor’s Interlocutry Appeal Concerning Disclosure 
Obligations (23 January 2008)  
• Decision on Joseph Nzirorera’s Appeal from Decision on Tenth Rule 68 Motion (14 
May 2008)  
• Decision on Joseph Nzirorera’s Appeal from Decision on Alleged Rule 66(B) 
Violation (17 May 2010)  
• Judgement and Sentence (2 February 2012) 
 
(Prosecutor v Ngirumpatse) Decision on the Defence Motion Challenging the 
Lawfulness of the Arrest or Detention and Seeking Return or Inspection of Seized Items 
(10 December 1999)  
 
Trial Chamber 
• Decision on the Defence Motion for Disclosure of Items Deemed Material to the 
Defence of the Accused (29 September 2003) 
• Decision on Defence Third Motion for Return of Property and Sanctions for 
Violation of Court Order (13 October 2003) 
• Decision on the Defence Notification of Failure to Comply with Trial Chamber 
Order and Motion for Remedial Measures (20 October 2003) 
• Decision on the Motion of the Defence of Joseph Nzirorera for Disclosure of 
Videotape Regarding Prosecution Witnesses (1 December 2003) 
• Decision on Juvenal Kajelijeli’s Motion for Disclosure of Open and Closed Session 
Testimony, Exhibits, and Pre-Trial Statements of Prosecution Witnesses GBU and 
GFA (24 November 2004) 
• Decision on Severance of Andre Rwamakuba and Amendments of the Indictment (7 
December 2004)  
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• Decision on Joseph Nzirorera’s Motion to Compel Inspection and Disclosure (5 July 
2005)  
• Decision on Defence Motion for Full Disclosure of Payments to Witnesses and to 
Exclude Testimony from Paid Witnesses (23 August 2005)  
• Decision on the Defence Motions for Reconsideration of Protective Measures for 
Prosecution Witnesses (29 August 2005) 
• Decision on Defence Motion to Report Government of a Certain State to the United 
Nations Security Council and on Prosecution Motions Under Rule 66(C) of the Rules 
(15 February 2006)  
• Oral Decision on the Motion for Inspection of Non-Rule 68 Material (9 March 2006) 
• Decision on Defence Motions for Disclosure of Information Obtained from Juvenal 
Uwilingiyimana (27 April 2006)  
• Oral Decision on Disclosure of Material from Joseph Serugendo (30 May 2006) 
• Decision on Defence Motion for Exclusion of Witness GK’s Testimony or for Request 
for Cooperation of the Government of Rwanda (27 November 2006)  
• Decision on Joseph Nzirorera’s Motion to Exclude Testimony of Witness QBG (11 
July 2007) 
• Decision on Joseph Nzirorera’s Motion for Inspection of Statement of Pierre 
Celestin Mbonankira (20 September 2007)  
• Decision on Joseph Nzirorera’s Notices of Rule 68 Violation and Motions for 
Remedial and Punitive Measures (25 October 2007) 
• Decision on Joseph Nzirorera’s Motion to Exclude the Testimony of Prosecution 
Witness Uphendra Baghel (30 October 2007)  
• Decision on Joseph Nzirorera’s Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Notices of Disclosure 
Violations and Motions for Remedial, Punitive, and Other Measures (29 November 
2007)  
• Decision on Joseph Nzirorera’s Tenth Notice of Disclosure Violations and Motion 
for Remedial and Punitive Measures (5 February 2008)  
• Decision on Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the Decision on Joseph 
Nzirorera’s Tenth Notice of Rule 68 Violation (16 April 2008)  
• Decision on Joseph Nzirorera’s Motion for Inspection: Michel Bagaragaza (10 July 
2008) 
• Decision on Joseph Nzirorera’s Eleventh Notice of Rule 68 Violation and Motion for 
Stay of Proceedings (11 September 2008)  
• Decision on Joseph Nzirorera’s 20th Notice of Violation of Rule 66 and Motion for 
Remedial and Punitive Measures: Colonel Felicien Muberuka (4 December 2008) 
• Decision on Joseph Nzirorera’s 13th, 14th, and 15th Notices of Rule 68 Violation 
and Motions for Remedial and Punitive Measures: ZF, Michel Bakuzakundi, and 
Tharcisse Renzaho (18 February 2009)  
• Decision on Joseph Nzirorera’s 25th Notice of Violation of Rule 66 and Motion for 
Remedial and Punitive Measures: Witness T (24 March 2009)  
• Decision on Prosecutor’s Rule 68(D) Application and Joseph Nzirorera’s 12th 
Notice of Rule 68 Violation (26 March 2009) 
• Decision on Joseph Nzirorera’s Motions for Admission of Written Statements and 
Witness Testimony (15 July 2009) 
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Prosecutor v Clément Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana (ICTR-95-1) 
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